Husband v. Target Corporation
The Second District affirms summary judgment for an employer, holding that knowledge of a disability is a prerequisite to FEHA liability and will be imputed from an employee’s undisclosed mental illness only when the disability is “the only reasonable interpretation” of the observed behavior.
Husband v. Target Corp. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 762
Disability & Accommodation
FEHA
Employer knowledge
Affirmed
In brief. Daniel Husband, who had an undisclosed diagnosis of bipolar I disorder, was terminated by Target after two incidents of erratic, “irrational” workplace behavior, and sued for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the interactive process under FEHA. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Target. An employer’s knowledge of a disability is a prerequisite to liability under each FEHA theory, and FEHA — though liberally construed — “does not reach unknown disabilities.” Knowledge of an undisclosed disability is imputed only when “the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts”; because Husband’s behavior had other reasonable explanations — intoxicants, a combination of prescribed medications, or sleep deprivation — no triable issue of imputed knowledge arose. (Husband v. Target Corp. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 762, 767–769, 778–779.)
By Jonathan J. Delshad
Draft for review · source-verification pending
Facts and statutory framework
FEHA prohibits, among other things, “discriminat[ing] against a person” because of a “mental disability,” “fail[ing] to make reasonable accommodation” for a “known … mental disability,” and “fail[ing] to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process … to determine effective reasonable accommodations.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (a), (m)(1), (n); 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 767.) As the court emphasized, “[a]n employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability is a prerequisite to FEHA liability under any of those theories”: an employer “cannot discriminate against an employee on the basis of a disability if it does not know of that disability,” and cannot fail to accommodate a disability it does not know about. (Id. at pp. 767–768, citing Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1247; the accommodation and interactive-process duties expressly require a “known” disability.)
Target hired Husband in October 2020 as a “fulfillment expert” at its Burbank store. (120 Cal.App.5th at p. 767.) His new-hire materials explained that Target would attempt to accommodate any “known physical or mental limitation(s),” but Husband “did not at the time of orientation or at any time thereafter inform any Target ‘official’” that he had been diagnosed with bipolar I disorder. (Ibid.) For his first twenty months there were no negative incidents. (Ibid.) That changed in June and July 2022, when, on two occasions, Husband behaved “erratically” and “emotional[ly]” — angry, upset, shaking, breathing heavily — and made statements the court described as “undeniably irrational,” including that his inanimate work orders were “laughing at him” and a query about whether he had “killed his stepmother and coworkers with his words.” (Id. at pp. 767, 778.) A supervisor was “concerned for his … mental state,” sent him home after the July 8 incident, and recommended he “get examined by a doctor/psych professional.” (Id. at pp. 767, 776.) Target later terminated him. (Id. at p. 767.)
Procedural history
Husband sued under FEHA for mental-disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the interactive process (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (a), (m)(1), (n)). (120 Cal.App.5th at p. 767.) The trial court granted Target summary judgment, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding “as a matter of law” that Target could not be charged with knowledge of Husband’s undisclosed bipolar disorder based on the two incidents. (Id. at pp. 767, 779.)
Issue
When an employee has not disclosed a mental disability, under what circumstances is the employer charged with knowledge of it — and was a triable issue raised here, where the employee’s undisclosed bipolar disorder manifested on two occasions as “aggressive” and “irrational” behavior that concerned his supervisor? (120 Cal.App.5th at p. 768.)
Holding
Affirmed. An employer’s knowledge of a disability is a statutorily required prerequisite to liability under every section 12940 theory, and FEHA, though liberally construed (Gov. Code, § 12993, subd. (a)), “does not reach unknown disabilities.” (120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 767–768.) For a discrimination claim, knowledge of an undisclosed disability is inferred “only … when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts”; for accommodation and interactive-process claims, only when the disability is “obvious” or its “observed symptoms” are “so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability” that a disability “always follow[s].” (Id. at pp. 768–769.) Husband’s erratic and irrational behavior was “not ‘the only reasonable interpretation’” of the known facts, because it “could also be reasonably interpreted as the side effect of ingesting illegal substances or a combination of prescribed medications or a manifestation of sleep deprivation,” so no triable issue of imputed knowledge existed. (Id. at p. 778.)
Reasoning
1. Knowledge is the gateway to every FEHA disability theory. The court grounded its analysis in the statutory text. Discrimination liability requires that the employer act “because of” a disability — impossible if the employer does not know of it — and the accommodation and interactive-process duties expressly attach only to a “known” disability. (120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 767–768, citing Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (m)(1), (n), and Avila, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.) FEHA’s liberal-construction mandate (§ 12993, subd. (a)) does not dissolve that prerequisite; it “does not reach unknown disabilities.” (Id. at p. 768.)
