The Review · Case Index

California employment case index

Search every indexed California wrongful-termination and employment decision, or browse by subject area, statute, and decade — each summary source-verified against the published reporter.

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169 cases

Doss v. Tesla, Inc.

June 11, 2026
A Tesla yard hostler who moved 53-foot trailers of out-of-state auto parts around the Fremont factory — never crossing a state line — sued for wage-and-hour violations, and Tesla moved to compel individual arbitration. In the published portion of its opinion, the First District holds yard hostlers are FAA section 1 transportation workers exempt from arbitration, and clarifies which wage claims Labor Code section 229 keeps in court.

Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC

June 11, 2026
A firm filed a wage-and-hour class action duplicating one it had already filed elsewhere, then opposed a stay with a brief — drafted by a contract attorney using generative AI — full of nonexistent citations and at least eight fabricated quotations. The First District affirms $6,000 in section 128.7 sanctions: counsel of record bear ultimate responsibility for what they sign, and the duty to verify authority cannot be delegated to any form of technology.

In re Orr (Orr v. United States District Court)

June 9, 2026
A former UPS seasonal driver sued for wage violations; the district court compelled arbitration of her individual claims but refused to decide whether the FAA or state arbitration law governed, reasoning the result was the same. The Ninth Circuit grants a writ of mandamus: under New Prime, the court — not an arbitrator — must decide whether the FAA section 1 transportation-worker exclusion applies before compelling arbitration.

Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc.

June 4, 2026
A trucking-job applicant brought an FCRA class action over confusing, noncompliant background-check disclosure forms; after Limon v. Circle K required concrete injury, the trial court decertified the class. The First District reverses and declines to follow Limon: California courts are not bound by Article III, and a willful FCRA violation supports statutory damages of $100–$1,000 and standing without proof of harm.

Cortina v. North American Title Company

May 29, 2026
After 19 years of litigation, a bifurcated bench trial produced a $43 million judgment for ~400 escrow workers who claimed they were misclassified as exempt. The Fifth District reverses on two independent grounds: the trial court could not delegate the entire damages phase to a private referee without the parties’ consent, and the liability-phase trial plan violated Duran by using representative sampling to prove classwide liability while barring the employer from contesting individual exempt status.

Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, Inc.

May 26, 2026
A PAGA plaintiff proved Labor Code violations but recovered about one percent of the $56 million maximum he calculated, and his attorney fees were cut by a 0.70 negative multiplier. The Fourth District affirms: section 2699(e)(2) mandates no method for reducing penalties — per-employee is fine — and the trial court adequately justified the fee multiplier, leaving the “heightened scrutiny” question for the Supreme Court.

Husband v. Target Corporation

May 21, 2026
An employee with an undisclosed bipolar diagnosis was fired after two episodes of erratic, irrational behavior at work, then sued Target under FEHA. The Second District affirms summary judgment: employer knowledge is a prerequisite to FEHA disability liability, and it is imputed only when disability is the “only reasonable interpretation” of the conduct — not where intoxication, medication, or sleep deprivation could equally explain it.

Williams v. Legacy Health

May 6, 2026
Nine hospital-system employees sought religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement and sued under Title VII when they were denied. The Ninth Circuit affirms judgment for the employer: after Groff v. DeJoy, undue hardship means a “substantial” burden — including realistic health, safety, and staffing costs — and exempting unvaccinated clinical staff during the Delta surge met that standard.

Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc.

May 5, 2026
A staffing agency hired a worker under an arbitration agreement and placed him at a client; when the placement ended, the client hired him directly, and he later sued the client over that direct-employment period. The First District affirms denial of arbitration: the client was not a party or “affiliate” of the agency, the claims fell outside the agreement’s scope, and the worker was not equitably estopped — a nonsignatory cannot simply borrow a staffing agency’s arbitration clause.

Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc.

May 1, 2026
A railcar repairman who inspected and repaired freight cars taken out of service in a rail yard brought a wage-and-hour class action and argued his arbitration agreement was exempt as a transportation worker’s contract. The Second District disagrees: he is neither a “railroad employee” nor a “transportation worker” under FAA section 1, because repairing decommissioned cars is too far removed from actual transportation — so his arbitration agreement and class waiver are enforceable.

Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar, Inc.

April 21, 2026
An EMT sought to certify a 135-worker class alleging the employer left nondiscretionary “EMS Bonuses” out of the regular rate, underpaying overtime and premiums. The Fifth District reverses the denial of class certification: the employer’s gift/discretion defense applied to every EMS Bonus, so it was not a defense “unique” to the named plaintiff.

Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center, LLC

April 7, 2026
Studebaker made a new employee sign three onboarding arbitration documents; the trial court found their “conflicts” showed no valid agreement and denied arbitration. The Second District reverses and compels arbitration — ambiguities must be reconciled to give effect to the intent to arbitrate, the agreement was not unconscionable, and an inconsistent wholesale PAGA waiver should have been severed.

United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy Mortgage Corporation

April 6, 2026
A former Academy Mortgage employee won a False Claims Act qui tam case after the government declined to intervene, and her counsel obtained a fee award enhanced by a 1.75 lodestar multiplier. The Ninth Circuit reverses the enhancement: above-lodestar multipliers are reserved for the “rare and exceptional” case, cannot rest on factors already in the lodestar, and require a reviewable methodology.

O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc.

April 1, 2026
After two of four bellwether arbitrators found a travel-nursing agency’s arbitration agreements invalid, a district court used non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to void 255 other employees’ separate agreements. The Ninth Circuit reverses: the FAA guarantees individualized, one-on-one proceedings, and forbids using other arbitrators’ rulings to invalidate other parties’ agreements wholesale.

Guardian Storage Centers, LLC v. Simpson

March 24, 2026
A terminated COO forwarded her employer’s e-mails — some attorney-client privileged — to her personal account and handed them to her lawyers for her wrongful-termination and harassment cross-claims. The Fourth District holds the State Fund rule on handling privileged materials applies even to such intentional, unauthorized disclosures, and reverses the denial of the employer’s motion to disqualify counsel.

Paknad v. Superior Court

March 24, 2026
Intuitive Surgical defended a harassment suit by pointing to the adequacy of its attorney-led investigation, then tried to withhold the investigator’s findings as work product. The Sixth District grants the employee a writ: putting the investigation’s adequacy at issue waives privilege and even core work product over the investigator’s factual findings and anything bearing on the investigation’s scope and adequacy.

Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University

March 24, 2026
Two Chico State physics professors sued the CSU Trustees for retaliation, alleging a sham investigation and sabotage of their move to a new university after they reported harassment. The Trustees moved to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute as “based in part” on protected speech. The Third District affirms denial: a movant must analyze each claim element-by-element and identify which acts are protected — “based in part” is not enough.

Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District

March 18, 2026
A nursing student said the faculty member running her hospital clinical rotation sexually harassed her and tanked her grade when she refused him. The Fourth District holds a student in a required clinical placement is an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA, and reverses summary judgment on standing, Government-Claims-Act notice, and deliberate indifference.

Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center

March 2, 2026
A former Work Practice Apprentice at the San Francisco Zen Center won a wage award, but the trial court held the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred his claims. The First District reverses, adopting its companion case Lorenzo: the exception bars only claims that require resolving ecclesiastical questions, and the Center showed none. NOTE: the controlling ministerial-exception issue is now before the California Supreme Court in Lorenzo (S294565), so this opinion is citable for persuasive value only.

Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC

February 20, 2026
Cambodian villagers forced to work at Thai seafood factories sued a U.S. marketer under the trafficking civil-remedy statute; their case was dismissed because the statute then reached only those who succeeded in benefiting, not those who attempted to. After Congress amended the law, the en banc Ninth Circuit holds the clarifying amendment retroactive — and that Landgraf governs all such amendments, overruling the “clarifying amendment” exception — reviving the claims.

Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.

February 4, 2026
Wal-Mart ran a background check on a job applicant but allegedly botched the ICRAA disclosure form, then won summary judgment because she showed no real-world harm. The Fourth District reverses: California standing requires only an invasion of a legally protected interest, and ICRAA’s “$10,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater” remedy is independent of actual damages — so a bare disclosure violation confers standing.

Avery v. TEKsystems, Inc.

January 28, 2026
Twenty-two months into a wage-and-hour class action, TEKsystems rolled out a new mandatory arbitration agreement to the recruiter class members and moved to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirms denial of that motion: Rule 23(d) lets a district court refuse to enforce an agreement obtained through misleading, mid-litigation communications that threaten the fairness of the class action — the FAA gives arbitration no special protection.

De Paolo v. Rosales

December 22, 2025
A resident manager whose apartment came with the job refused to leave after she was terminated. The Appellate Division affirms an unlawful detainer judgment: housing provided as part of employment compensation is not a protected tenancy, the former manager became a tenant at sufferance or licensee outside the Tenant Protection Act, and her retaliatory-eviction defense failed for lack of evidence.

Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce, Inc.

December 15, 2025
A produce-plant forklift driver was fired after complaining his pay lagged behind coworkers’. He wrongly believed the Equal Pay Act reached the gap — but the Fourth District holds his mistake of law does not sink his Labor Code section 1102.5(b) whistleblower verdict, because the statute asks only whether he had objectively reasonable cause to believe a violation occurred, a question for the jury.

County of Los Angeles v. Niblett

October 31, 2025
A fire-department mechanic repeatedly confronted management and then alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The Second District affirms a three-year workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8: the veiled reference was a credible, implied threat outside the First Amendment, and the order’s firearm restriction survives Second Amendment review under Rahimi.

Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services: The Employer’s Response as the Hostile Environment

September 8, 2025
A coworker’s off-site sexual advances were not work-related and not imputable to the employer — yet the Fifth District held the employee still stated a FEHA hostile-work-environment claim, because the employer’s refusal to act and its HR representative’s mocking response could independently alter the workplace in an objectively severe manner. A pleading-stage reversal that imports the Ninth Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances, employer-response framework (Fuller, Okonowsky) into California law.

Muñoz v. Regents of the University of California: Litigation Risk Alone Cannot Justify Immigration-Status Discrimination

August 5, 2025
The University of California refuses to employ undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The First District held that the policy facially discriminates based on immigration status under the FEHA national-origin regulations, and that the University’s only justification — fear that the federal government might read IRCA to cover it and prosecute — could not sustain the policy, because the University never attempted the regulation’s clear-and-convincing showing that federal law requires the discrimination. The court issued a writ directing the Regents to reconsider the policy on proper criteria, while pointedly declining to decide whether IRCA applies to state entities at all.

McMahon v. World Vision: The Ministerial Exception’s Functional Reach to a Customer-Service Rep

August 5, 2025
World Vision revoked a job offer to a customer-service applicant after learning she was in a same-sex marriage. The Ninth Circuit held the ministerial exception barred her Title VII and WLAD claims, because — viewed in the context of World Vision’s religious mission — CSRs perform “vital religious duties” by communicating the faith and praying with donors. A striking extension of the exception’s functional reach to an entry-level, remote position.

Associational Disability Accommodation: The Open Question After Castro-Ramirez

July 17, 2025
Must a California employer accommodate an employee who is not disabled but who cares for someone who is? Castro-Ramirez said in 2016 that FEHA “may reasonably be interpreted” to require it — and expressly declined to decide. Nine years on, no published California decision has answered, the Civil Rights Council’s 2020 request for public input produced no regulation, and CACI 2547 still calls the element optional. Meanwhile five federal district courts — Castro v. Classy, McVay, and 2025’s Acosta, Head, and De Wit — have all held that failure-to-accommodate and interactive-process claims may rest on associational disability. This analysis maps the statutory argument, the unpublished contrary authority, and how to plead the caregiver’s claim while the question stays open.

Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles: No § 1102.5(j) Fees After a § 1102.6 Same-Decision Defense

July 8, 2025
A sheriff’s deputy proved every element of his whistleblower retaliation claim — and still left the courthouse owing costs. The jury found his protected disclosures were a factor in the County’s actions against him, but also that the County would have made the same decisions anyway. Division Four held that a plaintiff defeated by the section 1102.6 same-decision defense who obtains no relief has not brought a “successful action” under section 1102.5(j): no attorney’s fees, and the employer is the prevailing party for costs. The panel declined to extend Harris v. City of Santa Monica’s FEHA rule, agreed the contrary result would be “a rational policy choice,” and pointedly left the fix to the Legislature.

Brown v. City of Inglewood: Elected Officials Are Not “Employees” Under Labor Code § 1102.5

July 7, 2025
Inglewood’s elected city treasurer accused the mayor of misappropriating public funds, then saw her monthly salary cut from $8,000 to $1,404 and her duties stripped away. Her whistleblower retaliation suit under Labor Code section 1102.5 failed at the threshold: a unanimous Supreme Court held that elected officials are not “employees” within section 1106’s definition. Finding the statutory text inconclusive, the court rested on legislative history and context — section 1106 protects rank-and-file public workers, not officials who answer to the electorate — while noting that other remedies, including the First Amendment, may remain available.

Velarde v. Monroe Operations: HR Misrepresentations as Unconscionability

June 6, 2025
A newly hired care coordinator was pressured to sign an arbitration agreement amid a stack of 31 onboarding documents on her first day. When she said she did not understand it, the HR manager assured her it would let the company resolve disputes cheaply and without lawyers — untrue, since the agreement imposed adversarial federal-rules arbitration with each side bearing its own fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of arbitration: the oral misrepresentation, contradicting the written terms, made the agreement substantively unconscionable because it defeated the employee's reasonable expectations. Intent to mislead was not required — the court focused on effect, not intent.

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: No “Background Circumstances” Hurdle for Majority-Group Title VII Plaintiffs

June 5, 2025
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, lost a promotion to a lesbian candidate, then was demoted and replaced by a gay man. The Sixth Circuit threw out her Title VII case because she had not shown “background circumstances” suggesting her employer was the unusual one that discriminates against the majority. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated: Title VII protects “any individual,” and its prima facie standard does not vary with the plaintiff’s group. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred to question whether McDonnell Douglas belongs at summary judgment at all — an invitation with consequences for FEHA practice under Guz.

FEHA Fee Haircuts and the Scrutiny Split

May 30, 2025
When a trial court takes an across-the-board percentage cut to a prevailing plaintiff’s lodestar, must it explain why that particular percentage — or is a general finding of overlitigation enough? Warren demanded case-specific explanation and Snoeck brought that rule into FEHA; Morris rejected it as imported federal law, and Cash v. County of Los Angeles — a 30 percent, $195,234 haircut affirmed over Justice Baker’s meat-cleaver dissent — squarely joined Morris. The Supreme Court granted review on August 20, 2025 (S291827). Until it rules, Cash is persuasive-only under rule 8.1115(e)(1), the published split remains live, and the smart fee motion is built to win under either standard — starting with a written request for specific findings.

Carranza v. City of Los Angeles: § 12923, Single Incidents, and Harassment the Plaintiff Never Saw

May 23, 2025
An LAPD captain never witnessed officers passing around a fake nude photo of her and was never confronted to her face — yet the Second District affirmed a $4 million FEHA verdict, holding that her secondhand knowledge of the department-wide circulation, and the LAPD’s refusal to stop it, supplied substantial evidence of a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. A leading application of Government Code section 12923.

Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating: Prospective, Revocable Meal-Period Waivers Are Valid

April 21, 2025
Two veterinary workers signed a standing written waiver of their meal break for shifts of six hours or less — revocable at any time — then sued years later, arguing meal periods can be waived only shift by shift after the right accrues. Division Seven disagreed: section 512 and the wage orders are silent on timing and form, and eighty years of IWC history treats written prospective waivers as employee protection, not evasion. But the holding is expressly conditional: the court reserved unconscionable, coerced, unknowing, and irrevocable waivers, and oral prospective waivers entirely. Bradsbery is a safe harbor for clean waiver programs — and a litigation roadmap against defective ones.

Moniz v. Adecco: Applying Turrieta — No Intervention or Vacatur by a Competing PAGA Plaintiff

February 28, 2025
After Turrieta v. Lyft disapproved Moniz II by name, the objector in the long-running Adecco PAGA settlement tried a new key for the same lock: she was asserting her own personal interests — a penalty share, fees, a service award — not the state’s. Division Four dismissed her appeals. Every interest she claimed arises from PAGA itself and is derivative of the state’s; relabeling it personal is a semantic exercise that would leave Turrieta’s holding with no effect. The first published application of Turrieta makes overlapping-settlement fights a before-judgment affair: object in the approving court, police preclusion scope under LaCour — but intervention, vacatur, and appeal are closed.

Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District: Denial of Disability-Retirement Benefits Is Not an Adverse Employment Action

February 26, 2025
After a harbor patrol officer’s on-duty accident left him unable to work, the Port San Luis Harbor District told him retirement was his “single option” — then denied his CalPERS disability-retirement application and terminated him on a resignation theory it later admitted was false. Division Six affirmed summary judgment on his FEHA claim anyway: denial of disability-retirement payments is not an adverse employment action, because retirement benefits begin when employment ends, and a claimant who cannot perform his essential duties is not a “qualified individual” under Green. The remedy for a wrongful denial is an appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings and administrative mandamus — a route Lowry lost by following a repealed procedure.

Lui v. DeJoy: Replacement Evidence and the Myth of the “Independent” Investigation

February 26, 2025
A Postmaster of Chinese ethnicity was demoted after coworkers targeted her with complaints her supervisor believed were racially motivated, and the demotion was confirmed by an official who reviewed only the paperwork. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, holding that replacement by a white man satisfied the McDonnell Douglas fourth element and that a genuine dispute existed over whether the confirming decision was “actually independent or influenced by subordinate bias” — a Ninth Circuit application of the cat’s-paw doctrine.

Vo v. Technology Credit Union: JAMS Rule 17, Nonparty Discovery, and the Split with Aixtron

February 4, 2025
A terminated employee resisted arbitration of his FEHA claims, arguing that under Aixtron the arbitrator could not compel prehearing third-party discovery. The Sixth District reversed the denial of arbitration: applying Ramirez’s five discovery factors and construing the clause to preserve validity, it held that JAMS Rule 17 (2014) gives the arbitrator authority to expand nonparty discovery when necessary, so the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. The court disapproved Aixtron to the extent it read an arbitrator’s authority narrowly — creating an intra-district split — and noted that Senate Bill 940 now supplies CAA third-party discovery by default for current agreements.

Arzate v. ACE American: Who Must Initiate Arbitration After an Order Compelling

January 27, 2025
After a court compelled arbitration of a wage-and-hour class action, neither side filed a demand, and the trial court lifted the stay on the theory that the employer — which had moved to compel — waived arbitration by not commencing it. The Court of Appeal reversed: reading the agreement as a whole, the ‘party who wants to start the Arbitration Procedure’ is the claimant asserting a legal claim, so the employees who agreed to ‘submit’ their claims had to file the demand; the employer’s inaction was neither a breach nor a waiver. The court expressly declined to reach the separate arbitration-fee-default statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98).

Wawrzenski v. United Airlines — comparator evidence is for the jury: the marquee MSJ reversal on FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation

October 22, 2024
Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.

Stone v. Alameda Health System: Public-Entity Employers Are Not Subject to PAGA (or Most Labor Code Wage Rules)

August 15, 2024
Two Highland Hospital workers sued the public hospital authority running Alameda County’s medical facilities for meal-and-rest violations, unpaid wages, and PAGA penalties. A unanimous Supreme Court ended the case at the definitions: Labor Code section 18’s “person” — the term that controls who is an “employer” under the wage order and who can be penalized under PAGA — affirmatively excludes public entities. Absent express words bringing the government in, break rules and PAGA penalties stop at the public-sector line. The court disapproved Sargent’s contrary rule for statutes carrying their own penalties, declined to decide whether Government Code section 818 independently bars such penalties, and reserved the effect of the 2024 PAGA reform.

Turrieta v. Lyft: A PAGA Plaintiff Cannot Intervene in Another’s Overlapping PAGA Action

August 1, 2024
Three Lyft drivers filed overlapping PAGA actions; when one settled, the other two moved to intervene, objected, and moved to vacate the judgment — invoking their status as deputized proxies of the state. A divided Supreme Court held a PAGA plaintiff’s deputization confers no such rights: the statute delegates the power to commence and prosecute one’s own action, and it entrusts settlement oversight to the LWDA and the approving court. Moniz v. Adecco is disapproved. What remains for rival plaintiffs is coordination, informal input to the approving court, and advocacy to the LWDA — plus the open questions the court expressly reserved, including the state’s own rights and personal-interest intervention.

Castellanos v. State of California: The Supreme Court Upholds Proposition 22 and Holds the Legislature’s Article XIV Workers’-Compensation Power Is Not Exclusive of the Initiative

July 25, 2024
The California Supreme Court unanimously upholds Proposition 22 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7451), holding that the Legislature’s “plenary” and “unlimited” authority over workers’ compensation under article XIV, section 4 is not exclusive of the people’s reserved initiative power — while expressly reserving the harder questions about Proposition 22’s seven-eighths amendment rule.

Okonowsky v. Garland: Off-Site Social Media and the Totality of the Workplace

July 25, 2024
The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the Bureau of Prisons, holding that a corrections lieutenant’s off-duty Instagram page targeting a prison psychologist — followed by more than a hundred coworkers — is part of the totality of the circumstances in a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. There is no rule that only conduct inside the physical workplace counts, ‘especially in light of the ubiquity of social media,’ and the employer’s dismissive, ineffectual response can independently create a hostile environment.

Ramirez v. Charter Communications: Unconscionability and the Mandatory Qualitative Severance Analysis

July 15, 2024
Charter’s mandatory arbitration agreement directed employees’ claims into arbitration while carving out the claims Charter itself would bring, compressed FEHA filing to the one-year administrative window, and made anyone who unsuccessfully resisted arbitration pay the fees incurred to compel it. The Supreme Court held all three terms substantively unconscionable — but validated the four-deposition discovery cap, disapproving the line of cases that judged discovery limits by a particular plaintiff’s later needs. On remedy, the court rejected clause-counting: severance is a qualitative, totality inquiry under Armendariz, and the refusal to enforce was reversed and remanded for that analysis.

Cook v. USC: Infinite Duration, All-Claims Scope — Unconscionable and Unseverable

May 24, 2024
USC required a staff employee to sign an arbitration agreement reaching ‘all claims, whether or not arising out of’ her employment, against USC and a broad web of affiliated persons, surviving her employment indefinitely and revocable only by the university president. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of arbitration: the agreement was substantively unconscionable for three independent reasons — overbroad scope, infinite duration, and lack of mutuality — and the trial court reasonably refused to sever, because curing it would require rewriting the plain language and would hand USC a windfall. Unconscionability is judged at the time of contracting, so the employer could not save the agreement by noting the plaintiff’s actual claims were employment-related.

Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital: The Cat’s-Paw Theory in FEHA Discrimination

May 17, 2024
In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, a 62-year-old hospital laboratory supervisor won a bench verdict for FEHA age discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination after her director made years of ageist remarks and steered her selection for layoff. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the “cat's-paw” (imputed-animus) theory, it held that a biased subordinate's discriminatory motive may be imputed to the employer where the subordinate was a “significant participant” in the adverse decision — even though a separate, formally unbiased officer signed off on the final call. Animus by a significant participant supports an inference that the decision itself was discriminatory.

Smith v. Spizzirri: FAA § 3 Requires a Stay, Not Dismissal

May 16, 2024
Delivery drivers sued for wage and misclassification violations; their employer moved to compel arbitration and dismiss. A unanimous Supreme Court held that FAA § 3 gives a district court no discretion to dismiss a suit it sends to arbitration when a party requests a stay — ‘shall’ means ‘shall’ and ‘stay’ means ‘stay.’ Staying rather than dismissing preserves the parties’ return ticket to court if arbitration breaks down, a point with real stakes for employees whose employers later default on arbitration fees.

Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services (Naranjo II): A Good-Faith Belief in Compliance Defeats Section 226 and Section 203 Penalties

May 6, 2024
In Naranjo II (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, the California Supreme Court holds that an employer’s objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that its wage statements complied with the law defeats both Labor Code § 226 penalties (no “knowing and intentional” violation) and § 203 waiting-time penalties (no “willful” failure) — harmonizing the two penalty statutes around a common good-faith defense.

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis

April 17, 2024
Muldrow v. City of St. LouisA Title VII plaintiff challenging a discriminatory job transfer must show only “some harm” to a term or condition of employment — not a “significant” or “material” disadvantage.Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346Parallel citations: 144 S.Ct. 967; 218 L.Ed.2d 322. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St.: The FAA § 1 Exemption Follows the Work, Not the Industry

April 12, 2024
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers turns on what a worker does, not the industry the employer occupies. Bakery-goods delivery drivers who sued for wage violations therefore could not be forced into arbitration merely because their employer sells bread rather than transportation. The decision resolves a circuit split and completes the § 1 line running from Circuit City through Saxon, while expressly leaving open whether these particular distributors qualify as transportation workers at all.

Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors: “Hours Worked” at the Security Gate, the Commute, and On-Premises Meal Periods

March 25, 2024
A solar-project electrician queued unpaid at a security gate while guards inspected vehicles, drove miles of access road under strict site rules, and ate lunch confined to a designated area under a CBA calling meal periods “unpaid.” Answering the Ninth Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court held the exit procedure is compensable “hours worked”; the gate-to-lot drive is compensable only as “employer-mandated travel,” and only if the gate is the first location required for a reason beyond site access; and no collective bargaining agreement can waive the minimum wage for a meal period during which the employer’s confinement forecloses otherwise feasible personal activities.

Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills: PAGA Claims Cannot Be Struck as “Unmanageable”

January 18, 2024
Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582 holds that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim as unmanageable, even if it is complex or time-intensive. Manageability is a class-action requirement that does not apply to PAGA; complexity must be handled through ordinary case-management tools, not dismissal.

LaCour v. Marshalls: PAGA Claim Preclusion Is Set by the LWDA Notice, Not the Release

August 29, 2023
Marshalls bought a sweeping PAGA release in a federal settlement whose plaintiff had noticed only one theory to the LWDA — off-the-clock time in end-of-shift bag checks. When Robert LaCour later sued over expense reimbursement and other never-noticed violations, the trial court struck his claims as precluded. Division Four reversed: a PAGA judgment’s preclusive reach is measured by the claims the settling plaintiff pleaded or was authorized by her LWDA notice to plead, not by the words of her release, and an unauthorized proxy is in privity with no one. The court also upheld pandemic Emergency Rule 9, and it reserved issue preclusion while barring any double recovery.

Groff v. DeJoy: Title VII Undue Hardship Requires Substantial Increased Costs

June 29, 2023
An Evangelical Christian postal worker who would not work Sundays sued under Title VII after being disciplined for declining Sunday Amazon deliveries. The Third Circuit, reading Hardison to require only 'more than a de minimis cost,' affirmed summary judgment for the employer. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and clarified the standard: an employer that denies a religious accommodation must show that granting it would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not merely a more-than-trivial cost.

Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC

June 28, 2023
Analysis · Key Case Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1073 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight · Docket No. B318880 · Decided June 28, 2023 Verify before relying. A summary and analysis as of its publication date — not legal advice, and not a representation that the decision remains good […]

Sharp v. S&S Activewear: Ambient Harassment — Music, Misogyny, and the End of the “Equal Opportunity Harasser”

June 7, 2023
Eight warehouse workers alleged their employer let staff blast “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music for nearly two years over almost daily complaints. The Ninth Circuit vacated a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that pervasive sexist content can create a Title VII hostile work environment even if it targets no one and offends both sexes — and that an employer’s “equal opportunity harasser” status “provides no escape hatch for liability.”

People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc.

May 22, 2023
People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. A protected “disclosure” under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) includes an employee’s report or complaint of a legal violation to an employer — even when the recipient already knows of the violation. People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719 Parallel citations: 529 P.3d 49; 308 […]

Westmoreland v. Kindercare: The PAGA-Waiver Poison Pill

April 24, 2023
Kindercare’s arbitration agreement contained a “poison pill”: a clause providing that the whole agreement is invalid if its class/representative-action waiver is unenforceable. Because a wholesale predispute waiver of representative PAGA claims cannot be enforced after Iskanian and Viking River, the Court of Appeal held the poison pill voided the entire agreement — sending every claim, including the employee’s individual claims, to court. Had Kindercare omitted the poison pill, Viking River would have let it compel the individual claims; its own drafting foreclosed that path. The drafter was held to the all-or-nothing clause it wrote.

Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres: The Elements of a Pregnancy-Accommodation Claim Under the PDLL

March 16, 2023
In the first California decision to articulate the elements of a reasonable-accommodation claim under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(3)(A)), the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff must prove a pregnancy-related condition, a request made on her health care provider's advice, the employer's refusal of a reasonable accommodation, and that she could perform the essential functions of the job with that accommodation. Although section 12945 affords protections over and above section 12940, none entitles an employee to a job she cannot perform. Judgment for the employer affirmed.

Atalla v. Rite Aid: The “Acting in the Capacity of Supervisor” Limit on FEHA Strict Liability

February 24, 2023
A Rite Aid district manager sent a staff pharmacist lewd photos in a late-night, off-site text exchange that grew out of a friendship predating her employment. The Fifth District affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that FEHA strict liability for supervisor harassment attaches only when the supervisor acts “in the capacity of supervisor,” not where the conduct arises from a completely private relationship — and that the plaintiff, invited back after the harasser was fired, was not constructively discharged.

Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Granting Every Requested Accommodation Is Not Enough

February 24, 2023
A unanimous Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for Kaiser, holding that even though the employer granted every accommodation the employee requested, it could still be liable for failing to accommodate and failing to engage in the interactive process because, through her supervisor, it knew of but never provided a needed lighter-tasks accommodation. The court also reinstated the disability-discrimination and retaliation claims on a cat’s-paw theory.

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta

February 15, 2023
The Ninth Circuit held the Federal Arbitration Act preempts AB 51 (Labor Code § 432.6), California's attempt to ban mandatory employment arbitration, because a state rule that burdens the formation of arbitration agreements stands as an obstacle to the FAA.

