The Review · Case Index
California employment case index
Search every indexed California wrongful-termination and employment decision, or browse by subject area, statute, and decade — each summary source-verified against the published reporter.
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Browse the case index
Select any subject area, statute, or decade to filter the indexed decisions. Combine filters to narrow further.
Subject Area
- Arbitration
- At-will & implied contract
- Civil Procedure
- Class Actions
- Disability & Accommodation
- Discrimination
- Harassment
- Independent Contractor & Misclassification
- Leave & Medical
- Negligent hiring / supervision / retention
- PAGA
- Privacy
- Remedies & Fees
- Retaliation
- Statutes
- Trade Secrets & Non-Compete
- Wage & hour
- Whistleblower
- Wrongful Termination
Statute
- 42 U.S.C. § 1981
- ADA
- ADEA
- Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600
- Bus. & Prof. Code § 7451
- CFRA
- Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (Privacy)
- Cal. Const., art. I, § 8
- Civ. Code § 1670.5
- Civ. Code § 1714
- Civ. Code § 1786 (ICRAA)
- Civ. Code § 1946.2 (Tenant Protection Act)
- Civ. Code § 3291
- Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7
- Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2
- Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.98
- Code Civ. Proc. § 437c
- Code Civ. Proc. § 527.8
- Common law (Tameny)
- Compassionate Use Act
- Ed. Code § 87160 et seq.
- FAA
- FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.)
- FEHA
- FEHA — Gov. Code § 12926
- FEHA — Gov. Code § 12940
- FEHA — Gov. Code § 12941
- False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3730)
- Gov. Code § 12653 (CFCA)
- Gov. Code § 12923
- Gov. Code § 12945
- Gov. Code § 12960
- Gov. Code § 12965
- Gov. Code § 8547.10
- Health & Saf. Code § 1278.5
- IWC Wage Order No. 16
- IWC Wage Order No. 7
- Lab. Code § 1102.5
- Lab. Code § 1102.6
- Lab. Code § 1106
- Lab. Code § 1194
- Lab. Code § 132a
- Lab. Code § 203
- Lab. Code § 226
- Lab. Code § 226.7
- Lab. Code § 229
- Lab. Code § 230
- Lab. Code § 2699 (PAGA)
- Lab. Code § 2775
- Lab. Code § 2922
- Lab. Code § 432.6 (AB 51)
- Lab. Code § 510
- Lab. Code § 512
- Lab. Code § 558
- Lab. Code § 98.2
- Lab. Code §§ 201–203
- NLRA
- PAGA
- TVPRA (18 U.S.C. § 1595)
- Title VII
- USERRA (38 U.S.C. § 4311)
107 cases
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: The Public-Policy Wrongful-Discharge Tort
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 created California’s public-policy wrongful-discharge tort: an employee fired for refusing to commit an illegal act may sue in tort, recovering tort and punitive damages, not just contract remedies.
Doss v. Tesla, Inc.
A Tesla yard hostler who moved 53-foot trailers of out-of-state auto parts around the Fremont factory — never crossing a state line — sued for wage-and-hour violations, and Tesla moved to compel individual arbitration. In the published portion of its opinion, the First District holds yard hostlers are FAA section 1 transportation workers exempt from arbitration, and clarifies which wage claims Labor Code section 229 keeps in court.
Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC
A firm filed a wage-and-hour class action duplicating one it had already filed elsewhere, then opposed a stay with a brief — drafted by a contract attorney using generative AI — full of nonexistent citations and at least eight fabricated quotations. The First District affirms $6,000 in section 128.7 sanctions: counsel of record bear ultimate responsibility for what they sign, and the duty to verify authority cannot be delegated to any form of technology.
In re Orr (Orr v. United States District Court)
A former UPS seasonal driver sued for wage violations; the district court compelled arbitration of her individual claims but refused to decide whether the FAA or state arbitration law governed, reasoning the result was the same. The Ninth Circuit grants a writ of mandamus: under New Prime, the court — not an arbitrator — must decide whether the FAA section 1 transportation-worker exclusion applies before compelling arbitration.
Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc.
A trucking-job applicant brought an FCRA class action over confusing, noncompliant background-check disclosure forms; after Limon v. Circle K required concrete injury, the trial court decertified the class. The First District reverses and declines to follow Limon: California courts are not bound by Article III, and a willful FCRA violation supports statutory damages of $100–$1,000 and standing without proof of harm.
Cortina v. North American Title Company
After 19 years of litigation, a bifurcated bench trial produced a $43 million judgment for ~400 escrow workers who claimed they were misclassified as exempt. The Fifth District reverses on two independent grounds: the trial court could not delegate the entire damages phase to a private referee without the parties’ consent, and the liability-phase trial plan violated Duran by using representative sampling to prove classwide liability while barring the employer from contesting individual exempt status.
Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, Inc.
A PAGA plaintiff proved Labor Code violations but recovered about one percent of the $56 million maximum he calculated, and his attorney fees were cut by a 0.70 negative multiplier. The Fourth District affirms: section 2699(e)(2) mandates no method for reducing penalties — per-employee is fine — and the trial court adequately justified the fee multiplier, leaving the “heightened scrutiny” question for the Supreme Court.
Husband v. Target Corporation
An employee with an undisclosed bipolar diagnosis was fired after two episodes of erratic, irrational behavior at work, then sued Target under FEHA. The Second District affirms summary judgment: employer knowledge is a prerequisite to FEHA disability liability, and it is imputed only when disability is the “only reasonable interpretation” of the conduct — not where intoxication, medication, or sleep deprivation could equally explain it.
