The Review · Case Index
California employment case index
Search every indexed California wrongful-termination and employment decision, or browse by subject area, statute, and decade — each summary source-verified against the published reporter.
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Browse the case index
Select any subject area, statute, or decade to filter the indexed decisions. Combine filters to narrow further.
Subject Area
- Arbitration
- At-will & implied contract
- Civil Procedure
- Class Actions
- Disability & Accommodation
- Discrimination
- Harassment
- Independent Contractor & Misclassification
- Leave & Medical
- Negligent hiring / supervision / retention
- PAGA
- Privacy
- Remedies & Fees
- Retaliation
- Statutes
- Trade Secrets & Non-Compete
- Wage & hour
- Whistleblower
- Wrongful Termination
Statute
- 42 U.S.C. § 1981
- ADA
- ADEA
- Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600
- Bus. & Prof. Code § 7451
- CFRA
- Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (Privacy)
- Cal. Const., art. I, § 8
- Civ. Code § 1670.5
- Civ. Code § 1714
- Civ. Code § 1786 (ICRAA)
- Civ. Code § 1946.2 (Tenant Protection Act)
- Civ. Code § 3291
- Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7
- Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2
- Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.98
- Code Civ. Proc. § 437c
- Code Civ. Proc. § 527.8
- Common law (Tameny)
- Compassionate Use Act
- Ed. Code § 87160 et seq.
- FAA
- FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.)
- FEHA
- FEHA — Gov. Code § 12926
- FEHA — Gov. Code § 12940
- FEHA — Gov. Code § 12941
- False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3730)
- Gov. Code § 12653 (CFCA)
- Gov. Code § 12923
- Gov. Code § 12945
- Gov. Code § 12960
- Gov. Code § 12965
- Gov. Code § 8547.10
- Health & Saf. Code § 1278.5
- IWC Wage Order No. 16
- IWC Wage Order No. 7
- Lab. Code § 1102.5
- Lab. Code § 1102.6
- Lab. Code § 1106
- Lab. Code § 1194
- Lab. Code § 132a
- Lab. Code § 203
- Lab. Code § 226
- Lab. Code § 226.7
- Lab. Code § 229
- Lab. Code § 230
- Lab. Code § 2699 (PAGA)
- Lab. Code § 2775
- Lab. Code § 2922
- Lab. Code § 432.6 (AB 51)
- Lab. Code § 510
- Lab. Code § 512
- Lab. Code § 558
- Lab. Code § 98.2
- Lab. Code §§ 201–203
- NLRA
- PAGA
- TVPRA (18 U.S.C. § 1595)
- Title VII
- USERRA (38 U.S.C. § 4311)
206 cases
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: The Public-Policy Wrongful-Discharge Tort
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 created California’s public-policy wrongful-discharge tort: an employee fired for refusing to commit an illegal act may sue in tort, recovering tort and punitive damages, not just contract remedies.
Harris v. City of Santa Monica: FEHA Mixed Motive and the Substantial-Motivating-Factor Standard
Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 holds that FEHA discrimination must be a “substantial motivating factor,” and that an employer’s same-decision showing bars damages, backpay, and reinstatement but not declaratory/injunctive relief or attorney’s fees.
Doss v. Tesla, Inc.
A Tesla yard hostler who moved 53-foot trailers of out-of-state auto parts around the Fremont factory — never crossing a state line — sued for wage-and-hour violations, and Tesla moved to compel individual arbitration. In the published portion of its opinion, the First District holds yard hostlers are FAA section 1 transportation workers exempt from arbitration, and clarifies which wage claims Labor Code section 229 keeps in court.
Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC
A firm filed a wage-and-hour class action duplicating one it had already filed elsewhere, then opposed a stay with a brief — drafted by a contract attorney using generative AI — full of nonexistent citations and at least eight fabricated quotations. The First District affirms $6,000 in section 128.7 sanctions: counsel of record bear ultimate responsibility for what they sign, and the duty to verify authority cannot be delegated to any form of technology.
In re Orr (Orr v. United States District Court)
A former UPS seasonal driver sued for wage violations; the district court compelled arbitration of her individual claims but refused to decide whether the FAA or state arbitration law governed, reasoning the result was the same. The Ninth Circuit grants a writ of mandamus: under New Prime, the court — not an arbitrator — must decide whether the FAA section 1 transportation-worker exclusion applies before compelling arbitration.
Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc.
A trucking-job applicant brought an FCRA class action over confusing, noncompliant background-check disclosure forms; after Limon v. Circle K required concrete injury, the trial court decertified the class. The First District reverses and declines to follow Limon: California courts are not bound by Article III, and a willful FCRA violation supports statutory damages of $100–$1,000 and standing without proof of harm.
Cortina v. North American Title Company
After 19 years of litigation, a bifurcated bench trial produced a $43 million judgment for ~400 escrow workers who claimed they were misclassified as exempt. The Fifth District reverses on two independent grounds: the trial court could not delegate the entire damages phase to a private referee without the parties’ consent, and the liability-phase trial plan violated Duran by using representative sampling to prove classwide liability while barring the employer from contesting individual exempt status.
Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, Inc.
A PAGA plaintiff proved Labor Code violations but recovered about one percent of the $56 million maximum he calculated, and his attorney fees were cut by a 0.70 negative multiplier. The Fourth District affirms: section 2699(e)(2) mandates no method for reducing penalties — per-employee is fine — and the trial court adequately justified the fee multiplier, leaving the “heightened scrutiny” question for the Supreme Court.
Husband v. Target Corporation
An employee with an undisclosed bipolar diagnosis was fired after two episodes of erratic, irrational behavior at work, then sued Target under FEHA. The Second District affirms summary judgment: employer knowledge is a prerequisite to FEHA disability liability, and it is imputed only when disability is the “only reasonable interpretation” of the conduct — not where intoxication, medication, or sleep deprivation could equally explain it.
Williams v. Legacy Health
Nine hospital-system employees sought religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement and sued under Title VII when they were denied. The Ninth Circuit affirms judgment for the employer: after Groff v. DeJoy, undue hardship means a “substantial” burden — including realistic health, safety, and staffing costs — and exempting unvaccinated clinical staff during the Delta surge met that standard.
Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc.
A staffing agency hired a worker under an arbitration agreement and placed him at a client; when the placement ended, the client hired him directly, and he later sued the client over that direct-employment period. The First District affirms denial of arbitration: the client was not a party or “affiliate” of the agency, the claims fell outside the agreement’s scope, and the worker was not equitably estopped — a nonsignatory cannot simply borrow a staffing agency’s arbitration clause.
Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc.
A railcar repairman who inspected and repaired freight cars taken out of service in a rail yard brought a wage-and-hour class action and argued his arbitration agreement was exempt as a transportation worker’s contract. The Second District disagrees: he is neither a “railroad employee” nor a “transportation worker” under FAA section 1, because repairing decommissioned cars is too far removed from actual transportation — so his arbitration agreement and class waiver are enforceable.
Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar, Inc.
An EMT sought to certify a 135-worker class alleging the employer left nondiscretionary “EMS Bonuses” out of the regular rate, underpaying overtime and premiums. The Fifth District reverses the denial of class certification: the employer’s gift/discretion defense applied to every EMS Bonus, so it was not a defense “unique” to the named plaintiff.
Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center, LLC
Studebaker made a new employee sign three onboarding arbitration documents; the trial court found their “conflicts” showed no valid agreement and denied arbitration. The Second District reverses and compels arbitration — ambiguities must be reconciled to give effect to the intent to arbitrate, the agreement was not unconscionable, and an inconsistent wholesale PAGA waiver should have been severed.
United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy Mortgage Corporation
A former Academy Mortgage employee won a False Claims Act qui tam case after the government declined to intervene, and her counsel obtained a fee award enhanced by a 1.75 lodestar multiplier. The Ninth Circuit reverses the enhancement: above-lodestar multipliers are reserved for the “rare and exceptional” case, cannot rest on factors already in the lodestar, and require a reviewable methodology.
O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc.
After two of four bellwether arbitrators found a travel-nursing agency’s arbitration agreements invalid, a district court used non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to void 255 other employees’ separate agreements. The Ninth Circuit reverses: the FAA guarantees individualized, one-on-one proceedings, and forbids using other arbitrators’ rulings to invalidate other parties’ agreements wholesale.
Guardian Storage Centers, LLC v. Simpson
A terminated COO forwarded her employer’s e-mails — some attorney-client privileged — to her personal account and handed them to her lawyers for her wrongful-termination and harassment cross-claims. The Fourth District holds the State Fund rule on handling privileged materials applies even to such intentional, unauthorized disclosures, and reverses the denial of the employer’s motion to disqualify counsel.
Paknad v. Superior Court
Intuitive Surgical defended a harassment suit by pointing to the adequacy of its attorney-led investigation, then tried to withhold the investigator’s findings as work product. The Sixth District grants the employee a writ: putting the investigation’s adequacy at issue waives privilege and even core work product over the investigator’s factual findings and anything bearing on the investigation’s scope and adequacy.
Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University
Two Chico State physics professors sued the CSU Trustees for retaliation, alleging a sham investigation and sabotage of their move to a new university after they reported harassment. The Trustees moved to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute as “based in part” on protected speech. The Third District affirms denial: a movant must analyze each claim element-by-element and identify which acts are protected — “based in part” is not enough.
Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District
A nursing student said the faculty member running her hospital clinical rotation sexually harassed her and tanked her grade when she refused him. The Fourth District holds a student in a required clinical placement is an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA, and reverses summary judgment on standing, Government-Claims-Act notice, and deliberate indifference.
Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center
A former Work Practice Apprentice at the San Francisco Zen Center won a wage award, but the trial court held the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred his claims. The First District reverses, adopting its companion case Lorenzo: the exception bars only claims that require resolving ecclesiastical questions, and the Center showed none. NOTE: the controlling ministerial-exception issue is now before the California Supreme Court in Lorenzo (S294565), so this opinion is citable for persuasive value only.
Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC
Cambodian villagers forced to work at Thai seafood factories sued a U.S. marketer under the trafficking civil-remedy statute; their case was dismissed because the statute then reached only those who succeeded in benefiting, not those who attempted to. After Congress amended the law, the en banc Ninth Circuit holds the clarifying amendment retroactive — and that Landgraf governs all such amendments, overruling the “clarifying amendment” exception — reviving the claims.
Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.
