Practice Guide · Wage & Hour

Off-the-Clock Work and Compensable “Hours Worked” in California

A practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling authority on what time California employers must pay for — the two independent definitions of “hours worked,” the rejection of the federal de minimis rule in Troester, compensable exit-search and on-call time, and the live question of time rounding after Donohue and Camp. A research starting point you can cite from.

Practice Guide
Wage & Hour
Off-the-Clock Work
Hours Worked
Lab. Code § 1194
IWC Wage Orders
Authorities current to June 2026

In brief. California requires payment for all “hours worked,” and the governing wage orders define that phrase in the disjunctive: time the employee is subject to the control of the employer or time the employee is suffered or permitted to work. Either branch is independently sufficient. (Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 590.) Because California has not adopted the federal de minimis doctrine, even small amounts of regularly recurring off-the-clock work must be paid (Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829), and time spent on mandatory, employer-controlled activities — such as exit security searches — is compensable even after the employee clocks out (Frlekin v. Apple, Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038). This guide collects the governing authority and the points that decide these cases.

1. The issue and why it matters

“Off-the-clock” litigation turns on a single statutory question: was the disputed time compensable “hours worked”? California’s minimum-wage and overtime guarantees attach only to compensable hours, but the universe of compensable time is broad and is defined by the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage orders, not by what the employer chose to record. An employee may recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages for that time under Labor Code section 1194, together with attorney’s fees and costs, and the failure to capture the time can cascade into derivative wage-statement (§ 226) and waiting-time (§ 203) penalties.

The stakes are structural rather than per-shift. A few unpaid minutes a day, multiplied across a workforce and a limitations period, is the engine of most wage-and-hour class and representative actions. The defense that the time was trivial — the federal de minimis rule — is largely unavailable in California. Counsel on both sides therefore litigate two questions: (1) does the time fall within either branch of the “hours worked” definition, and (2) is there any cognizable excuse for not paying it.

2. The two independent definitions of “hours worked”

The IWC wage orders define “hours worked” as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer,” and “includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” The California Supreme Court reads these as two independent factors: time is compensable if it satisfies either the control clause or the suffer-or-permit clause. (Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575; Frlekin v. Apple, Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038.)

The practical consequence is that an employee need not be actively laboring to be on the clock. Being subject to the employer’s control — confined to the premises, forbidden to leave, required to wait — can itself be compensable even if no “work” in the colloquial sense is being performed. Conversely, work the employer knows about and tolerates is compensable even if the employer did not “require” it.

3. The control prong: required travel, waiting, and on-call time

The control branch reaches time the employer commandeers even when the employee is idle. In Morillion, the Court held that time agricultural workers spent riding employer-mandated buses to and from the fields was compensable because the employees were subject to the employer’s control during the ride — they could not use the time for their own purposes. (Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 590.)

The Court extended the principle to on-call and standby arrangements in Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833, holding that on-call hours security guards spent at their worksites — and, on the facts, sleep time — constituted compensable hours worked because the constraints the employer imposed kept the guards subject to its control. (Mendiola, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 838.) The lesson is that the degree of restriction, not the label “on call,” controls: the more the employer limits what the worker may do with the time, the more likely the time is compensable.

4. The suffer-or-permit prong: work the employer knows about

The second branch captures work the employer “suffers or permits.” The phrase is deliberately broad; it was borrowed into California’s wage orders to reach work the employer knew or should have known was being performed, even if it was not formally authorized. (See Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 [tracing the “suffer or permit to work” standard].) In off-the-clock cases, this is the branch that defeats the “we told them not to” defense: a policy prohibiting unrecorded work does not excuse payment where the employer knew or had reason to know the work was occurring and accepted its benefit. The pivotal facts are the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge and its failure to stop — or to pay for — the work.

5. No de minimis defense for regular off-the-clock work

The single most important development for off-the-clock claims is Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829. A shift supervisor was required to perform closing tasks — transmitting data, activating the alarm, locking up, walking coworkers to their cars — after clocking out, amounting to several minutes each closing shift. The Court held that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act’s de minimis doctrine, which excuses small and administratively difficult-to-record increments of time, has not been adopted in California, and does not bar recovery for the regularly occurring off-the-clock minutes at issue. (Troester, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 835.)

The Court was careful about the boundary. It did not decide “whether there are circumstances where compensable time is so minute or irregular that it is unreasonable to expect the time to be recorded,” leaving a narrow, fact-bound opening for genuinely trivial and sporadic increments. But for the common pattern — a few minutes of required tasks on every shift — the answer is that the employer must pay. Modern timekeeping technology, the Court observed, makes the administrative-difficulty rationale for de minimis largely obsolete.

6. Exit searches and on-premises waiting: Frlekin

In Frlekin v. Apple, Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, the Court applied the control prong to time employees spent waiting for and undergoing mandatory bag and device searches before leaving the store — time that occurred after they had clocked out. Answering a question certified by the Ninth Circuit, the Court held the time was compensable because the employees remained subject to Apple’s control: they were confined to the premises, required to find a manager, and forbidden to leave until the search was complete. (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1058.) That the search policy was, in a sense, for the employees’ convenience (it allowed them to bring bags to work at all) did not change the analysis; the controlling fact was the employer-imposed restriction on movement. Frlekin confirms that clocking out does not end compensability when the employer continues to control the worker.

