California employment case index

Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 created California’s public-policy wrongful-discharge tort: an employee fired for refusing to commit an illegal act may sue in tort, recovering tort and punitive damages, not just contract remedies.

To state a hostile-environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that was unwelcome, based on sex, and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; an employee may be “subjected to” a hostile environment by harassment she…

Raytheon refused to reinstate an employee diagnosed with AIDS even though its own medical staff and public-health officials uniformly found the disease was not transmissible through ordinary workplace contact. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission found unlawful handicap discrimination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. AIDS is a physical handicap protected by California's antidiscrimination law, and an employer invoking the threat-to-health-and-safety-of-others defense bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.

In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 sets California’s multifactor control test for employee vs. independent-contractor status — the right to control the manner and means of the work, plus secondary factors, applied in light of the statute’s protective purpose. It still governs the Assembly Bill 5 exemptions after Dynamex.

The Tameny claim failed because Foley’s report about a coworker served the employer’s private interest, not a fundamental public policy. Foley nonetheless adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause — based on longevity of service, promotions, raises, assurances, and the employer’s…

A FEHA complainant need not prove that discriminatory animus was the sole motivation for an adverse action — but must still prove it was a determining factor. Affirming the Commission's finding that a Black employee was discharged for commute-cost reasons rather than race, the Sixth District clarified the causation standard that underlies CACI Nos. 2500 and 2507, even as it upheld the employer's legitimate-reason defense on the facts.

A disparate-impact plaintiff is relieved of proving discriminatory intent, but is not relieved of proving the discriminatory impact. Affirming summary judgment for the University, the First District held that the plaintiff offered no statistical or other evidence that a facially neutral practice fell more harshly on a protected group — the indispensable element of a disparate-impact theory (CACI No. 2502).

A facially neutral firefighter promotional exam that screened out Black candidates at well below four-fifths of the White rate, and that failed to test the job’s primary supervisory function, violated FEHA — though parallel federal litigation displaced the Commission’s remedy.

When Lillian Garland returned from pregnancy disability leave to find her receptionist job filled, California’s guarantee of leave and reinstatement collided with her employer’s theory that Title VII forbade treating pregnancy “better” than other disabilities. The Supreme Court sided with California: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is a floor beneath which pregnancy benefits may not drop, not a ceiling above which states may not rise — and employers can always comply with both laws by leveling benefits up. Guerra remains the constitutional foundation of the PDLL and of every California pregnancy protection built since.

An exclusive all-male club is a covered FEHA employer, and its members’ preference for male staff is no bona fide occupational qualification. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the BFOQ defense is an extremely narrow exception that customer preference can never satisfy.

A claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII; the harassment need not cause economic or tangible loss, but must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and must be unwelcome.

In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell (1985) 472 U.S. 400, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part age-BFOQ test for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: the age limit must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business, and the employer must show either reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all older workers cannot perform the job safely or that it is impossible or highly impractical to assess older employees individually. The Court rejected a deferential “rational basis” standard.

Punitive damages are recoverable under the FEHA in a court action for intentional employment discrimination; the statute’s remedial scheme does not limit a plaintiff to the relief the administrative agency could award, so the full range of tort-type remedies, including punitive damages, is available.

The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a racially balanced “bottom-line” workforce to defend a discriminatory pass/fail barrier that excludes individual employees. Title VII protects the person, not just the group.

A trucking company refused permanent employment to a driver whose preemployment physical revealed a congenital low-back condition, applying an absolute rule against hiring anyone with back deficiencies. The Fair Employment Practice Commission found unlawful handicap discrimination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. An employer cannot exclude handicapped workers by class unless all or substantially all of the class cannot perform safely, the individualized safety defense cannot rest on conjecture of future harm, and there is no financial-impact exception.

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. BurdineAt step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248Parallel citations: 101 S.Ct. 1089; […]

Yes. The longevity of Pugh’s service, together with the employer’s commendations and assurances and its acknowledged practices, supported an implied-in-fact promise that he would not be discharged except for good cause; the nonsuit was therefore error and the judgment was reversed (id. at p. 330).