Williams v. Legacy Health
Nine hospital-system employees sought religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement and sued under Title VII when they were denied. The Ninth Circuit affirms judgment for the employer: after Groff v. DeJoy, undue hardship means a “substantial” burden — including realistic health, safety, and staffing costs — and exempting unvaccinated clinical staff during the Delta surge met that standard.
Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc.
A staffing agency hired a worker under an arbitration agreement and placed him at a client; when the placement ended, the client hired him directly, and he later sued the client over that direct-employment period. The First District affirms denial of arbitration: the client was not a party or “affiliate” of the agency, the claims fell outside the agreement’s scope, and the worker was not equitably estopped — a nonsignatory cannot simply borrow a staffing agency’s arbitration clause.
Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc.
A railcar repairman who inspected and repaired freight cars taken out of service in a rail yard brought a wage-and-hour class action and argued his arbitration agreement was exempt as a transportation worker’s contract. The Second District disagrees: he is neither a “railroad employee” nor a “transportation worker” under FAA section 1, because repairing decommissioned cars is too far removed from actual transportation — so his arbitration agreement and class waiver are enforceable.
Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar, Inc.
An EMT sought to certify a 135-worker class alleging the employer left nondiscretionary “EMS Bonuses” out of the regular rate, underpaying overtime and premiums. The Fifth District reverses the denial of class certification: the employer’s gift/discretion defense applied to every EMS Bonus, so it was not a defense “unique” to the named plaintiff.
Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center, LLC
Studebaker made a new employee sign three onboarding arbitration documents; the trial court found their “conflicts” showed no valid agreement and denied arbitration. The Second District reverses and compels arbitration — ambiguities must be reconciled to give effect to the intent to arbitrate, the agreement was not unconscionable, and an inconsistent wholesale PAGA waiver should have been severed.
United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy Mortgage Corporation
A former Academy Mortgage employee won a False Claims Act qui tam case after the government declined to intervene, and her counsel obtained a fee award enhanced by a 1.75 lodestar multiplier. The Ninth Circuit reverses the enhancement: above-lodestar multipliers are reserved for the “rare and exceptional” case, cannot rest on factors already in the lodestar, and require a reviewable methodology.
O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc.
After two of four bellwether arbitrators found a travel-nursing agency’s arbitration agreements invalid, a district court used non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to void 255 other employees’ separate agreements. The Ninth Circuit reverses: the FAA guarantees individualized, one-on-one proceedings, and forbids using other arbitrators’ rulings to invalidate other parties’ agreements wholesale.
Guardian Storage Centers, LLC v. Simpson
A terminated COO forwarded her employer’s e-mails — some attorney-client privileged — to her personal account and handed them to her lawyers for her wrongful-termination and harassment cross-claims. The Fourth District holds the State Fund rule on handling privileged materials applies even to such intentional, unauthorized disclosures, and reverses the denial of the employer’s motion to disqualify counsel.
Paknad v. Superior Court
Intuitive Surgical defended a harassment suit by pointing to the adequacy of its attorney-led investigation, then tried to withhold the investigator’s findings as work product. The Sixth District grants the employee a writ: putting the investigation’s adequacy at issue waives privilege and even core work product over the investigator’s factual findings and anything bearing on the investigation’s scope and adequacy.
Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University
Two Chico State physics professors sued the CSU Trustees for retaliation, alleging a sham investigation and sabotage of their move to a new university after they reported harassment. The Trustees moved to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute as “based in part” on protected speech. The Third District affirms denial: a movant must analyze each claim element-by-element and identify which acts are protected — “based in part” is not enough.
Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District
A nursing student said the faculty member running her hospital clinical rotation sexually harassed her and tanked her grade when she refused him. The Fourth District holds a student in a required clinical placement is an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA, and reverses summary judgment on standing, Government-Claims-Act notice, and deliberate indifference.
Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center
A former Work Practice Apprentice at the San Francisco Zen Center won a wage award, but the trial court held the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred his claims. The First District reverses, adopting its companion case Lorenzo: the exception bars only claims that require resolving ecclesiastical questions, and the Center showed none. NOTE: the controlling ministerial-exception issue is now before the California Supreme Court in Lorenzo (S294565), so this opinion is citable for persuasive value only.
Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC
Cambodian villagers forced to work at Thai seafood factories sued a U.S. marketer under the trafficking civil-remedy statute; their case was dismissed because the statute then reached only those who succeeded in benefiting, not those who attempted to. After Congress amended the law, the en banc Ninth Circuit holds the clarifying amendment retroactive — and that Landgraf governs all such amendments, overruling the “clarifying amendment” exception — reviving the claims.
Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.
Wal-Mart ran a background check on a job applicant but allegedly botched the ICRAA disclosure form, then won summary judgment because she showed no real-world harm. The Fourth District reverses: California standing requires only an invasion of a legally protected interest, and ICRAA’s “$10,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater” remedy is independent of actual damages — so a bare disclosure violation confers standing.
Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc.: Illegibility, Unconscionability, and No Presumption for Arbitration
The California Supreme Court holds that illegible, one-sided arbitration print is procedural (not substantive) unconscionability — and that no presumption favors arbitration.
Avery v. TEKsystems, Inc.
Twenty-two months into a wage-and-hour class action, TEKsystems rolled out a new mandatory arbitration agreement to the recruiter class members and moved to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirms denial of that motion: Rule 23(d) lets a district court refuse to enforce an agreement obtained through misleading, mid-litigation communications that threaten the fairness of the class action — the FAA gives arbitration no special protection.
De Paolo v. Rosales
A resident manager whose apartment came with the job refused to leave after she was terminated. The Appellate Division affirms an unlawful detainer judgment: housing provided as part of employment compensation is not a protected tenancy, the former manager became a tenant at sufferance or licensee outside the Tenant Protection Act, and her retaliatory-eviction defense failed for lack of evidence.
Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce, Inc.
A produce-plant forklift driver was fired after complaining his pay lagged behind coworkers’. He wrongly believed the Equal Pay Act reached the gap — but the Fourth District holds his mistake of law does not sink his Labor Code section 1102.5(b) whistleblower verdict, because the statute asks only whether he had objectively reasonable cause to believe a violation occurred, a question for the jury.
County of Los Angeles v. Niblett
A fire-department mechanic repeatedly confronted management and then alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The Second District affirms a three-year workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8: the veiled reference was a credible, implied threat outside the First Amendment, and the order’s firearm restriction survives Second Amendment review under Rahimi.
Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services: The Employer’s Response as the Hostile Environment
A coworker’s off-site sexual advances were not work-related and not imputable to the employer — yet the Fifth District held the employee still stated a FEHA hostile-work-environment claim, because the employer’s refusal to act and its HR representative’s mocking response could independently alter the workplace in an objectively severe manner. A pleading-stage reversal that imports the Ninth Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances, employer-response framework (Fuller, Okonowsky) into California law.
Iloff v. LaPaille: The Good-Faith Defense to Liquidated Damages
An employer must prove a reasonable, good-faith attempt to comply before escaping liquidated damages under Labor Code section 1194.2.
Muñoz v. Regents of the University of California: Litigation Risk Alone Cannot Justify Immigration-Status Discrimination
The University of California refuses to employ undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The First District held that the policy facially discriminates based on immigration status under the FEHA national-origin regulations, and that the University’s only justification — fear that the federal government might read IRCA to cover it and prosecute — could not sustain the policy, because the University never attempted the regulation’s clear-and-convincing showing that federal law requires the discrimination. The court issued a writ directing the Regents to reconsider the policy on proper criteria, while pointedly declining to decide whether IRCA applies to state entities at all.
McMahon v. World Vision: The Ministerial Exception’s Functional Reach to a Customer-Service Rep
World Vision revoked a job offer to a customer-service applicant after learning she was in a same-sex marriage. The Ninth Circuit held the ministerial exception barred her Title VII and WLAD claims, because — viewed in the context of World Vision’s religious mission — CSRs perform “vital religious duties” by communicating the faith and praying with donors. A striking extension of the exception’s functional reach to an entry-level, remote position.
Associational Disability Accommodation: The Open Question After Castro-Ramirez
Must a California employer accommodate an employee who is not disabled but who cares for someone who is? Castro-Ramirez said in 2016 that FEHA “may reasonably be interpreted” to require it — and expressly declined to decide. Nine years on, no published California decision has answered, the Civil Rights Council’s 2020 request for public input produced no regulation, and CACI 2547 still calls the element optional. Meanwhile five federal district courts — Castro v. Classy, McVay, and 2025’s Acosta, Head, and De Wit — have all held that failure-to-accommodate and interactive-process claims may rest on associational disability. This analysis maps the statutory argument, the unpublished contrary authority, and how to plead the caregiver’s claim while the question stays open.
Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles: No § 1102.5(j) Fees After a § 1102.6 Same-Decision Defense
A sheriff’s deputy proved every element of his whistleblower retaliation claim — and still left the courthouse owing costs. The jury found his protected disclosures were a factor in the County’s actions against him, but also that the County would have made the same decisions anyway. Division Four held that a plaintiff defeated by the section 1102.6 same-decision defense who obtains no relief has not brought a “successful action” under section 1102.5(j): no attorney’s fees, and the employer is the prevailing party for costs. The panel declined to extend Harris v. City of Santa Monica’s FEHA rule, agreed the contrary result would be “a rational policy choice,” and pointedly left the fix to the Legislature.
Brown v. City of Inglewood: Elected Officials Are Not “Employees” Under Labor Code § 1102.5
Inglewood’s elected city treasurer accused the mayor of misappropriating public funds, then saw her monthly salary cut from $8,000 to $1,404 and her duties stripped away. Her whistleblower retaliation suit under Labor Code section 1102.5 failed at the threshold: a unanimous Supreme Court held that elected officials are not “employees” within section 1106’s definition. Finding the statutory text inconclusive, the court rested on legislative history and context — section 1106 protects rank-and-file public workers, not officials who answer to the electorate — while noting that other remedies, including the First Amendment, may remain available.
Velarde v. Monroe Operations: HR Misrepresentations as Unconscionability
A newly hired care coordinator was pressured to sign an arbitration agreement amid a stack of 31 onboarding documents on her first day. When she said she did not understand it, the HR manager assured her it would let the company resolve disputes cheaply and without lawyers — untrue, since the agreement imposed adversarial federal-rules arbitration with each side bearing its own fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of arbitration: the oral misrepresentation, contradicting the written terms, made the agreement substantively unconscionable because it defeated the employee's reasonable expectations. Intent to mislead was not required — the court focused on effect, not intent.
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: No “Background Circumstances” Hurdle for Majority-Group Title VII Plaintiffs
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, lost a promotion to a lesbian candidate, then was demoted and replaced by a gay man. The Sixth Circuit threw out her Title VII case because she had not shown “background circumstances” suggesting her employer was the unusual one that discriminates against the majority. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated: Title VII protects “any individual,” and its prima facie standard does not vary with the plaintiff’s group. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred to question whether McDonnell Douglas belongs at summary judgment at all — an invitation with consequences for FEHA practice under Guz.
