Practice Guide · Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Tameny Claims)

A practitioner’s synthesis of the common-law tort recognized in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. — when a discharge that violates a fundamental public policy gives an employee, even an at-will employee, a tort claim for damages; the four-part test for a qualifying policy; the recurring categories of protected conduct; who may be sued; and how the claim pairs with statutory theories. A research starting point you can cite from.

Practice Guide
Wrongful Termination
Public Policy
Tameny
Tort & Punitive Damages
Authorities current to June 2026

By Jonathan J. Delshad, Editor-in-Chief · Last reviewed June 22, 2026

In brief. California recognizes a common-law tort — the “Tameny claim” — for an employee discharged in violation of a fundamental public policy. Because the claim sounds in tort rather than contract, it reaches at-will employees and opens the door to tort damages, including punitive damages. The decisive question in most cases is whether the policy the employer violated is sufficiently fundamental, public, and well established, and is tethered to a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision. This guide collects the governing authority and the points that decide these cases.

1. The tort and why it matters

In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, the California Supreme Court held that “when an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Id. at p. 170.) The plaintiff alleged he was fired for refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme. The Court reasoned that “an employer’s authority over its employee does not include the right to demand that the employee commit a criminal act,” and an employer may not “coerce compliance with such unlawful directions by discharging an employee who refuses to follow such an order.” (Id. at p. 178.)

The significance is remedial. The tort is a judicially created exception to the at-will presumption of Labor Code section 2922, and — because it sounds in tort, not contract — it makes the full range of tort damages available, including emotional-distress and punitive damages. That distinguishes the Tameny claim from contract-based employment theories, such as breach of an implied-in-fact agreement not to terminate without good cause or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which sound in contract and generally yield only contract damages. (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317.) For that reason the tort is a frequent — and valuable — companion to statutory discrimination and retaliation claims.

2. The four-part test for a qualifying public policy

Not every workplace grievance will support the tort. The public policy at issue must satisfy four requirements, stated most cleanly in Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889–890. The policy must be: (1) delineated in a constitutional or statutory provision; (2) “public” in that it “inures to the benefit of the public” rather than serving merely the employee’s individual interest; (3) well established and articulated at the time of the discharge; and (4) “fundamental” and “substantial.” (Ibid.) These requirements synthesize Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083 and Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 669–670 (the policy must “affect society at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest”). The requirement that the policy be “well established” at the time of discharge means the employer must have been on notice; a novel or debatable policy will not support the tort.

3. Sources and categories of public policy

Gantt identified four recurring categories of protected conduct: an employee discharged for “(1) refusing to violate a statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation; (3) exercising a constitutional or statutory right or privilege; or (4) reporting a statutory violation for the public’s benefit.” (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1090–1091.) The policy must be “carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Id. at p. 1095.)

The source need not be a statute alone. Administrative regulations may also supply a fundamental public policy, provided they implement a constitutional or statutory objective. (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80.) (Gantt was overruled on another point in Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 80, fn. 6, insofar as it suggested a regulation could never be a policy source; Gantt’s four categories and the tethering requirement otherwise remain good law.)

In practice, the policies most often invoked include: the policy against discrimination embodied in the FEHA — the policy against age discrimination supports the tort (Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th 880), as does the policy against sex discrimination and harassment (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65); the whistleblower protections of Labor Code section 1102.5; workplace-safety requirements (the setting of Green); and an employee’s adherence to a mandatory professional or ethical obligation — the Supreme Court held in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 that even an in-house attorney may pursue a retaliatory-discharge claim when fired for following a mandatory ethical duty. The unifying thread is that the conduct serves a public interest the Legislature or Constitution has identified, not merely the employee’s private advantage.

Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167

Foundational holding

“[W]hen an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” (Id. at p. 170.)

Read the Review’s full case analysis of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield →

4. Elements of the claim

To prevail, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an employer-employee relationship; (2) that the employer discharged the plaintiff; (3) that the violation of public policy was a substantial motivating reason for the discharge; (4) that the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) that the discharge was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (See Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instns. (CACI) No. 2430.)

Two elements deserve emphasis. The discharge element is satisfied by either an actual termination or a constructive discharge — a resignation coerced by working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign; counsel should plead constructive discharge expressly where the separation took that form. The causation element applies the “substantial motivating reason” standard that the Supreme Court adopted for FEHA claims in Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232, and that the CACI directions carry over to the public-policy tort. That standard requires more than a trivial or incidental role for the protected conduct, but does not require it to be the sole or “but for” cause.

