California employment case index

135 cases

Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.: Regulations as a Source of Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge

June 22, 2026

Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66 holds that administrative safety regulations — here FAA airline-safety rules — can supply the fundamental public policy supporting a Tameny wrongful-discharge claim, extending Gantt beyond constitutional and statutory sources.

Martinez v. Combs: The Wage Orders Define “Employer” — Control, Suffer or Permit, or Common-Law Engagement

May 20, 2010

Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 holds that the IWC wage orders’ own definitions govern who is an “employer” for minimum-wage claims: to “employ” means (a) to exercise control over wages, hours, or working conditions, (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage in a common-law employment relationship. The produce merchants were not the workers’ employers.

George v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.: The Substantial-Motivating-Factor Standard

December 9, 2009

A state administrative law judge prevailed on a FEHA retaliation claim after she was suspended following gender-bias complaints. Affirming her judgment, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a retaliation plaintiff need prove only that retaliatory animus was “at least a substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse action — not its sole or but-for cause — and that a civil-service board's finding that some discipline was warranted does not, by itself, defeat the claim.

Roby v. McKesson Corp.

November 30, 2009

Harassment and discrimination are distinct wrongs, but official personnel actions can themselves supply evidence of a hostile message and thus support a harassment claim; the two theories are not hermetically sealed. On punitive damages, the court held that in the circumstances of this case the amount of compensatory…

Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.

October 9, 2009

Summary judgment was improperly granted on the harassment and retaliation claims because triable issues of fact existed; the decision is notable for its strong criticism of the overuse and abuse of summary judgment in employment cases, for its treatment of the parties’ voluminous (and often meritless) evidentiary…

A.M. v. Albertsons: The Interactive Process and Reasonable Accommodation Are Separate Duties

September 18, 2009

Affirming a judgment for a disabled grocery checker on her FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court of Appeal held that the duty to engage in the interactive process (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)) and the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation (id., subd. (m)) are separate, independent claims; an employer cannot graft the interactive process onto, and thereby excuse, a later failure to deliver an accommodation it had already granted. The court also held the failure-to-accommodate statute contains no “pattern of failure” requirement, so a single lapse is actionable, with triviality a jury question.

Arias v. Superior Court: PAGA Representative Actions Need No Class Certification

June 29, 2009

Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969 holds that a representative PAGA action for civil penalties need not satisfy class-action requirements, while a representative UCL claim for the same Labor Code violations must — and that a non-class PAGA action does not violate the employer’s due-process rights.

Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1756 v. Superior Court: PAGA Claims Cannot Be Assigned

June 29, 2009

Two unions took assignments from more than 150 transportation workers and sued their employers under the UCL and PAGA for meal- and rest-break violations. The Supreme Court unanimously shut the door: after Proposition 64, an assignment cannot confer UCL standing on an uninjured assignee, and a PAGA claim cannot be assigned at all — the act creates no property right, so the aggrieved employee, suing as the state’s proxy, ‘does not own an assignable interest.’ Associational standing does not fill the gap, and representative UCL claims must proceed as class actions per the same-day companion, Arias. The state-proxy architecture announced here is the foundation Iskanian, Kim v. Reins, Adolph, and Turrieta all build on — and the 2024 reform kept its line intact.

Scotch v. Art Institute of California

May 6, 2009

To recover for failure to engage in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that was available at the time the interactive process should have occurred; because Scotch did not identify such an available accommodation, he could not recover on that claim.

Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy — “Me-Too” Declarations Are Per Se Admissible and Defeat Summary Judgment

April 30, 2009

Fired the day she returned from pregnancy-related bed rest, a caregiver defeated summary judgment with declarations from four coworkers describing pregnancy-triggered firings by the same supervisors — evidence the court held admissible as a matter of law to prove motive, not propensity.

DeJung v. Superior Court: Direct Evidence, the Cat’s-Paw Doctrine, and No Discretionary Immunity Under FEHA

December 19, 2008

A 64-year-old superior-court commissioner, passed over for a full-time post in favor of a 43-year-old after the presiding judge said the court wanted “somebody younger, maybe in their 40's,” sued for age discrimination under the FEHA. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding a superior court has no discretionary-act immunity against FEHA suits and that the presiding judge's remarks were direct evidence whose animus could taint a multilevel hiring decision under the cat's-paw doctrine.

Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and FEHA Limitations Accrual

November 21, 2008

Reversing summary judgment, the Second District held that a lesbian mail-services employee raised triable issues on whether her FEHA administrative complaint was timely under the continuing-violation doctrine, even though her harasser stopped his explicit sexual-orientation slurs over a year before she filed. Applying Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the harasser's later, facially neutral work-sabotage campaign could be “similar in kind” to the slurs and that “permanence” turns on when the harassment stops, the employee resigns, or protest becomes futile — not on when the offensive words cease.

Hoopes v. Dolan: Sequencing Equitable Defenses Against a Jury Verdict on Common Facts

November 12, 2008

In a mixed legal-equitable trial, the First District held that a judge must follow a jury's factual findings on the legal claims when fashioning equitable relief on common facts — yet may independently resolve an equitable defense such as estoppel that turns on facts the jury never decided. Hoopes v. Dolan affirmed a defense judgment and supplies the procedural architecture for sequencing and trying equitable affirmative defenses alongside a jury verdict — a structure FEHA practitioners invoke when an employer raises equitable defenses.

Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.

September 10, 2008

The decision clarified the reasonable-accommodation burdens: an employee claiming failure to accommodate by reassignment must show a vacant position existed for which she was qualified, while the allocation of proof tracks who has access to the relevant information; on this record, triable issues precluded summary…

Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

August 11, 2008

An employee fired under a no-fault attendance policy after a pancreatitis hospitalization sued under FEHA, CFRA, and Tameny. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment on the FEHA disability claims — telling the employer he was “sick” or hospitalized did not give notice of a disability — but reversed on CFRA and the related Tameny claim, holding that while “calling in sick” alone is insufficient CFRA notice, hospital records showing inpatient care can constitute a request for CFRA-qualifying leave, shifting to the employer the burden to inquire and designate, and that causation does not require the decision-maker to know the absences were protected.

Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP

August 7, 2008

Section 16600 voids contracts that restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business; Edwards’s noncompetition agreement was therefore invalid. California does not recognize the federal courts’ “narrow-restraint” exception — even a limited or partial restraint on practicing one’s profession is…

Miklosy v. Regents of University of California

July 31, 2008

Miklosy v. Regents of University of CaliforniaThe Whistleblower Protection Act bars a damages action against the University once it timely decides an internal retaliation complaint; a Tameny tort does not lie against a public entity or against a supervisor; and workers’ compensation exclusivity bars the related emotional-distress claim.Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) […]

Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.

July 30, 2008

Summary judgment was error. A plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence from which a trier of fact could find the employer’s proffered reasons unworthy of credence, and the record here showed the dismissal decision may in fact have been made by Mamou’s own biased immediate supervisor, raising triable…

Arteaga v. Brink’s — Temporal Proximity Is Not Pretext

May 28, 2008

Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd.: Preemptive FEHA Retaliation

May 13, 2008

In Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, the Third District affirmed a judgment and fee award for an employee, holding that FEHA's anti-retaliation provision reaches preemptive retaliation—adverse action taken against an employee the employer believes will become a complainant or witness in a discrimination proceeding—even before the employee has formally opposed any practice or filed any charge.

Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central

April 7, 2008

The California Supreme Court held that a CFRA employee’s simultaneous performance of a similar part-time job for another employer is strong but not conclusive evidence that she could perform the functions of her own full-time position. Because the phrase “functions of the position of that employee” means the job this employer assigned — not job functions “generally” — whether Lonicki had a serious health condition disabling her from her Sutter job remained a triable issue, and summary judgment was reversed. The Court separately held that an employer’s failure to invoke the second- and third-opinion dispute-resolution procedure does not estop it from litigating the medical merits.

Hicks v. KNTV Television — Falsity Alone Is Not Pretext: The Limits of a Decisionmaker’s Lie at Summary Judgment

March 5, 2008

A White news anchor’s claim that his station’s “on-air style” rationale masked race-conscious hiring failed on summary judgment because the record corroborated the employer’s subjective assessment, and his sole contrary showing — that the executive lied about counseling him — could not alone support the inference that race was the real reason.

Jones v. The Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership

March 3, 2008

The same rule that governs discrimination governs retaliation: the employer, but not nonemployer individuals, may be held liable for retaliation under the FEHA (id. at p. 1160).

Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc.

January 24, 2008

The FEHA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s use of medical marijuana. The Compassionate Use Act did not address the rights and duties of employers and employees, and under California law an employer may require pre-employment drug testing and may take illegal drug use into account in employment…

Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California

November 29, 2007

Failure to engage in the interactive process is a separate FEHA violation requiring different proof from failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; the two findings are not inconsistent, so a jury may hold an employer liable for failing to engage in the interactive process even while finding no failure to…

Mokler v. County of Orange — Whistleblower Retaliation, Waived Exhaustion, and a Harassment Holding Overtaken by § 12923

November 26, 2007

The Fourth District affirmed a whistleblower-retaliation verdict for an Office on Aging director fired after warning that a County reorganization was unlawful — holding the County waived its exhaustion defense by first raising it after trial — while reversing her sexual-harassment claim under the pre-§ 12923 "severe or pervasive" standard and affirming a remittitur-backed new trial order on damages.

Gentry v. Superior Court

August 30, 2007

A class-action waiver in an employment arbitration agreement may be unenforceable where class arbitration would be a significantly more effective way to vindicate employees’ unwaivable statutory rights (such as overtime), considering factors like the modest size of individual recoveries, the risk of retaliation, and…

Green v. State of California

August 23, 2007

The employee bears the burden of proving he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA — that is, able to perform the essential duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation — just as the federal ADA requires; it is not the employer’s burden to disprove qualification.

Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation: Proving the Nexus and Adverse Action

June 14, 2007

Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that a correctional officer's FEHA claims for sexual harassment, gender and race discrimination, and retaliation all failed because she could not establish a nexus between the conduct and her protected status — asked whether her coworkers' conduct was prompted by gender or race, she “repeatedly answered, 'No' and 'I don't know'” — and could not show a “substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions” of her employment. Her common-law claims for assault, emotional distress, and negligent supervision were barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

King v. United Parcel Service — The Honest-Belief Rule on Summary Judgment

May 23, 2007

The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. — Temporal Proximity Alone Does Not Defeat Summary Judgment

May 14, 2007

The Fourth District held that while the timing of an adverse action can carry a FEHA retaliation plaintiff past the prima facie stage — even on an uncorroborated declaration — temporal proximity does not, standing alone, create a triable issue of pretext once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate reason, and it expressly rejected Gemini Aluminum's suggestion that employers must also prove their termination procedures were objectively fair.

Faust v. California Portland Cement Co.: CFRA Interference, Employer Notice Duties, and the No-Magic-Words Rule at Summary Judgment

May 10, 2007

Reversing summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that an employee need not mention the CFRA to request protected medical leave — and that an employer that never gave notice of CFRA rights, rejected a chiropractor's certification out of hand, and refused to communicate with the employee's designated representatives could not defeat his interference, retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful termination claims as a matter of law.

Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc.

April 16, 2007

The section 226.7 meal/rest payment is a wage (premium pay), not a penalty, and is therefore governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to wage claims rather than the one-year period for penalties.

Malais v. Los Angeles City Fire Dept.: A Less-Preferred Assignment Is Not an Adverse Employment Action

March 29, 2007

A fire captain who lost his leg sued for disability discrimination after his department barred him from the firefighting “platoon duty” he loved and kept him in an office-style “special duty” assignment. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the department, holding the reassignment was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA: the special-duty post carried equal pay, equal promotional opportunity, and substantial overtime, so the captain's complaint was a preference, not a material detriment.

Myers v. Trendwest Resorts: Supervisor Strict Liability Under FEHA

February 28, 2007

In Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, the Third District reversed summary adjudication for the employer, reaffirming that under FEHA an employer is strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate unless the harassment 'result[ed] from a completely private relationship unconnected with the employment'—a narrow exception the court declined to apply where the supervisor exploited his workplace authority.