Wal-Mart ran a background check on a job applicant but allegedly botched the ICRAA disclosure form, then won summary judgment because she showed no real-world harm. The Fourth District reverses: California standing requires only an invasion of a legally protected interest, and ICRAA’s “$10,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater” remedy is independent of actual damages — so a bare disclosure violation confers standing.
Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc.: Illegibility, Unconscionability, and No Presumption for Arbitration
The California Supreme Court holds that illegible, one-sided arbitration print is procedural (not substantive) unconscionability — and that no presumption favors arbitration.
Avery v. TEKsystems, Inc.
Twenty-two months into a wage-and-hour class action, TEKsystems rolled out a new mandatory arbitration agreement to the recruiter class members and moved to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirms denial of that motion: Rule 23(d) lets a district court refuse to enforce an agreement obtained through misleading, mid-litigation communications that threaten the fairness of the class action — the FAA gives arbitration no special protection.
De Paolo v. Rosales
A resident manager whose apartment came with the job refused to leave after she was terminated. The Appellate Division affirms an unlawful detainer judgment: housing provided as part of employment compensation is not a protected tenancy, the former manager became a tenant at sufferance or licensee outside the Tenant Protection Act, and her retaliatory-eviction defense failed for lack of evidence.
Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce, Inc.
A produce-plant forklift driver was fired after complaining his pay lagged behind coworkers’. He wrongly believed the Equal Pay Act reached the gap — but the Fourth District holds his mistake of law does not sink his Labor Code section 1102.5(b) whistleblower verdict, because the statute asks only whether he had objectively reasonable cause to believe a violation occurred, a question for the jury.
County of Los Angeles v. Niblett
A fire-department mechanic repeatedly confronted management and then alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The Second District affirms a three-year workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8: the veiled reference was a credible, implied threat outside the First Amendment, and the order’s firearm restriction survives Second Amendment review under Rahimi.
Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services: The Employer’s Response as the Hostile Environment
A coworker’s off-site sexual advances were not work-related and not imputable to the employer — yet the Fifth District held the employee still stated a FEHA hostile-work-environment claim, because the employer’s refusal to act and its HR representative’s mocking response could independently alter the workplace in an objectively severe manner. A pleading-stage reversal that imports the Ninth Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances, employer-response framework (Fuller, Okonowsky) into California law.
Iloff v. LaPaille: The Good-Faith Defense to Liquidated Damages
An employer must prove a reasonable, good-faith attempt to comply before escaping liquidated damages under Labor Code section 1194.2.
Muñoz v. Regents of the University of California: Litigation Risk Alone Cannot Justify Immigration-Status Discrimination
The University of California refuses to employ undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The First District held that the policy facially discriminates based on immigration status under the FEHA national-origin regulations, and that the University’s only justification — fear that the federal government might read IRCA to cover it and prosecute — could not sustain the policy, because the University never attempted the regulation’s clear-and-convincing showing that federal law requires the discrimination. The court issued a writ directing the Regents to reconsider the policy on proper criteria, while pointedly declining to decide whether IRCA applies to state entities at all.
McMahon v. World Vision: The Ministerial Exception’s Functional Reach to a Customer-Service Rep
World Vision revoked a job offer to a customer-service applicant after learning she was in a same-sex marriage. The Ninth Circuit held the ministerial exception barred her Title VII and WLAD claims, because — viewed in the context of World Vision’s religious mission — CSRs perform “vital religious duties” by communicating the faith and praying with donors. A striking extension of the exception’s functional reach to an entry-level, remote position.
Associational Disability Accommodation: The Open Question After Castro-Ramirez
Must a California employer accommodate an employee who is not disabled but who cares for someone who is? Castro-Ramirez said in 2016 that FEHA “may reasonably be interpreted” to require it — and expressly declined to decide. Nine years on, no published California decision has answered, the Civil Rights Council’s 2020 request for public input produced no regulation, and CACI 2547 still calls the element optional. Meanwhile five federal district courts — Castro v. Classy, McVay, and 2025’s Acosta, Head, and De Wit — have all held that failure-to-accommodate and interactive-process claims may rest on associational disability. This analysis maps the statutory argument, the unpublished contrary authority, and how to plead the caregiver’s claim while the question stays open.
Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles: No § 1102.5(j) Fees After a § 1102.6 Same-Decision Defense
A sheriff’s deputy proved every element of his whistleblower retaliation claim — and still left the courthouse owing costs. The jury found his protected disclosures were a factor in the County’s actions against him, but also that the County would have made the same decisions anyway. Division Four held that a plaintiff defeated by the section 1102.6 same-decision defense who obtains no relief has not brought a “successful action” under section 1102.5(j): no attorney’s fees, and the employer is the prevailing party for costs. The panel declined to extend Harris v. City of Santa Monica’s FEHA rule, agreed the contrary result would be “a rational policy choice,” and pointedly left the fix to the Legislature.
Brown v. City of Inglewood: Elected Officials Are Not “Employees” Under Labor Code § 1102.5
Inglewood’s elected city treasurer accused the mayor of misappropriating public funds, then saw her monthly salary cut from $8,000 to $1,404 and her duties stripped away. Her whistleblower retaliation suit under Labor Code section 1102.5 failed at the threshold: a unanimous Supreme Court held that elected officials are not “employees” within section 1106’s definition. Finding the statutory text inconclusive, the court rested on legislative history and context — section 1106 protects rank-and-file public workers, not officials who answer to the electorate — while noting that other remedies, including the First Amendment, may remain available.
Velarde v. Monroe Operations: HR Misrepresentations as Unconscionability
A newly hired care coordinator was pressured to sign an arbitration agreement amid a stack of 31 onboarding documents on her first day. When she said she did not understand it, the HR manager assured her it would let the company resolve disputes cheaply and without lawyers — untrue, since the agreement imposed adversarial federal-rules arbitration with each side bearing its own fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of arbitration: the oral misrepresentation, contradicting the written terms, made the agreement substantively unconscionable because it defeated the employee's reasonable expectations. Intent to mislead was not required — the court focused on effect, not intent.
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: No “Background Circumstances” Hurdle for Majority-Group Title VII Plaintiffs
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, lost a promotion to a lesbian candidate, then was demoted and replaced by a gay man. The Sixth Circuit threw out her Title VII case because she had not shown “background circumstances” suggesting her employer was the unusual one that discriminates against the majority. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated: Title VII protects “any individual,” and its prima facie standard does not vary with the plaintiff’s group. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred to question whether McDonnell Douglas belongs at summary judgment at all — an invitation with consequences for FEHA practice under Guz.
FEHA Fee Haircuts and the Scrutiny Split
When a trial court takes an across-the-board percentage cut to a prevailing plaintiff’s lodestar, must it explain why that particular percentage — or is a general finding of overlitigation enough? Warren demanded case-specific explanation and Snoeck brought that rule into FEHA; Morris rejected it as imported federal law, and Cash v. County of Los Angeles — a 30 percent, $195,234 haircut affirmed over Justice Baker’s meat-cleaver dissent — squarely joined Morris. The Supreme Court granted review on August 20, 2025 (S291827). Until it rules, Cash is persuasive-only under rule 8.1115(e)(1), the published split remains live, and the smart fee motion is built to win under either standard — starting with a written request for specific findings.
Carranza v. City of Los Angeles: § 12923, Single Incidents, and Harassment the Plaintiff Never Saw
An LAPD captain never witnessed officers passing around a fake nude photo of her and was never confronted to her face — yet the Second District affirmed a $4 million FEHA verdict, holding that her secondhand knowledge of the department-wide circulation, and the LAPD’s refusal to stop it, supplied substantial evidence of a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. A leading application of Government Code section 12923.
Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating: Prospective, Revocable Meal-Period Waivers Are Valid
Two veterinary workers signed a standing written waiver of their meal break for shifts of six hours or less — revocable at any time — then sued years later, arguing meal periods can be waived only shift by shift after the right accrues. Division Seven disagreed: section 512 and the wage orders are silent on timing and form, and eighty years of IWC history treats written prospective waivers as employee protection, not evasion. But the holding is expressly conditional: the court reserved unconscionable, coerced, unknowing, and irrevocable waivers, and oral prospective waivers entirely. Bradsbery is a safe harbor for clean waiver programs — and a litigation roadmap against defective ones.
Moniz v. Adecco: Applying Turrieta — No Intervention or Vacatur by a Competing PAGA Plaintiff
After Turrieta v. Lyft disapproved Moniz II by name, the objector in the long-running Adecco PAGA settlement tried a new key for the same lock: she was asserting her own personal interests — a penalty share, fees, a service award — not the state’s. Division Four dismissed her appeals. Every interest she claimed arises from PAGA itself and is derivative of the state’s; relabeling it personal is a semantic exercise that would leave Turrieta’s holding with no effect. The first published application of Turrieta makes overlapping-settlement fights a before-judgment affair: object in the approving court, police preclusion scope under LaCour — but intervention, vacatur, and appeal are closed.
Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District: Denial of Disability-Retirement Benefits Is Not an Adverse Employment Action
After a harbor patrol officer’s on-duty accident left him unable to work, the Port San Luis Harbor District told him retirement was his “single option” — then denied his CalPERS disability-retirement application and terminated him on a resignation theory it later admitted was false. Division Six affirmed summary judgment on his FEHA claim anyway: denial of disability-retirement payments is not an adverse employment action, because retirement benefits begin when employment ends, and a claimant who cannot perform his essential duties is not a “qualified individual” under Green. The remedy for a wrongful denial is an appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings and administrative mandamus — a route Lowry lost by following a repealed procedure.
Lui v. DeJoy: Replacement Evidence and the Myth of the “Independent” Investigation
A Postmaster of Chinese ethnicity was demoted after coworkers targeted her with complaints her supervisor believed were racially motivated, and the demotion was confirmed by an official who reviewed only the paperwork. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, holding that replacement by a white man satisfied the McDonnell Douglas fourth element and that a genuine dispute existed over whether the confirming decision was “actually independent or influenced by subordinate bias” — a Ninth Circuit application of the cat’s-paw doctrine.
Vo v. Technology Credit Union: JAMS Rule 17, Nonparty Discovery, and the Split with Aixtron
A terminated employee resisted arbitration of his FEHA claims, arguing that under Aixtron the arbitrator could not compel prehearing third-party discovery. The Sixth District reversed the denial of arbitration: applying Ramirez’s five discovery factors and construing the clause to preserve validity, it held that JAMS Rule 17 (2014) gives the arbitrator authority to expand nonparty discovery when necessary, so the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. The court disapproved Aixtron to the extent it read an arbitrator’s authority narrowly — creating an intra-district split — and noted that Senate Bill 940 now supplies CAA third-party discovery by default for current agreements.