FEHA Fee Haircuts and the Scrutiny Split
When a trial court takes an across-the-board percentage cut to a prevailing plaintiff’s lodestar, must it explain why that particular percentage — or is a general finding of overlitigation enough? Warren demanded case-specific explanation and Snoeck brought that rule into FEHA; Morris rejected it as imported federal law, and Cash v. County of Los Angeles — a 30 percent, $195,234 haircut affirmed over Justice Baker’s meat-cleaver dissent — squarely joined Morris. The Supreme Court granted review on August 20, 2025 (S291827). Until it rules, Cash is persuasive-only under rule 8.1115(e)(1), the published split remains live, and the smart fee motion is built to win under either standard — starting with a written request for specific findings.
Carranza v. City of Los Angeles: § 12923, Single Incidents, and Harassment the Plaintiff Never Saw
An LAPD captain never witnessed officers passing around a fake nude photo of her and was never confronted to her face — yet the Second District affirmed a $4 million FEHA verdict, holding that her secondhand knowledge of the department-wide circulation, and the LAPD’s refusal to stop it, supplied substantial evidence of a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. A leading application of Government Code section 12923.
Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating: Prospective, Revocable Meal-Period Waivers Are Valid
Two veterinary workers signed a standing written waiver of their meal break for shifts of six hours or less — revocable at any time — then sued years later, arguing meal periods can be waived only shift by shift after the right accrues. Division Seven disagreed: section 512 and the wage orders are silent on timing and form, and eighty years of IWC history treats written prospective waivers as employee protection, not evasion. But the holding is expressly conditional: the court reserved unconscionable, coerced, unknowing, and irrevocable waivers, and oral prospective waivers entirely. Bradsbery is a safe harbor for clean waiver programs — and a litigation roadmap against defective ones.
Moniz v. Adecco: Applying Turrieta — No Intervention or Vacatur by a Competing PAGA Plaintiff
After Turrieta v. Lyft disapproved Moniz II by name, the objector in the long-running Adecco PAGA settlement tried a new key for the same lock: she was asserting her own personal interests — a penalty share, fees, a service award — not the state’s. Division Four dismissed her appeals. Every interest she claimed arises from PAGA itself and is derivative of the state’s; relabeling it personal is a semantic exercise that would leave Turrieta’s holding with no effect. The first published application of Turrieta makes overlapping-settlement fights a before-judgment affair: object in the approving court, police preclusion scope under LaCour — but intervention, vacatur, and appeal are closed.
Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District: Denial of Disability-Retirement Benefits Is Not an Adverse Employment Action
After a harbor patrol officer’s on-duty accident left him unable to work, the Port San Luis Harbor District told him retirement was his “single option” — then denied his CalPERS disability-retirement application and terminated him on a resignation theory it later admitted was false. Division Six affirmed summary judgment on his FEHA claim anyway: denial of disability-retirement payments is not an adverse employment action, because retirement benefits begin when employment ends, and a claimant who cannot perform his essential duties is not a “qualified individual” under Green. The remedy for a wrongful denial is an appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings and administrative mandamus — a route Lowry lost by following a repealed procedure.
Lui v. DeJoy: Replacement Evidence and the Myth of the “Independent” Investigation
A Postmaster of Chinese ethnicity was demoted after coworkers targeted her with complaints her supervisor believed were racially motivated, and the demotion was confirmed by an official who reviewed only the paperwork. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, holding that replacement by a white man satisfied the McDonnell Douglas fourth element and that a genuine dispute existed over whether the confirming decision was “actually independent or influenced by subordinate bias” — a Ninth Circuit application of the cat’s-paw doctrine.
Vo v. Technology Credit Union: JAMS Rule 17, Nonparty Discovery, and the Split with Aixtron
A terminated employee resisted arbitration of his FEHA claims, arguing that under Aixtron the arbitrator could not compel prehearing third-party discovery. The Sixth District reversed the denial of arbitration: applying Ramirez’s five discovery factors and construing the clause to preserve validity, it held that JAMS Rule 17 (2014) gives the arbitrator authority to expand nonparty discovery when necessary, so the agreement was not substantively unconscionable. The court disapproved Aixtron to the extent it read an arbitrator’s authority narrowly — creating an intra-district split — and noted that Senate Bill 940 now supplies CAA third-party discovery by default for current agreements.
Arzate v. ACE American: Who Must Initiate Arbitration After an Order Compelling
After a court compelled arbitration of a wage-and-hour class action, neither side filed a demand, and the trial court lifted the stay on the theory that the employer — which had moved to compel — waived arbitration by not commencing it. The Court of Appeal reversed: reading the agreement as a whole, the ‘party who wants to start the Arbitration Procedure’ is the claimant asserting a legal claim, so the employees who agreed to ‘submit’ their claims had to file the demand; the employer’s inaction was neither a breach nor a waiver. The court expressly declined to reach the separate arbitration-fee-default statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98).
Defamation in the Termination: Hearn v. PG&E and the Tort the Supreme Court Will Define
A partially published Court of Appeal decision on defamation and compelled self-publication in the termination context — an issue now pending before the California Supreme Court.
Headless PAGA: Leeper v. Shipt and the Split the Supreme Court Will Resolve
Does every PAGA action contain an individual claim an employer can compel to arbitration? The split the California Supreme Court will resolve.
Wawrzenski v. United Airlines — comparator evidence is for the jury: the marquee MSJ reversal on FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation
Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.
Stone v. Alameda Health System: Public-Entity Employers Are Not Subject to PAGA (or Most Labor Code Wage Rules)
Two Highland Hospital workers sued the public hospital authority running Alameda County’s medical facilities for meal-and-rest violations, unpaid wages, and PAGA penalties. A unanimous Supreme Court ended the case at the definitions: Labor Code section 18’s “person” — the term that controls who is an “employer” under the wage order and who can be penalized under PAGA — affirmatively excludes public entities. Absent express words bringing the government in, break rules and PAGA penalties stop at the public-sector line. The court disapproved Sargent’s contrary rule for statutes carrying their own penalties, declined to decide whether Government Code section 818 independently bars such penalties, and reserved the effect of the 2024 PAGA reform.