Camp v. Home Depot: Is Neutral Time-Rounding Still Lawful When Actual Time Is Captured? (pending review)

October 24, 2022
Home Depot’s Kronos system recorded Delmer Camp’s time to the minute — then quarter-hour rounding paid him for 470 fewer minutes than his own timecards showed. The Sixth District reversed summary judgment: under Troester and Donohue, an employer that can capture and has captured exact worktime must pay for all of it, and no California text authorizes rounding that underpays an identifiable employee. The panel invited the Supreme Court to decide whether See’s Candy neutral rounding survives at all — and the Court granted review (S277518), where the case remains pending. Cite it as persuasive only, with the review-granted parenthetical, and re-verify status before filing.

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana

June 15, 2022
The FAA preempts Iskanian to the extent it bars division of a PAGA action and prevents arbitration of an employee’s individual PAGA claim; an employer may compel the individual PAGA claim to arbitration. (The Supreme Court further opined that, under its reading of California law, the plaintiff would then lack standing…

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.

May 23, 2022
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. A court may not condition waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing that the opposing party was prejudiced; the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration” places arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts and does not authorize arbitration-specific procedural rules. Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411 Parallel citations: […]

Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento — the same-decision defense wins summary judgment after Lawson

May 5, 2022
Months after Lawson, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for the County of Sacramento under Labor Code § 1102.6 — undisputed evidence of insubordination, disrespect, and dishonesty proved clearly and convincingly that the county would have released the probationary employee anyway — while leaving open whether § 1102.5 requires an actual belief that the law was violated.

Scheer v. Regents of the University of California — which framework governs which whistleblower statute after Lawson

March 28, 2022
Reversing summary judgment for the UC Regents, the Second District mapped the post-Lawson landscape — Labor Code § 1102.6 governs § 1102.5 claims, Government Code § 8547.10(e) supplies the same framework for University of California whistleblowers, and McDonnell Douglas still governs Health and Safety Code § 1278.5 claims, under which Scheer's clause-by-clause dismantling of his termination letter raised a triable issue of pretext.

Khoiny v. Dignity Health: No Academic Deference for a Residency Program’s Stated Reasons

March 16, 2022
When a medical resident sues her residency program for discrimination, the program's 'academic' justification for dismissing her is not entitled to the deference courts extend to genuine academic judgments. The Second District held that a resident is predominantly an employee, not a student, so the jury must evaluate the program's real reason without deference — and the contrary instruction required a new trial.

Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists — the modern disability-MSJ playbook: RIF selections, the interactive process, and cumulative pretext

September 30, 2021
In the Sixth District's treatise-level employment-MSJ opinion, a security supervisor laid off days before his expected return from knee surgery revives his disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims — the employer's RIF showing was inadequate under Guz's "roadmap" because it never explained retaining two lower-ranked supervisors, and its failure to accommodate, the timing, and an overpayment vendetta were substantial evidence of animus — while the retaliation claim fails because pre-2016 accommodation requests were not protected activity.

Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising: The Dynamex ABC Test Applies Retroactively

January 14, 2021
Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. (2021) 10 Cal.5th 944 holds that the ABC test adopted in Dynamex applies retroactively — to all cases not yet final when Dynamex was decided — exposing pre-2018 wage-order conduct to the new worker-classification standard.

Shirvanyan v. LACCD: Proving an Available Accommodation in an Interactive-Process Claim

November 30, 2020
The Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff suing for failure to engage in the interactive process under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) must prove a reasonable accommodation was actually available. Substantial evidence supported finite leave as an available accommodation for the plaintiff’s carpal-tunnel (wrist) injury, but none supported any accommodation for her later shoulder injury. Because the general verdict did not reveal which disability the jury relied on, the judgment was reversed for a limited retrial.

People v. Uber Technologies: Rideshare Drivers Are Likely Employees Under Prong B of the ABC Test

October 22, 2020
The Court of Appeal affirms a statewide preliminary injunction against Uber and Lyft, holding the People likely to prevail under prong B of the ABC test (Lab. Code, § 2775) — rideshare driving is within the usual course of the companies’ business — and rejecting the “technology platform” defense as a false dichotomy. (Predates Proposition 22; see Castellanos.)

Bostock v. Clayton County

June 15, 2020
An employer that fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily entails discrimination because of sex, because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being gay or transgender without taking the…

Kim v. Reins International California, Inc.

March 12, 2020
Settling and dismissing individual Labor Code claims does not strip an employee of standing to pursue a PAGA claim. PAGA standing depends on being an “aggrieved employee” — someone employed by the alleged violator against whom one or more Labor Code violations were committed — not on maintaining an unredressed…

Frlekin v. Apple Inc.: Mandatory Exit-Search Time Is Compensable “Hours Worked”

February 13, 2020
Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038 holds that time spent waiting for and undergoing mandatory exit bag-and-device searches is compensable “hours worked” under the control clause — even after clocking out, and even though employees could have avoided a search by not bringing a bag. It applies Morillion and rejects the “optional” defense.

Martinez v. Combs: The Wage Orders Define “Employer” — Control, Suffer or Permit, or Common-Law Engagement

May 20, 2010
Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 holds that the IWC wage orders’ own definitions govern who is an “employer” for minimum-wage claims: to “employ” means (a) to exercise control over wages, hours, or working conditions, (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage in a common-law employment relationship. The produce merchants were not the workers’ employers.

George v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.: The Substantial-Motivating-Factor Standard

December 9, 2009
A state administrative law judge prevailed on a FEHA retaliation claim after she was suspended following gender-bias complaints. Affirming her judgment, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a retaliation plaintiff need prove only that retaliatory animus was “at least a substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse action — not its sole or but-for cause — and that a civil-service board's finding that some discipline was warranted does not, by itself, defeat the claim.

Roby v. McKesson Corp.

November 30, 2009
Harassment and discrimination are distinct wrongs, but official personnel actions can themselves supply evidence of a hostile message and thus support a harassment claim; the two theories are not hermetically sealed. On punitive damages, the court held that in the circumstances of this case the amount of compensatory…

Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.

October 9, 2009
Summary judgment was improperly granted on the harassment and retaliation claims because triable issues of fact existed; the decision is notable for its strong criticism of the overuse and abuse of summary judgment in employment cases, for its treatment of the parties’ voluminous (and often meritless) evidentiary…

A.M. v. Albertsons: The Interactive Process and Reasonable Accommodation Are Separate Duties

September 18, 2009
Affirming a judgment for a disabled grocery checker on her FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court of Appeal held that the duty to engage in the interactive process (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)) and the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation (id., subd. (m)) are separate, independent claims; an employer cannot graft the interactive process onto, and thereby excuse, a later failure to deliver an accommodation it had already granted. The court also held the failure-to-accommodate statute contains no “pattern of failure” requirement, so a single lapse is actionable, with triviality a jury question.

Arias v. Superior Court: PAGA Representative Actions Need No Class Certification

June 29, 2009
Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969 holds that a representative PAGA action for civil penalties need not satisfy class-action requirements, while a representative UCL claim for the same Labor Code violations must — and that a non-class PAGA action does not violate the employer’s due-process rights.

Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1756 v. Superior Court: PAGA Claims Cannot Be Assigned

June 29, 2009
Two unions took assignments from more than 150 transportation workers and sued their employers under the UCL and PAGA for meal- and rest-break violations. The Supreme Court unanimously shut the door: after Proposition 64, an assignment cannot confer UCL standing on an uninjured assignee, and a PAGA claim cannot be assigned at all — the act creates no property right, so the aggrieved employee, suing as the state’s proxy, ‘does not own an assignable interest.’ Associational standing does not fill the gap, and representative UCL claims must proceed as class actions per the same-day companion, Arias. The state-proxy architecture announced here is the foundation Iskanian, Kim v. Reins, Adolph, and Turrieta all build on — and the 2024 reform kept its line intact.

Scotch v. Art Institute of California

May 6, 2009
To recover for failure to engage in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that was available at the time the interactive process should have occurred; because Scotch did not identify such an available accommodation, he could not recover on that claim.