Arzate v. ACE American: Who Must Initiate Arbitration After an Order Compelling
After a court compelled arbitration of a wage-and-hour class action, neither side filed a demand, and the trial court lifted the stay on the theory that the employer — which had moved to compel — waived arbitration by not commencing it. The Court of Appeal reversed: reading the agreement as a whole, the ‘party who wants to start the Arbitration Procedure’ is the claimant asserting a legal claim, so the employees who agreed to ‘submit’ their claims had to file the demand; the employer’s inaction was neither a breach nor a waiver. The court expressly declined to reach the separate arbitration-fee-default statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98).
Defamation in the Termination: Hearn v. PG&E and the Tort the Supreme Court Will Define
A partially published Court of Appeal decision on defamation and compelled self-publication in the termination context — an issue now pending before the California Supreme Court.
Headless PAGA: Leeper v. Shipt and the Split the Supreme Court Will Resolve
Does every PAGA action contain an individual claim an employer can compel to arbitration? The split the California Supreme Court will resolve.
Wawrzenski v. United Airlines — comparator evidence is for the jury: the marquee MSJ reversal on FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation
Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.
Stone v. Alameda Health System: Public-Entity Employers Are Not Subject to PAGA (or Most Labor Code Wage Rules)
Two Highland Hospital workers sued the public hospital authority running Alameda County’s medical facilities for meal-and-rest violations, unpaid wages, and PAGA penalties. A unanimous Supreme Court ended the case at the definitions: Labor Code section 18’s “person” — the term that controls who is an “employer” under the wage order and who can be penalized under PAGA — affirmatively excludes public entities. Absent express words bringing the government in, break rules and PAGA penalties stop at the public-sector line. The court disapproved Sargent’s contrary rule for statutes carrying their own penalties, declined to decide whether Government Code section 818 independently bars such penalties, and reserved the effect of the 2024 PAGA reform.
Turrieta v. Lyft: A PAGA Plaintiff Cannot Intervene in Another’s Overlapping PAGA Action
Three Lyft drivers filed overlapping PAGA actions; when one settled, the other two moved to intervene, objected, and moved to vacate the judgment — invoking their status as deputized proxies of the state. A divided Supreme Court held a PAGA plaintiff’s deputization confers no such rights: the statute delegates the power to commence and prosecute one’s own action, and it entrusts settlement oversight to the LWDA and the approving court. Moniz v. Adecco is disapproved. What remains for rival plaintiffs is coordination, informal input to the approving court, and advocacy to the LWDA — plus the open questions the court expressly reserved, including the state’s own rights and personal-interest intervention.
Castellanos v. State of California: The Supreme Court Upholds Proposition 22 and Holds the Legislature’s Article XIV Workers’-Compensation Power Is Not Exclusive of the Initiative
The California Supreme Court unanimously upholds Proposition 22 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7451), holding that the Legislature’s “plenary” and “unlimited” authority over workers’ compensation under article XIV, section 4 is not exclusive of the people’s reserved initiative power — while expressly reserving the harder questions about Proposition 22’s seven-eighths amendment rule.
Okonowsky v. Garland: Off-Site Social Media and the Totality of the Workplace
The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the Bureau of Prisons, holding that a corrections lieutenant’s off-duty Instagram page targeting a prison psychologist — followed by more than a hundred coworkers — is part of the totality of the circumstances in a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. There is no rule that only conduct inside the physical workplace counts, ‘especially in light of the ubiquity of social media,’ and the employer’s dismissive, ineffectual response can independently create a hostile environment.
Ramirez v. Charter Communications: Unconscionability and the Mandatory Qualitative Severance Analysis
Charter’s mandatory arbitration agreement directed employees’ claims into arbitration while carving out the claims Charter itself would bring, compressed FEHA filing to the one-year administrative window, and made anyone who unsuccessfully resisted arbitration pay the fees incurred to compel it. The Supreme Court held all three terms substantively unconscionable — but validated the four-deposition discovery cap, disapproving the line of cases that judged discovery limits by a particular plaintiff’s later needs. On remedy, the court rejected clause-counting: severance is a qualitative, totality inquiry under Armendariz, and the refusal to enforce was reversed and remanded for that analysis.
Cook v. USC: Infinite Duration, All-Claims Scope — Unconscionable and Unseverable
USC required a staff employee to sign an arbitration agreement reaching ‘all claims, whether or not arising out of’ her employment, against USC and a broad web of affiliated persons, surviving her employment indefinitely and revocable only by the university president. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of arbitration: the agreement was substantively unconscionable for three independent reasons — overbroad scope, infinite duration, and lack of mutuality — and the trial court reasonably refused to sever, because curing it would require rewriting the plain language and would hand USC a windfall. Unconscionability is judged at the time of contracting, so the employer could not save the agreement by noting the plaintiff’s actual claims were employment-related.
Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital: The Cat’s-Paw Theory in FEHA Discrimination
In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, a 62-year-old hospital laboratory supervisor won a bench verdict for FEHA age discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination after her director made years of ageist remarks and steered her selection for layoff. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the “cat's-paw” (imputed-animus) theory, it held that a biased subordinate's discriminatory motive may be imputed to the employer where the subordinate was a “significant participant” in the adverse decision — even though a separate, formally unbiased officer signed off on the final call. Animus by a significant participant supports an inference that the decision itself was discriminatory.
Smith v. Spizzirri: FAA § 3 Requires a Stay, Not Dismissal
Delivery drivers sued for wage and misclassification violations; their employer moved to compel arbitration and dismiss. A unanimous Supreme Court held that FAA § 3 gives a district court no discretion to dismiss a suit it sends to arbitration when a party requests a stay — ‘shall’ means ‘shall’ and ‘stay’ means ‘stay.’ Staying rather than dismissing preserves the parties’ return ticket to court if arbitration breaks down, a point with real stakes for employees whose employers later default on arbitration fees.
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services (Naranjo II): A Good-Faith Belief in Compliance Defeats Section 226 and Section 203 Penalties
In Naranjo II (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, the California Supreme Court holds that an employer’s objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that its wage statements complied with the law defeats both Labor Code § 226 penalties (no “knowing and intentional” violation) and § 203 waiting-time penalties (no “willful” failure) — harmonizing the two penalty statutes around a common good-faith defense.
Veverka v. Department of Veterans Affairs — the same-decision showing is a complete defense under Labor Code § 1102.6
The First District held that an employer's same-decision showing under Labor Code § 1102.6 is a complete defense to a § 1102.5 whistleblower claim — barring declaratory relief and attorney's fees along with damages — expressly declining to import Harris v. City of Santa Monica's FEHA partial-defense rule.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
Muldrow v. City of St. LouisA Title VII plaintiff challenging a discriminatory job transfer must show only “some harm” to a term or condition of employment — not a “significant” or “material” disadvantage.Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346Parallel citations: 144 S.Ct. 967; 218 L.Ed.2d 322. Supreme Court of the United States. […]
Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St.: The FAA § 1 Exemption Follows the Work, Not the Industry
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers turns on what a worker does, not the industry the employer occupies. Bakery-goods delivery drivers who sued for wage violations therefore could not be forced into arbitration merely because their employer sells bread rather than transportation. The decision resolves a circuit split and completes the § 1 line running from Circuit City through Saxon, while expressly leaving open whether these particular distributors qualify as transportation workers at all.
Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors: “Hours Worked” at the Security Gate, the Commute, and On-Premises Meal Periods
A solar-project electrician queued unpaid at a security gate while guards inspected vehicles, drove miles of access road under strict site rules, and ate lunch confined to a designated area under a CBA calling meal periods “unpaid.” Answering the Ninth Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court held the exit procedure is compensable “hours worked”; the gate-to-lot drive is compensable only as “employer-mandated travel,” and only if the gate is the first location required for a reason beyond site access; and no collective bargaining agreement can waive the minimum wage for a meal period during which the employer’s confinement forecloses otherwise feasible personal activities.
Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills: PAGA Claims Cannot Be Struck as “Unmanageable”
Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582 holds that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim as unmanageable, even if it is complex or time-intensive. Manageability is a class-action requirement that does not apply to PAGA; complexity must be handled through ordinary case-management tools, not dismissal.
LaCour v. Marshalls: PAGA Claim Preclusion Is Set by the LWDA Notice, Not the Release
Marshalls bought a sweeping PAGA release in a federal settlement whose plaintiff had noticed only one theory to the LWDA — off-the-clock time in end-of-shift bag checks. When Robert LaCour later sued over expense reimbursement and other never-noticed violations, the trial court struck his claims as precluded. Division Four reversed: a PAGA judgment’s preclusive reach is measured by the claims the settling plaintiff pleaded or was authorized by her LWDA notice to plead, not by the words of her release, and an unauthorized proxy is in privity with no one. The court also upheld pandemic Emergency Rule 9, and it reserved issue preclusion while barring any double recovery.
Adolph v. Uber Technologies: A PAGA Plaintiff Keeps Standing for Representative Claims After Individual Arbitration
Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 holds that a PAGA plaintiff whose individual claims are compelled to arbitration retains standing as an “aggrieved employee” to litigate the non-individual representative claims in court — California’s answer to the standing question left open by Viking River.
Groff v. DeJoy: Title VII Undue Hardship Requires Substantial Increased Costs
An Evangelical Christian postal worker who would not work Sundays sued under Title VII after being disciplined for declining Sunday Amazon deliveries. The Third Circuit, reading Hardison to require only 'more than a de minimis cost,' affirmed summary judgment for the employer. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and clarified the standard: an employer that denies a religious accommodation must show that granting it would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not merely a more-than-trivial cost.
Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC
Analysis · Key Case Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1073 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight · Docket No. B318880 · Decided June 28, 2023 Verify before relying. A summary and analysis as of its publication date — not legal advice, and not a representation that the decision remains good […]
Sharp v. S&S Activewear: Ambient Harassment — Music, Misogyny, and the End of the “Equal Opportunity Harasser”
Eight warehouse workers alleged their employer let staff blast “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music for nearly two years over almost daily complaints. The Ninth Circuit vacated a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that pervasive sexist content can create a Title VII hostile work environment even if it targets no one and offends both sexes — and that an employer’s “equal opportunity harasser” status “provides no escape hatch for liability.”