Taylor v. L.A. DWP: Retaliation as Discrimination Under § 12940(k)

November 20, 2006

In Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, the Second District reversed a dismissal on demurrer, holding that retaliation is a form of discrimination so that the employer's duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k), extends to retaliation—and that a supervisor may be held personally liable for retaliation under subdivision (h).

McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation — What Counts as an Adverse Employment Action After Yanowitz

August 29, 2006

On retransfer from the Supreme Court in light of Yanowitz, the First District reversed a $75,000 retaliation verdict, holding that file memoranda, a letter of instruction, an investigation, an unimplemented 30-day suspension, and a lateral transfer to a comparable position did not — separately or collectively — materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and that the surgeon's beliefs about her employer's motives were not substantial evidence of pretext.

Dore v. Arnold Worldwide — “at will” means at any time: offer letters and the end of the implied-contract workaround

August 3, 2006

A unanimous Supreme Court holds that a signed offer letter stating employment is "at will" and terminable "at any time" is unambiguous — recruitment talk of a "long-term fix" cannot create an implied for-cause contract or support fraud reliance — with Justice Baxter (joined by Corrigan) urging reconsideration of Pacific Gas and Justice Moreno reserving "upon notice" clauses.

Smith v. Superior Court (L’Oreal)

July 10, 2006

“Discharge” under sections 201 and 203 includes not only firing but also releasing an employee upon completion of the particular job assignment or time duration for which he or she was hired; final wages are then immediately due, and a willful failure to pay triggers waiting-time penalties.

Singleton v. United States Gypsum: Same-Sex Harassment Without Desire

July 3, 2006

In Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547, the Second District reversed summary judgment for the employer, holding that same-sex sexual harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire to be actionable: it is enough that sex was 'used as a weapon to create a hostile work environment,' and the court found triable issues on both the harassment and the employer's knowledge.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White

June 22, 2006

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is not limited to employer actions affecting the terms and conditions of employment or occurring at the workplace; it prohibits any employer action that a reasonable employee would have found materially adverse — that is, action that might well dissuade a reasonable worker from…

Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

June 2, 2006

Yes. An employer that regards a person as physically disabled must engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodation to that person, even if he or she is not actually disabled; the duty runs to those “regarded as” disabled, not only to the actually disabled (id. at p. 40).

Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions

April 20, 2006

The sexually coarse and vulgar language used in the Friends writers’ room was not actionable sexual harassment on this record, because it was generally part of the creative process of writing adult comedic material rather than conduct directed at the plaintiff or at women because of their sex; harassment must be…

Armenta v. Osmose, Inc.

December 29, 2005

California does not permit wage averaging: the minimum-wage standard applies to each hour worked, and an employer must pay at least the minimum wage for every compensable hour; it cannot use higher pay for some hours to offset unpaid or sub-minimum hours.

Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. — the employer’s initial summary-judgment burden and the limits of the RIF defense

December 21, 2005

A pregnant marketing VP laid off in a reduction in force wins reversal of summary judgment: the Second District holds the moving employer must present evidence permitting a more-likely-than-not finding that its nondiscriminatory reason actually drove the discharge, and that replacement by a consultant, a decisionmaker's lie, and an evaluation e-mailed hours after her internal complaint made falsity and pregnancy animus triable.

Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist.: The Yanowitz Materiality Test Governs a Section 1102.5 Whistleblower Claim

December 19, 2005

When a whistleblowing high-school principal was moved to a smaller, quieter school at identical pay, title, and job description, the Third District held that the Yanowitz “materiality” standard for an adverse employment action — built for FEHA retaliation — governs a Labor Code section 1102.5(b) whistleblower claim too, and that a same-pay transfer can still be materially adverse where it significantly diminishes the employee's responsibilities.

Claudio v. Regents of UC: Suing for a Failed Interactive Process

November 22, 2005

In Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, the Third District reversed summary judgment, holding that an employee may bring a stand-alone FEHA claim for the employer's failure to engage in the timely, good-faith interactive process required by Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n)—while emphasizing that the process demands good-faith participation by both employer and employee.

Miller v. Department of Corrections

July 18, 2005

Although an isolated workplace romance does not by itself constitute sexual harassment, widespread sexual favoritism that is severe or pervasive may create an actionable hostile work environment — one that conveys the demeaning message that women are sexual playthings and that managers view sexual favors as the way to…

Discover Bank v. Superior Court

June 27, 2005

At least some class-action waivers in consumer adhesion contracts are unconscionable under California law — the “Discover Bank rule” — where the waiver is in an adhesion contract, the disputes predictably involve small amounts of damages, and the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to cheat…

Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment — employer knowledge, direct evidence, and the pregnancy prima facie case

May 31, 2005

Over a Mosk dissent, Division Five holds that a pregnancy-discrimination plaintiff who confided her early pregnancy only to sworn-to-secrecy friends cannot make a prima facie case absent evidence the decisionmaker knew, and that "Not while you are working for me" and post-firing outbursts were not direct evidence bypassing McDonnell Douglas.

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.

January 1, 2005

An employee engages in protected activity by opposing conduct she reasonably and in good faith believes is unlawful under the FEHA, even without using magic words or filing a formal complaint. For the adverse-action element, the FEHA reaches employer actions that materially and adversely affect the terms, conditions,…

Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court: Deferential Review and the Theory-of-Recovery Test for Class Certification

August 26, 2004

Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319 holds that wage-and-hour class certification is reviewed for abuse of discretion and turns on whether the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery is amenable to common proof — not on the existence of individual issues or the ultimate merits. The Court reinstated certification of a manager-misclassification class.

Reeves v. Hanlon

August 12, 2004

To recover for intentional interference with an at-will employment relationship, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act — conduct unlawful by some measure beyond the interference itself — that induced the employees to leave or otherwise disrupted the relationship; here, the…

Reeves v. Safeway Stores: California’s Cat’s-Paw Rule for Retaliatory Discharge

July 29, 2004

California's leading “cat's paw” decision. A 29-year Safeway food clerk who complained that his female coworkers were being sexually harassed was fired after a trivial bathroom-door confrontation was escalated into “workplace violence” by a resentful store manager and a one-sided security investigation, then rubber-stamped by a district manager who had never heard of his complaints. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding that a biased supervisor's animus is a but-for cause that imputes to the employer through the “cat's paw” it uses to carry out the firing.