Turrieta v. Lyft: A PAGA Plaintiff Cannot Intervene in Another’s Overlapping PAGA Action
Three Lyft drivers filed overlapping PAGA actions; when one settled, the other two moved to intervene, objected, and moved to vacate the judgment — invoking their status as deputized proxies of the state. A divided Supreme Court held a PAGA plaintiff’s deputization confers no such rights: the statute delegates the power to commence and prosecute one’s own action, and it entrusts settlement oversight to the LWDA and the approving court. Moniz v. Adecco is disapproved. What remains for rival plaintiffs is coordination, informal input to the approving court, and advocacy to the LWDA — plus the open questions the court expressly reserved, including the state’s own rights and personal-interest intervention.
Castellanos v. State of California: The Supreme Court Upholds Proposition 22 and Holds the Legislature’s Article XIV Workers’-Compensation Power Is Not Exclusive of the Initiative
The California Supreme Court unanimously upholds Proposition 22 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7451), holding that the Legislature’s “plenary” and “unlimited” authority over workers’ compensation under article XIV, section 4 is not exclusive of the people’s reserved initiative power — while expressly reserving the harder questions about Proposition 22’s seven-eighths amendment rule.
Okonowsky v. Garland: Off-Site Social Media and the Totality of the Workplace
The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the Bureau of Prisons, holding that a corrections lieutenant’s off-duty Instagram page targeting a prison psychologist — followed by more than a hundred coworkers — is part of the totality of the circumstances in a Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. There is no rule that only conduct inside the physical workplace counts, ‘especially in light of the ubiquity of social media,’ and the employer’s dismissive, ineffectual response can independently create a hostile environment.
Ramirez v. Charter Communications: Unconscionability and the Mandatory Qualitative Severance Analysis
Charter’s mandatory arbitration agreement directed employees’ claims into arbitration while carving out the claims Charter itself would bring, compressed FEHA filing to the one-year administrative window, and made anyone who unsuccessfully resisted arbitration pay the fees incurred to compel it. The Supreme Court held all three terms substantively unconscionable — but validated the four-deposition discovery cap, disapproving the line of cases that judged discovery limits by a particular plaintiff’s later needs. On remedy, the court rejected clause-counting: severance is a qualitative, totality inquiry under Armendariz, and the refusal to enforce was reversed and remanded for that analysis.
Cook v. USC: Infinite Duration, All-Claims Scope — Unconscionable and Unseverable
USC required a staff employee to sign an arbitration agreement reaching ‘all claims, whether or not arising out of’ her employment, against USC and a broad web of affiliated persons, surviving her employment indefinitely and revocable only by the university president. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of arbitration: the agreement was substantively unconscionable for three independent reasons — overbroad scope, infinite duration, and lack of mutuality — and the trial court reasonably refused to sever, because curing it would require rewriting the plain language and would hand USC a windfall. Unconscionability is judged at the time of contracting, so the employer could not save the agreement by noting the plaintiff’s actual claims were employment-related.
Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital: The Cat’s-Paw Theory in FEHA Discrimination
In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, a 62-year-old hospital laboratory supervisor won a bench verdict for FEHA age discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination after her director made years of ageist remarks and steered her selection for layoff. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the “cat's-paw” (imputed-animus) theory, it held that a biased subordinate's discriminatory motive may be imputed to the employer where the subordinate was a “significant participant” in the adverse decision — even though a separate, formally unbiased officer signed off on the final call. Animus by a significant participant supports an inference that the decision itself was discriminatory.
Smith v. Spizzirri: FAA § 3 Requires a Stay, Not Dismissal
Delivery drivers sued for wage and misclassification violations; their employer moved to compel arbitration and dismiss. A unanimous Supreme Court held that FAA § 3 gives a district court no discretion to dismiss a suit it sends to arbitration when a party requests a stay — ‘shall’ means ‘shall’ and ‘stay’ means ‘stay.’ Staying rather than dismissing preserves the parties’ return ticket to court if arbitration breaks down, a point with real stakes for employees whose employers later default on arbitration fees.
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services (Naranjo II): A Good-Faith Belief in Compliance Defeats Section 226 and Section 203 Penalties
In Naranjo II (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, the California Supreme Court holds that an employer’s objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that its wage statements complied with the law defeats both Labor Code § 226 penalties (no “knowing and intentional” violation) and § 203 waiting-time penalties (no “willful” failure) — harmonizing the two penalty statutes around a common good-faith defense.
Veverka v. Department of Veterans Affairs — the same-decision showing is a complete defense under Labor Code § 1102.6
The First District held that an employer's same-decision showing under Labor Code § 1102.6 is a complete defense to a § 1102.5 whistleblower claim — barring declaratory relief and attorney's fees along with damages — expressly declining to import Harris v. City of Santa Monica's FEHA partial-defense rule.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
Muldrow v. City of St. LouisA Title VII plaintiff challenging a discriminatory job transfer must show only “some harm” to a term or condition of employment — not a “significant” or “material” disadvantage.Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346Parallel citations: 144 S.Ct. 967; 218 L.Ed.2d 322. Supreme Court of the United States. […]
Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St.: The FAA § 1 Exemption Follows the Work, Not the Industry
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers turns on what a worker does, not the industry the employer occupies. Bakery-goods delivery drivers who sued for wage violations therefore could not be forced into arbitration merely because their employer sells bread rather than transportation. The decision resolves a circuit split and completes the § 1 line running from Circuit City through Saxon, while expressly leaving open whether these particular distributors qualify as transportation workers at all.
Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors: “Hours Worked” at the Security Gate, the Commute, and On-Premises Meal Periods
A solar-project electrician queued unpaid at a security gate while guards inspected vehicles, drove miles of access road under strict site rules, and ate lunch confined to a designated area under a CBA calling meal periods “unpaid.” Answering the Ninth Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court held the exit procedure is compensable “hours worked”; the gate-to-lot drive is compensable only as “employer-mandated travel,” and only if the gate is the first location required for a reason beyond site access; and no collective bargaining agreement can waive the minimum wage for a meal period during which the employer’s confinement forecloses otherwise feasible personal activities.
Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills: PAGA Claims Cannot Be Struck as “Unmanageable”
Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582 holds that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim as unmanageable, even if it is complex or time-intensive. Manageability is a class-action requirement that does not apply to PAGA; complexity must be handled through ordinary case-management tools, not dismissal.
LaCour v. Marshalls: PAGA Claim Preclusion Is Set by the LWDA Notice, Not the Release
Marshalls bought a sweeping PAGA release in a federal settlement whose plaintiff had noticed only one theory to the LWDA — off-the-clock time in end-of-shift bag checks. When Robert LaCour later sued over expense reimbursement and other never-noticed violations, the trial court struck his claims as precluded. Division Four reversed: a PAGA judgment’s preclusive reach is measured by the claims the settling plaintiff pleaded or was authorized by her LWDA notice to plead, not by the words of her release, and an unauthorized proxy is in privity with no one. The court also upheld pandemic Emergency Rule 9, and it reserved issue preclusion while barring any double recovery.
Adolph v. Uber Technologies: A PAGA Plaintiff Keeps Standing for Representative Claims After Individual Arbitration
Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 holds that a PAGA plaintiff whose individual claims are compelled to arbitration retains standing as an “aggrieved employee” to litigate the non-individual representative claims in court — California’s answer to the standing question left open by Viking River.
Groff v. DeJoy: Title VII Undue Hardship Requires Substantial Increased Costs
An Evangelical Christian postal worker who would not work Sundays sued under Title VII after being disciplined for declining Sunday Amazon deliveries. The Third Circuit, reading Hardison to require only 'more than a de minimis cost,' affirmed summary judgment for the employer. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and clarified the standard: an employer that denies a religious accommodation must show that granting it would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not merely a more-than-trivial cost.
Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC
Analysis · Key Case Cvejic v. Skyview Capital, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1073 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight · Docket No. B318880 · Decided June 28, 2023 Verify before relying. A summary and analysis as of its publication date — not legal advice, and not a representation that the decision remains good […]
Sharp v. S&S Activewear: Ambient Harassment — Music, Misogyny, and the End of the “Equal Opportunity Harasser”
Eight warehouse workers alleged their employer let staff blast “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music for nearly two years over almost daily complaints. The Ninth Circuit vacated a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that pervasive sexist content can create a Title VII hostile work environment even if it targets no one and offends both sexes — and that an employer’s “equal opportunity harasser” status “provides no escape hatch for liability.”
People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc.
People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. A protected “disclosure” under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) includes an employee’s report or complaint of a legal violation to an employer — even when the recipient already knows of the violation. People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719 Parallel citations: 529 P.3d 49; 308 […]
Westmoreland v. Kindercare: The PAGA-Waiver Poison Pill
Kindercare’s arbitration agreement contained a “poison pill”: a clause providing that the whole agreement is invalid if its class/representative-action waiver is unenforceable. Because a wholesale predispute waiver of representative PAGA claims cannot be enforced after Iskanian and Viking River, the Court of Appeal held the poison pill voided the entire agreement — sending every claim, including the employee’s individual claims, to court. Had Kindercare omitted the poison pill, Viking River would have let it compel the individual claims; its own drafting foreclosed that path. The drafter was held to the all-or-nothing clause it wrote.
Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres: The Elements of a Pregnancy-Accommodation Claim Under the PDLL
In the first California decision to articulate the elements of a reasonable-accommodation claim under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(3)(A)), the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff must prove a pregnancy-related condition, a request made on her health care provider's advice, the employer's refusal of a reasonable accommodation, and that she could perform the essential functions of the job with that accommodation. Although section 12945 affords protections over and above section 12940, none entitles an employee to a job she cannot perform. Judgment for the employer affirmed.
Atalla v. Rite Aid: The “Acting in the Capacity of Supervisor” Limit on FEHA Strict Liability
A Rite Aid district manager sent a staff pharmacist lewd photos in a late-night, off-site text exchange that grew out of a friendship predating her employment. The Fifth District affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that FEHA strict liability for supervisor harassment attaches only when the supervisor acts “in the capacity of supervisor,” not where the conduct arises from a completely private relationship — and that the plaintiff, invited back after the harasser was fired, was not constructively discharged.
Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Granting Every Requested Accommodation Is Not Enough
A unanimous Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for Kaiser, holding that even though the employer granted every accommodation the employee requested, it could still be liable for failing to accommodate and failing to engage in the interactive process because, through her supervisor, it knew of but never provided a needed lighter-tasks accommodation. The court also reinstated the disability-discrimination and retaliation claims on a cat’s-paw theory.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta
The Ninth Circuit held the Federal Arbitration Act preempts AB 51 (Labor Code § 432.6), California's attempt to ban mandatory employment arbitration, because a state rule that burdens the formation of arbitration agreements stands as an obstacle to the FAA.