People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc.
People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. A protected “disclosure” under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) includes an employee’s report or complaint of a legal violation to an employer — even when the recipient already knows of the violation. People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719 Parallel citations: 529 P.3d 49; 308 […]
Westmoreland v. Kindercare: The PAGA-Waiver Poison Pill
Kindercare’s arbitration agreement contained a “poison pill”: a clause providing that the whole agreement is invalid if its class/representative-action waiver is unenforceable. Because a wholesale predispute waiver of representative PAGA claims cannot be enforced after Iskanian and Viking River, the Court of Appeal held the poison pill voided the entire agreement — sending every claim, including the employee’s individual claims, to court. Had Kindercare omitted the poison pill, Viking River would have let it compel the individual claims; its own drafting foreclosed that path. The drafter was held to the all-or-nothing clause it wrote.
Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres: The Elements of a Pregnancy-Accommodation Claim Under the PDLL
In the first California decision to articulate the elements of a reasonable-accommodation claim under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(3)(A)), the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff must prove a pregnancy-related condition, a request made on her health care provider's advice, the employer's refusal of a reasonable accommodation, and that she could perform the essential functions of the job with that accommodation. Although section 12945 affords protections over and above section 12940, none entitles an employee to a job she cannot perform. Judgment for the employer affirmed.
Atalla v. Rite Aid: The “Acting in the Capacity of Supervisor” Limit on FEHA Strict Liability
A Rite Aid district manager sent a staff pharmacist lewd photos in a late-night, off-site text exchange that grew out of a friendship predating her employment. The Fifth District affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that FEHA strict liability for supervisor harassment attaches only when the supervisor acts “in the capacity of supervisor,” not where the conduct arises from a completely private relationship — and that the plaintiff, invited back after the harasser was fired, was not constructively discharged.
Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Granting Every Requested Accommodation Is Not Enough
A unanimous Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for Kaiser, holding that even though the employer granted every accommodation the employee requested, it could still be liable for failing to accommodate and failing to engage in the interactive process because, through her supervisor, it knew of but never provided a needed lighter-tasks accommodation. The court also reinstated the disability-discrimination and retaliation claims on a cat’s-paw theory.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta
The Ninth Circuit held the Federal Arbitration Act preempts AB 51 (Labor Code § 432.6), California's attempt to ban mandatory employment arbitration, because a state rule that burdens the formation of arbitration agreements stands as an obstacle to the FAA.
Camp v. Home Depot: Is Neutral Time-Rounding Still Lawful When Actual Time Is Captured? (pending review)
Home Depot’s Kronos system recorded Delmer Camp’s time to the minute — then quarter-hour rounding paid him for 470 fewer minutes than his own timecards showed. The Sixth District reversed summary judgment: under Troester and Donohue, an employer that can capture and has captured exact worktime must pay for all of it, and no California text authorizes rounding that underpays an identifiable employee. The panel invited the Supreme Court to decide whether See’s Candy neutral rounding survives at all — and the Court granted review (S277518), where the case remains pending. Cite it as persuasive only, with the review-granted parenthetical, and re-verify status before filing.
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
The FAA preempts Iskanian to the extent it bars division of a PAGA action and prevents arbitration of an employee’s individual PAGA claim; an employer may compel the individual PAGA claim to arbitration. (The Supreme Court further opined that, under its reading of California law, the plaintiff would then lack standing…
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services: Missed-Break Premium Pay Is “Wages” Supporting §203 and §226 Penalties
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (Naranjo I) Premium pay owed for missed meal and rest breaks under Labor Code section 226.7 constitutes “wages,” so it must be reported on wage statements under section 226 and is subject to waiting-time penalties under section 203 when not timely paid at separation. Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, […]
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. A court may not condition waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing that the opposing party was prejudiced; the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration” places arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts and does not authorize arbitration-specific procedural rules. Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411 Parallel citations: […]
Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento — the same-decision defense wins summary judgment after Lawson
Months after Lawson, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for the County of Sacramento under Labor Code § 1102.6 — undisputed evidence of insubordination, disrespect, and dishonesty proved clearly and convincingly that the county would have released the probationary employee anyway — while leaving open whether § 1102.5 requires an actual belief that the law was violated.
Scheer v. Regents of the University of California — which framework governs which whistleblower statute after Lawson
Reversing summary judgment for the UC Regents, the Second District mapped the post-Lawson landscape — Labor Code § 1102.6 governs § 1102.5 claims, Government Code § 8547.10(e) supplies the same framework for University of California whistleblowers, and McDonnell Douglas still governs Health and Safety Code § 1278.5 claims, under which Scheer's clause-by-clause dismantling of his termination letter raised a triable issue of pretext.
Khoiny v. Dignity Health: No Academic Deference for a Residency Program’s Stated Reasons
When a medical resident sues her residency program for discrimination, the program's 'academic' justification for dismissing her is not entitled to the deference courts extend to genuine academic judgments. The Second District held that a resident is predominantly an employee, not a student, so the jury must evaluate the program's real reason without deference — and the contrary instruction required a new trial.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd.: Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
An employer cannot rebut a discrimination plaintiff’s prima facie case by professing ignorance: stage-two production under McDonnell Douglas demands the actual nondiscriminatory reason for a failure to interview, not a witness’s “I don’t know.”
Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists — the modern disability-MSJ playbook: RIF selections, the interactive process, and cumulative pretext
In the Sixth District's treatise-level employment-MSJ opinion, a security supervisor laid off days before his expected return from knee surgery revives his disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims — the employer's RIF showing was inadequate under Guz's "roadmap" because it never explained retaining two lower-ranked supervisors, and its failure to accommodate, the timing, and an overpayment vendetta were substantial evidence of animus — while the retaliation claim fails because pre-2016 accommodation requests were not protected activity.
Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel: Meal and Rest Premiums Must Be Paid at the Regular Rate of Compensation
Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858 holds that the meal/rest premium under Labor Code § 226.7(c) must be paid at the “regular rate of compensation,” which is synonymous with the overtime “regular rate of pay” and includes all nondiscretionary payments — not just base hourly wages. The holding is retroactive.
Donohue v. AMN Services: No Rounding of Meal-Period Punches, and a Rebuttable Presumption From Time Records
Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 holds that employers may not round meal-period time punches, and that time records showing short, late, or missed meal periods raise a rebuttable presumption of a violation — usable even at summary judgment.
Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising: The Dynamex ABC Test Applies Retroactively
Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. (2021) 10 Cal.5th 944 holds that the ABC test adopted in Dynamex applies retroactively — to all cases not yet final when Dynamex was decided — exposing pre-2018 wage-order conduct to the new worker-classification standard.
Shirvanyan v. LACCD: Proving an Available Accommodation in an Interactive-Process Claim
The Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff suing for failure to engage in the interactive process under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) must prove a reasonable accommodation was actually available. Substantial evidence supported finite leave as an available accommodation for the plaintiff’s carpal-tunnel (wrist) injury, but none supported any accommodation for her later shoulder injury. Because the general verdict did not reveal which disability the jury relied on, the judgment was reversed for a limited retrial.
Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp. — The Defensible RIF: Exhaustion Traps, Combined Positions, and What Statistics Must Eliminate
A 60-year-old engineer cut in a 306-person, budget-driven layoff lost on both procedure and merits: his EEOC and post-closure DFEH amendments could not exhaust class and disparate-impact theories, and his pretext case failed for want of combined-position qualifications, controlled statistics, and comparators.
People v. Uber Technologies: Rideshare Drivers Are Likely Employees Under Prong B of the ABC Test
The Court of Appeal affirms a statewide preliminary injunction against Uber and Lyft, holding the People likely to prevail under prong B of the ABC test (Lab. Code, § 2775) — rideshare driving is within the usual course of the companies’ business — and rejecting the “technology platform” defense as a false dichotomy. (Predates Proposition 22; see Castellanos.)
Bostock v. Clayton County
An employer that fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily entails discrimination because of sex, because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being gay or transgender without taking the…
Kim v. Reins International California, Inc.
Settling and dismissing individual Labor Code claims does not strip an employee of standing to pursue a PAGA claim. PAGA standing depends on being an “aggrieved employee” — someone employed by the alleged violator against whom one or more Labor Code violations were committed — not on maintaining an unredressed…
Frlekin v. Apple Inc.: Mandatory Exit-Search Time Is Compensable “Hours Worked”
Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038 holds that time spent waiting for and undergoing mandatory exit bag-and-device searches is compensable “hours worked” under the control clause — even after clocking out, and even though employees could have avoided a search by not bringing a bag. It applies Morillion and rejects the “optional” defense.
Gupta v. Trustees of California State University: Comparator Evidence and the Similarly-Situated Standard
Comparator evidence is admissible in a FEHA case where the plaintiff and the comparator are similarly situated in all relevant respects — similar jobs and similar conduct. Affirming a plaintiff's verdict against San Francisco State University, the First District clarified how Reeves v. MV Transportation governs the admissibility, not merely the weight, of evidence that others outside the protected class were treated more favorably.
ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court
The unpaid-wages component of section 558 is not a civil penalty recoverable through PAGA; only the fixed civil penalties ($50/$100 per employee per pay period) are PAGA penalties. Because the unpaid wages are not part of the PAGA claim, the trial court could not compel that portion to arbitration as if it were.
OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho
The agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The manner of presentation — a take-it-or-leave-it document thrust at a low-wage worker for immediate signature, in dense legalese he was unlikely to understand — was highly oppressive and surprising, and the arbitral…
Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn.: Accent and National-Origin Discrimination Under FEHA
An employer's stereotyping of a long-tenured Filipino nurse over her accent and English skills was not a neutral performance concern but evidence of national-origin discrimination. The Third District reversed summary judgment for Dameron Hospital, holding that a jury could find the hospital's stated reasons pretextual and that accent-based bias falls squarely within FEHA's protection of national origin.
Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital: Accent-Based Harassment and Supervisor Animus Under FEHA
In Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, the Third District reversed summary judgment for a hospital, holding a jury could find a national-origin and age hostile work environment where a supervisor repeatedly mocked older Filipino nurses’ accents, transferred the plaintiff to a unit she was untrained for, and falsely accused her of sleeping on the job. The supervisor’s animus was attributable to the employer under Government Code section 12926, subdivision (d).
