The Review · Case Index

California employment case index

Search every indexed California wrongful-termination and employment decision, or browse by subject area, statute, and decade — each summary source-verified against the published reporter.

The index

Browse the case index

Select any subject area, statute, or decade to filter the indexed decisions. Combine filters to narrow further.

Filtered by: Discrimination ×Civil Procedure ×Clear all

Subject Area

Decade

Statute

101 cases

Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC

June 11, 2026
A firm filed a wage-and-hour class action duplicating one it had already filed elsewhere, then opposed a stay with a brief — drafted by a contract attorney using generative AI — full of nonexistent citations and at least eight fabricated quotations. The First District affirms $6,000 in section 128.7 sanctions: counsel of record bear ultimate responsibility for what they sign, and the duty to verify authority cannot be delegated to any form of technology.

Williams v. Legacy Health

May 6, 2026
Nine hospital-system employees sought religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement and sued under Title VII when they were denied. The Ninth Circuit affirms judgment for the employer: after Groff v. DeJoy, undue hardship means a “substantial” burden — including realistic health, safety, and staffing costs — and exempting unvaccinated clinical staff during the Delta surge met that standard.

Guardian Storage Centers, LLC v. Simpson

March 24, 2026
A terminated COO forwarded her employer’s e-mails — some attorney-client privileged — to her personal account and handed them to her lawyers for her wrongful-termination and harassment cross-claims. The Fourth District holds the State Fund rule on handling privileged materials applies even to such intentional, unauthorized disclosures, and reverses the denial of the employer’s motion to disqualify counsel.

Paknad v. Superior Court

March 24, 2026
Intuitive Surgical defended a harassment suit by pointing to the adequacy of its attorney-led investigation, then tried to withhold the investigator’s findings as work product. The Sixth District grants the employee a writ: putting the investigation’s adequacy at issue waives privilege and even core work product over the investigator’s factual findings and anything bearing on the investigation’s scope and adequacy.

Pechkis v. Trustees of the California State University

March 24, 2026
Two Chico State physics professors sued the CSU Trustees for retaliation, alleging a sham investigation and sabotage of their move to a new university after they reported harassment. The Trustees moved to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute as “based in part” on protected speech. The Third District affirms denial: a movant must analyze each claim element-by-element and identify which acts are protected — “based in part” is not enough.

Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District

March 18, 2026
A nursing student said the faculty member running her hospital clinical rotation sexually harassed her and tanked her grade when she refused him. The Fourth District holds a student in a required clinical placement is an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA, and reverses summary judgment on standing, Government-Claims-Act notice, and deliberate indifference.

Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC

February 20, 2026
Cambodian villagers forced to work at Thai seafood factories sued a U.S. marketer under the trafficking civil-remedy statute; their case was dismissed because the statute then reached only those who succeeded in benefiting, not those who attempted to. After Congress amended the law, the en banc Ninth Circuit holds the clarifying amendment retroactive — and that Landgraf governs all such amendments, overruling the “clarifying amendment” exception — reviving the claims.

De Paolo v. Rosales

December 22, 2025
A resident manager whose apartment came with the job refused to leave after she was terminated. The Appellate Division affirms an unlawful detainer judgment: housing provided as part of employment compensation is not a protected tenancy, the former manager became a tenant at sufferance or licensee outside the Tenant Protection Act, and her retaliatory-eviction defense failed for lack of evidence.

County of Los Angeles v. Niblett

October 31, 2025
A fire-department mechanic repeatedly confronted management and then alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The Second District affirms a three-year workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8: the veiled reference was a credible, implied threat outside the First Amendment, and the order’s firearm restriction survives Second Amendment review under Rahimi.

Muñoz v. Regents of the University of California: Litigation Risk Alone Cannot Justify Immigration-Status Discrimination

August 5, 2025
The University of California refuses to employ undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The First District held that the policy facially discriminates based on immigration status under the FEHA national-origin regulations, and that the University’s only justification — fear that the federal government might read IRCA to cover it and prosecute — could not sustain the policy, because the University never attempted the regulation’s clear-and-convincing showing that federal law requires the discrimination. The court issued a writ directing the Regents to reconsider the policy on proper criteria, while pointedly declining to decide whether IRCA applies to state entities at all.