7. Time rounding after Donohue — and the pending Camp

For years California tolerated facially neutral time rounding under See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, which imported the federal rule permitting rounding that is neutral on its face and as applied. That tolerance has narrowed. In Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58, the Court held that employers may not round time punches in the meal-period context, and that time records showing missed, short, or late meal periods raise a rebuttable presumption of a violation. (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 59.)

The broader question — whether neutral rounding survives at all when an employer can capture actual minutes — is squarely presented in Camp v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. The Court of Appeal held that an employer that records exact time may not pay on a rounded basis. (Camp v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 638, 660, review granted.) The California Supreme Court granted review (S277518) and, as of this writing, the matter is pending; the opinion is therefore persuasive only, and counsel should confirm its current status before relying on it. The trajectory of Troester, Donohue, and Camp is unmistakable: where an employer can record actual time, courts increasingly expect it to pay for actual time.

8. Remedies and proof

Unpaid off-the-clock time supports recovery of unpaid minimum and overtime wages under Labor Code sections 1194 (with attorney’s fees and costs) and 1197 (minimum wage), and overtime computed under section 510. The failure to record and pay the time typically generates derivative claims: inaccurate wage statements under section 226 and, at separation, waiting-time penalties under section 203. As discussed in the Review’s companion guide on meal and rest breaks, premium pay and related amounts now count as “wages” for these derivative penalties, so the downstream exposure can dwarf the underlying wage loss.

On proof, the employee’s burden is eased where the employer failed to keep accurate records: under the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery framework long followed in California wage cases, once the employee proves uncompensated work as a matter of just and reasonable inference, the burden shifts to the employer to negate the reasonableness of that inference. Counsel should therefore pursue timekeeping data, point-of-sale and access-badge logs, alarm and computer records, and manager testimony — the contemporaneous electronic footprint that, after Troester, makes the “too hard to record” defense untenable.

9. Practice pointers

  • Plead both branches. Frame the disputed time under both the control clause and the suffer-or-permit clause; either is independently sufficient, and the two reach different facts.
  • Neutralize the de minimis defense early. Troester forecloses it for regularly recurring off-the-clock work; hold the defense to the narrow “minute and irregular” opening the Court expressly left unresolved.
  • Follow the electronic footprint. Alarm logs, badge swipes, POS timestamps, and computer login/logout data both prove the time and rebut any claim that it was impractical to record.
  • Attack “no unauthorized work” policies factually. Under the suffer-or-permit branch, the question is the employer’s knowledge and acceptance of the work — not whether a handbook prohibited it.
  • Press the rounding issue. After Donohue, rounding is dead in the meal-period context; with Camp pending, preserve the argument that rounding fails wherever actual time is captured.
  • Calendar derivative claims. Build the § 226 and § 203 exposure into the demand; the penalties often exceed the wages and drive settlement.

Frequently asked questions

What counts as off-the-clock work in California?

Off-the-clock work is time you spend working, or under the employer’s control, that the employer does not pay you for. In California, time is compensable if you are either subject to the employer’s control or “suffered or permitted” to work — and either test alone is enough (Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000)).

Do I get paid for work my employer didn’t authorize?

Usually yes. If the employer knew or should have known you were working, the time is compensable even if the work was not authorized. An employer cannot accept the benefit of work while refusing to pay for it.

Does the small-amounts (de minimis) rule apply in California?

Generally no. California rejected the federal de minimis rule for small amounts of regularly occurring off-the-clock time (Troester v. Starbucks (2018)). Employers must pay for all hours worked, including short recurring tasks before or after a shift.

Is time spent in security or bag checks paid time?

Yes. Time spent on a required exit search, while you remain under the employer’s control, is compensable hours worked in California (Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020)).

What can I recover for unpaid off-the-clock work?

You can recover the unpaid wages (including overtime), interest, and often penalties such as wage-statement and waiting-time penalties, plus attorney’s fees. Off-the-clock claims are frequently pursued as class or PAGA actions.

Key authorities

  • Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 (two independent definitions of “hours worked”; control prong; required travel).
  • Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829 (California has not adopted the federal de minimis doctrine).
  • Frlekin v. Apple, Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038 (mandatory exit-search time is compensable as time subject to control).
  • Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833 (on-call and sleep time compensable where subject to control).
  • Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 (origin and scope of the “suffer or permit to work” standard).
  • Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 (no rounding of meal-period punches; rebuttable presumption from records).
  • Camp v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 638, review granted, S277518 (rounding where actual time is recorded; pending — persuasive only).
  • See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889 (older neutral-rounding rule, now narrowed).
  • Lab. Code, §§ 1194, 1197 (recovery of unpaid minimum/overtime wages; fees), 510 (overtime), 226, 203 (derivative penalties); IWC Wage Orders (definition of “hours worked”).

Authorities current to June 2026. Browse related decisions in the case index →

Not legal advice. This guide is dated legal analysis for general information only and does not create an attorney–client relationship. The law changes: a statute or decision discussed here may since have been amended, reversed, overruled, depublished, superseded, limited, or distinguished, and its citability may have changed, after the date shown. Confirm that any authority is current and citable through an independent citator before relying on or citing it. See the full Terms & Conditions.

See also: Camp v. Home Depot