Ross v. County of Riverside — Job-Duty Disclosures Are Protected: a Pre-Lawson Building Block
The Fourth District reversed summary judgment for the County, holding that a deputy district attorney's internal warnings that a murder prosecution lacked probable cause were protected disclosures under Labor Code section 1102.5 — no express citation of law required, job duties notwithstanding — and that months of testing for a suspected neurological disease raised a triable issue of FEHA disability.
Laker v. Board of Trustees of CSU: When a Retaliation Claim Does Not Arise From Protected Speech
A tenured professor sued CSU for retaliation and defamation after the university launched investigations and made statements about him. CSU moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal held the retaliation claim did not “arise from” protected speech merely because protected activity sat in the background, and applied Baral v. Schnitt to parse the pleading into its component claims — striking only the discrete defamation allegations that were themselves based on protected statements.
Ward v. Tilly’s: Reporting-Time Pay for On-Call / Call-In Shifts
Tilly’s required retail workers to phone the store exactly two hours before every on-call shift — under threat of written discipline — and paid nothing if the answer was ‘don’t come in.’ Division Three held, 2–1, that this triggers Wage Order 7 reporting-time pay: ‘reporting for work’ means presenting oneself as ordered, and the employer’s own directions define the manner, whether that is walking through the door, logging on remotely, or making a mandatory call. The holding is deliberately tied to the two-hour call-in regime, the retroactivity question was expressly left open, and Justice Egerton’s partial dissent — built on 18,000 pages of IWC history — supplies the employer playbook. Review was denied; Ward remains the leading California authority on call-in scheduling.
AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc.
The employee-non-solicitation provision was void under section 16600 because it restrained the individual defendants — recruiters whose profession is recruiting and placing nurses — from engaging in their chosen profession; applying Edwards, the court declined to use the older “reasonableness” analysis and held such…
Troester v. Starbucks Corp.: California Rejects the Federal De Minimis Rule for Off-the-Clock Work
Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829 holds that California has not adopted the federal de minimis doctrine: an employer that requires small but regularly recurring off-the-clock work — here, several minutes of closing tasks each shift — must pay for that time and cannot invoke de minimis to avoid it.
Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation: Harassment Need Only Be Severe or Pervasive
In Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, a correctional officer who stutters proved that a supervisor mocked his speech impediment in front of others at least a dozen times over roughly two years, and a jury awarded $500,000 for FEHA disability harassment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the liability finding, reaffirming that harassment need only be severe OR pervasive — not both — and that because the conduct occurred on “more than one isolated occasion,” the plaintiff was not required to prove a physical assault or threat. On the employer's cross-appeal, the court reversed the trial court's order granting a new trial on damages, because the court failed to file the statement of reasons within the ten days Code of Civil Procedure section 657 requires, rendering the order a nullity.
Meeks v. AutoZone: Sexual Harassment Evidence and Evidence Code Section 1106
In Meeks v. AutoZone, the Fourth District reversed defense verdicts in a FEHA sexual harassment case, holding that a cluster of evidentiary rulings cumulatively skewed a credibility contest against the plaintiff. The court drew a usable line under Evidence Code section 1106: a plaintiff’s sexually charged banter directed at the harasser is admissible under subdivision (b), but a privately posted photograph of her tattoo — never shared “with” the harasser — remains barred by subdivision (a). It also confirmed that a harasser puts his intent in issue, and opens the door to me-too evidence, simply by claiming he treated everyone the same.
Wassmann v. South Orange County CCD: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and Permanence at Termination
In Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment against a dismissed community-college librarian, holding her FEHA discrimination and harassment claims time-barred. Applying the three-part continuing-violation test from Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the doctrine could not save the claims because the pre- and post-limitations acts were “not at all similar” and the employer’s conduct “acquired a degree of permanence” when her employment was terminated — and post-dismissal acts of a neutral administrative law judge could not be imputed to the employer.
Abed v. Western Dental Services: FEHA Failure-to-Hire and the Applicant Who Never Applied
The Court of Appeal reinstated Ada Abed’s FEHA pregnancy claim, holding that a job application is not an element of a failure-to-hire claim. An employer who falsely tells a pregnant woman no position is open — and thereby stops her from applying — can be liable for pregnancy discrimination, even though she never applied.
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
Arbitration agreements providing for individualized proceedings — including class- and collective-action waivers in the employment context — are enforceable under the FAA, and the NLRA does not override the FAA or render such agreements unlawful; courts must enforce the agreements according to their terms.
Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago: Finite Leave That Forces a Firing Is No Accommodation
A unanimous Court of Appeal affirmed a $723,746 judgment for a probationary community-college employee terminated while on approved industrial-injury leave. Granting the leave was not a reasonable accommodation because it led directly to her termination; FEHA and Education Code section 88013 let the district toll, not forfeit, her probation, and its conduct showed no good-faith interactive process.
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court: California Adopts the ABC Test for Worker Classification
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 adopts the “ABC test” for California wage-order claims: a worker is presumed an employee, and the hiring entity must prove all three prongs — freedom from control, work outside the usual course of business, and an independently established trade — to establish independent-contractor status.
Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp.
For a flat-sum bonus like the attendance bonus here, the bonus is divided by the number of non-overtime (straight-time) hours the employee actually worked — not by total hours including overtime — to determine the per-hour value added to the regular rate; this yields a higher overtime rate, more protective than the…
Simers v. Los Angeles Times: Discriminatory Motive Does Not Equal Constructive Discharge
In Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, a celebrated sports columnist won a jury verdict on FEHA age and disability discrimination and constructive discharge, recovering more than $7 million. The trial court let the discrimination liability stand but granted JNOV on the constructive-discharge claim and ordered a new trial limited to damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed all of the orders. Even where age or disability is a substantial motivating reason for a demotion, an employee who resigns in response to standard disciplinary procedures has not suffered a constructive discharge absent “unusually aggravated” conditions or a “continuous pattern of mistreatment.” And because the noneconomic award could not be apportioned between the surviving discrimination theory and the vacated constructive-discharge theory, a new trial limited to damages — not liability — was the proper remedy.
Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club: Obesity as a Protected Disability and Disability Harassment under FEHA
A 15-year Berkeley Tennis Club employee fired after a recorder was found at a board meeting sued for FEHA disability discrimination, harassment, and more, alleging her severe obesity is a protected physical disability. The Court of Appeal held the Club, as summary-adjudication movant, never carried its initial burden of showing Cornell could not prove a physiological cause for her obesity, reinstating her discrimination, harassment, and defamation claims while affirming dismissal of accommodation and retaliation.
Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino: Administrative Leave as an Adverse Employment Action
In Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 352, a county social worker was placed on administrative leave days after telling the juvenile court that her superiors had directed her to submit misleading evidence; the County’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike her whistleblower suit was denied. Affirming, the Court of Appeal held the leave — unrequested, investigative, paired with a decision to terminate her, and removing her from her assigned case — was an adverse employment action under Yanowitz’s contextual materiality standard, so the claim was not a meritless SLAPP.
M.F. v. Pacific Pearl Hotel Management: Employer Liability for Harassment by a Nonemployee
Reversing a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that a hotel housekeeper stated viable FEHA claims for sexual harassment by a nonemployee (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1)) and for failure to prevent harassment (id., subd. (k)) where she alleged she was assaulted on the employer's premises by a drunk trespasser the employer knew or should have known was wandering the property and aggressively propositioning other housekeepers. Whether the employer's response was adequate is a question of fact unsuitable for resolution on demurrer.
Diego v. City of Los Angeles: When Pretext Is Not Enough to Prove Discrimination
A FEHA disparate-treatment verdict collapsed where the only proof of racial animus was the race of the officers’ shooting victim — not the officers themselves — and the City’s risk-management rationale stood unrebutted. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to enter judgment for the City.
Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation
An employee’s refusal to participate in conduct she reasonably believes is unlawful under the FEHA — including refusing to go along with retaliation against a coworker — can constitute protected activity, and threats or intimidation may qualify as a materially adverse employment action supporting a retaliation claim;…
Williams v. Superior Court
A PAGA plaintiff is presumptively entitled to discover the identities and contact information of other aggrieved employees statewide, subject to the employees’ privacy interests (which may be protected through a Belaire-West opt-out notice) rather than to a heightened threshold showing of merit before discovery.
Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.: Sexual-Orientation Discrimination and the Substantial-Motivating-Factor Standard
A gay executive's evidence that his sexual orientation was a substantial motivating factor in his termination was enough to revive his FEHA discrimination claim, even though his parallel retaliation theory failed. The Second District applied Harris v. City of Santa Monica's causation and same-decision framework (CACI Nos. 2500, 2505, 2512) to a sexual-orientation disparate-treatment case.
Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente: Rescinding a Resignation and Employer Knowledge of Disability
When an employee resigns and the employer promptly accepts, can she undo it by later revealing she was disabled at the time? In Featherstone, the Court of Appeal said no — refusing to let a former employee rescind a voluntary, accepted resignation is not an adverse employment action under FEHA, and an accommodation duty never arises for a disability the employer did not know about when the resignation was accepted.
McGill v. Citibank, N.A.
A provision in a predispute arbitration agreement that waives the right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum is contrary to California public policy and unenforceable (the “McGill rule”); and because that rule applies to contracts generally and does not single out arbitration, the FAA does not preempt it.
Atkins v. City of Los Angeles: Essential Functions and Reasonable Accommodation for Injured Police Recruits
Five LAPD recruits were injured during Academy training and parked in the Department’s light-duty “Recycle” program until, mid-recovery, the City imposed a new six-month cutoff and forced them out. Atkins holds that the recruits could not win a FEHA disability-discrimination claim — they could not perform a recruit’s physically demanding essential functions, and FEHA never requires eliminating an essential function — yet could win a failure-to-accommodate claim, because they had actually performed the Recycle duties and the City’s own longstanding practice made continued reassignment reasonable. The court also vacated lifetime-career front-pay damages as speculative.
Bareno v. San Diego Community College District
In Bareno v. San Diego Community College District (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, the Fourth District reversed summary judgment for the employer on a CFRA retaliation claim, holding that the 30-day advance-notice rule does not apply when the need for medical leave is unforeseeable — notice need only be given “as soon as practicable” — and that whether an employee sufficiently requested leave and supplied adequate certification is a question of fact. The employer’s decision to treat the employee’s medical absences as a “voluntary resignation,” coming virtually immediately after she sought leave, raised triable issues of retaliatory causation.