McMahon v. World Vision: The Ministerial Exception’s Functional Reach to a Customer-Service Rep

August 5, 2025
World Vision revoked a job offer to a customer-service applicant after learning she was in a same-sex marriage. The Ninth Circuit held the ministerial exception barred her Title VII and WLAD claims, because — viewed in the context of World Vision’s religious mission — CSRs perform “vital religious duties” by communicating the faith and praying with donors. A striking extension of the exception’s functional reach to an entry-level, remote position.

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: No “Background Circumstances” Hurdle for Majority-Group Title VII Plaintiffs

June 5, 2025
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, lost a promotion to a lesbian candidate, then was demoted and replaced by a gay man. The Sixth Circuit threw out her Title VII case because she had not shown “background circumstances” suggesting her employer was the unusual one that discriminates against the majority. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated: Title VII protects “any individual,” and its prima facie standard does not vary with the plaintiff’s group. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred to question whether McDonnell Douglas belongs at summary judgment at all — an invitation with consequences for FEHA practice under Guz.

Lui v. DeJoy: Replacement Evidence and the Myth of the “Independent” Investigation

February 26, 2025
A Postmaster of Chinese ethnicity was demoted after coworkers targeted her with complaints her supervisor believed were racially motivated, and the demotion was confirmed by an official who reviewed only the paperwork. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, holding that replacement by a white man satisfied the McDonnell Douglas fourth element and that a genuine dispute existed over whether the confirming decision was “actually independent or influenced by subordinate bias” — a Ninth Circuit application of the cat’s-paw doctrine.

Wawrzenski v. United Airlines — comparator evidence is for the jury: the marquee MSJ reversal on FEHA discrimination, harassment, and retaliation

October 22, 2024
Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.

Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital: The Cat’s-Paw Theory in FEHA Discrimination

May 17, 2024
In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, a 62-year-old hospital laboratory supervisor won a bench verdict for FEHA age discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination after her director made years of ageist remarks and steered her selection for layoff. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the “cat's-paw” (imputed-animus) theory, it held that a biased subordinate's discriminatory motive may be imputed to the employer where the subordinate was a “significant participant” in the adverse decision — even though a separate, formally unbiased officer signed off on the final call. Animus by a significant participant supports an inference that the decision itself was discriminatory.

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis

April 17, 2024
Muldrow v. City of St. LouisA Title VII plaintiff challenging a discriminatory job transfer must show only “some harm” to a term or condition of employment — not a “significant” or “material” disadvantage.Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346Parallel citations: 144 S.Ct. 967; 218 L.Ed.2d 322. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

Groff v. DeJoy: Title VII Undue Hardship Requires Substantial Increased Costs

June 29, 2023
An Evangelical Christian postal worker who would not work Sundays sued under Title VII after being disciplined for declining Sunday Amazon deliveries. The Third Circuit, reading Hardison to require only 'more than a de minimis cost,' affirmed summary judgment for the employer. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and clarified the standard: an employer that denies a religious accommodation must show that granting it would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not merely a more-than-trivial cost.

Khoiny v. Dignity Health: No Academic Deference for a Residency Program’s Stated Reasons

March 16, 2022
When a medical resident sues her residency program for discrimination, the program's 'academic' justification for dismissing her is not entitled to the deference courts extend to genuine academic judgments. The Second District held that a resident is predominantly an employee, not a student, so the jury must evaluate the program's real reason without deference — and the contrary instruction required a new trial.

Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists — the modern disability-MSJ playbook: RIF selections, the interactive process, and cumulative pretext

September 30, 2021
In the Sixth District's treatise-level employment-MSJ opinion, a security supervisor laid off days before his expected return from knee surgery revives his disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims — the employer's RIF showing was inadequate under Guz's "roadmap" because it never explained retaining two lower-ranked supervisors, and its failure to accommodate, the timing, and an overpayment vendetta were substantial evidence of animus — while the retaliation claim fails because pre-2016 accommodation requests were not protected activity.

Bostock v. Clayton County

June 15, 2020
An employer that fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily entails discrimination because of sex, because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being gay or transgender without taking the…

Gupta v. Trustees of California State University: Comparator Evidence and the Similarly-Situated Standard

September 26, 2019
Comparator evidence is admissible in a FEHA case where the plaintiff and the comparator are similarly situated in all relevant respects — similar jobs and similar conduct. Affirming a plaintiff's verdict against San Francisco State University, the First District clarified how Reeves v. MV Transportation governs the admissibility, not merely the weight, of evidence that others outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Assn.: Accent and National-Origin Discrimination Under FEHA

June 20, 2019
An employer's stereotyping of a long-tenured Filipino nurse over her accent and English skills was not a neutral performance concern but evidence of national-origin discrimination. The Third District reversed summary judgment for Dameron Hospital, holding that a jury could find the hospital's stated reasons pretextual and that accent-based bias falls squarely within FEHA's protection of national origin.