DeJung v. Superior Court: Direct Evidence, the Cat’s-Paw Doctrine, and No Discretionary Immunity Under FEHA

December 19, 2008
A 64-year-old superior-court commissioner, passed over for a full-time post in favor of a 43-year-old after the presiding judge said the court wanted “somebody younger, maybe in their 40's,” sued for age discrimination under the FEHA. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding a superior court has no discretionary-act immunity against FEHA suits and that the presiding judge's remarks were direct evidence whose animus could taint a multilevel hiring decision under the cat's-paw doctrine.

Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and FEHA Limitations Accrual

November 21, 2008
Reversing summary judgment, the Second District held that a lesbian mail-services employee raised triable issues on whether her FEHA administrative complaint was timely under the continuing-violation doctrine, even though her harasser stopped his explicit sexual-orientation slurs over a year before she filed. Applying Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the harasser's later, facially neutral work-sabotage campaign could be “similar in kind” to the slurs and that “permanence” turns on when the harassment stops, the employee resigns, or protest becomes futile — not on when the offensive words cease.

Hoopes v. Dolan: Sequencing Equitable Defenses Against a Jury Verdict on Common Facts

November 12, 2008
In a mixed legal-equitable trial, the First District held that a judge must follow a jury's factual findings on the legal claims when fashioning equitable relief on common facts — yet may independently resolve an equitable defense such as estoppel that turns on facts the jury never decided. Hoopes v. Dolan affirmed a defense judgment and supplies the procedural architecture for sequencing and trying equitable affirmative defenses alongside a jury verdict — a structure FEHA practitioners invoke when an employer raises equitable defenses.

Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.

September 10, 2008
The decision clarified the reasonable-accommodation burdens: an employee claiming failure to accommodate by reassignment must show a vacant position existed for which she was qualified, while the allocation of proof tracks who has access to the relevant information; on this record, triable issues precluded summary…

Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

August 11, 2008
An employee fired under a no-fault attendance policy after a pancreatitis hospitalization sued under FEHA, CFRA, and Tameny. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment on the FEHA disability claims — telling the employer he was “sick” or hospitalized did not give notice of a disability — but reversed on CFRA and the related Tameny claim, holding that while “calling in sick” alone is insufficient CFRA notice, hospital records showing inpatient care can constitute a request for CFRA-qualifying leave, shifting to the employer the burden to inquire and designate, and that causation does not require the decision-maker to know the absences were protected.

Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP

August 7, 2008
Section 16600 voids contracts that restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business; Edwards’s noncompetition agreement was therefore invalid. California does not recognize the federal courts’ “narrow-restraint” exception — even a limited or partial restraint on practicing one’s profession is…

Miklosy v. Regents of University of California

July 31, 2008
Miklosy v. Regents of University of California The Whistleblower Protection Act bars a damages action against the University once it timely decides an internal retaliation complaint; a Tameny tort does not lie against a public entity or against a supervisor; and workers’ compensation exclusivity bars the related emotional-distress claim. Miklosy v. Regents of University of […]

Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.

July 30, 2008
Summary judgment was error. A plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence from which a trier of fact could find the employer’s proffered reasons unworthy of credence, and the record here showed the dismissal decision may in fact have been made by Mamou’s own biased immediate supervisor, raising triable…

Arteaga v. Brink’s — Temporal Proximity Is Not Pretext

May 28, 2008
Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd.: Preemptive FEHA Retaliation

May 13, 2008
In Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, the Third District affirmed a judgment and fee award for an employee, holding that FEHA's anti-retaliation provision reaches preemptive retaliation—adverse action taken against an employee the employer believes will become a complainant or witness in a discrimination proceeding—even before the employee has formally opposed any practice or filed any charge.

Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central

April 7, 2008
The California Supreme Court held that a CFRA employee’s simultaneous performance of a similar part-time job for another employer is strong but not conclusive evidence that she could perform the functions of her own full-time position. Because the phrase “functions of the position of that employee” means the job this employer assigned — not job functions “generally” — whether Lonicki had a serious health condition disabling her from her Sutter job remained a triable issue, and summary judgment was reversed. The Court separately held that an employer’s failure to invoke the second- and third-opinion dispute-resolution procedure does not estop it from litigating the medical merits.

Jones v. The Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership

March 3, 2008
The same rule that governs discrimination governs retaliation: the employer, but not nonemployer individuals, may be held liable for retaliation under the FEHA (id. at p. 1160).

Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc.

January 24, 2008
The FEHA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s use of medical marijuana. The Compassionate Use Act did not address the rights and duties of employers and employees, and under California law an employer may require pre-employment drug testing and may take illegal drug use into account in employment…

Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California

November 29, 2007
Failure to engage in the interactive process is a separate FEHA violation requiring different proof from failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; the two findings are not inconsistent, so a jury may hold an employer liable for failing to engage in the interactive process even while finding no failure to…

Mokler v. County of Orange — Whistleblower Retaliation, Waived Exhaustion, and a Harassment Holding Overtaken by § 12923

November 26, 2007
The Fourth District affirmed a whistleblower-retaliation verdict for an Office on Aging director fired after warning that a County reorganization was unlawful — holding the County waived its exhaustion defense by first raising it after trial — while reversing her sexual-harassment claim under the pre-§ 12923 "severe or pervasive" standard and affirming a remittitur-backed new trial order on damages.

Gentry v. Superior Court

August 30, 2007
A class-action waiver in an employment arbitration agreement may be unenforceable where class arbitration would be a significantly more effective way to vindicate employees’ unwaivable statutory rights (such as overtime), considering factors like the modest size of individual recoveries, the risk of retaliation, and…

Green v. State of California

August 23, 2007
The employee bears the burden of proving he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA — that is, able to perform the essential duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation — just as the federal ADA requires; it is not the employer’s burden to disprove qualification.

Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation: Proving the Nexus and Adverse Action

June 14, 2007
Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that a correctional officer's FEHA claims for sexual harassment, gender and race discrimination, and retaliation all failed because she could not establish a nexus between the conduct and her protected status — asked whether her coworkers' conduct was prompted by gender or race, she “repeatedly answered, 'No' and 'I don't know'” — and could not show a “substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions” of her employment. Her common-law claims for assault, emotional distress, and negligent supervision were barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

King v. United Parcel Service — The Honest-Belief Rule on Summary Judgment

May 23, 2007
The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. — Temporal Proximity Alone Does Not Defeat Summary Judgment

May 14, 2007
The Fourth District held that while the timing of an adverse action can carry a FEHA retaliation plaintiff past the prima facie stage — even on an uncorroborated declaration — temporal proximity does not, standing alone, create a triable issue of pretext once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate reason, and it expressly rejected Gemini Aluminum's suggestion that employers must also prove their termination procedures were objectively fair.

Faust v. California Portland Cement Co.: CFRA Interference, Employer Notice Duties, and the No-Magic-Words Rule at Summary Judgment

May 10, 2007
Reversing summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that an employee need not mention the CFRA to request protected medical leave — and that an employer that never gave notice of CFRA rights, rejected a chiropractor's certification out of hand, and refused to communicate with the employee's designated representatives could not defeat his interference, retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful termination claims as a matter of law.

Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.

April 16, 2007
The section 226.7 meal/rest payment is a wage (premium pay), not a penalty, and is therefore governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to wage claims rather than the one-year period for penalties.

Malais v. Los Angeles City Fire Dept.: A Less-Preferred Assignment Is Not an Adverse Employment Action

March 29, 2007
A fire captain who lost his leg sued for disability discrimination after his department barred him from the firefighting “platoon duty” he loved and kept him in an office-style “special duty” assignment. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the department, holding the reassignment was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA: the special-duty post carried equal pay, equal promotional opportunity, and substantial overtime, so the captain's complaint was a preference, not a material detriment.