Augustus v. ABM Security Services: Rest Periods Must Be Off-Duty and Off-Call
Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 257 holds that a compliant rest period must be free of both duties and employer control: an employer may not require employees to remain “on call” during a rest break, even if interruptions rarely occur.
Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco: Advocacy Is Not Protected Activity
When a recreation-program manager was laid off after publicly opposing the City's cuts to disabled-community services, he sued for FEHA retaliation. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that generalized advocacy for the disabled public is not “protected activity” under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h): the opposition clause reaches only opposition to conduct an employee reasonably believes is unlawful employment discrimination against an employee or applicant, not opposition to policy choices affecting the public at large.
Castro-Ramirez v. Dependable Highway Express: Associational Disability Discrimination Under FEHA
A truck driver fired for refusing a shift that would have stopped him from administering his disabled son’s dialysis raised triable issues of associational disability discrimination and retaliation under FEHA — because association with a disabled person is itself a protected disability.
Moore v. Regents of University of California: Direct Evidence and McDonnell Douglas
A long-serving employee laid off after her supervisor allegedly called her a “liability to the department” in light of her heart condition sued for perceived-disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, CFRA violations, and FEHA retaliation. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment on the disability-related claims — the supervisor's remark plus the employer's departure from its own seniority and recall policies raised triable issues of pretext — but affirmed on retaliation, holding that a pre-2016 accommodation request was not, by itself, “protected activity.”
Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange: The Harris Same-Decision Defense and the Common Law Tort
In Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, the Court of Appeal held that the mixed-motive, same-decision framework adopted in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA disparate-treatment claims applies equally to a common law wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim grounded in the policy against age discrimination — even though the plaintiff pleaded no FEHA claim. Because the jury found age was a substantial motivating reason but that Farmers would have fired Davis anyway, the same-decision finding left no damages, no equitable relief, and no fees; the court nonetheless reversed a directed verdict on his wage claim, holding the employer bears the burden of proving paycheck deductions lawful.
Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc.
Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. A detailed application of the summary-judgment framework to FEHA disability claims: triable issues on the employer’s knowledge of the disability, pretext, and the interactive process defeated summary judgment. Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570 Parallel citation: 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 59. Court of Appeal of […]
Wallace v. County of Stanislaus
Wallace v. County of Stanislaus A FEHA disability-discrimination plaintiff need not prove the employer acted out of animosity or ill will; it is enough that the disability was a “substantial motivating reason” for the adverse action — even a well-intentioned but mistaken one. Wallace v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109 Parallel citation: 199 […]
Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles: Pretext, the Continuing-Violation Doctrine, and Disparate Impact
A Black firefighter's discrimination verdict collapsed because he could not show the City's reasons were pretextual or marshal the statistical proof a disparate-impact theory requires, and the continuing-violation doctrine could not rescue time-barred claims. The Second District reversed with directions to enter judgment for the City, illustrating the demanding pretext and impact standards behind CACI Nos. 2502, 2505, and 2508.
Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Medical Foundation: Inability to Work Under a Particular Supervisor Is Not a FEHA Disability
An employee who cannot work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress tied to that supervisor’s ordinary oversight has no disability under FEHA. In Higgins-Williams, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for Sutter on that single ground, which dissolved the plaintiff’s discrimination, accommodation, retaliation, and wrongful-termination claims, while remanding only the cost award under Williams v. Chino Valley.
Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist.
Government Code section 12965(b) governs both fee and cost awards in FEHA actions and makes them discretionary under the asymmetric Christiansburg standard: a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily recovers fees and costs, but a prevailing defendant may recover them only if the action was objectively frivolous, unreasonable,…
Young v. United Parcel Service: The PDA Disparate-Treatment Accommodation Framework
UPS accommodated drivers hurt on the job, drivers with ADA disabilities, and drivers who lost their DOT certifications — but told pregnant driver Peggy Young she could not work under a 20-pound lifting restriction. The Supreme Court vacated summary judgment and built the governing framework for PDA accommodation claims: show the employer accommodated others similar in ability to work, and a jury may infer discrimination if the policies significantly burden pregnant workers and the employer’s reasons are not strong enough to justify it. In California, where the PDLL and FEHA impose affirmative accommodation duties, Young is the federal floor — essential in pure Title VII postures, rarely the lead theory at home.
Dickson v. Burke Williams: Failure to Prevent Requires an Underlying FEHA Violation
A massage therapist won a FEHA verdict against her spa employer for failing to prevent customer sexual harassment and sex discrimination — even though the same jury found the harassing conduct was not severe or pervasive and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) is wholly derivative: it cannot stand without an underlying, actionable FEHA violation. Sharpening Trujillo, the court held it is the absence of actionable harassment — not the lack of any harassing conduct — that defeats the prevention claim, and directed entry of judgment for the employer.
Richey v. AutoNation, Inc.
The arbitrator’s award was upheld. Under the narrow standard of review governing arbitration awards, the court declined to decide whether the “honest belief” defense applies to CFRA claims; even assuming the arbitrator erred in invoking it, the error did not deprive the employee of an unwaivable statutory right, so…
Nealy v. City of Santa Monica: Essential Functions, Reassignment, and the Interactive Process
A disabled Santa Monica refuse worker argued his employer could have kept him on by stripping heavy lifting from the job or holding a position open. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that eliminating a true essential function is not a reasonable accommodation, that reassignment is required only where an actual qualifying vacancy exists, and that a bare request for accommodation is not protected activity for a retaliation claim.
Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions: On-Call Time Is Hours Worked, and Sleep Time Cannot Be Excluded
Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833 holds that security guards’ required on-call time at their worksites was compensable “hours worked” under the control clause, and that California’s Wage Order 4 — unlike federal law — does not permit excluding sleep time from compensable hours on a 24-hour shift.
Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare District
Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare District An employee need not exhaust the Labor Commissioner’s administrative remedy before bringing a civil whistleblower-retaliation action; the 2013 enactment of Labor Code sections 244 and 98.7, subdivision (g), merely clarified existing law. Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare District (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1022 Parallel citation: 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 21. […]
Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist.
In Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for a school district sued by a breast-cancer-survivor teacher whose contract was not renewed. The court held that FEHA imposes a continuous, good-faith duty to engage in the interactive process under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) — not satisfied by a single gesture — and that reasonable accommodation can require reassignment to a vacant position under subdivision (m), implicating CACI Nos. 2541 and 2546.
Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC
A franchisor is not ordinarily the employer of its franchisee’s employees and is not vicariously liable for a franchisee-supervisor’s harassment unless the franchisor has retained or assumed general control over the relevant day-to-day aspects of the franchisee’s employment practices; a comprehensive operating system…
Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.
An employer satisfies the minimum-earnings prong of the commissioned-employee exemption only in those pay periods in which it actually pays the required minimum earnings; it may not attribute commission wages paid in one pay period to other pay periods to manufacture compliance (59 Cal.4th at p. 664).
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.
For certification, the key question is whether the hiring entity’s right to control the manner and means of the work — the principal test of employment — can be established through common proof (such as the standard contract and uniform policies), not whether each worker was in fact controlled to the same degree; the…
Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co.: After-Acquired Evidence and Unclean Hands Limit, But Do Not Bar, FEHA Remedies
In Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 407, a production worker who had obtained his job with a false Social Security number sued under FEHA for disability discrimination and retaliation; after litigation began, the employer discovered the fraud and won summary judgment on after-acquired-evidence and unclean-hands theories. The California Supreme Court reversed. It held that Senate Bill No. 1818 (Gov. Code § 7285; Civ. Code § 3339; Lab. Code § 1171.5) extends FEHA's remedies to workers “regardless of immigration status,” and that federal immigration law (IRCA, as read in Hoffman Plastic) does not preempt those state remedies except as to lost-pay damages for the period after the employer discovers the worker's ineligibility. Neither after-acquired evidence nor unclean hands is a complete defense; both bear on the remedy, not on liability.
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation: PAGA Waivers Unenforceable, Class Waivers Enforceable
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 holds that class-action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are enforceable after Concepcion (abrogating Gentry), but a predispute waiver of a representative PAGA action is contrary to public policy and not preempted by the FAA, because a PAGA claim belongs to the state.
Kim v. Konad USA Distribution: FEHA Exhaustion Is Not Jurisdictional — and Can Be Forfeited
In Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, the Court of Appeal affirmed a $60,000 bench-trial judgment for a sexually harassed employee, holding that FEHA’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is “jurisdictional” only in the loose, prudential sense and does not affect the trial court’s fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. Because the defendants waited until after the case was submitted to assert non-exhaustion, they forfeited the defense; and because exhaustion is not truly jurisdictional, the court could consider post-trial materials confirming the plaintiff had in fact exhausted. The court also held a harassment claim lies against an employer of any size.
Duran v. U.S. Bank: Statistical Sampling, Trial Plans, and the Due-Process Right to Litigate Defenses
Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 holds that a class-action trial plan using statistical or representative proof must still let the defendant litigate its affirmative defenses. A plan that extrapolated liability for 260 employees from a flawed 21-person sample and barred defense evidence violated due process.
Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School: Avoidable Consequences Beyond Harassment
In Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 886, the Court of Appeal affirmed a defense verdict in an age-discrimination suit and held that an employer may put before the jury, on mitigation of damages, the employee’s failure to invoke the employer’s internal grievance procedure — extending the FEHA avoidable-consequences doctrine of State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court beyond the hostile-environment harassment context in which it arose.
Serri v. Santa Clara University: Personnel-Management Decisions Are Not Harassment
In Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the University and reaffirmed the FEHA line between discrimination and harassment: a supervisor’s personnel-management decisions — who attends an employee’s meetings, how they are run, and accusations of dishonesty or poor performance — are not harassment under Reno v. Baird and Janken, even if discriminatory; the few stray remarks the plaintiff cited were neither offensive nor pervasive. The court also held after-acquired expert evidence of no adverse consequences did not raise a triable issue on pretext.
Lewis v. City of Benicia: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment under FEHA
A heterosexual male volunteer at a city water plant sued under FEHA for same-sex harassment by two supervisors. The First District reversed summary judgment for one supervisor — gifts, lunches, suggestive remarks, and pornographic images supported an inference of genuine sexual interest and pervasiveness — while affirming for the other. Finding sexual interest on the record, the court expressly declined to decide the effect of the new statute providing that harassing conduct “need not be motivated by sexual desire.”