Wassmann v. South Orange County CCD: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and Permanence at Termination

June 12, 2018
In Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment against a dismissed community-college librarian, holding her FEHA discrimination and harassment claims time-barred. Applying the three-part continuing-violation test from Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the doctrine could not save the claims because the pre- and post-limitations acts were “not at all similar” and the employer’s conduct “acquired a degree of permanence” when her employment was terminated — and post-dismissal acts of a neutral administrative law judge could not be imputed to the employer.

Simers v. Los Angeles Times: Discriminatory Motive Does Not Equal Constructive Discharge

January 5, 2018
In Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, a celebrated sports columnist won a jury verdict on FEHA age and disability discrimination and constructive discharge, recovering more than $7 million. The trial court let the discrimination liability stand but granted JNOV on the constructive-discharge claim and ordered a new trial limited to damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed all of the orders. Even where age or disability is a substantial motivating reason for a demotion, an employee who resigns in response to standard disciplinary procedures has not suffered a constructive discharge absent “unusually aggravated” conditions or a “continuous pattern of mistreatment.” And because the noneconomic award could not be apportioned between the surviving discrimination theory and the vacated constructive-discharge theory, a new trial limited to damages — not liability — was the proper remedy.

Diego v. City of Los Angeles: When Pretext Is Not Enough to Prove Discrimination

September 14, 2017
A FEHA disparate-treatment verdict collapsed where the only proof of racial animus was the race of the officers’ shooting victim — not the officers themselves — and the City’s risk-management rationale stood unrebutted. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to enter judgment for the City.

Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.: Sexual-Orientation Discrimination and the Substantial-Motivating-Factor Standard

June 21, 2017
A gay executive's evidence that his sexual orientation was a substantial motivating factor in his termination was enough to revive his FEHA discrimination claim, even though his parallel retaliation theory failed. The Second District applied Harris v. City of Santa Monica's causation and same-decision framework (CACI Nos. 2500, 2505, 2512) to a sexual-orientation disparate-treatment case.

Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange: The Harris Same-Decision Defense and the Common Law Tort

March 28, 2016
In Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, the Court of Appeal held that the mixed-motive, same-decision framework adopted in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA disparate-treatment claims applies equally to a common law wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim grounded in the policy against age discrimination — even though the plaintiff pleaded no FEHA claim. Because the jury found age was a substantial motivating reason but that Farmers would have fired Davis anyway, the same-decision finding left no damages, no equitable relief, and no fees; the court nonetheless reversed a directed verdict on his wage claim, holding the employer bears the burden of proving paycheck deductions lawful.

Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles: Pretext, the Continuing-Violation Doctrine, and Disparate Impact

November 10, 2015
A Black firefighter's discrimination verdict collapsed because he could not show the City's reasons were pretextual or marshal the statistical proof a disparate-impact theory requires, and the continuing-violation doctrine could not rescue time-barred claims. The Second District reversed with directions to enter judgment for the City, illustrating the demanding pretext and impact standards behind CACI Nos. 2502, 2505, and 2508.

Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist.

May 4, 2015
Government Code section 12965(b) governs both fee and cost awards in FEHA actions and makes them discretionary under the asymmetric Christiansburg standard: a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily recovers fees and costs, but a prevailing defendant may recover them only if the action was objectively frivolous, unreasonable,…

Young v. United Parcel Service: The PDA Disparate-Treatment Accommodation Framework

March 25, 2015
UPS accommodated drivers hurt on the job, drivers with ADA disabilities, and drivers who lost their DOT certifications — but told pregnant driver Peggy Young she could not work under a 20-pound lifting restriction. The Supreme Court vacated summary judgment and built the governing framework for PDA accommodation claims: show the employer accommodated others similar in ability to work, and a jury may infer discrimination if the policies significantly burden pregnant workers and the employer’s reasons are not strong enough to justify it. In California, where the PDLL and FEHA impose affirmative accommodation duties, Young is the federal floor — essential in pure Title VII postures, rarely the lead theory at home.