Myers v. Trendwest Resorts: Supervisor Strict Liability Under FEHA

February 28, 2007
In Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, the Third District reversed summary adjudication for the employer, reaffirming that under FEHA an employer is strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate unless the harassment 'result[ed] from a completely private relationship unconnected with the employment'—a narrow exception the court declined to apply where the supervisor exploited his workplace authority.

Taylor v. L.A. DWP: Retaliation as Discrimination Under § 12940(k)

November 20, 2006
In Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, the Second District reversed a dismissal on demurrer, holding that retaliation is a form of discrimination so that the employer's duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k), extends to retaliation—and that a supervisor may be held personally liable for retaliation under subdivision (h).

McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation — What Counts as an Adverse Employment Action After Yanowitz

August 29, 2006
On retransfer from the Supreme Court in light of Yanowitz, the First District reversed a $75,000 retaliation verdict, holding that file memoranda, a letter of instruction, an investigation, an unimplemented 30-day suspension, and a lateral transfer to a comparable position did not — separately or collectively — materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and that the surgeon's beliefs about her employer's motives were not substantial evidence of pretext.

Dore v. Arnold Worldwide — “at will” means at any time: offer letters and the end of the implied-contract workaround

August 3, 2006
A unanimous Supreme Court holds that a signed offer letter stating employment is "at will" and terminable "at any time" is unambiguous — recruitment talk of a "long-term fix" cannot create an implied for-cause contract or support fraud reliance — with Justice Baxter (joined by Corrigan) urging reconsideration of Pacific Gas and Justice Moreno reserving "upon notice" clauses.

Smith v. Superior Court (L’Oreal)

July 10, 2006
“Discharge” under sections 201 and 203 includes not only firing but also releasing an employee upon completion of the particular job assignment or time duration for which he or she was hired; final wages are then immediately due, and a willful failure to pay triggers waiting-time penalties.

Singleton v. United States Gypsum: Same-Sex Harassment Without Desire

July 3, 2006
In Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547, the Second District reversed summary judgment for the employer, holding that same-sex sexual harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire to be actionable: it is enough that sex was 'used as a weapon to create a hostile work environment,' and the court found triable issues on both the harassment and the employer's knowledge.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White

June 22, 2006
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is not limited to employer actions affecting the terms and conditions of employment or occurring at the workplace; it prohibits any employer action that a reasonable employee would have found materially adverse — that is, action that might well dissuade a reasonable worker from…

Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

June 2, 2006
Yes. An employer that regards a person as physically disabled must engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodation to that person, even if he or she is not actually disabled; the duty runs to those “regarded as” disabled, not only to the actually disabled (id. at p. 40).

Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions

April 20, 2006
The sexually coarse and vulgar language used in the Friends writers’ room was not actionable sexual harassment on this record, because it was generally part of the creative process of writing adult comedic material rather than conduct directed at the plaintiff or at women because of their sex; harassment must be…

Armenta v. Osmose, Inc.

December 29, 2005
California does not permit wage averaging: the minimum-wage standard applies to each hour worked, and an employer must pay at least the minimum wage for every compensable hour; it cannot use higher pay for some hours to offset unpaid or sub-minimum hours.

Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. — the employer’s initial summary-judgment burden and the limits of the RIF defense

December 21, 2005
A pregnant marketing VP laid off in a reduction in force wins reversal of summary judgment: the Second District holds the moving employer must present evidence permitting a more-likely-than-not finding that its nondiscriminatory reason actually drove the discharge, and that replacement by a consultant, a decisionmaker's lie, and an evaluation e-mailed hours after her internal complaint made falsity and pregnancy animus triable.

Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist.: The Yanowitz Materiality Test Governs a Section 1102.5 Whistleblower Claim

December 19, 2005
When a whistleblowing high-school principal was moved to a smaller, quieter school at identical pay, title, and job description, the Third District held that the Yanowitz “materiality” standard for an adverse employment action — built for FEHA retaliation — governs a Labor Code section 1102.5(b) whistleblower claim too, and that a same-pay transfer can still be materially adverse where it significantly diminishes the employee's responsibilities.

Claudio v. Regents of UC: Suing for a Failed Interactive Process

November 22, 2005
In Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, the Third District reversed summary judgment, holding that an employee may bring a stand-alone FEHA claim for the employer's failure to engage in the timely, good-faith interactive process required by Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n)—while emphasizing that the process demands good-faith participation by both employer and employee.

Miller v. Department of Corrections

July 18, 2005
Although an isolated workplace romance does not by itself constitute sexual harassment, widespread sexual favoritism that is severe or pervasive may create an actionable hostile work environment — one that conveys the demeaning message that women are sexual playthings and that managers view sexual favors as the way to…

Discover Bank v. Superior Court

June 27, 2005
At least some class-action waivers in consumer adhesion contracts are unconscionable under California law — the “Discover Bank rule” — where the waiver is in an adhesion contract, the disputes predictably involve small amounts of damages, and the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to cheat…

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.

January 1, 2005
An employee engages in protected activity by opposing conduct she reasonably and in good faith believes is unlawful under the FEHA, even without using magic words or filing a formal complaint. For the adverse-action element, the FEHA reaches employer actions that materially and adversely affect the terms, conditions,…

Reeves v. Hanlon

August 12, 2004
To recover for intentional interference with an at-will employment relationship, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act — conduct unlawful by some measure beyond the interference itself — that induced the employees to leave or otherwise disrupted the relationship; here, the…

Reeves v. Safeway Stores: California’s Cat’s-Paw Rule for Retaliatory Discharge

July 29, 2004
California's leading “cat's paw” decision. A 29-year Safeway food clerk who complained that his female coworkers were being sexually harassed was fired after a trivial bathroom-door confrontation was escalated into “workplace violence” by a resentful store manager and a one-sided security investigation, then rubber-stamped by a district manager who had never heard of his complaints. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding that a biased supervisor's animus is a but-for cause that imputes to the employer through the “cat's paw” it uses to carry out the firing.

Chapman v. Enos: Who Is a ‘Supervisor’ for FEHA Harassment Liability

March 10, 2004
Whether a harasser is personally liable under the FEHA — and his employer strictly liable — often turns on one threshold fact: was he the plaintiff's “supervisor”? In Chapman v. Enos, the Court of Appeal reversed a defense verdict because the trial court told the jury a supervisor must be “fully accountable and responsible” for a subordinate's work product, an extra-statutory requirement that wrongly narrowed the FEHA's class of supervisors. Full accountability is an indicium of supervisory power, the court held, not an element; the statute requires only the responsibility to direct an employee's work using independent judgment.

State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court

November 24, 2003
An employer is strictly liable under the FEHA for a supervisor’s hostile-environment sexual harassment. But the avoidable-consequences doctrine applies: the employer may avoid liability for those damages the employee could have avoided with reasonable effort — for example, by timely using the employer’s complaint…

Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc.

February 20, 2003
The FEHA requires only that a physiological disease or condition affecting a body system “limit” — not “substantially limit” — the plaintiff’s ability to participate in a major life activity, a standard broader than the federal ADA; the later Poppink Act merely clarified, and did not change, that existing “limits”…

Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara — The Continuing-Violation Doctrine Ends at Permanence

December 23, 2002
The Sixth District affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that a five-year pattern of stripping a female employee's coveted technical duties was "a collection of isolated employment decisions" that had acquired permanence by 1996 under Richards v. CH2M Hill — and that a biased supervisor's sexist remarks could not show pretext where he neither knew of her candidacy nor took part in the challenged hiring.