Cheal v. El Camino Hospital: The Limits of the Business-Judgment Rule on Summary Judgment
In Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the hospital in a FEHA age-discrimination suit, holding triable issues existed on whether the 61-year-old dietary technician performed satisfactorily and on discriminatory animus. Although “satisfactory performance” is ordinarily within the employer’s sole discretion, an employer cannot conclusively establish the governing standard merely by asserting the plaintiff fell short; the hospital’s own written policies anticipated and tolerated the errors charged, and the supervisor’s recorded admission that she favored younger workers was admissible against interest.
Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP: Same-Sex Harassment of a Heterosexual Man Is Because of Sex
A male oil-rig floorhand was relentlessly gay-baited, urinated on, and propositioned by his supervisors. The Court of Appeal held these sex-based attacks on his heterosexual identity were harassment because of sex under the FEHA — no proof of the harassers' sexual desire required — endorsing Singleton, rejecting Kelley, and holding that a special verdict rendered defective by a drafting typo is subject to harmless-error review.
Thornbrough v. Western Placer: The Same-Decision Defense After Harris, Without Conceding Mixed Motives
A school-district maintenance supervisor, fired after a sustained pattern of insubordination, computer misuse, and retaliation against co-workers, claimed his discharge was really payback for whistleblowing about District construction projects. The Third District affirmed the denial of his mandamus petition, applying the Supreme Court's then-new decision in Harris v. City of Santa Monica to hold that an employer may invoke the same-decision showing without conceding mixed motives, and that untainted misconduct alone justified termination — making the protected-activity question unnecessary to decide.
Vasquez v. Franklin Management: Constructive Discharge Is a Jury Question, and the IIED Limit
A maintenance technician paid $10 an hour and never reimbursed for the heavy work mileage he was ordered to drive in his own truck could state a claim for constructive discharge in violation of public policy, where the unreimbursed expense pushed his effective pay below the minimum wage; whether conditions were intolerable was normally a jury question, so the demurrer should not have been sustained. The IIED count, however, was barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.
Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno
Concepcion preempts a categorical, arbitration-specific rule that a Berman-hearing waiver is per se unconscionable; but generally applicable unconscionability doctrine survives, and an arbitration agreement remains unenforceable if it is unreasonably one-sided. The court concluded this agreement’s waiver was markedly…
Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc.: FEHA Associational-Disability Discrimination
In Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 635, the Second District held that FEHA forbids firing a nondisabled employee because of his association with a disabled relative, sustaining an expense-theory associational claim where the employer allegedly fired the plaintiff to avoid paying for organ-donation leave for his disabled sister. The court affirmed dismissal of the retaliation, Labor Code, PAGA, and direct-disability counts while reinstating the associational, failure-to-prevent, and public-policy claims.
Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp.: Harris’s Mixed-Motive Rule in a Pregnancy-Leave Retaliation Case
Applying Harris v. City of Santa Monica to a pregnancy-leave retaliation verdict, the Court of Appeal held the old “a motivating reason” instructions were prejudicial error — and that an employer who never pleads the same-decision defense forfeits it. The judgment and fee award were reversed.
Vance v. Ball State University: Who Is a “Supervisor” — Title VII’s Narrow Rule vs. FEHA’s Broader One
The Supreme Court held 5-4 that an employee is a “supervisor” for Title VII vicarious-liability purposes only if empowered to take tangible employment actions — hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline. An employee who merely directs daily work is a co-worker, so the employer is liable only for negligence. The decision does not govern California’s FEHA, which defines “supervisor” more broadly and imposes strict liability for supervisor harassment.
Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric: When the Limitations Clock Starts on a FEHA Termination
In Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402, reviewing a sustained demurrer, the Court of Appeal held the plaintiff’s FEHA disability- and race-discrimination claims time-barred but reversed on her retaliation and wrongful-termination claims, holding that the section 12960 clock for a discharge runs from the actual termination — not from when the retaliatory motive arose — and that the employer, which controlled the termination date, controlled the accrual trigger. On the accommodation claims, continuing-violation tolling ended once the employer’s refusal reached a degree of permanence.
McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn.: Retaliation Is for the Jury
After a vessel-planner trainee complained, a confidential settlement was leaked and coworker hostility followed; the jury found retaliation, but the trial court entered JNOV. The Court of Appeal reversed the JNOV, holding that actions for retaliation are “inherently fact-driven” and that the jury, not the court, decides whether the conduct materially altered the plaintiff's employment — while affirming the alternative new-trial order on grounds of attorney misconduct, surprise, and excessive damages.
Bluford v. Safeway, Inc.
Rest periods must be separately compensated and cannot be folded into a piece-rate or activity-based pay formula; because Safeway’s uniform pay system did not separately pay for rest periods, common issues predominated and the class should have been certified (216 Cal.App.4th at p. 866).
Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP
Piece-rate employees are entitled to separate hourly compensation for time spent waiting for repair work or performing other nonrepair tasks directed by the employer during their work shifts; piece-rate earnings cannot be averaged across that nonproductive time to satisfy the minimum-wage obligation (215 Cal.App.4th…
Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc.: PDLL Leave Is a Floor, Not a Ceiling, on FEHA Accommodation
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeal held that an employee disabled by a high-risk pregnancy who was terminated after exhausting the four months of leave guaranteed by the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law may still state a FEHA claim, because the PDLL augments rather than supplants the independent reasonable-accommodation duty of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m). A finite leave exceeding four months can be a reasonable accommodation, and the plaintiff's allegations cleared demurrer.
McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco — § 1102.5 Protects Reports of Coworker and Third-Party Illegality
A Recology supervisor who reported CRV weight-tag fraud to police and the company's board survived summary judgment: the Court of Appeal held Labor Code section 1102.5 protects reports of illegal conduct by fellow employees and third parties — not just the employer's own violations — and revived his False Claims Act and Tameny claims.
McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology: No Shield for Lying in an Investigation
A manager fired after an internal investigation into a subordinate's harassment complaint sued for discrimination and retaliation. Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h) does not shield an employee from termination or discipline for lying or withholding information during the employer's internal investigation — such dishonesty and non-cooperation are unprotected and supply a legitimate, nondiscriminatory ground to terminate an at-will employee.
Furtado v. State Personnel Board: The Limits of Reassignment as Reasonable Accommodation
A correctional lieutenant who lost the use of his left arm could no longer use a baton or subdue inmates. In Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA's reassignment duty, though affirmative, does not require an employer to waive an essential function or create an administrative position that does not exist; medical demotion to a position the employee could perform was proper.
Olofsson v. Mission Linen Supply
In Olofsson v. Mission Linen Supply (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1236, the First District held that an employer’s regulatory duty to respond to a CFRA leave request within ten calendar days is not a duty to grant or deny it within that window. Affirming a defense judgment, the court ruled substantial evidence supported findings that the employer neither misrepresented that a route driver’s family leave was approved nor stayed silent when it had a duty to speak, even though it disclosed his ineligibility — 175 to 176 hours short of the 1,250-hour threshold — only the day before he left to care for his mother.
Lui v. City and County of San Francisco: When Rarely-Used Strenuous Duties Are Still Essential Functions
In Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, the First District affirmed a defense judgment, holding that strenuous patrol duties — forcible arrests, pursuing suspects, emergency response — are essential functions of administrative police positions because the Department must be able to deploy every full-duty officer during mass mobilizations, even if those situations are infrequent. A disabled officer who cannot perform those duties is not a qualified individual under FEHA, and the employer need not create a permanent light-duty post.
Veronese v. Lucasfilm: The Business-Judgment Instruction and Reversible Instructional Error in a Pregnancy-Discrimination Case
Reversing a $113,830 pregnancy-discrimination verdict against Lucasfilm, the First District held that a FEHA defendant is entitled, on request, to a “business judgment” jury instruction — the rule that an employer may act on a wrong, unwise, or mistaken but nondiscriminatory reason — and that an abstractly correct “no fetal-hazard defense” instruction untethered to any defense actually in the case was misleading error. The cumulative instructional errors required a retrial.
Fitzsimons v. California Emergency Physicians: A Partner’s Right to Sue for Retaliation
A physician-partner alleged she was stripped of her regional directorship after reporting that CEP officers had sexually harassed the partnership's employees. The trial court dismissed her claim because, as a partner, she was not an “employee.” The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that FEHA's retaliation provision protects “any person” who opposes forbidden practices — so a partner who opposes her partnership-employer's harassment of its employees is protected from retaliation, notwithstanding Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines.
Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc.
Neither Labor Code section 1194 nor section 218.5 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a party that prevails on a section 226.7 claim; such claims are not actions for the nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime (§1194) and are not the kind of nonpayment-of-wages action that triggers §218.5 fee-shifting, so each…
Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court: Provide, Not Ensure — California’s Governing Meal-and-Rest and Class-Certification Decision
Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 is California’s foundational meal-and-rest decision: an employer must provide a duty-free meal period but need not ensure no work is done; it sets the meal-timing and rest-period rules and confirms that courts may resolve merits questions enmeshed with class certification.
Rehmani v. Superior Court: Coworker Harassment and the Employer-Negligence Standard
A Muslim engineer born in Pakistan raised triable claims that his employer was liable for a hostile work environment created by Indian coworkers. Because the harassers were nonsupervisory, liability turned on negligence — whether the employer knew or should have known and failed to take corrective action. The Court of Appeal granted a writ reversing summary adjudication of the national-origin and religion harassment claims.
Joaquin v. City of Los Angeles: The Honest-Belief Defense to Retaliation
An LAPD officer who was disciplined after the Department concluded he had fabricated a sexual-harassment complaint won a jury verdict for retaliation. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an employer does not retaliate under FEHA when it disciplines an employee based on a genuine, good-faith determination that the harassment complaint was false — and that an independent, de novo adjudication of the charges insulates the resulting discipline from claims that animus tainted the underlying investigation.
Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Community College Dist. — Defining “Disclosure” (and What Kolla’s Later Rejected)
The First District reversed a defense verdict for instructional error, holding a whistleblower's motive irrelevant and reasonable-belief reports of unlawful policies protected even where debatable — but its further rule that reporting “publicly known” information is not a disclosure was later rejected by the Supreme Court in Kolla's, and the article maps what survives.
Harris v. Superior Court
Courts may not treat the administrative/production worker dichotomy as a dispositive test for the administrative exemption; the exemption must be analyzed under the language of the applicable IWC wage order and governing regulations, considering the actual work performed, rather than a rigid dichotomy.