Camp v. Home Depot: Is Neutral Time-Rounding Still Lawful When Actual Time Is Captured? (pending review)
Home Depot’s Kronos system recorded Delmer Camp’s time to the minute — then quarter-hour rounding paid him for 470 fewer minutes than his own timecards showed. The Sixth District reversed summary judgment: under Troester and Donohue, an employer that can capture and has captured exact worktime must pay for all of it, and no California text authorizes rounding that underpays an identifiable employee. The panel invited the Supreme Court to decide whether See’s Candy neutral rounding survives at all — and the Court granted review (S277518), where the case remains pending. Cite it as persuasive only, with the review-granted parenthetical, and re-verify status before filing.
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
The FAA preempts Iskanian to the extent it bars division of a PAGA action and prevents arbitration of an employee’s individual PAGA claim; an employer may compel the individual PAGA claim to arbitration. (The Supreme Court further opined that, under its reading of California law, the plaintiff would then lack standing…
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services: Missed-Break Premium Pay Is “Wages” Supporting §203 and §226 Penalties
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (Naranjo I) Premium pay owed for missed meal and rest breaks under Labor Code section 226.7 constitutes “wages,” so it must be reported on wage statements under section 226 and is subject to waiting-time penalties under section 203 when not timely paid at separation. Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, […]
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. A court may not condition waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing that the opposing party was prejudiced; the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration” places arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts and does not authorize arbitration-specific procedural rules. Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411 Parallel citations: […]
Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento — the same-decision defense wins summary judgment after Lawson
Months after Lawson, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for the County of Sacramento under Labor Code § 1102.6 — undisputed evidence of insubordination, disrespect, and dishonesty proved clearly and convincingly that the county would have released the probationary employee anyway — while leaving open whether § 1102.5 requires an actual belief that the law was violated.
Scheer v. Regents of the University of California — which framework governs which whistleblower statute after Lawson
Reversing summary judgment for the UC Regents, the Second District mapped the post-Lawson landscape — Labor Code § 1102.6 governs § 1102.5 claims, Government Code § 8547.10(e) supplies the same framework for University of California whistleblowers, and McDonnell Douglas still governs Health and Safety Code § 1278.5 claims, under which Scheer's clause-by-clause dismantling of his termination letter raised a triable issue of pretext.
Khoiny v. Dignity Health: No Academic Deference for a Residency Program’s Stated Reasons
When a medical resident sues her residency program for discrimination, the program's 'academic' justification for dismissing her is not entitled to the deference courts extend to genuine academic judgments. The Second District held that a resident is predominantly an employee, not a student, so the jury must evaluate the program's real reason without deference — and the contrary instruction required a new trial.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd.: Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
An employer cannot rebut a discrimination plaintiff’s prima facie case by professing ignorance: stage-two production under McDonnell Douglas demands the actual nondiscriminatory reason for a failure to interview, not a witness’s “I don’t know.”
Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists — the modern disability-MSJ playbook: RIF selections, the interactive process, and cumulative pretext
In the Sixth District's treatise-level employment-MSJ opinion, a security supervisor laid off days before his expected return from knee surgery revives his disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims — the employer's RIF showing was inadequate under Guz's "roadmap" because it never explained retaining two lower-ranked supervisors, and its failure to accommodate, the timing, and an overpayment vendetta were substantial evidence of animus — while the retaliation claim fails because pre-2016 accommodation requests were not protected activity.
Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel: Meal and Rest Premiums Must Be Paid at the Regular Rate of Compensation
Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858 holds that the meal/rest premium under Labor Code § 226.7(c) must be paid at the “regular rate of compensation,” which is synonymous with the overtime “regular rate of pay” and includes all nondiscretionary payments — not just base hourly wages. The holding is retroactive.
Donohue v. AMN Services: No Rounding of Meal-Period Punches, and a Rebuttable Presumption From Time Records
Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 holds that employers may not round meal-period time punches, and that time records showing short, late, or missed meal periods raise a rebuttable presumption of a violation — usable even at summary judgment.
Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising: The Dynamex ABC Test Applies Retroactively
Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. (2021) 10 Cal.5th 944 holds that the ABC test adopted in Dynamex applies retroactively — to all cases not yet final when Dynamex was decided — exposing pre-2018 wage-order conduct to the new worker-classification standard.
Shirvanyan v. LACCD: Proving an Available Accommodation in an Interactive-Process Claim
The Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff suing for failure to engage in the interactive process under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) must prove a reasonable accommodation was actually available. Substantial evidence supported finite leave as an available accommodation for the plaintiff’s carpal-tunnel (wrist) injury, but none supported any accommodation for her later shoulder injury. Because the general verdict did not reveal which disability the jury relied on, the judgment was reversed for a limited retrial.
Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp. — The Defensible RIF: Exhaustion Traps, Combined Positions, and What Statistics Must Eliminate
A 60-year-old engineer cut in a 306-person, budget-driven layoff lost on both procedure and merits: his EEOC and post-closure DFEH amendments could not exhaust class and disparate-impact theories, and his pretext case failed for want of combined-position qualifications, controlled statistics, and comparators.
People v. Uber Technologies: Rideshare Drivers Are Likely Employees Under Prong B of the ABC Test
The Court of Appeal affirms a statewide preliminary injunction against Uber and Lyft, holding the People likely to prevail under prong B of the ABC test (Lab. Code, § 2775) — rideshare driving is within the usual course of the companies’ business — and rejecting the “technology platform” defense as a false dichotomy. (Predates Proposition 22; see Castellanos.)
Bostock v. Clayton County
An employer that fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily entails discrimination because of sex, because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being gay or transgender without taking the…
Kim v. Reins International California, Inc.
