Troester v. Starbucks Corp.
California wage law has not adopted the federal FLSA de minimis doctrine; an employer that regularly requires small amounts of off-the-clock work must compensate that time.
Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829
Wage & Hour
Off-the-Clock Work
De Minimis
Hours Worked
Certified Question
In brief. Answering a certified question, the Court held that California’s wage statutes and IWC wage orders “have not” adopted the federal de minimis rule, and that the de minimis principle did not apply to the facts presented — regularly recurring off-the-clock closing work of several minutes per shift. (Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, 834, 838–848.) An employer “that requires its employees to work minutes off the clock on a regular basis or as a regular feature of the job” must compensate that time. (Id. at p. 847.)
Facts
Douglas Troester worked as a shift supervisor for Starbucks. (5 Cal.5th at pp. 834–835.) The store’s software required him to clock out before completing closing tasks: transmitting daily sales data, activating the alarm, locking the doors, and walking coworkers to their cars, plus occasionally reopening the store to let employees retrieve belongings or to await safe departure. (Ibid.) These tasks took roughly four to ten minutes after each closing shift and, over Troester’s seventeen months of employment, totaled about $102.67 in unpaid time. (Id. at p. 835.) Troester sued for the unpaid wages, and the matter reached the Ninth Circuit, which certified to the California Supreme Court whether the FLSA’s de minimis doctrine applies to such claims under California law. (Id. at pp. 833–835.)
Procedural history
The federal district court granted Starbucks summary judgment, applying the federal de minimis doctrine to excuse the small amounts of unpaid time. (5 Cal.5th at p. 835.) On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified the controlling state-law question to the California Supreme Court, which answered it. (Id. at pp. 833–835, 848.)
Issue
Have California’s wage statutes and wage orders incorporated the federal FLSA de minimis doctrine — under which small, hard-to-record increments of work time may be disregarded — and, if not, does a de minimis principle nonetheless excuse compensation for several minutes of regularly recurring off-the-clock work? (5 Cal.5th at pp. 833–834.)
Holding
California has not adopted the federal de minimis rule, and it does not apply here. As to the first question — whether the wage statutes and orders “incorporate the federal de minimis rule” — “[w]e conclude they have not,” finding no indication in the relevant statutes and IWC wage orders “of such adoption.” (5 Cal.5th at pp. 838–842.) As to the second — whether a de minimis principle otherwise applies — “the relevant wage order and statutes do not permit application of the de minimis rule on the facts given to us,” because the work was required “on a regular basis.” (Id. at pp. 842–848.) An employer may not “evade the obligation to compensate the employee for that time by invoking the de minimis doctrine.” (Id. at p. 847.) Question answered. (Id. at p. 848.)
Reasoning
1. The FLSA de minimis doctrine is a federal gloss. The Court explained that the federal de minimis rule — recognizing that employers need not count “insubstantial or insignificant periods of time beyond the scheduled working hours, which cannot as a practical administrative matter be precisely recorded” — is a judicially created and regulatory feature of the FLSA. (5 Cal.5th at pp. 836–838.) California’s wage laws are independent and generally more protective, and the Court will not assume they silently incorporate federal limitations. (Ibid.)
2. No adoption in California’s text. Examining the Labor Code and the IWC wage orders, the Court found neither “amended to recognize a de minimis exception” nor otherwise expressing adoption of the federal rule. (5 Cal.5th at pp. 838–842.) California requires payment for “all hours worked,” defined broadly, and that mandate is not qualified by a de minimis carve-out. (Ibid.)
3. The de minimis principle does not fit regular off-the-clock work. The Court declined to graft a de minimis principle onto these facts. (5 Cal.5th at pp. 842–848.) Where “an employer . . . requires its employees to work minutes off the clock on a regular basis or as a regular feature of the job,” the time is neither truly irregular nor administratively impracticable to capture — modern timekeeping and scheduling make such time recordable. (Id. at pp. 845–847.) Even small amounts, “when added up . . . over a period of weeks, months, or years,” are substantial to a low-wage worker, and California’s wage laws are meant to protect exactly such workers. (Id. at pp. 844–847.)
4. A narrow reservation. The Court did not hold that every minute always must be captured in every circumstance. It expressly left open whether some de minimis-type principle might apply to work that is “so irregular or brief in duration that . . . employers may [not] reasonably be required to compensate employees for the time spent on them.” (5 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848.) Justice Cuéllar concurred separately, emphasizing both the protective thrust of the holding and the limited nature of any residual exception. (Id. at pp. 848 et seq. (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
Significance
Troester is the controlling California authority on off-the-clock work and the de minimis defense, and a leading example of California wage law diverging from the FLSA. By refusing to import the federal de minimis rule for regularly recurring small increments of work, it exposed common practices — pre- and post-shift closing tasks, security procedures, computer boot-up and log-off, bag checks, and the like — to wage liability and class and PAGA claims. It pairs with Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038 (time spent in mandatory exit bag searches is compensable) and the broad “hours worked”/control analysis of Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575. Employers responded by re-engineering timekeeping to capture all work time. Troester remains the first authority in any off-the-clock dispute. See the Review’s coverage of the wage-and-hour line.
Key quotes
On whether California adopted the federal rule: “We conclude they have not.” (Troester, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 838.)
An employer “that requires its employees to work minutes off the clock on a regular basis or as a regular feature of the job may not evade the obligation to compensate the employee for that time by invoking the de minimis doctrine.” (Id. at p. 847.)
Small amounts of time, “when added up . . . over a period of weeks, months, or years,” can be substantial to a worker. (Id. at p. 844.)
Read the full opinion (California Supreme Court — full text) →
Practice pointer
Hunt for regular off-the-clock routines. After Troester, the de minimis defense fails for time that recurs as a regular feature of the job, so identify required pre/post-shift tasks performed off the clock — closing and opening procedures, security or bag checks (Frlekin), system log-in/log-out, donning/doffing, and travel under employer control (Morillion) — and show they happened routinely and were recordable. Aggregate the small daily increments across the class period; they add up to substantial unpaid wages and support class/PAGA claims. Employers should audit timekeeping so that all work time is captured (clock-out only after all tasks), and should not rely on a de minimis defense for routine off-the-clock work; reserve any de minimis argument for genuinely irregular, brief, hard-to-record time, the narrow zone Troester left open.
Open questions
Troester left open whether any de minimis-type principle applies to work “so irregular or brief” that compensation cannot reasonably be required, and lower courts continue to map that narrow zone. How the holding applies to fractions of a minute, to modern electronic time systems, and to particular routines (booting computers, security lines, remote log-ins) remains actively litigated, as does its interaction with rounding practices.
See also: Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors · Camp v. Home Depot