Kim v. Konad USA Distribution: FEHA Exhaustion Is Not Jurisdictional — and Can Be Forfeited

June 12, 2014
In Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, the Court of Appeal affirmed a $60,000 bench-trial judgment for a sexually harassed employee, holding that FEHA’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is “jurisdictional” only in the loose, prudential sense and does not affect the trial court’s fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. Because the defendants waited until after the case was submitted to assert non-exhaustion, they forfeited the defense; and because exhaustion is not truly jurisdictional, the court could consider post-trial materials confirming the plaintiff had in fact exhausted. The court also held a harassment claim lies against an employer of any size.

Cheal v. El Camino Hospital: The Limits of the Business-Judgment Rule on Summary Judgment

January 31, 2014
In Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the hospital in a FEHA age-discrimination suit, holding triable issues existed on whether the 61-year-old dietary technician performed satisfactorily and on discriminatory animus. Although “satisfactory performance” is ordinarily within the employer’s sole discretion, an employer cannot conclusively establish the governing standard merely by asserting the plaintiff fell short; the hospital’s own written policies anticipated and tolerated the errors charged, and the supervisor’s recorded admission that she favored younger workers was admissible against interest.

Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric: When the Limitations Clock Starts on a FEHA Termination

June 19, 2013
In Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402, reviewing a sustained demurrer, the Court of Appeal held the plaintiff’s FEHA disability- and race-discrimination claims time-barred but reversed on her retaliation and wrongful-termination claims, holding that the section 12960 clock for a discharge runs from the actual termination — not from when the retaliatory motive arose — and that the employer, which controlled the termination date, controlled the accrual trigger. On the accommodation claims, continuing-violation tolling ended once the employer’s refusal reached a degree of permanence.

Veronese v. Lucasfilm: The Business-Judgment Instruction and Reversible Instructional Error in a Pregnancy-Discrimination Case

December 10, 2012
Reversing a $113,830 pregnancy-discrimination verdict against Lucasfilm, the First District held that a FEHA defendant is entitled, on request, to a “business judgment” jury instruction — the rule that an employer may act on a wrong, unwise, or mistaken but nondiscriminatory reason — and that an abstractly correct “no fetal-hazard defense” instruction untethered to any defense actually in the case was misleading error. The cumulative instructional errors required a retrial.

Earl v. Nielsen Media Research — Comparator Age Pretext

September 26, 2011
Nielsen fired Christine Earl, 59, for recording the wrong house address on a recruitment form, citing her history of policy violations. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on her FEHA age discrimination and wrongful termination claims: recruiters aged

Staub v. Proctor Hospital: “Cat’s Paw” (Subordinate-Bias) Liability Under USERRA and Title VII

March 1, 2011
The Supreme Court’s foundational “cat’s paw” decision: an employer is liable when a biased supervisor performs an act intended to cause an adverse employment action that is a proximate cause of the ultimate decision — even if the formal decisionmaker had no discriminatory animus. A decisionmaker’s “independent investigation” does not automatically break the causal chain, especially when it credits the biased actor’s report without independently confirming the action was justified.

Holmes v. Petrovich: Adverse Employment Action, Pregnancy Discrimination, and Privilege on a Company Computer

January 13, 2011
The Third District affirmed summary adjudication against a pregnant executive assistant whose two-month tenure ended in resignation after a pointed email exchange about her maternity-leave dates, holding the conduct neither severe nor pervasive enough to be FEHA harassment and not an adverse employment action under Yanowitz. In a holding of lasting evidentiary importance, the court also held that emails Holmes sent her attorney on the company computer — after being warned it was monitored and not private — were not confidential under Evidence Code section 952 and so were not privileged.

Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc.: Prima Facie Inferences, Pretext, and Age-and-Disability Disparate Treatment

September 7, 2010
A salesman who suffered a stroke and was fired raised triable issues of age and disability discrimination, even though the same people who hired him made the decision. The Fourth District reversed summary judgment, holding that cane use met the disability threshold, that unexplained employer actions can supply the prima facie inference, and that a strong same-actor inference is still only an inference for the jury (CACI Nos. 2500, 2540, 2570).

Reid v. Google, Inc.

