(2006) 39 Cal.4th 77
Supreme Court of California · Decided July 10, 2006
01. Facts
Amanza Smith was working as a salesperson in a Beverly Hills boutique when a representative of L’Oreal USA, Inc. asked her to be a “hair model” at an upcoming show; after a modeling call, L’Oreal agreed to pay her $500 for one day’s work at the show (39 Cal.4th at p. 81). When L’Oreal did not immediately pay her at the end of that single-day engagement, Smith sought waiting-time penalties, contending her final wages were due upon completion of the job (id. at p. 81).
02. Procedural posture
The Supreme Court held that completing a specific job assignment is a “discharge” triggering the immediate-final-pay requirement, and reversed (39 Cal.4th at p. 81).
03. Issue
Whether an employee is “discharged” for purposes of Labor Code sections 201 and 203 — so that final wages are immediately due — when the employer releases the employee upon completion of the specific job or time period for which the employee was hired.
Holding
“Discharge” under sections 201 and 203 includes not only firing but also releasing an employee upon completion of the particular job assignment or time duration for which he or she was hired; final wages are then immediately due, and a willful failure to pay triggers waiting-time penalties.
05. Reasoning
The court construed “discharge” in light of the statute’s protective purpose of ensuring prompt final payment. An employee hired for a discrete task or period is, in substance, let go when that task or period ends, so the same prompt-payment obligation applies as for any termination. Reading “discharge” narrowly would leave short-term and project employees without the protection the Legislature intended.
Practice Pointer
Smith extends prompt-final-pay protection (and section 203 penalties) to project-based, seasonal, and single-engagement workers: when the job for which the worker was hired ends, final wages are due immediately. Plaintiff’s counsel representing gig, freelance, or fixed-task employees should treat completion of the assignment as a discharge date for sections 201 and 203.
06. Open questions
Smith defined “discharge” to include completion of a job but left the willfulness element of section 203 (and good-faith-dispute defenses) for case-by-case resolution, as well as the application of the rule to recurring or intermittent engagements.
Cite this entry
Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77.
“defendant agreed to pay her $500 for one day’s work at the show.” — 39 Cal.4th at p. 81
Source: California Official Reports – [insert durable courts.ca.gov / Official Reports link at verification].