(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143

Supreme Court of California · No. S057121 · Decided August 17, 1998

Verify before relying. A summary and analysis as of its publication date — not legal advice, and not a representation that the decision remains good law. Confirm subsequent history independently.
JDBy Jonathan J. DelshadFounder & Editor-in-Chief

01. Facts

Theresa L. Dillon worked for the City of Moorpark as an administrative secretary from May 1990 until February 28, 1994 (18 Cal.4th at p. 1148). After she recovered from knee surgery and her doctor released her to return to work, City Manager Steve Kueny terminated her, telling her that her residual disability prevented her from performing her essential job functions; Dillon told the assistant city manager she could do her job and wanted to return, but was refused (id. at pp. 1148–1149). She filed a disability-discrimination charge with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, received a right-to-sue notice, and on February 22, 1995 sued the City and two officials for FEHA discrimination and wrongful termination in violation of public policy (id. at p. 1149).

02. Procedural posture

The defendants contended that Labor Code section 132a (the workers’-compensation anti-discrimination provision) was Dillon’s exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court held it was not and allowed her FEHA and common-law claims to proceed (id. at p. 1149).

03. Issue

Whether Labor Code section 132a, which forbids discrimination against employees who are injured on the job, provides the exclusive remedy and thereby bars a FEHA disability-discrimination claim and a common-law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Holding

Section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy; an employee may pursue FEHA disability-discrimination and common-law wrongful-termination claims notwithstanding the availability of a section 132a remedy.

05. Reasoning

The court reasoned that the workers’-compensation scheme and the FEHA serve different purposes and that nothing in section 132a or the compensation bargain was intended to displace the broader anti-discrimination protections of the FEHA or the common-law public-policy tort. Treating section 132a as exclusive would strip injured workers of remedies the Legislature separately provided, contrary to the FEHA’s remedial design.

Practice Pointer

Moorpark keeps the courthouse doors open for disabled-worker plaintiffs: a section 132a remedy before the WCAB does not foreclose a civil FEHA disability claim or a Tameny public-policy claim. Plead the FEHA and common-law claims in superior court even where a workers’-compensation discrimination remedy exists, and resist any exclusivity defense premised on section 132a.

06. Open questions

Moorpark resolved that section 132a is not exclusive but did not catalog every interaction between the workers’-compensation system and FEHA litigation; questions about overlap, offsets, and issue preclusion between the two forums continue to arise case by case.

Cite this entry

City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143.

“the City of Moorpark employed her as an administrative secretary from May 1990 until February 28, 1994.” — 18 Cal.4th at p. 1148

Source: California Official Reports – [insert durable courts.ca.gov / Official Reports link at verification].

Read the full opinion (free full text · Justia) →

See also: Badih v. Myers