August 5, 2010
Evidentiary objections made in writing before the summary-judgment hearing are preserved for appeal even if the trial court does not expressly rule on them. And California does not adopt a rigid stray-remarks doctrine: discriminatory remarks are not categorically irrelevant but must be considered, with all the…

Reeves v. MV Transportation, Inc.: When a Qualifications Comparison Supports an Inference of Discrimination

July 9, 2010
A plaintiff who relies on his superior qualifications to prove discrimination must show a substantial disparity — a juror who finds the comparison merely 'close' will not ordinarily infer bias. Affirming summary judgment, the First District surveyed the federal relative-qualifications cases and held that the gap between the rejected applicant and the person hired was not wide enough to raise a triable issue.

Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.

October 9, 2009
Summary judgment was improperly granted on the harassment and retaliation claims because triable issues of fact existed; the decision is notable for its strong criticism of the overuse and abuse of summary judgment in employment cases, for its treatment of the parties’ voluminous (and often meritless) evidentiary…

DeJung v. Superior Court: Direct Evidence, the Cat’s-Paw Doctrine, and No Discretionary Immunity Under FEHA

December 19, 2008
A 64-year-old superior-court commissioner, passed over for a full-time post in favor of a 43-year-old after the presiding judge said the court wanted “somebody younger, maybe in their 40's,” sued for age discrimination under the FEHA. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding a superior court has no discretionary-act immunity against FEHA suits and that the presiding judge's remarks were direct evidence whose animus could taint a multilevel hiring decision under the cat's-paw doctrine.

Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and FEHA Limitations Accrual

November 21, 2008
Reversing summary judgment, the Second District held that a lesbian mail-services employee raised triable issues on whether her FEHA administrative complaint was timely under the continuing-violation doctrine, even though her harasser stopped his explicit sexual-orientation slurs over a year before she filed. Applying Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the harasser's later, facially neutral work-sabotage campaign could be “similar in kind” to the slurs and that “permanence” turns on when the harassment stops, the employee resigns, or protest becomes futile — not on when the offensive words cease.

Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.

July 30, 2008
Summary judgment was error. A plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence from which a trier of fact could find the employer’s proffered reasons unworthy of credence, and the record here showed the dismissal decision may in fact have been made by Mamou’s own biased immediate supervisor, raising triable…

Arteaga v. Brink’s — Temporal Proximity Is Not Pretext

May 28, 2008
Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation: Proving the Nexus and Adverse Action

June 14, 2007
Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that a correctional officer's FEHA claims for sexual harassment, gender and race discrimination, and retaliation all failed because she could not establish a nexus between the conduct and her protected status — asked whether her coworkers' conduct was prompted by gender or race, she “repeatedly answered, 'No' and 'I don't know'” — and could not show a “substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions” of her employment. Her common-law claims for assault, emotional distress, and negligent supervision were barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

King v. United Parcel Service — The Honest-Belief Rule on Summary Judgment

May 23, 2007
The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

Malais v. Los Angeles City Fire Dept.: A Less-Preferred Assignment Is Not an Adverse Employment Action

March 29, 2007
A fire captain who lost his leg sued for disability discrimination after his department barred him from the firefighting “platoon duty” he loved and kept him in an office-style “special duty” assignment. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the department, holding the reassignment was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA: the special-duty post carried equal pay, equal promotional opportunity, and substantial overtime, so the captain's complaint was a preference, not a material detriment.

Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. — the employer’s initial summary-judgment burden and the limits of the RIF defense

December 21, 2005
A pregnant marketing VP laid off in a reduction in force wins reversal of summary judgment: the Second District holds the moving employer must present evidence permitting a more-likely-than-not finding that its nondiscriminatory reason actually drove the discharge, and that replacement by a consultant, a decisionmaker's lie, and an evaluation e-mailed hours after her internal complaint made falsity and pregnancy animus triable.

Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara — The Continuing-Violation Doctrine Ends at Permanence

December 23, 2002
The Sixth District affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that a five-year pattern of stripping a female employee's coveted technical duties was "a collection of isolated employment decisions" that had acquired permanence by 1996 under Richards v. CH2M Hill — and that a biased supervisor's sexist remarks could not show pretext where he neither knew of her candidacy nor took part in the challenged hiring.

West v. Bechtel: A Foreign Sovereign Client’s Age Bias Cannot Be Imputed to an Innocent Agent

March 6, 2002
A 62-year-old Bechtel engineer removed from a Saudi project after the Saudi government client called him too old won a FEHA age-discrimination and contract verdict in San Francisco. The Court of Appeal reversed outright, holding that a principal's discriminatory bias cannot be imputed to an innocent agent who merely carries out a foreign sovereign's removal order, and that, absent substantial evidence of the project director's own animus, the verdict could not stand. The contract award separately failed because West, who refused comparable offers and never looked for work, failed to mitigate as a matter of law.

