(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826

Supreme Court of California · Decided June 14, 2001

Verify before relying. A summary and analysis as of its publication date — not legal advice, and not a representation that the decision remains good law. Confirm subsequent history independently.
JDBy Jonathan J. DelshadFounder & Editor-in-Chief

01. Facts

Theresa Aguilar sued, on behalf of herself and an estimated 24 million retail consumers of California Air Resources Board (CARB) gasoline, a group of major petroleum companies, alleging an antitrust conspiracy to restrict the output of CARB gasoline and raise its price (25 Cal.4th at p. 837). Each defendant moved for summary judgment, presenting declarations from officers and managers stating that the company made its capacity, production, and pricing decisions independently and denying any collusion (id. at p. 837). Aguilar opposed with circumstantial evidence (id. at p. 837).

02. Procedural posture

The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants and, in doing so, clarified the summary-judgment burden-shifting standard under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c (25 Cal.4th at p. 837).

03. Issue

What burdens the moving and opposing parties bear on a motion for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, and how those burdens apply where the moving defendant contends the plaintiff cannot prove an element of the claim.

Holding

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit — that one or more elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense — by either conclusively negating an element or showing the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to prove an element; only then does the burden shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment is proper where no reasonable trier of fact could find for the opposing party.

05. Reasoning

The court synthesized the 1992–1993 amendments to section 437c with federal summary-judgment principles, holding that the moving defendant need not always conclusively disprove an element but may instead show the plaintiff lacks and cannot obtain needed evidence. It tied the standard to the applicable burden of proof at trial, directing courts to ask whether the evidence would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact more likely than not (or by whatever standard applies).

Practice Pointer

Aguilar is the operating manual for summary judgment in California — the standard that governs most employment-case dispositive motions. Plaintiff’s counsel should hold the moving defendant to its initial burden (it must affirmatively show the plaintiff cannot prove an element, not merely assert it), and then marshal specific, admissible evidence — including circumstantial evidence — sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in the plaintiff’s favor.

06. Open questions

Aguilar settled the general burden-shifting framework but its application is fact-specific, and how much of an evidentiary showing a moving defendant must make to demonstrate the plaintiff “cannot reasonably obtain” evidence remains a recurring battleground in employment summary-judgment practice (see Reid v. Google and Nazir v. United Airlines).

Cite this entry

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826.

“an antitrust action arising from a complaint filed by Theresa Aguilar on behalf of herself and all of the other … 24 million retail consumers of California Air Resources Board, or CARB, gasoline.” — 25 Cal.4th at p. 837

Source: California Official Reports – [insert durable courts.ca.gov / Official Reports link at verification].

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