5. Who may be sued

The tort lies only against the employer. As the Court explained in Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, a “Tameny action for wrongful discharge can only be asserted against an employer”; an individual who is not the employer “cannot commit the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy” and can only be “the agent by which an employer commits that tort.” (Id. at p. 900.) Individual supervisors and managers are therefore not proper defendants on this count — a meaningful difference from FEHA harassment claims, which do impose personal liability.

The tort also may not be asserted against public entities, which are immune from common-law tort liability under Government Code section 815. (Miklosy, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 899–900.) Against a public employer, counsel must look to statutory remedies — FEHA, the Labor Code, or the whistleblower statutes — rather than a common-law Tameny count. Screening the defendant’s status at intake avoids pleading a count that will not survive demurrer.

6. Relationship to statutory claims

The common-law tort is not displaced by overlapping statutory schemes. The FEHA does not provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination, does not supplant common-law claims, and does not require a plaintiff to exhaust FEHA’s administrative procedures before bringing a Tameny claim. (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88–91.) That last point is significant: a plaintiff who has missed the deadline to obtain a FEHA right-to-sue notice, or who simply prefers not to exhaust, may still pursue a Tameny claim grounded in the FEHA’s anti-discrimination policy (subject to the tort’s own limitations period). Likewise, Labor Code section 132a is not the exclusive remedy for work-related disability discrimination; FEHA and common-law remedies remain available. (City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1158.) In practice, plaintiffs plead the statutory violation (FEHA or Lab. Code, § 1102.5) together with a parallel Tameny count — capturing the statutory fee entitlement while preserving tort and punitive-damages exposure.

7. Remedies and limitations

Because the claim sounds in tort, a prevailing plaintiff may recover compensatory tort damages — including lost earnings and emotional-distress damages — and, on a showing of oppression, fraud, or malice by clear and convincing evidence, punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3294.) For a corporate employer, the punitive-damages showing must reach an officer, director, or managing agent. (Id., subd. (b).) The availability of punitive damages is the principal reason to plead the tort alongside a statutory claim that does not itself authorize them.

The Tameny tort is a personal-injury claim generally subject to a two-year limitations period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.) That is shorter than the three-year period that governs a statutory Labor Code section 1102.5 claim and shorter than the FEHA administrative window, so when several theories are pleaded, calendar to the earliest applicable date and do not let the tort lapse while pursuing administrative exhaustion on the statutory claims.

8. Practice pointers

  • Anchor the policy in a specific provision. Identify the constitutional, statutory, or regulatory source up front; generalized appeals to “public policy” that are not tethered to a concrete provision fail under Gantt and Stevenson.
  • Confirm the policy was well established at the time of discharge. A policy that was novel or unsettled when the employer acted will not support the tort.
  • Use the tort to unlock punitive damages. Pair the Tameny count with the statutory claim; the statute often supplies attorney’s fees while the tort supplies punitive exposure.
  • Sue the right defendant. The employer only — not individual supervisors, and not public entities. Against a public employer, rely on the statutory claim.
  • Plead constructive discharge where the resignation was coerced by intolerable conditions; the discharge element requires a termination, actual or constructive.
  • Mind the two-year clock. The tort’s limitations period is shorter than several companion statutory claims and does not wait for administrative exhaustion.

Frequently asked questions

What is wrongful termination in violation of public policy?

It is a tort claim — a “Tameny” claim — that lets an at-will California employee sue for being fired for a reason that violates a fundamental public policy, such as refusing to break the law, reporting illegal conduct, or exercising a legal right. It comes from Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980).

Can I sue for wrongful termination if I’m an at-will employee?

Yes. At-will employees can still sue for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. At-will status lets an employer fire you for almost any reason or no reason — but not for a reason that violates a fundamental, legally established public policy.

What do I have to prove for a Tameny claim?

That the policy your firing violated is (1) fundamental, (2) public — benefiting society, not just you, (3) well established when you were fired, and (4) grounded in a constitutional or statutory provision. This four-part test comes from Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) and Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997).

Can I sue my supervisor personally for wrongful termination?

No. Only the employer can be sued for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Individual supervisors, managers, and coworkers cannot be held personally liable for the discharge itself.

What damages can I recover, and how long do I have to sue?

Because the claim is a tort, you can recover lost pay and benefits, emotional-distress damages, and — if the employer acted with oppression, fraud, or malice — punitive damages. The deadline is generally two years from the termination (Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1).

Key authorities

Browse related decisions in the case index →

See also: Badih v. Myers