Northrop Grumman v. WCAB: A FEHA-Mandated Investigation Is a Good Faith Personnel Action

November 21, 2002
A workers' compensation judge awarded an inspector benefits for a psychiatric injury, finding the employer's investigation into a coworker's accusation that he had racially discriminated against a trainee was not a good faith personnel action under Labor Code section 3208.3, subdivision (h). The Court of Appeal reversed: because FEHA imposes an affirmative, mandatory duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent and investigate workplace discrimination, a legally compelled investigation conducted without arbitrary motive or intent to deceive is a good faith personnel action exempting the employer from compensation liability — and an unsubstantiated outcome does not retroactively brand the inquiry bad faith.

Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation: Failure to Accommodate Is Its Own FEHA Wrong

April 2, 2002
Reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that an employee stated a cause of action for damages caused by her employer's failure to make reasonable accommodation for her known disability under FEHA. Treating Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) as a “separate and distinct” unlawful employment practice independent of the disability-discrimination prohibition in subdivision (a), the court rejected the importation of federal ADA limits (the “qualified individual” and adverse-action requirements) and held the FEHA accommodation duty broader than the ADA's, and not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

West v. Bechtel: A Foreign Sovereign Client’s Age Bias Cannot Be Imputed to an Innocent Agent

March 6, 2002
A 62-year-old Bechtel engineer removed from a Saudi project after the Saudi government client called him too old won a FEHA age-discrimination and contract verdict in San Francisco. The Court of Appeal reversed outright, holding that a principal's discriminatory bias cannot be imputed to an innocent agent who merely carries out a foreign sovereign's removal order, and that, absent substantial evidence of the project director's own animus, the verdict could not stand. The contract award separately failed because West, who refused comparable offers and never looked for work, failed to mitigate as a matter of law.

Akers v. County of San Diego — defining the adverse employment action in FEHA retaliation claims

February 8, 2002
Affirming a retaliation verdict for a former deputy district attorney, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA retaliation requires a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment — a test satisfied where undeserved accusations of dishonesty and incompetence destroyed the prosecutor's promotability even without a firing, demotion, or lost pay.

Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.

August 23, 2001
The continuing-violation doctrine applies to FEHA claims: an employer’s related unlawful acts are treated as a single continuing violation — and the limitations period does not begin to run — so long as the conduct is sufficiently similar and frequent and has not yet acquired a degree of permanence that should put the…

Flannery v. Prentice

August 13, 2001
Attorney fees awarded under section 12965 belong to the attorneys whose services earned them, except to the extent the attorneys and client have entered an enforceable agreement providing otherwise; the portion of a statutory fee award exceeding fees the client already paid does not belong to the client by default.

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

June 14, 2001
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit — that one or more elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense — by either conclusively negating an element or showing the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to…

Clark County School District v. Breeden: “Very Close” Temporal Proximity and the Limits of Retaliation’s Most-Cited Defense Authority

April 23, 2001
The Supreme Court's per curiam reversal holds that no reasonable person could believe a single offhand exchange violated Title VII and that timing alone proves retaliatory causation only when the employer's knowledge and the adverse action are "very close" — the twin rules that now anchor nearly every FEHA retaliation summary judgment motion.

Ketchum v. Moses

February 26, 2001
Statutory attorney fees are calculated by the lodestar method — the reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate — and the lodestar may be adjusted by a multiplier based on factors including the contingent risk of the representation, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill displayed,…

Thompson v. Tracor Flight Systems: After-Acquired Evidence Limits Remedies, Never Liability

February 2, 2001
A jury found Rosie Thompson, a human-resources director, was constructively discharged in retaliation for opposing employment practices she reasonably believed unlawful. The Court of Appeal affirmed the verdict and the full damages award, holding the after-acquired-evidence defense — an equitable doctrine akin to unclean hands — limits relief only where the employer proves the employee in fact would have been terminated for the later-discovered conduct, a burden Tracor failed to meet.

Morgan v. Regents of University of California: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and the Significant-Participant Rule

November 30, 2000
An African-American electronic technician laid off in a budget cut applied for dozens of university jobs, was hired for none, and sued under the FEHA for retaliation. Affirming summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that a string of rejections by different managers in unrelated departments is a series of isolated decisions, not a “continuing violation” — and that retaliatory remarks by HR staff who took no part in the hiring cannot establish causation, because every actual decisionmaker disclaimed knowledge of the protected grievance.

Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff: Limits of the “Regarded-As” Prong

November 14, 2000
In Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1031, the Fourth District reversed a verdict for a color-blind deputy applicant and directed judgment for the County, holding that a 'regarded-as' disability claim requires proof that the employer's perception stemmed from a false idea—'myths, fears and stereotypes'—about disability; an employer's accurate assessment of a genuine limitation does not satisfy the perceived-disability prong.

Chuang v. UC Davis — The Ninth Circuit Pretext Playbook

August 30, 2000
A world-class AIDS researcher — the only full-time, non-Caucasian faculty member in his department, and the only one without a tenured (FTE) position — was promised a tenure line for over a decade while the university gave the openings to others, then had his

Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.

August 24, 2000
Mandatory employment arbitration of unwaivable statutory claims is permissible only if the agreement provides certain minimum protections — a neutral arbitrator, adequate discovery, a written award subject to limited review, all types of relief otherwise available in court, and no requirement that the employee bear…

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

June 12, 2000
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. A plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false can, without more, sustain a finding of intentional discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133 Parallel citations: 120 S.Ct. 2097; 147 L.Ed.2d 105. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

Spitzer v. Good Guys: The FEHA Duty to Reassign

May 1, 2000
In Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376, the First District reversed summary judgment on a failure-to-accommodate claim, holding in the published portion that FEHA's reasonable-accommodation duty can require reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position—an obligation the employer escapes only by showing undue hardship or that no suitable vacancy exists.

Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville: When McDonnell Douglas Burdens Drop From the Case at Trial

April 14, 2000
A city secretary hired at 62 and let go at 74 during a budget crisis lost her FEHA age-discrimination claim after a bench trial. Affirming, the First District clarified that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is a pretrial screening device; at trial it drops from the case, leaving only the ultimate question whether the employer intentionally discriminated, reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence.

Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc.

April 10, 2000
In Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, the Court of Appeal drew the first California line around what it means to take family leave “to care for” a parent. A physical therapist fired after flying to New York to help her independent, 81-year-old mother pack and relocate to a one-level apartment was held not to be “caring for” her mother under the Family Rights Act: her participation had to be “warranted” during “a period of the treatment or supervision” of her mother, and packing boxes and directing movers was not. Affirming judgment on the pleadings, the court confirmed that courts — not the agency — bear ultimate responsibility for construing CalFRA.

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co.: The Two Independent Definitions of “Hours Worked” and Compensable Compulsory Travel Time

March 27, 2000
Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 holds that the wage order’s “subject to the control of an employer” and “suffered or permitted to work” clauses are independent: an employee under the employer’s control is paid even when not working. Compulsory travel on employer-mandated buses is compensable “hours worked,” and the federal Portal-to-Portal Act does not govern California law.

Thomas v. Department of Corrections: An Adverse Employment Action Must Be Both Detrimental and Substantial

January 10, 2000
In one of California's early decisions defining the scope of an “adverse employment action,” the Court of Appeal borrowed the prevailing federal standard and held the action must be both detrimental and substantial — a material change in the terms of employment. A corrections officer's pleaded grievances (a delayed paycheck, an early job change, one missed overtime payment, interference with an outside credit-union post) failed that test on demurrer. The opinion was certified for partial publication; the citable holdings live in published parts 6 and 7.

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.

March 4, 1969
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (5th Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 228, the Fifth Circuit announced the foundational Title VII sex-BFOQ standard: an employer invoking sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must prove a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job. The court rejected stereotype-based “romantic paternalism” and a state weight-lifting limit as justifications and placed the burden on the employer.