Chapman v. Enos: Who Is a ‘Supervisor’ for FEHA Harassment Liability

March 10, 2004

Whether a harasser is personally liable under the FEHA — and his employer strictly liable — often turns on one threshold fact: was he the plaintiff's “supervisor”? In Chapman v. Enos, the Court of Appeal reversed a defense verdict because the trial court told the jury a supervisor must be “fully accountable and responsible” for a subordinate's work product, an extra-statutory requirement that wrongly narrowed the FEHA's class of supervisors. Full accountability is an indicium of supervisory power, the court held, not an element; the statute requires only the responsibility to direct an employee's work using independent judgment.

State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court

November 24, 2003

An employer is strictly liable under the FEHA for a supervisor’s hostile-environment sexual harassment. But the avoidable-consequences doctrine applies: the employer may avoid liability for those damages the employee could have avoided with reasonable effort — for example, by timely using the employer’s complaint…

Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc.

February 20, 2003

The FEHA requires only that a physiological disease or condition affecting a body system “limit” — not “substantially limit” — the plaintiff’s ability to participate in a major life activity, a standard broader than the federal ADA; the later Poppink Act merely clarified, and did not change, that existing “limits”…

Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara — The Continuing-Violation Doctrine Ends at Permanence

December 23, 2002

The Sixth District affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that a five-year pattern of stripping a female employee's coveted technical duties was "a collection of isolated employment decisions" that had acquired permanence by 1996 under Richards v. CH2M Hill — and that a biased supervisor's sexist remarks could not show pretext where he neither knew of her candidacy nor took part in the challenged hiring.

Northrop Grumman v. WCAB: A FEHA-Mandated Investigation Is a Good Faith Personnel Action

November 21, 2002

A workers' compensation judge awarded an inspector benefits for a psychiatric injury, finding the employer's investigation into a coworker's accusation that he had racially discriminated against a trainee was not a good faith personnel action under Labor Code section 3208.3, subdivision (h). The Court of Appeal reversed: because FEHA imposes an affirmative, mandatory duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent and investigate workplace discrimination, a legally compelled investigation conducted without arbitrary motive or intent to deceive is a good faith personnel action exempting the employer from compensation liability — and an unsubstantiated outcome does not retroactively brand the inquiry bad faith.

Colarossi v. Coty US Inc.: Circumstantial Evidence of Retaliatory Termination

April 24, 2002

An alleged harasser’s vow to “get revenge” on those who cooperated against her, plus suspiciously timed scrutiny of a star performer’s paperwork, was enough direct and circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive to defeat summary judgment on a wrongful-termination claim.

Bagatti v. Department of Rehabilitation: Failure to Accommodate Is Its Own FEHA Wrong

April 2, 2002

Reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that an employee stated a cause of action for damages caused by her employer's failure to make reasonable accommodation for her known disability under FEHA. Treating Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) as a “separate and distinct” unlawful employment practice independent of the disability-discrimination prohibition in subdivision (a), the court rejected the importation of federal ADA limits (the “qualified individual” and adverse-action requirements) and held the FEHA accommodation duty broader than the ADA's, and not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

West v. Bechtel: A Foreign Sovereign Client’s Age Bias Cannot Be Imputed to an Innocent Agent

March 6, 2002

A 62-year-old Bechtel engineer removed from a Saudi project after the Saudi government client called him too old won a FEHA age-discrimination and contract verdict in San Francisco. The Court of Appeal reversed outright, holding that a principal's discriminatory bias cannot be imputed to an innocent agent who merely carries out a foreign sovereign's removal order, and that, absent substantial evidence of the project director's own animus, the verdict could not stand. The contract award separately failed because West, who refused comparable offers and never looked for work, failed to mitigate as a matter of law.

Akers v. County of San Diego — defining the adverse employment action in FEHA retaliation claims

February 8, 2002

Affirming a retaliation verdict for a former deputy district attorney, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA retaliation requires a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment — a test satisfied where undeserved accusations of dishonesty and incompetence destroyed the prosecutor's promotability even without a firing, demotion, or lost pay.

Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.

August 23, 2001

The continuing-violation doctrine applies to FEHA claims: an employer’s related unlawful acts are treated as a single continuing violation — and the limitations period does not begin to run — so long as the conduct is sufficiently similar and frequent and has not yet acquired a degree of permanence that should put the…

Flannery v. Prentice

August 13, 2001

Attorney fees awarded under section 12965 belong to the attorneys whose services earned them, except to the extent the attorneys and client have entered an enforceable agreement providing otherwise; the portion of a statutory fee award exceeding fees the client already paid does not belong to the client by default.

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

June 14, 2001

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit — that one or more elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense — by either conclusively negating an element or showing the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to…

Slatkin v. University of Redlands — Pretext Evidence Must Point to Animus: The Concealed-Grudge Rule in FEHA Tenure Cases

May 8, 2001

“Academic catfighting or anti-Semitism?” — a professor’s proof that her tenure denial rested on a hidden, forbidden “collegiality” criterion defeated her own FEHA claim, because the same evidence showed the real motive was a colleague’s grudge, not her religion.

Clark County School District v. Breeden: “Very Close” Temporal Proximity and the Limits of Retaliation’s Most-Cited Defense Authority

April 23, 2001

The Supreme Court's per curiam reversal holds that no reasonable person could believe a single offhand exchange violated Title VII and that timing alone proves retaliatory causation only when the employer's knowledge and the adverse action are "very close" — the twin rules that now anchor nearly every FEHA retaliation summary judgment motion.

Ketchum v. Moses

February 26, 2001

Statutory attorney fees are calculated by the lodestar method — the reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate — and the lodestar may be adjusted by a multiplier based on factors including the contingent risk of the representation, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill displayed,…

Thompson v. Tracor Flight Systems: After-Acquired Evidence Limits Remedies, Never Liability

February 2, 2001

A jury found Rosie Thompson, a human-resources director, was constructively discharged in retaliation for opposing employment practices she reasonably believed unlawful. The Court of Appeal affirmed the verdict and the full damages award, holding the after-acquired-evidence defense — an equitable doctrine akin to unclean hands — limits relief only where the employer proves the employee in fact would have been terminated for the later-discovered conduct, a burden Tracor failed to meet.