Akers v. County of San Diego — defining the adverse employment action in FEHA retaliation claims

February 8, 2002
Affirming a retaliation verdict for a former deputy district attorney, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA retaliation requires a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment — a test satisfied where undeserved accusations of dishonesty and incompetence destroyed the prosecutor's promotability even without a firing, demotion, or lost pay.

Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.

August 23, 2001
The continuing-violation doctrine applies to FEHA claims: an employer’s related unlawful acts are treated as a single continuing violation — and the limitations period does not begin to run — so long as the conduct is sufficiently similar and frequent and has not yet acquired a degree of permanence that should put the…

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

June 14, 2001
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit — that one or more elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense — by either conclusively negating an element or showing the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to…

Morgan v. Regents of University of California: The Continuing-Violation Doctrine and the Significant-Participant Rule

November 30, 2000
An African-American electronic technician laid off in a budget cut applied for dozens of university jobs, was hired for none, and sued under the FEHA for retaliation. Affirming summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that a string of rejections by different managers in unrelated departments is a series of isolated decisions, not a “continuing violation” — and that retaliatory remarks by HR staff who took no part in the hiring cannot establish causation, because every actual decisionmaker disclaimed knowledge of the protected grievance.

Chuang v. UC Davis — The Ninth Circuit Pretext Playbook

August 30, 2000
A world-class AIDS researcher — the only full-time, non-Caucasian faculty member in his department, and the only one without a tenured (FTE) position — was promised a tenure line for over a decade while the university gave the openings to others, then had his

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

June 12, 2000
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. A plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false can, without more, sustain a finding of intentional discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133 Parallel citations: 120 S.Ct. 2097; 147 L.Ed.2d 105. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville: When McDonnell Douglas Burdens Drop From the Case at Trial

April 14, 2000
A city secretary hired at 62 and let go at 74 during a budget crisis lost her FEHA age-discrimination claim after a bench trial. Affirming, the First District clarified that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is a pretrial screening device; at trial it drops from the case, leaving only the ultimate question whether the employer intentionally discriminated, reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence.

Thomas v. Department of Corrections: An Adverse Employment Action Must Be Both Detrimental and Substantial

January 10, 2000
In one of California's early decisions defining the scope of an “adverse employment action,” the Court of Appeal borrowed the prevailing federal standard and held the action must be both detrimental and substantial — a material change in the terms of employment. A corrections officer's pleaded grievances (a delayed paycheck, an early job change, one missed overtime payment, interference with an outside credit-union post) failed that test on demurrer. The opinion was certified for partial publication; the citable holdings live in published parts 6 and 7.

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson: “Very Little” Direct Evidence, “Specific and Substantial” Circumstantial Evidence — the Ninth Circuit’s Two-Track Pretext Standard

August 11, 1998
Reversing summary judgment in a FEHA failure-to-promote case, the Ninth Circuit reconciled its competing pretext lines — direct evidence of bias needs only "very little" weight to reach a jury, while circumstantial evidence must be "specific" and "substantial" — a formulation later questioned after Desert Palace but still central to MSJ briefing on both sides.

Reno v. Baird

July 16, 1998
The FEHA allows employees to sue and hold liable their employers, but not individual supervisors, for discrimination; the same rule applies to common-law claims for wrongful discharge (id. at p. 643).

Hersant v. Department of Social Services: The FEHA Summary-Judgment Pretext Standard

September 18, 1997
In Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for an employer in a FEHA age-discrimination case, adopting the rule that once an employer offers a legitimate, non-age-based reason for an adverse action, the employee must offer substantial evidence that the reason is untrue or pretextual, or evidence of discriminatory animus, or a combination, and not merely triable issues about whether the decision was sound.

Stevenson v. Superior Court

August 27, 1997
Age discrimination in violation of the FEHA supports a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. When a plaintiff relies on a statutory prohibition to support such a claim, the common-law claim is subject to the statute’s substantive limits (the nature and scope of the prohibition) but not…

Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center — Comparative Treatment, Pretext, and the Applicant’s Right Against Retaliation

July 1, 1997
Reversing summary judgment for the hospital, Division One held that a registry nurse's point-by-point factual dispute, the employer's conclusory comparative-qualifications showing, and the decisionmaker's anti-Mexican remarks created triable issues of discrimination and retaliation — and that the FEHA's antiretaliation provision protects job applicants, including one whose injury was the loss of temporary contract work.

Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines: FEHA Religious Accommodation and RLA Preemption

November 27, 1996
A conservative Jewish airline employee fired for refusing to work the first day of Passover sued under FEHA for religious discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding the claims were not RLA-preempted 'minor' disputes and that a collective bargaining agreement does not, in the abstract, discharge an employer's duty to accommodate where the employer did nothing to explore alternatives. Any reasonable accommodation suffices, but the employer must actually offer one.

Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics

June 5, 1996
Individual supervisors are not personally liable under the FEHA for discrimination, which arises out of the necessary personnel-management functions of the employer; by contrast, harassment — conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance and presumably engaged in for personal gratification or bias — can give…

Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist.: McDonnell Douglas Burdens Are for the Judge, Not the Jury

December 20, 1995
A school administrator lost his FEHA age- and race-discrimination claims at trial, then won a new trial when the judge decided he had mis-instructed the jury on the McDonnell Douglas prima facie burden. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the prima facie and rebuttal stages are questions of law for the court, not the jury: once the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden-shifting construct drops from the case and only the ultimate question of discriminatory intent reaches the jury.

Badih v. Myers: Pregnancy Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination Under the California Constitution

July 20, 1995
Nine days after Fatmeh Badih told her employer — a physician with fewer than five employees — that she was pregnant, her last day was set; the DFEH would not even accept her complaint because the office was too small for the FEHA. Division One of the First District affirmed her wrongful-discharge verdict anyway, holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, whose fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment binds every employer regardless of size. Jennings v. Marralle was distinguished, not disturbed: age has no constitutional anchor, but sex — and therefore pregnancy — does. Badih remains the pleading answer for pregnancy discharges at California's smallest workplaces.

Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. — McDonnell Douglas Meets California Summary Judgment

November 11, 1994
The Sixth District's 1994 decision translated McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting into Code of Civil Procedure section 437c practice — affirming summary judgment for Lockheed where a laid-off 65-year-old answered a documented reduction in force with speculation rather than "substantial responsive evidence," and holding that EEOC-only filings did not exhaust DFEH remedies.

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks

June 25, 1993
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks Disproving the employer’s stated reason permits — but does not compel — a finding of intentional discrimination; the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502 Parallel citations: 113 […]

Clark v. Claremont University Center: Multilevel-Review Causation in FEHA Race Discrimination

May 13, 1992
A Black assistant professor denied tenure won a jury verdict for race discrimination under FEHA, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in the published portion of its opinion. The court held the verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that a tenure plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of a multilevel review: discrimination at one level can infect the ultimate decision. On causation, racial animus need not be the sole motivation, only a but-for cause of the adverse decision.

International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

March 20, 1991
In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, the Supreme Court held that an employer's fetal-protection policy excluding all fertile women from lead-exposed jobs is facial sex discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — not a neutral practice to be tested for business necessity. The narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense reaches only qualifications affecting an employee's ability to do the job, and cannot be grounded in feared harm to a future fetus or in cost and tort-liability concerns.

Rojo v. Kliger

December 20, 1990
The FEHA does not displace other state-law remedies, including common-law claims, for employment discrimination; an employee need not exhaust FEHA’s administrative process before pursuing nonstatutory causes of action; and sex discrimination in employment may support a tort claim for wrongful discharge in…

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.

February 28, 1990
In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 517, the Court of Appeal struck down a fetal-protection policy barring fertile women from lead-exposed battery jobs as overt sex discrimination under FEHA. The court articulated California's two-part bona fide occupational qualification test — the sex-based qualification must be reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business, and the employer must show that all or substantially all of the excluded class cannot safely and efficiently perform the job — and held the employer failed both prongs.

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio

June 5, 1989
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

Mixon v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Discriminatory Animus Need Not Be the Sole Motivation

June 24, 1987
A FEHA complainant need not prove that discriminatory animus was the sole motivation for an adverse action — but must still prove it was a determining factor. Affirming the Commission's finding that a Black employee was discharged for commute-cost reasons rather than race, the Sixth District clarified the causation standard that underlies CACI Nos. 2500 and 2507, even as it upheld the employer's legitimate-reason defense on the facts.