Settling and dismissing individual Labor Code claims does not strip an employee of standing to pursue a PAGA claim. PAGA standing depends on being an “aggrieved employee” — someone employed by the alleged violator against whom one or more Labor Code violations were committed — not on maintaining an unredressed…
Frlekin v. Apple Inc.: Mandatory Exit-Search Time Is Compensable “Hours Worked”
Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038 holds that time spent waiting for and undergoing mandatory exit bag-and-device searches is compensable “hours worked” under the control clause — even after clocking out, and even though employees could have avoided a search by not bringing a bag. It applies Morillion and rejects the “optional” defense.
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital
To state a hostile-environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that was unwelcome, based on sex, and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; an employee may be “subjected to” a hostile environment by harassment she…
Raytheon Co. v. FEHC: AIDS Is a Protected Handicap and the Danger Defense Is the Employer’s Burden
Raytheon refused to reinstate an employee diagnosed with AIDS even though its own medical staff and public-health officials uniformly found the disease was not transmissible through ordinary workplace contact. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission found unlawful handicap discrimination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. AIDS is a physical handicap protected by California's antidiscrimination law, and an employer invoking the threat-to-health-and-safety-of-others defense bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department of Industrial Relations: California’s Multifactor Control Test for Independent-Contractor Status
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 sets California’s multifactor control test for employee vs. independent-contractor status — the right to control the manner and means of the work, plus secondary factors, applied in light of the statute’s protective purpose. It still governs the Assembly Bill 5 exemptions after Dynamex.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
The Tameny claim failed because Foley’s report about a coworker served the employer’s private interest, not a fundamental public policy. Foley nonetheless adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause — based on longevity of service, promotions, raises, assurances, and the employer’s…
Mixon v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Discriminatory Animus Need Not Be the Sole Motivation
A FEHA complainant need not prove that discriminatory animus was the sole motivation for an adverse action — but must still prove it was a determining factor. Affirming the Commission's finding that a Black employee was discharged for commute-cost reasons rather than race, the Sixth District clarified the causation standard that underlies CACI Nos. 2500 and 2507, even as it upheld the employer's legitimate-reason defense on the facts.
Ibarbia v. Regents of the University of California: Proving Discriminatory Impact Without Proving Intent
A disparate-impact plaintiff is relieved of proving discriminatory intent, but is not relieved of proving the discriminatory impact. Affirming summary judgment for the University, the First District held that the plaintiff offered no statistical or other evidence that a facially neutral practice fell more harshly on a protected group — the indispensable element of a disparate-impact theory (CACI No. 2502).
City and County of San Francisco v. FEHC: Disparate Impact in a Firefighter Promotional Exam
A facially neutral firefighter promotional exam that screened out Black candidates at well below four-fifths of the White rate, and that failed to test the job’s primary supervisory function, violated FEHA — though parallel federal litigation displaced the Commission’s remedy.
California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra: Pregnancy-Leave Statute Upheld — the “Floor, Not a Ceiling”
When Lillian Garland returned from pregnancy disability leave to find her receptionist job filled, California’s guarantee of leave and reinstatement collided with her employer’s theory that Title VII forbade treating pregnancy “better” than other disabilities. The Supreme Court sided with California: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is a floor beneath which pregnancy benefits may not drop, not a ceiling above which states may not rise — and employers can always comply with both laws by leveling benefits up. Guerra remains the constitutional foundation of the PDLL and of every California pregnancy protection built since.
Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.: The BFOQ Defense and Customer Preference
An exclusive all-male club is a covered FEHA employer, and its members’ preference for male staff is no bona fide occupational qualification. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the BFOQ defense is an extremely narrow exception that customer preference can never satisfy.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
A claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII; the harassment need not cause economic or tangible loss, but must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and must be unwelcome.
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell (1985) 472 U.S. 400, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part age-BFOQ test for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: the age limit must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business, and the employer must show either reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all older workers cannot perform the job safely or that it is impossible or highly impractical to assess older employees individually. The Court rejected a deferential “rational basis” standard.
Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court
Punitive damages are recoverable under the FEHA in a court action for intentional employment discrimination; the statute’s remedial scheme does not limit a plaintiff to the relief the administrative agency could award, so the full range of tort-type remedies, including punitive damages, is available.
Connecticut v. Teal: Title VII Protects the Individual, Not the Bottom Line
The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a racially balanced “bottom-line” workforce to defend a discriminatory pass/fail barrier that excludes individual employees. Title VII protects the person, not just the group.
Sterling Transit Co. v. FEP Commission: The Physical-Handicap Danger and BFOQ Defenses
A trucking company refused permanent employment to a driver whose preemployment physical revealed a congenital low-back condition, applying an absolute rule against hiring anyone with back deficiencies. The Fair Employment Practice Commission found unlawful handicap discrimination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. An employer cannot exclude handicapped workers by class unless all or substantially all of the class cannot perform safely, the individualized safety defense cannot rest on conjecture of future harm, and there is no financial-impact exception.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine At step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 Parallel citations: […]
Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc.
Yes. The longevity of Pugh’s service, together with the employer’s commendations and assurances and its acknowledged practices, supported an implied-in-fact promise that he would not be discharged except for good cause; the nonsuit was therefore error and the judgment was reversed (id. at p. 330).
For practitioners
Practice guides
Each guide gathers and summarizes the controlling cases and authorities on a single question — a research starting point you can cite from.
Practice guideRetaliation under Lab. Code § 1102.5A practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideFEHA discrimination & the McDonnell Douglas testA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideTermination in violation of public policyA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideCompelling arbitration of FEHA claimsA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideDisability discrimination & reasonable accommodationA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideSexual harassment under FEHAA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideOff-the-clock work & compensable hours workedA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideMeal & rest breaks & premium payA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideWage & hour class actions & PAGAA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideIndependent-contractor misclassification & the ABC testA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.