Morgan v. Regents of University of California: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and the Significant-Participant Rule

November 30, 2000

An African-American electronic technician laid off in a budget cut applied for dozens of university jobs, was hired for none, and sued under the FEHA for retaliation. Affirming summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that a string of rejections by different managers in unrelated departments is a series of isolated decisions, not a “continuing violation” — and that retaliatory remarks by HR staff who took no part in the hiring cannot establish causation, because every actual decisionmaker disclaimed knowledge of the protected grievance.

Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff: Limits of the “Regarded-As” Prong

November 14, 2000

In Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1031, the Fourth District reversed a verdict for a color-blind deputy applicant and directed judgment for the County, holding that a 'regarded-as' disability claim requires proof that the employer's perception stemmed from a false idea—'myths, fears and stereotypes'—about disability; an employer's accurate assessment of a genuine limitation does not satisfy the perceived-disability prong.

Chuang v. UC Davis — The Ninth Circuit Pretext Playbook

August 30, 2000

A world-class AIDS researcher — the only full-time, non-Caucasian faculty member in his department, and the only one without a tenured (FTE) position — was promised a tenure line for over a decade while the university gave the openings to others, then had his

Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.

August 24, 2000

Mandatory employment arbitration of unwaivable statutory claims is permissible only if the agreement provides certain minimum protections — a neutral arbitrator, adequate discovery, a written award subject to limited review, all types of relief otherwise available in court, and no requirement that the employee bear…

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

June 12, 2000

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. A plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false can, without more, sustain a finding of intentional discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133 Parallel citations: 120 S.Ct. 2097; 147 L.Ed.2d 105. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

Spitzer v. Good Guys: The FEHA Duty to Reassign

May 1, 2000

In Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376, the First District reversed summary judgment on a failure-to-accommodate claim, holding in the published portion that FEHA's reasonable-accommodation duty can require reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position—an obligation the employer escapes only by showing undue hardship or that no suitable vacancy exists.

Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville: When McDonnell Douglas Burdens Drop From the Case at Trial

April 14, 2000

A city secretary hired at 62 and let go at 74 during a budget crisis lost her FEHA age-discrimination claim after a bench trial. Affirming, the First District clarified that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is a pretrial screening device; at trial it drops from the case, leaving only the ultimate question whether the employer intentionally discriminated, reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence.

Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc.

April 10, 2000

In Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, the Court of Appeal drew the first California line around what it means to take family leave “to care for” a parent. A physical therapist fired after flying to New York to help her independent, 81-year-old mother pack and relocate to a one-level apartment was held not to be “caring for” her mother under the Family Rights Act: her participation had to be “warranted” during “a period of the treatment or supervision” of her mother, and packing boxes and directing movers was not. Affirming judgment on the pleadings, the court confirmed that courts — not the agency — bear ultimate responsibility for construing CalFRA.

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co.: The Two Independent Definitions of “Hours Worked” and Compensable Compulsory Travel Time

March 27, 2000

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 holds that the wage order’s “subject to the control of an employer” and “suffered or permitted to work” clauses are independent: an employee under the employer’s control is paid even when not working. Compulsory travel on employer-mandated buses is compensable “hours worked,” and the federal Portal-to-Portal Act does not govern California law.

Thomas v. Department of Corrections: An Adverse Employment Action Must Be Both Detrimental and Substantial

January 10, 2000

In one of California's early decisions defining the scope of an “adverse employment action,” the Court of Appeal borrowed the prevailing federal standard and held the action must be both detrimental and substantial — a material change in the terms of employment. A corrections officer's pleaded grievances (a delayed paycheck, an early job change, one missed overtime payment, interference with an outside credit-union post) failed that test on demurrer. The opinion was certified for partial publication; the citable holdings live in published parts 6 and 7.

Carrisales v. Department of Corrections: No Personal Liability for Coworker Harassment (Superseded)

December 9, 1999

The California Supreme Court held that a nonsupervisory coworker could not be held personally liable under FEHA for harassing a fellow employee: although former Government Code section 12940 prohibited “any … person” from harassing an employee, the statute as a whole reached only the employer's failure to take corrective action, not the coworker's underlying conduct. The court pointed the policy question to the Legislature — which responded the next year by adding Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(3), making individual employees personally liable for their own harassment and abrogating the holding.

Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel — Testimony Retaliation, Disability Pretext, and the Limits of LMRA § 301 Preemption

November 3, 1999

A steelworker fired months after testifying in a coworker’s asbestos case revived his public-policy and FEHA disability claims: they required no CBA interpretation, his union could not waive his judicial forum, and coworker evidence that the termination-night incident was staged made pretext a jury question.

Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles — Proving Retaliatory Motive with Direct and Comparative Evidence

October 13, 1999

Affirming a remitted $500,000 FEHA retaliation judgment for a Nigerian-American harbor-department engineer, the Second District held that pretext may be shown by direct evidence of decisionmakers' retaliatory remarks and by comparative evidence of disparate treatment — not only by a head-on attack on the employer's stated performance reasons — and that lay testimony alone can support a substantial emotional-distress award.

Hanson v. Lucky Stores: Finite Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation

August 13, 1999

Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held in the published portion of this opinion that a finite leave of absence can be a reasonable accommodation under FEHA, “provided it is likely that at the end of the leave, the employee would be able to perform his or her duties.” On undisputed facts the employer had accommodated its injured meatcutter twice — sixteen months of leave (nearly double the CBA's nine) and an offer of a vacant part-time position — so it need not also furnish the hand brace and other measures the employee preferred. The interactive-process discussion has since been overtaken by the Legislature's addition of an independent interactive-process duty (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)).

Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.

August 2, 1999

A remedial injunction prohibiting an employer (and a supervisor adjudicated to have engaged in unlawful racial harassment) from continuing to use racial epithets in the workplace against the plaintiff employees is permissible and does not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint, because it enjoins speech only…

Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co.

