(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019
Supreme Court of California · No. S098895 · Decided February 20, 2003
01. Facts
Francisco Colmenares began working for Braemar Country Club in 1972 as a general laborer, injured his back at work in 1981, and thereafter performed lighter duties (29 Cal.4th at p. 1023). In 1982 Braemar promoted him to foreman of a golf-course maintenance crew, a position that accounted for his physical limitations, and his performance reviews were good for years (id. at p. 1023). Beginning in 1995 a new supervisor gave him unfavorable reviews; in July 1997 Braemar reassigned him from supervising a maintenance crew to supervising a clubhouse construction project involving heavy labor, and in September 1997 it fired him for “deficiencies in his work performance” (id. at p. 1023). Colmenares sued under the FEHA, alleging his termination was based on his chronic back condition; the trial court granted Braemar summary judgment on the ground his back condition did not “substantially” limit a major life activity (id. at pp. 1023–1024).
02. Procedural posture
The Court of Appeal affirmed, applying the federal “substantially limits” standard. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding the lower courts applied the wrong standard (id. at p. 1024).
03. Issue
Whether, at the time of Colmenares’s 1997 termination, a “physical disability” under the FEHA required that the impairment “substantially limit” a major life activity (the federal ADA test) or only that it “limit” a major life activity.
Holding
The FEHA requires only that a physiological disease or condition affecting a body system “limit” — not “substantially limit” — the plaintiff’s ability to participate in a major life activity, a standard broader than the federal ADA; the later Poppink Act merely clarified, and did not change, that existing “limits” test (id. at p. 1032).
05. Reasoning
Tracing the FEHA’s text and history, the court held that since the 1992 amendments California law used “limits,” not the ADA’s “substantially limits,” and that the Legislature deliberately chose broader coverage. The contrary language in earlier authority was dictum. The 2000 Poppink Act expressly confirmed that California disability law requires only a limitation, so it clarified rather than altered the law — meaning the “limits” test governed Colmenares’s 1997 claim. Because the lower courts demanded a substantial limitation, the judgment was reversed.
Practice Pointer
Colmenares is the foundation of California’s broader-than-federal disability definition: a plaintiff need only show the condition “limits” (makes difficult) a major life activity, not that it “substantially limits” one. Plead and prove the FEHA standard, and resist any defense or instruction that imports the ADA’s more demanding test. Note that the FEHA definition has since been further broadened by statute, so confirm the current statutory language for present-day claims.
06. Open questions
Colmenares interpreted the pre-Poppink FEHA for a 1997 termination; because the FEHA disability definition has continued to evolve by statute, the decision’s practical significance is largely historical and transitional, and current claims should be analyzed under the present Government Code definitions.
Cite this entry
Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019.
“the disease or condition limited (as opposed to substantially limited, as required under federal law) the plaintiff’s ability to participate in major life activities.” — 29 Cal.4th at p. 1032
Source: California Official Reports – [insert durable courts.ca.gov / Official Reports link at verification].