Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District
The Fourth District holds that a postsecondary nursing student in a required clinical rotation qualifies as an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA, and reverses summary judgment for the college district on standing, Government-Claims-Act notice, and deliberate indifference.
Walton v. Victor Valley Community College Dist. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1164
Harassment
FEHA
Unpaid intern
Reversed
In brief. Jessie Walton, a postsecondary nursing student, alleged that the District faculty member supervising her hospital clinical rotation sexually harassed her and retaliated when she refused his advances. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District, holding she was a student rather than an “unpaid intern” and so lacked FEHA standing. The Court of Appeal reversed across the board: a student in a required clinical placement can simultaneously be an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (c), (j)(1)); counsel’s pre-suit demand letter substantially complied with the Government Claims Act regardless of its “confidential settlement” label; a triable issue of deliberate indifference existed despite the District’s investigation; and the court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s declaration over a curable subscription defect. (Walton v. Victor Valley Community College Dist. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170–1176.)
By Jonathan J. Delshad
Draft for review · source-verification pending
Facts and statutory framework
FEHA makes it unlawful “[f]or any person to discriminate against any person in the … training, or other terms or treatment of that person in … an unpaid internship … because of the … sex [or] gender,” and separately “[f]or an employer … or any other person, because of … sex [or] gender … , to harass … an unpaid intern.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (c), (j)(1); see 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172.) The Legislature added these protections in 2015. (Id. at pp. 1172–1173; Stats. 2014, ch. 302, § 1.) A parallel provision, Education Code section 66270, mirrors Title IX and bars gender discrimination “in any program or activity conducted by any postsecondary educational institution” receiving state funds. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.)
Jessie Walton enrolled as a postsecondary nursing student at the District in 2017; her coursework required clinical rotations at local hospitals, where District faculty supervised her work with patients. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1168.) Her spring 2018 supervisor, the District’s nursing program director Diego Garcia, allegedly subjected her to “extensive verbal and physical sexual harassment” and sought to coerce a sexual relationship in exchange for better grades; when she rebuffed him, he allegedly gave her a nonpassing grade and refused to discuss it. (Ibid.) Walton complained to the District in June 2018; the District placed Garcia on leave and retained an outside investigator, whose 79-page report found Garcia had “highly inappropriate[ly]” sexually harassed Walton and another student, after which human resources recommended his removal. (Id. at p. 1168.) Walton, however, had by then been denied a grade change, repeated the semester, and ultimately withdrew, completing her degree out of state. (Id. at pp. 1168, 1175.)
In December 2018, Walton’s counsel sent the District a 13-page letter detailing Garcia’s misconduct, estimating damages, and warning of litigation; it was labeled “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL” under Evidence Code section 1152 and did not reference the Government Claims Act. (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1168–1169.) Walton later sued, asserting five FEHA claims (sex discrimination, sexual harassment, failure to prevent, retaliation, injunctive relief), Civil Code and Education Code claims, and negligence. (Id. at p. 1169.)
Procedural history
The District moved for summary judgment, arguing Walton lacked FEHA standing as a mere student, failed to give Government Claims Act notice, and could not show deliberate indifference under the Education Code. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1169.) In opposition, Walton submitted her counsel’s declaration authenticating much of her evidence — including the December 2018 letter and deposition excerpts showing the District knew Garcia had harassed other students. (Ibid.) The declaration bore counsel’s signature but omitted the place of execution and the statement that it was made under penalty of perjury under California law. (Id. at pp. 1169–1170; Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) The trial court sustained the District’s objection, excluded the declaration, and granted summary judgment on every theory. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170.) Less than an hour later, counsel filed a corrected declaration under penalty of perjury; the court deemed it untimely and entered judgment for the District. (Ibid.) The opinion was filed March 18, 2026 and ordered published April 14, 2026. (Id. at p. 1167.)
Issue
Three questions controlled: (1) whether a postsecondary nursing student completing a required clinical rotation can qualify as an “unpaid intern” with standing to sue under FEHA; (2) whether a pre-suit demand letter labeled a confidential settlement communication can satisfy the Government Claims Act; and (3) whether a public entity’s having conducted an investigation defeats, as a matter of law, the “deliberate indifference” element of an Education Code section 66270 claim. A threshold evidentiary question — whether the trial court could exclude counsel’s declaration for a curable subscription defect — preceded all three. (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1170–1174.)
Holding
Reversed. (1) “[A] postsecondary nursing student like Walton doing a clinical rotation at a hospital qualifies as an ‘unpaid intern’ under FEHA”; “student” and “unpaid intern” are not mutually exclusive, and her student status “does not deprive her of FEHA protection.” (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1172–1173.) (2) Counsel’s 13-page December 2018 letter substantially complied with the Government Claims Act, because the “relevant inquiry” is whether the letter disclosed a claim that, if unresolved, would result in litigation — not the claimant’s subjective intent or the letter’s label. (Id. at pp. 1173–1174.) (3) The bare fact that the District “conducted an investigation is not necessarily dispositive”; a jury could find deliberate indifference where the investigation conferred no benefit on Walton and the District had earlier reports about Garcia. (Id. at pp. 1174–1175.) (4) Excluding counsel’s declaration for a curable Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5 defect was an abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 1170–1171.) The District obtains summary adjudication only on the unchallenged Civil Code cause of action. (Id. at p. 1176.)