June 17, 1999

The outside-salesperson exemption is determined by a fact-specific inquiry into how the employee actually spends his or her time, not merely the employer’s job description or expectations; California uses its own quantitative standard (more than half the time engaged in outside sales) rather than importing the federal…

Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield — The Defense’s Favorite Pretext Case, and How Plaintiffs Answer It

May 6, 1999

Affirming summary judgment on a 59-year-old communications manager's age claim, the First District adopted Hersant's substantial-evidence pretext standard, gave the same-actor inference "strong" force across a five-year span, and discounted a non-decisionmaker's isolated remark — making Horn the case every California employment plaintiff must be ready to distinguish.

Etter v. Veriflo Corp.: The “Severe or Pervasive” Threshold for FEHA Racial Harassment

October 20, 1998

In one of California's first published workplace racial-harassment decisions under FEHA, the Court of Appeal affirmed a defense verdict, holding that the trial court properly instructed jurors that “occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial” racial conduct is not actionable and importing the federal Title VII “severe or pervasive” threshold into state law.

City of Moorpark v. Superior Court

August 17, 1998

Section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy; an employee may pursue FEHA disability-discrimination and common-law wrongful-termination claims notwithstanding the availability of a section 132a remedy.

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson: “Very Little” Direct Evidence, “Specific and Substantial” Circumstantial Evidence — the Ninth Circuit’s Two-Track Pretext Standard

August 11, 1998

Reversing summary judgment in a FEHA failure-to-promote case, the Ninth Circuit reconciled its competing pretext lines — direct evidence of bias needs only "very little" weight to reach a jury, while circumstantial evidence must be "specific" and "substantial" — a formulation later questioned after Desert Palace but still central to MSJ briefing on both sides.

Reno v. Baird

July 16, 1998

The FEHA allows employees to sue and hold liable their employers, but not individual supervisors, for discrimination; the same rule applies to common-law claims for wrongful discharge (id. at p. 643).

Beyda v. City of Los Angeles: Awareness and “Me-Too” Harassment

July 9, 1998

In Beyda v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511, the Second District affirmed a defense judgment, holding that a hostile-environment claim requires conduct that is both objectively and subjectively offensive, and that harassment directed at other employees is relevant only where the plaintiff was aware of it—conduct she neither witnessed nor knew about could not have altered the conditions of her own employment.

Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods: After-Acquired Evidence Is No Complete Defense to a FEHA Harassment Claim

June 30, 1998

An undocumented assembler bought false papers to get hired, then sued for relentless sexual harassment. The employer's only defense was after-acquired evidence of her document fraud. Following McKennon, the Court of Appeal reversed: after-acquired evidence is no complete bar to a FEHA harassment claim, an undocumented worker keeps full employment-law protection while employed, and the defense's factual predicate — whether the employer in fact would have fired her — is a jury question.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

June 26, 1998

An employer is vicariously liable for actionable hostile-environment harassment by a supervisor with authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action was taken, the employer may raise an affirmative defense (the Faragher/Ellerth defense): that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct…

Burlington Industries v. Ellerth: Supervisor Harassment, Vicarious Liability, and the Ellerth/Faragher Defense

June 26, 1998

In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 742, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII for a supervisor’s hostile-environment harassment of a subordinate, but where the harassment yields no tangible employment action the employer may raise the two-element Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. The Court demoted the “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” labels from liability tests to threshold proof categories and grounded employer liability in general agency principles.

Guthrey v. State of California — The Evidentiary Rulebook for Opposing Summary Judgment

May 11, 1998

The Fifth District affirmed summary judgment and a $64,796.50 defense fee award against a correctional counselor whose gender-bias case rested on "perception" rather than proof — writing the evidentiary rulebook for MSJ oppositions: admissible, specific, personal-knowledge evidence (and record citations on appeal), or nothing.

Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie

May 4, 1998

In Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, the Court of Appeal affirmed a FEHA sexual-harassment verdict for a legal secretary against a partner and his international law firm, sustaining punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294. The court applied section 3294, subdivision (b)'s managing-agent and ratification requirements to hold the firm liable for the partner's harassment and upheld the punitive award against constitutional challenge.

Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist.: No Failure-to-Prevent Liability Without an Underlying Wrong

April 17, 1998

The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the employer, holding that a jury finding of failure to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and harassment cannot stand where the same jury found, by special verdict, that no discrimination, harassment, or retaliation actually occurred. A failure-to-prevent claim is derivative: there must be an underlying actionable wrong to prevent.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

March 4, 1998

Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” protects against same-sex sexual harassment; nothing in the statute bars a claim merely because the plaintiff and the harassers are of the same sex, so long as the conduct constitutes discrimination because of sex and meets Title VII’s other requirements.

Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc.

January 5, 1998

Good cause to terminate under an implied “good cause” contract means a reasoned, good-faith conclusion that the misconduct occurred, supported by substantial evidence gathered through an adequate investigation that gave the employee notice and a chance to respond — not the jury’s after-the-fact determination of…

Hersant v. Department of Social Services: The FEHA Summary-Judgment Pretext Standard

September 18, 1997

In Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for an employer in a FEHA age-discrimination case, adopting the rule that once an employer offers a legitimate, non-age-based reason for an adverse action, the employee must offer substantial evidence that the reason is untrue or pretextual, or evidence of discriminatory animus, or a combination, and not merely triable issues about whether the decision was sound.

Stevenson v. Superior Court

August 27, 1997

Age discrimination in violation of the FEHA supports a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. When a plaintiff relies on a statutory prohibition to support such a claim, the common-law claim is subject to the statute’s substantive limits (the nature and scope of the prohibition) but not…

Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center — Comparative Treatment, Pretext, and the Applicant’s Right Against Retaliation

July 1, 1997

Reversing summary judgment for the hospital, Division One held that a registry nurse's point-by-point factual dispute, the employer's conclusory comparative-qualifications showing, and the decisionmaker's anti-Mexican remarks created triable issues of discrimination and retaliation — and that the FEHA's antiretaliation provision protects job applicants, including one whose injury was the loss of temporary contract work.

Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp.: When a Constructive-Discharge Contract Claim Accrues

May 29, 1997

In Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 731, a long-tenured manager who resigned after a demotion and a steady erosion of his responsibilities sued for constructive discharge in contract; the trial court and Court of Appeal held his claims time-barred, running the limitations period from the date he learned of the adverse changes. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Extending its reasoning in Romano v. Rockwell, the court held that the limitations period for a contract action based on constructive discharge runs from the date of actual termination of employment — the resignation — not from the onset of, or the employee's knowledge of, the intolerable conditions. Because the breach alleged is termination without good cause, and an employee who continues to perform retains an election of remedies, the cause of action accrues only upon resignation. The court disapproved Regents of University of California v. Superior Court to the extent inconsistent.

Loder v. City of Glendale

January 6, 1997

A public employer may require suspicionless drug testing of job applicants as part of a lawful pre-employment medical examination, because applicants’ privacy expectations are lower and such testing is a reasonable hiring practice; but it may not impose the same blanket, suspicionless testing on current employees…

Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc.

January 1, 1997

Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. An employer who knows of an employee’s disability has an affirmative duty to make known available, suitable job opportunities and to determine whether the employee is interested and qualified — not merely to wait for the employee to ask. Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 935 […]

Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw

December 19, 1996

The DLSE’s interpretive policies constitute regulations and are void because they were not adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (the “underground regulation” rule); nevertheless, the agency properly exercised enforcement jurisdiction, and the IWC wage orders apply to the work at issue, so the trial court…

Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines: FEHA Religious Accommodation and RLA Preemption

November 27, 1996

A conservative Jewish airline employee fired for refusing to work the first day of Passover sued under FEHA for religious discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding the claims were not RLA-preempted 'minor' disputes and that a collective bargaining agreement does not, in the abstract, discharge an employer's duty to accommodate where the employer did nothing to explore alternatives. Any reasonable accommodation suffices, but the employer must actually offer one.

Fiol v. Doellstedt: No Personal FEHA Liability for a Nonharassing Supervisor’s Inaction

November 19, 1996

The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment on the pleadings for a second-tier supervisor sued only for failing to act on a harassment complaint, holding that a nonharassing supervisor is not personally liable under FEHA — not as an aider and abettor of the harasser or employer, and not as the employer's agent — and distilling supervisor liability into three clear rules.

Doe v. Capital Cities: Strict Liability for an Agent-Harasser Off the Worksite

November 8, 1996

An aspiring actor alleged a casting director drugged and gang-raped him at the director's home. The Court of Appeal held the director could be treated as the network's agent, triggering FEHA strict liability rather than the negligence standard for coworkers, and that the off-site, off-hours assault was sufficiently work-related to be actionable — while affirming dismissal of the negligent-hiring claim.

Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics

June 5, 1996

Individual supervisors are not personally liable under the FEHA for discrimination, which arises out of the necessary personnel-management functions of the employer; by contrast, harassment — conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance and presumably engaged in for personal gratification or bias — can give…

Proksel v. Gattis: Paramour Favoritism Is Not Sex Discrimination Under FEHA

January 26, 1996

In Proksel v. Gattis (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1626, the Court of Appeal held that an employer's favoritism toward a coworker with whom he is romantically involved does not, without more, give rise to a sex discrimination or sexual harassment claim under FEHA or California public policy — declining to make courts a generalized police power over consensual office relationships.

Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist.: McDonnell Douglas Burdens Are for the Judge, Not the Jury

December 20, 1995

A school administrator lost his FEHA age- and race-discrimination claims at trial, then won a new trial when the judge decided he had mis-instructed the jury on the McDonnell Douglas prima facie burden. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the prima facie and rebuttal stages are questions of law for the court, not the jury: once the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden-shifting construct drops from the case and only the ultimate question of discriminatory intent reaches the jury.

Badih v. Myers: Pregnancy Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination Under the California Constitution

July 20, 1995

Nine days after Fatmeh Badih told her employer — a physician with fewer than five employees — that she was pregnant, her last day was set; the DFEH would not even accept her complaint because the office was too small for the FEHA. Division One of the First District affirmed her wrongful-discharge verdict anyway, holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, whose fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment binds every employer regardless of size. Jennings v. Marralle was distinguished, not disturbed: age has no constitutional anchor, but sex — and therefore pregnancy — does. Badih remains the pleading answer for pregnancy discharges at California's smallest workplaces.

Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro: After-Acquired Evidence and Government Disqualification

May 31, 1995

A married couple fired by a law firm sued for wrongful termination, but the firm discovered during litigation that both had concealed felony convictions. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment: their at-will acknowledgments doomed the contract claims, and the after-acquired-evidence doctrine barred the statutory and public-policy claims because the Camps had misrepresented a government-imposed job qualification, leaving them unlawfully unqualified for the position. Camp marks the point where after-acquired evidence shifts from limiting remedies to barring recovery outright.

Matthews v. Superior Court: Individual Supervisor Liability for Harassment Under FEHA

April 26, 1995

In a same-sex sexual-harassment action under FEHA, the trial court sustained the individual defendants' demurrers on the theory that only the employer can be liable. The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate, holding that 'persons' under Government Code section 12965 includes individuals, so a harassment claimant may sue the supervisors who personally participated in or aided and abetted the conduct. Harassment by a supervisor with hire-and-fire power is a particularly personal form of discrimination, distinct from hiring discrimination, for which the employer alone answers.

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.: After-Acquired Evidence Limits Remedies, Not Liability

January 23, 1995

In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 352, a 62-year-old secretary discharged in what the employer conceded for summary-judgment purposes was age discrimination admitted in deposition that she had copied confidential company documents during her final year. The lower courts held this after-acquired evidence barred all ADEA relief. A unanimous Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy, reversed. Such evidence does not bar liability — the ADEA violation that prompted the discharge cannot be disregarded — but it bears on the remedy: as a general rule it forecloses reinstatement and front pay, and back pay runs only from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the employer discovered the wrongdoing. And the employer must first prove the wrongdoing was so severe that it would in fact have discharged the employee on that ground alone.

Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. — McDonnell Douglas Meets California Summary Judgment

November 11, 1994

The Sixth District's 1994 decision translated McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting into Code of Civil Procedure section 437c practice — affirming summary judgment for Lockheed where a laid-off 65-year-old answered a documented reduction in force with speculation rather than "substantial responsive evidence," and holding that EEOC-only filings did not exhaust DFEH remedies.

Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

July 25, 1994

To establish a constructive discharge, an employee must prove that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions so intolerable or aggravated that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have had no reasonable alternative but to resign; ordinary job dissatisfaction or…

General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court

July 18, 1994

General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court In-house counsel may sue for wrongful termination — both on an implied-in-fact contract theory and, within limits, a Tameny public-policy theory — even though a client may generally discharge its lawyer at will. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 Parallel citations: 876 P.2d 487; 32 […]

Cooper v. Rykoff-Sexton: Application Fraud Is Not a Complete After-Acquired-Evidence Defense

April 28, 1994

A 10-year employee sued for wrongful discharge and age discrimination; the employer then discovered application misrepresentations made nearly a decade earlier and won summary judgment on the theory that the fraud forfeited all remedies. The Court of Appeal reversed, declining to adopt a blanket rule that material application falsification is a complete defense to a claim the employer did not know about when it fired the worker. The first published California decision on the point, Cooper anticipated the Supreme Court's McKennon by less than a year.

Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co.: Harris Comes to FEHA, and the Limits of Strict Liability

February 10, 1994

In Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397, the Court of Appeal carried Harris v. Forklift Systems into California's FEHA, holding that harassment need not seriously affect a plaintiff's psychological well-being to be actionable. It confirmed that an employer is strictly liable in compensatory damages for a supervisor's harassment, but held that punitive damages run only through Civil Code section 3294's managing-agent test — which a supervisor with hiring-and-firing power, but no policymaking discretion, did not satisfy.

Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.

January 28, 1994

A plaintiff asserting a state constitutional privacy claim must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (3) conduct constituting a serious invasion of privacy; the defendant may then prevail by showing legitimate, countervailing…

Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries: Section 3291 Prejudgment Interest, Fee-Order Appealability, and No Interest on Punitives

December 16, 1993

In Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, a unanimous California Supreme Court resolved three recurring procedural and damages questions: a postjudgment order denying discovery-sanction (cost-of-proof) attorney fees is separately appealable; a personal-injury plaintiff bears the burden of proving which portion of a general award is “damages for personal injury” before claiming Civil Code section 3291 prejudgment interest; and that interest never accrues on punitive damages. The court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded.

Mogilefsky v. Superior Court: FEHA Reaches Same-Sex Sexual Harassment

December 10, 1993

A male creative editor alleged that his male supervisor subjected him to quid pro quo and hostile-environment sexual harassment. Sustaining the complaint, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA’s prohibition on sexual harassment reaches same-gender conduct: the statute protects against harassment “because of sex” regardless of whether harasser and victim are of the same sex.

Harris v. Forklift Systems: The Severe-or-Pervasive Hostile-Environment Standard

November 9, 1993

A unanimous Supreme Court held that Title VII hostile-environment harassment need not “seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being” or cause tangible injury. Reaffirming Meritor, the Court adopted a “middle path” requiring conduct severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that both a reasonable person and the victim find abusive, judged on the totality of the circumstances.

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks

June 25, 1993

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks Disproving the employer’s stated reason permits — but does not compel — a finding of intentional discrimination; the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502 Parallel citations: 113 […]

Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems: The Missing Personnel File and the Suppression Inference

February 24, 1993

The Court of Appeal affirmed a multimillion-dollar FEHA sexual-harassment judgment, holding that AT&T's concealment of the harasser's lost personnel file justified a willful-suppression instruction, and that sexual harassment is a personal injury supporting prejudgment interest. The decision is a leading authority on respondeat-superior liability for harassment and on the adverse inference from spoliated employment records.

Clark v. Claremont University Center: Multilevel-Review Causation in FEHA Race Discrimination

May 13, 1992

A Black assistant professor denied tenure won a jury verdict for race discrimination under FEHA, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in the published portion of its opinion. The court held the verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that a tenure plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of a multilevel review: discrimination at one level can infect the ultimate decision. On causation, racial animus need not be the sole motivation, only a but-for cause of the adverse decision.

Gantt v. Sentry Insurance

February 27, 1992

The discharge stated an actionable Tameny claim and was not preempted by the workers’-compensation law (id. at p. 1085). More durably, the court held that the public policy underpinning a Tameny claim must be “tethered to” specific constitutional or statutory provisions, not merely the court’s own notions of sound…

Flait v. North American Watch Corp. — a supervisor’s opposition to harassment of a subordinate is protected activity

February 6, 1992

In a foundational FEHA retaliation opinion, the Court of Appeal held that a supervisor who confronts a fellow manager over sexual harassment of a subordinate engages in protected activity based on a reasonable, good-faith belief — whether or not harassment is ultimately proved — and reversed summary adjudication where the confronted harasser himself made the termination decision four months later.

International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

March 20, 1991

In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, the Supreme Court held that an employer's fetal-protection policy excluding all fertile women from lead-exposed jobs is facial sex discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — not a neutral practice to be tested for business necessity. The narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense reaches only qualifications affecting an employee's ability to do the job, and cannot be grounded in feared harm to a future fetus or in cost and tort-liability concerns.

Rojo v. Kliger

December 20, 1990

The FEHA does not displace other state-law remedies, including common-law claims, for employment discrimination; an employee need not exhaust FEHA’s administrative process before pursuing nonstatutory causes of action; and sex discrimination in employment may support a tort claim for wrongful discharge in…

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.

February 28, 1990

In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 517, the Court of Appeal struck down a fetal-protection policy barring fertile women from lead-exposed battery jobs as overt sex discrimination under FEHA. The court articulated California's two-part bona fide occupational qualification test — the sex-based qualification must be reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business, and the employer must show that all or substantially all of the excluded class cannot safely and efficiently perform the job — and held the employer failed both prongs.

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.

March 4, 1969

In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (5th Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 228, the Fifth Circuit announced the foundational Title VII sex-BFOQ standard: an employer invoking sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must prove a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job. The court rejected stereotype-based “romantic paternalism” and a state weight-lifting limit as justifications and placed the burden on the employer.