2. Two standards for imputing knowledge of an undisclosed disability. The court drew a careful distinction between the theories. For discrimination, knowledge is inferred “only … when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts.” (120 Cal.App.5th at p. 768, quoting Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 237.) For failure to accommodate or to engage in the interactive process, knowledge is inferred only if the disability is “obvious” or its “observed symptoms” are “so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability” that the existence of a disability “always follow[s].” (Id. at pp. 768–769, citing Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 601, and Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 724–725.) Both are demanding, objective tests.
3. The behavior had multiple reasonable interpretations. Applying those standards, the court accepted that “emotional and irrational conduct is a symptom of bipolar disorder” and that mental disability was “one reasonable interpretation” of Husband’s behavior — but that was not enough. (120 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.) It was “not ‘the only reasonable interpretation,’” because the same conduct “could also be reasonably interpreted as the side effect of ingesting illegal substances or a combination of prescribed medications or a manifestation of sleep deprivation,” and the court noted that Husband himself “acknowledged that there were ‘a litany of other reasons other than potentially a disability.’” (Id. at p. 778 & fn. 4, citing Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1167.)
4. A coworker’s subjective concern does not impute knowledge. The court rejected the argument that the supervisor’s belief that Husband “needed help,” that “a hospital would be better than the police,” and his recommendation to see a mental-health professional supplied the missing knowledge. (120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 776, 778–779.) The imputation standard is objective — “the ‘reasonable’ … interpretation of the observed facts” — and a single coworker’s “untrained, subjective ‘personal opinion’” cannot control. (Id. at p. 779.) Making liability turn on a layperson’s willingness to speculate “would make the standard for imputing knowledge … turn on the vagaries of the … workplace” and on counsel’s ability to elicit speculation in deposition. (Ibid.)
Significance
Husband is a clear restatement of the knowledge prerequisite for FEHA disability claims and a strong articulation of how high the constructive-knowledge bar is for undisclosed, non-obvious conditions — particularly invisible mental-health conditions whose behavioral manifestations overlap with intoxication, medication effects, or exhaustion. By holding that a disability must be the “only reasonable interpretation” of observed conduct, the court makes clear that the existence of one plausible disability-based explanation does not create a triable issue when other reasonable explanations exist. The decision also rejects an attempt to convert a coworker’s subjective concern, or a referral to seek medical help, into employer knowledge, insisting on an objective standard. For both sides, the practical lesson is the same one the opinion implies: disclosure is often the single most protective step an employee with an invisible disability can take, because it converts a contested constructive-knowledge question into actual knowledge that triggers the accommodation and interactive-process duties.
Key quotes
“An employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability is a prerequisite to FEHA liability under any of those theories … . [FEHA] does not reach unknown disabilities.” (Husband, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 767–768.)
“[W]hile one reasonable interpretation of that behavior is that plaintiff suffered from a mental disability, that is not ‘the only reasonable interpretation’ of plaintiff’s behavior … . [P]laintiff’s conduct could also be reasonably interpreted as the side effect of ingesting illegal substances or a combination of prescribed medications or a manifestation of sleep deprivation.” (Husband, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.)
Practice pointer
For plaintiff-side counsel, Husband is a warning that constructive-knowledge claims built on “the employer should have realized” are difficult: to survive summary judgment on an undisclosed mental disability, the record must foreclose competing innocent explanations so that disability is the “only reasonable interpretation” of what the employer observed — a high bar where the symptoms resemble intoxication, medication effects, or fatigue. Where possible, develop evidence of actual disclosure, of obvious and unambiguous symptoms, or of the employer’s independent awareness. Counsel should also advise clients, candidly, that disclosing a disability and requesting accommodation — though personal and difficult — is frequently the most protective course, because it triggers the employer’s “known disability” duties under section 12940, subdivisions (m)(1) and (n). For employers, the case confirms that referring a distressed employee for medical help does not, without more, impute knowledge of a specific disability, but prudent practice still favors engaging the interactive process when a need for accommodation is apparent. (120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 767–769, 778–779.)
Open questions
The opinion resolves only the knowledge question and does not address whether Target’s stated reasons for termination were otherwise lawful, an issue rendered academic by the failure of the knowledge prerequisite. (120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 767, 779.) It leaves unspecified how much more — beyond “erratic” and “irrational” conduct with plausible alternative causes — an employer must observe before a mental disability becomes the “only reasonable interpretation,” a line that will remain fact-intensive. (Id. at p. 778.) And by distinguishing a coworker’s “untrained, subjective” concern from objective knowledge, the court does not decide when an employer’s own trained personnel (for example, an on-site medical or HR professional) might cross the line into imputed knowledge. (Id. at p. 779.)