Reasoning
1. A curable declaration defect should have been cured, not weaponized. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court reaffirmed that summary judgment should not rest “on a curable procedural default, which deprives the opposing party of a decision on the merits,” and that the “proper response” to a defective declaration is to allow a cure. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1170, quoting Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211, 1213.) A missing section 2015.5 subscription is exactly such a curable defect (citing Gall v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 117, 125, and Ambriz v. Kelegian (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1527–1528). Counsel was in the courtroom, could have fixed the error on the spot, and did cure it hours later; the District identified no prejudice. (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1170–1171.) Because the trial court never ruled on the District’s other objections, the court presumed them overruled and deemed them forfeited for lack of renewed argument on appeal. (Id. at p. 1171.)
2. “Student” and “unpaid intern” are not mutually exclusive. The decisive move on standing was interpretive. The Legislature, in extending FEHA to unpaid interns, expressly understood that “many ‘internships are part of a more formalized educational or vocational program,’” and singled out nursing among programs that “require or at least typically include some type of internship placement.” (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172, quoting the bill analysis; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11008(m) [defining “unpaid intern” as “any individual (often a student or trainee)” in an unpaid placement].) Reading the statute and regulation together, the court concluded that a student’s status cannot strip her of intern protection. (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1172–1173.)
3. The District ran the internship and is a covered “person.” The court rejected the District’s argument that Walton “volunteered at hospitals, not for the District,” because the evidence showed District staff — not hospital staff — supervised her and “controlled the details of her work,” a point Garcia’s own declaration appeared to concede. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.) FEHA’s unpaid-intern provisions reach “any person” and “any other person,” not just formal employers, so the District was subject to them. (Ibid.; Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (c), (j)(1).)
4. Substantial compliance turns on disclosure, not the sender’s intent. On the Government Claims Act, the court applied the substantial-compliance test: a claim suffices if there is “some compliance with all of the statutory requirements” and it discloses enough to let the entity investigate and, if appropriate, settle. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173, quoting A.S. v. Palmdale School Dist. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1097.) Counsel’s 13-page letter did so, and the District “tellingly” never identified which required element was missing. (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1173–1174.) The “confidential settlement” label and the sub-45-day response window were immaterial, because under Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 709–710, a claimant’s subjective intent “does not matter”; the question is whether the letter disclosed a claim that, if unresolved, would lead to litigation. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.)
5. An investigation is not a deliberate-indifference safe harbor. Applying the Title IX-parallel elements of an Education Code section 66270 claim, the court held the “bare fact” of an investigation was not dispositive “particularly considering the order of events.” (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1174–1175.) The District refused to correct Walton’s grade, forced her to repeat the semester, and prompted her withdrawal before the investigation concluded, so the investigation “conferred no benefit on Walton, aside from belatedly validating her complaints” — from which “[a] reasonable jury could potentially find ‘deliberate indifference.’” (Id. at p. 1175.) The wrongly excluded declaration also contained evidence of prior reports about Garcia, reinforcing the triable issue. (Ibid.) Finally, the court held Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587 — no duty to prevent “nonphysical” harassment — inapplicable because Walton alleged unwanted physical touching, so her negligence claim survived. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.)
Significance
Walton supplies the published authority the court said was needed on two points: that an unpaid intern’s FEHA standing is not defeated by concurrent student status, and that the “deliberate indifference” element of a section 66270 claim is not satisfied as a matter of law merely because the institution investigated. For employment practitioners, the intern-standing holding matters well beyond higher education: any organization that places students, trainees, or clinical participants in supervised, unpaid roles can be a covered “person” under FEHA’s harassment and discrimination provisions, and cannot assume those protections attach only to payroll employees. The opinion is also a strong restatement of two recurring summary-judgment principles — that curable declaration defects must be allowed to be cured rather than used to win dispositive motions, and that pre-suit demand letters can satisfy the Government Claims Act despite a “settlement” label. Its precedential weight is qualified by the pending petition for review noted above.
Key quotes
“[A] postsecondary nursing student like Walton doing a clinical rotation at a hospital qualifies as an ‘unpaid intern’ under FEHA. Her student status does not deprive her of FEHA protection.” (Walton, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.)
“[T]he bare fact the District conducted an investigation is not necessarily dispositive, particularly considering the order of events. … [T]he investigation conferred no benefit on Walton, aside from belatedly validating her complaints. A reasonable jury could potentially find ‘deliberate indifference’ from these facts.” (Walton, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.)
Practice pointer
Two takeaways for plaintiff-side intake. First, do not let a defendant define your client out of FEHA because she was “just a student,” “a volunteer,” or “a trainee”: if a covered entity supervised and controlled the details of an unpaid placement, the unpaid-intern provisions (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (c), (j)(1)) likely apply, and Walton is your authority. Second, when you send a pre-suit demand to a public entity, assume it may double as your government claim — include the section 910 information (claimant’s name and address, dates and places, a description of the loss, and the responsible employees) even if you label the letter confidential, because substantial compliance turns on disclosure, not your stated intent. On the defense side, Walton forecloses two easy summary-judgment wins: exploiting a curable section 2015.5 subscription error, and treating the existence of an internal investigation as a deliberate-indifference safe harbor — the timing and efficacy of the response remain jury questions. (119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1170–1175.)
Open questions
The opinion leaves the merits entirely for remand: it holds only that triable issues exist, not that Walton will prevail on harassment, retaliation, deliberate indifference, or negligence. (119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.) It does not define the outer limits of who counts as an “unpaid intern” — how much supervision or control a covered entity must exert over an educational placement before FEHA attaches — leaving room for fact-specific disputes in less clear-cut placements. (Id. at p. 1173.) And because the District forfeited its remaining evidentiary objections by not renewing them, the opinion does not resolve whether the deposition excerpts authenticated by counsel’s declaration are otherwise admissible. (Id. at p. 1171.) The pending petition for review may yet reshape the intern-standing holding.