California employment case index

Tilly’s required retail workers to phone the store exactly two hours before every on-call shift — under threat of written discipline — and paid nothing if the answer was ‘don’t come in.’ Division Three held, 2–1, that this triggers Wage Order 7 reporting-time pay: ‘reporting for work’ means presenting oneself as ordered, and the employer’s own directions define the manner, whether that is walking through the door, logging on remotely, or making a mandatory call. The holding is deliberately tied to the two-hour call-in regime, the retroactivity question was expressly left open, and Justice Egerton’s partial dissent — built on 18,000 pages of IWC history — supplies the employer playbook. Review was denied; Ward remains the leading California authority on call-in scheduling.

Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829 holds that California has not adopted the federal de minimis doctrine: an employer that requires small but regularly recurring off-the-clock work — here, several minutes of closing tasks each shift — must pay for that time and cannot invoke de minimis to avoid it.

Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 adopts the “ABC test” for California wage-order claims: a worker is presumed an employee, and the hiring entity must prove all three prongs — freedom from control, work outside the usual course of business, and an independently established trade — to establish independent-contractor status.

For a flat-sum bonus like the attendance bonus here, the bonus is divided by the number of non-overtime (straight-time) hours the employee actually worked — not by total hours including overtime — to determine the per-hour value added to the regular rate; this yields a higher overtime rate, more protective than the…

Two Nordstrom employees worked stretches of more than six consecutive days, but never seven days inside a single established workweek, and always with at least one short shift. The Ninth Circuit certified three questions, and a unanimous Supreme Court answered all of them on one page: the day-of-rest guarantee runs by the workweek rather than on a rolling seven days, so runs spanning two workweeks are not per se prohibited; the six-hour exemption applies only where the employee never exceeds six hours on any day of that week, because the contrary reading would let a single short shift swallow the rule; and an employer 'causes' a lost day of rest by inducing the employee to forgo it, owing a duty to apprise employees of the right and then maintain absolute neutrality about its exercise.

Stoneledge paid furniture sales associates on commission with a guaranteed $12.01 hourly draw that was deducted from later commissions. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the employer, holding that Wage Order No. 7 requires separate compensation for rest periods and applies equally to commissioned employees, piece-rate employees, or any other system that does not pay for rest breaks. The draws were not compensation at all – at best, interest-free loans.

Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 257 holds that a compliant rest period must be free of both duties and employer control: an employer may not require employees to remain “on call” during a rest break, even if interruptions rarely occur.

Answering three questions certified by the Ninth Circuit, the California Supreme Court held that the “nature of the work” under the wage orders' seating provision refers to the tasks an employee performs at a given location – not to the whole job – and that whether the work reasonably permits sitting is an objective, totality-of-the-circumstances question in which employer business judgment and workplace layout are relevant but not dispositive. If the employer contends no suitable seat exists, it bears the burden of proving unavailability.

Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833 holds that security guards’ required on-call time at their worksites was compensable “hours worked” under the control clause, and that California’s Wage Order 4 — unlike federal law — does not permit excluding sleep time from compensable hours on a 24-hour shift.

A class of 1,500 customer service managers was denied certification because the trial court believed Labor Code section 2802 liability turned on each employee's own cell phone plan and on who actually paid the bill. Division Two reversed and stated the rule in its opening sentence: when employees must use personal cell phones for work-related calls, the employer must reimburse them a reasonable percentage of the bill, whether the plan is limited or unlimited. Whether a third party paid, and whether the employee changed plans, are irrelevant – plan details go to damages, not liability. The disposition is a reversal of a certification denial, not a merits judgment.

An employer satisfies the minimum-earnings prong of the commissioned-employee exemption only in those pay periods in which it actually pays the required minimum earnings; it may not attribute commission wages paid in one pay period to other pay periods to manufacture compliance (59 Cal.4th at p. 664).

Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 holds that a class-action trial plan using statistical or representative proof must still let the defendant litigate its affirmative defenses. A plan that extrapolated liability for 260 employees from a flawed 21-person sample and barred defense evidence violated due process.

Rest periods must be separately compensated and cannot be folded into a piece-rate or activity-based pay formula; because Safeway’s uniform pay system did not separately pay for rest periods, common issues predominated and the class should have been certified (216 Cal.App.4th at p. 866).