Jaramillo v. County of Orange
Jaramillo v. County of Orange A peace officer’s warnings to his own boss about the boss’s illegal conduct are protected whistleblowing under Labor Code section 1102.5; blanket POBRA waivers are invalid; and after-acquired evidence of unrelated crimes does not retroactively defeat a wrongful-discharge backpay award. Jaramillo v. County of Orange (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 811 Parallel […]
Earl v. Nielsen Media Research — Comparator Age Pretext
Nielsen fired Christine Earl, 59, for recording the wrong house address on a recruitment form, citing her history of policy violations. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on her FEHA age discrimination and wrongful termination claims: recruiters aged
Rogers v. County of Los Angeles
The Court of Appeal reversed a $356,000 CFRA judgment, holding that the right to reinstatement to the same or a comparable position expires at the end of the 12-week protected leave — so an employee who returned after 19 weeks had no interference claim — and that her retaliation claim failed for lack of evidence rebutting the County’s reorganization rationale.
Pantoja v. Anton: Me-Too Evidence and Harassment Because of Sex
After a Kern County jury returned a defense verdict, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “me-too” evidence of harassment of other women — even outside the plaintiff’s presence — is admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove discriminatory intent and motive, and that harassment “because of sex” requires bias against the plaintiff’s gender, not sexual desire.
Kelley v. The Conco Companies: Employer Liability for Coworker Retaliation
An ironworker apprentice subjected to graphic same-sex verbal abuse complained, then faced a campaign of coworker hostility and lost work opportunities. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment on the sexual-harassment claim (the conduct was not shown to be “because of sex”) but revived the retaliation claim, holding that an employer may be liable under FEHA when it knows or should know that coworkers are punishing an employee for protected complaints and fails to take reasonable steps to stop them.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
The FAA preempts the Discover Bank rule. A state rule that conditions the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to…
Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles: Light-Duty Posts Define the Essential-Functions Inquiry
A disabled LAPD officer placed in a permanent administrative light-duty post under the department's longstanding accommodation policy is a qualified individual under FEHA if he can perform that post's essential functions — not the field duties of a sworn officer generally. Removing him because a workers' compensation administrator rated him 100% disabled violated Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m). The Court of Appeal affirmed a $1,571,500 judgment.
Wills v. Superior Court
The FEHA protects an employee’s disability status, not threatening or violent conduct; an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for making workplace threats even if the threats are caused by a disability, and doing so is not unlawful disability discrimination (195 Cal.App.4th at p. 147).
Staub v. Proctor Hospital: “Cat’s Paw” (Subordinate-Bias) Liability Under USERRA and Title VII
The Supreme Court’s foundational “cat’s paw” decision: an employer is liable when a biased supervisor performs an act intended to cause an adverse employment action that is a proximate cause of the ultimate decision — even if the formal decisionmaker had no discriminatory animus. A decisionmaker’s “independent investigation” does not automatically break the causal chain, especially when it credits the biased actor’s report without independently confirming the action was justified.
Holmes v. Petrovich: Adverse Employment Action, Pregnancy Discrimination, and Privilege on a Company Computer
The Third District affirmed summary adjudication against a pregnant executive assistant whose two-month tenure ended in resignation after a pointed email exchange about her maternity-leave dates, holding the conduct neither severe nor pervasive enough to be FEHA harassment and not an adverse employment action under Yanowitz. In a holding of lasting evidentiary importance, the court also held that emails Holmes sent her attorney on the company computer — after being warned it was monitored and not private — were not confidential under Evidence Code section 952 and so were not privileged.
Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A.
Section 203(b) contains a single, three-year limitations period governing all actions for section 203 penalties, regardless of whether the penalty claim is accompanied by a claim for unpaid final wages; and the penalties may be recovered even though the underlying wages were eventually paid.
Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc.: Prima Facie Inferences, Pretext, and Age-and-Disability Disparate Treatment
A salesman who suffered a stroke and was fired raised triable issues of age and disability discrimination, even though the same people who hired him made the decision. The Fourth District reversed summary judgment, holding that cane use met the disability threshold, that unexplained employer actions can supply the prima facie inference, and that a strong same-actor inference is still only an inference for the jury (CACI Nos. 2500, 2540, 2570).
Reid v. Google, Inc.
Evidentiary objections made in writing before the summary-judgment hearing are preserved for appeal even if the trial court does not expressly rule on them. And California does not adopt a rigid stray-remarks doctrine: discriminatory remarks are not categorically irrelevant but must be considered, with all the…
Reeves v. MV Transportation, Inc.: When a Qualifications Comparison Supports an Inference of Discrimination
A plaintiff who relies on his superior qualifications to prove discrimination must show a substantial disparity — a juror who finds the comparison merely 'close' will not ordinarily infer bias. Affirming summary judgment, the First District surveyed the federal relative-qualifications cases and held that the gap between the rejected applicant and the person hired was not wide enough to raise a triable issue.
Chavez v. City of Los Angeles
A trial court has discretion to deny or reduce a FEHA fee award when the plaintiff’s recovery is modest and the case could have been litigated as a limited civil case; where the fees sought are grossly disproportionate to a minor recovery (here, the judgment could have been rendered in a limited civil case), the court…
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital
To state a hostile-environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that was unwelcome, based on sex, and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; an employee may be “subjected to” a hostile environment by harassment she…
Raytheon Co. v. FEHC: AIDS Is a Protected Handicap and the Danger Defense Is the Employer’s Burden
Raytheon refused to reinstate an employee diagnosed with AIDS even though its own medical staff and public-health officials uniformly found the disease was not transmissible through ordinary workplace contact. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission found unlawful handicap discrimination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. AIDS is a physical handicap protected by California's antidiscrimination law, and an employer invoking the threat-to-health-and-safety-of-others defense bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations: California’s Multifactor Control Test for Independent-Contractor Status
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 sets California’s multifactor control test for employee vs. independent-contractor status — the right to control the manner and means of the work, plus secondary factors, applied in light of the statute’s protective purpose. It still governs the Assembly Bill 5 exemptions after Dynamex.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
The Tameny claim failed because Foley’s report about a coworker served the employer’s private interest, not a fundamental public policy. Foley nonetheless adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause — based on longevity of service, promotions, raises, assurances, and the employer’s…
Mixon v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Discriminatory Animus Need Not Be the Sole Motivation
A FEHA complainant need not prove that discriminatory animus was the sole motivation for an adverse action — but must still prove it was a determining factor. Affirming the Commission's finding that a Black employee was discharged for commute-cost reasons rather than race, the Sixth District clarified the causation standard that underlies CACI Nos. 2500 and 2507, even as it upheld the employer's legitimate-reason defense on the facts.
Ibarbia v. Regents of the University of California: Proving Discriminatory Impact Without Proving Intent
A disparate-impact plaintiff is relieved of proving discriminatory intent, but is not relieved of proving the discriminatory impact. Affirming summary judgment for the University, the First District held that the plaintiff offered no statistical or other evidence that a facially neutral practice fell more harshly on a protected group — the indispensable element of a disparate-impact theory (CACI No. 2502).
City and County of San Francisco v. FEHC: Disparate Impact in a Firefighter Promotional Exam
A facially neutral firefighter promotional exam that screened out Black candidates at well below four-fifths of the White rate, and that failed to test the job’s primary supervisory function, violated FEHA — though parallel federal litigation displaced the Commission’s remedy.
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra: Pregnancy-Leave Statute Upheld — the “Floor, Not a Ceiling”
When Lillian Garland returned from pregnancy disability leave to find her receptionist job filled, California’s guarantee of leave and reinstatement collided with her employer’s theory that Title VII forbade treating pregnancy “better” than other disabilities. The Supreme Court sided with California: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is a floor beneath which pregnancy benefits may not drop, not a ceiling above which states may not rise — and employers can always comply with both laws by leveling benefits up. Guerra remains the constitutional foundation of the PDLL and of every California pregnancy protection built since.
Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.: The BFOQ Defense and Customer Preference
An exclusive all-male club is a covered FEHA employer, and its members’ preference for male staff is no bona fide occupational qualification. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the BFOQ defense is an extremely narrow exception that customer preference can never satisfy.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
A claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII; the harassment need not cause economic or tangible loss, but must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and must be unwelcome.
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell (1985) 472 U.S. 400, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part age-BFOQ test for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: the age limit must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business, and the employer must show either reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all older workers cannot perform the job safely or that it is impossible or highly impractical to assess older employees individually. The Court rejected a deferential “rational basis” standard.
Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court
Punitive damages are recoverable under the FEHA in a court action for intentional employment discrimination; the statute’s remedial scheme does not limit a plaintiff to the relief the administrative agency could award, so the full range of tort-type remedies, including punitive damages, is available.
Connecticut v. Teal: Title VII Protects the Individual, Not the Bottom Line
The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a racially balanced “bottom-line” workforce to defend a discriminatory pass/fail barrier that excludes individual employees. Title VII protects the person, not just the group.
Sterling Transit Co. v. FEP Commission: The Physical-Handicap Danger and BFOQ Defenses
A trucking company refused permanent employment to a driver whose preemployment physical revealed a congenital low-back condition, applying an absolute rule against hiring anyone with back deficiencies. The Fair Employment Practice Commission found unlawful handicap discrimination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. An employer cannot exclude handicapped workers by class unless all or substantially all of the class cannot perform safely, the individualized safety defense cannot rest on conjecture of future harm, and there is no financial-impact exception.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine At step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 Parallel citations: […]
Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.
Yes. The longevity of Pugh’s service, together with the employer’s commendations and assurances and its acknowledged practices, supported an implied-in-fact promise that he would not be discharged except for good cause; the nonsuit was therefore error and the judgment was reversed (id. at p. 330).
For practitioners
Practice guides
Each guide gathers and summarizes the controlling cases and authorities on a single question — a research starting point you can cite from.
Practice guideRetaliation under Lab. Code § 1102.5A practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideFEHA discrimination & the McDonnell Douglas testA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideTermination in violation of public policyA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideCompelling arbitration of FEHA claimsA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideDisability discrimination & reasonable accommodationA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideSexual harassment under FEHAA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideOff-the-clock work & compensable hours workedA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideMeal & rest breaks & premium payA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideWage & hour class actions & PAGAA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideIndependent-contractor misclassification & the ABC testA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.