Ibarbia v. Regents of the University of California: Proving Discriminatory Impact Without Proving Intent

May 15, 1987
A disparate-impact plaintiff is relieved of proving discriminatory intent, but is not relieved of proving the discriminatory impact. Affirming summary judgment for the University, the First District held that the plaintiff offered no statistical or other evidence that a facially neutral practice fell more harshly on a protected group — the indispensable element of a disparate-impact theory (CACI No. 2502).

Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell

June 17, 1985
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell (1985) 472 U.S. 400, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part age-BFOQ test for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: the age limit must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business, and the employer must show either reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all older workers cannot perform the job safely or that it is impossible or highly impractical to assess older employees individually. The Court rejected a deferential “rational basis” standard.

Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court

August 30, 1982
Punitive damages are recoverable under the FEHA in a court action for intentional employment discrimination; the statute’s remedial scheme does not limit a plaintiff to the relief the administrative agency could award, so the full range of tort-type remedies, including punitive damages, is available.

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine

March 4, 1981
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine At step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 Parallel citations: […]

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison: De Minimis Cost and Seniority Under Title VII

June 16, 1977
Larry Hardison was fired when his Saturday Sabbath collided with a low-seniority shift at TWA's around-the-clock maintenance base. Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer to override a bona fide seniority system to accommodate an employee's religion, and that requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost is an undue hardship. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. The de minimis standard was later clarified and raised by Groff v. DeJoy (2023).

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States

May 31, 1977
In Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324, the Supreme Court drew the foundational line between disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination, explained the Government's pattern-or-practice burden to prove that discrimination was a company's “standard operating procedure,” shielded bona fide seniority systems under section 703(h), and recognized the “futile gesture” doctrine excusing non-applicants deterred from applying by a known discriminatory policy.

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.: Title VII and Section 1981 Protect Every Race

June 25, 1976
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976) 427 U.S. 273, two white employees were discharged for participating in the theft of antifreeze from a shipment in their employer's care, while a Black employee charged with the same misconduct was retained. The Supreme Court held — unanimously as to Title VII, and seven-to-two as to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 — that both statutes protect against racial discrimination directed at any race, including white persons. An employer “may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.” The judgment dismissing the complaint was reversed and the case remanded.

Geduldig v. Aiello: The Equal-Protection Origin Point (Pregnancy Classification Not Sex-Based)

June 17, 1974
Four women who paid into California’s employee-funded disability insurance program were denied benefits because their disabilities arose from pregnancy. Six Justices upheld the exclusion: the program’s risk selection was rational social-welfare line-drawing, and — in footnote 20, the most consequential footnote in pregnancy-discrimination law — the classification was not sex-based at all, because it divided “pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.” Congress answered with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; California answered with the FEHA’s definition of sex, the PDLL, and Badih v. Myers; even the SDI statute now expressly covers pregnancy. Yet the constitutional holding stands, reaffirmed in Dobbs — a live obstacle for equal-protection claims, and a museum piece everywhere else.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

May 14, 1973
Title VII disparate-treatment claims proceed under a three-step framework: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and (3) the plaintiff must then have the…

Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

March 8, 1971
Title VII prohibits employment practices that operate to exclude protected groups and are not demonstrably related to job performance, regardless of the employer’s intent (disparate-impact liability). If a neutral practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, the employer must show the practice is job-related…

Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.

March 4, 1969
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (5th Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 228, the Fifth Circuit announced the foundational Title VII sex-BFOQ standard: an employer invoking sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must prove a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job. The court rejected stereotype-based “romantic paternalism” and a state weight-lifting limit as justifications and placed the burden on the employer.
For practitioners

Practice guides

Each guide gathers and summarizes the controlling cases and authorities on a single question — a research starting point you can cite from.

Practice guideRetaliation under Lab. Code § 1102.5A practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideFEHA discrimination & the McDonnell Douglas testA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideTermination in violation of public policyA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideCompelling arbitration of FEHA claimsA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideDisability discrimination & reasonable accommodationA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideSexual harassment under FEHAA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideOff-the-clock work & compensable hours workedA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideMeal & rest breaks & premium payA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideWage & hour class actions & PAGAA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.Practice guideIndependent-contractor misclassification & the ABC testA practitioner’s synthesis of the controlling cases and authorities.