Piece-rate employees are entitled to separate hourly compensation for time spent waiting for repair work or performing other nonrepair tasks directed by the employer during their work shifts; piece-rate earnings cannot be averaged across that nonproductive time to satisfy the minimum-wage obligation (215 Cal.App.4th…

There is no California statute or case law authorizing or prohibiting employee time rounding, so Division One borrowed the federal rule: an employer may round punch times to the nearest tenth of an hour if the policy is fair and neutral on its face and, as applied, does not fail over time to compensate employees for the time they actually worked. The posture is narrow – a writ vacating summary adjudication on two of the employer's affirmative defenses, with the court expressly leaving open whether either side will prevail. The plaintiff's expert lost the case by treating the employer's separate grace-period policy as if it were rounding. Whether neutral rounding survives at all is now pending before the California Supreme Court in Camp v. Home Depot, S277518.

Neither Labor Code section 1194 nor section 218.5 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a party that prevails on a section 226.7 claim; such claims are not actions for the nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime (§1194) and are not the kind of nonpayment-of-wages action that triggers §218.5 fee-shifting, so each…

Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 is California’s foundational meal-and-rest decision: an employer must provide a duty-free meal period but need not ensure no work is done; it sets the meal-timing and rest-period rules and confirms that courts may resolve merits questions enmeshed with class certification.

Courts may not treat the administrative/production worker dichotomy as a dispositive test for the administrative exemption; the exemption must be analyzed under the language of the applicable IWC wage order and governing regulations, considering the actual work performed, rather than a rigid dichotomy.

Three Oracle instructors living in Colorado and Arizona worked a limited number of days in California for their California-headquartered employer. Answering certified questions from the Ninth Circuit, the California Supreme Court held that the Labor Code's overtime provisions apply to work performed in this state regardless of residence, and that those violations support a UCL claim – but that the UCL does not reach FLSA violations occurring in other states on these stipulated facts. The court confined its holding to overtime and to entire days and weeks worked in California.

Section 203(b) contains a single, three-year limitations period governing all actions for section 203 penalties, regardless of whether the penalty claim is accompanied by a claim for unpaid final wages; and the penalties may be recovered even though the underlying wages were eventually paid.

Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 holds that the IWC wage orders’ own definitions govern who is an “employer” for minimum-wage claims: to “employ” means (a) to exercise control over wages, hours, or working conditions, (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage in a common-law employment relationship. The produce merchants were not the workers’ employers.

Citigroup let employees take part of their annual compensation as discounted restricted stock vesting only after two years; an employee who resigned early forfeited both the shares and the pay used to buy them. The California Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the company, holding that no earned wages remained unpaid on resignation. The decision agrees that restricted stock is a wage – so it turns on when incentive compensation is earned, not on characterization – and expressly refuses to extend Suastez's pro rata vacation-vesting rule to voluntary incentive programs.

Harte-Hanks paid outside sales representatives higher salaries and commission rates than inside representatives and treated the difference as reimbursement for their automobile expenses. The California Supreme Court held the practice permissible in principle, but only where the employer establishes a means to identify which portion of overall compensation is intended as reimbursement and that portion fully covers expenses actually and necessarily incurred. Section 2804 bars any agreement that waives full reimbursement – a holding that unravelled the trial court's denial of class certification.

The section 226.7 meal/rest payment is a wage (premium pay), not a penalty, and is therefore governed by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to wage claims rather than the one-year period for penalties.

“Discharge” under sections 201 and 203 includes not only firing but also releasing an employee upon completion of the particular job assignment or time duration for which he or she was hired; final wages are then immediately due, and a willful failure to pay triggers waiting-time penalties.

California does not permit wage averaging: the minimum-wage standard applies to each hour worked, and an employer must pay at least the minimum wage for every compensable hour; it cannot use higher pay for some hours to offset unpaid or sub-minimum hours.

Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319 holds that wage-and-hour class certification is reviewed for abuse of discretion and turns on whether the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery is amenable to common proof — not on the existence of individual issues or the ultimate merits. The Court reinstated certification of a manager-misclassification class.

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 holds that the wage order’s “subject to the control of an employer” and “suffered or permitted to work” clauses are independent: an employee under the employer’s control is paid even when not working. Compulsory travel on employer-mandated buses is compensable “hours worked,” and the federal Portal-to-Portal Act does not govern California law.