California employment case index

Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66 holds that administrative safety regulations — here FAA airline-safety rules — can supply the fundamental public policy supporting a Tameny wrongful-discharge claim, extending Gantt beyond constitutional and statutory sources.

Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 holds that FEHA discrimination must be a “substantial motivating factor,” and that an employer’s same-decision showing bars damages, backpay, and reinstatement but not declaratory/injunctive relief or attorney’s fees.

Nine hospital-system employees sought religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement and sued under Title VII when they were denied. The Ninth Circuit affirms judgment for the employer: after Groff v. DeJoy, undue hardship means a “substantial” burden — including realistic health, safety, and staffing costs — and exempting unvaccinated clinical staff during the Delta surge met that standard.

A nursing student said the faculty member running her hospital clinical rotation sexually harassed her and tanked her grade when she refused him. The Fourth District holds a student in a required clinical placement is an “unpaid intern” protected by FEHA, and reverses summary judgment on standing, Government-Claims-Act notice, and deliberate indifference.

World Vision revoked a job offer to a customer-service applicant after learning she was in a same-sex marriage. The Ninth Circuit held the ministerial exception barred her Title VII and WLAD claims, because — viewed in the context of World Vision’s religious mission — CSRs perform “vital religious duties” by communicating the faith and praying with donors. A striking extension of the exception’s functional reach to an entry-level, remote position.

The University of California refuses to employ undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The First District held that the policy facially discriminates based on immigration status under the FEHA national-origin regulations, and that the University’s only justification — fear that the federal government might read IRCA to cover it and prosecute — could not sustain the policy, because the University never attempted the regulation’s clear-and-convincing showing that federal law requires the discrimination. The court issued a writ directing the Regents to reconsider the policy on proper criteria, while pointedly declining to decide whether IRCA applies to state entities at all.

Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, lost a promotion to a lesbian candidate, then was demoted and replaced by a gay man. The Sixth Circuit threw out her Title VII case because she had not shown “background circumstances” suggesting her employer was the unusual one that discriminates against the majority. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated: Title VII protects “any individual,” and its prima facie standard does not vary with the plaintiff’s group. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred to question whether McDonnell Douglas belongs at summary judgment at all — an invitation with consequences for FEHA practice under Guz.

A Postmaster of Chinese ethnicity was demoted after coworkers targeted her with complaints her supervisor believed were racially motivated, and the demotion was confirmed by an official who reviewed only the paperwork. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, holding that replacement by a white man satisfied the McDonnell Douglas fourth element and that a genuine dispute existed over whether the confirming decision was “actually independent or influenced by subordinate bias” — a Ninth Circuit application of the cat’s-paw doctrine.

Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.

In Hoglund v. Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 56, a 62-year-old hospital laboratory supervisor won a bench verdict for FEHA age discrimination, harassment, and wrongful termination after her director made years of ageist remarks and steered her selection for layoff. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the “cat's-paw” (imputed-animus) theory, it held that a biased subordinate's discriminatory motive may be imputed to the employer where the subordinate was a “significant participant” in the adverse decision — even though a separate, formally unbiased officer signed off on the final call. Animus by a significant participant supports an inference that the decision itself was discriminatory.

Muldrow v. City of St. LouisA Title VII plaintiff challenging a discriminatory job transfer must show only “some harm” to a term or condition of employment — not a “significant” or “material” disadvantage.Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) 601 U.S. 346Parallel citations: 144 S.Ct. 967; 218 L.Ed.2d 322. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group Business-Entity Agents Can Be Directly Liable Under FEHA Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group (2023) 15 Cal.5th 268 Parallel citations: 534 P.3d 40; 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 301. Supreme Court of California. Opinion filed August 21, 2023. Docket No. S273630. On a question certified by the United States Court of Appeals […]

An Evangelical Christian postal worker who would not work Sundays sued under Title VII after being disciplined for declining Sunday Amazon deliveries. The Third Circuit, reading Hardison to require only 'more than a de minimis cost,' affirmed summary judgment for the employer. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and clarified the standard: an employer that denies a religious accommodation must show that granting it would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not merely a more-than-trivial cost.

When a medical resident sues her residency program for discrimination, the program's 'academic' justification for dismissing her is not entitled to the deference courts extend to genuine academic judgments. The Second District held that a resident is predominantly an employee, not a student, so the jury must evaluate the program's real reason without deference — and the contrary instruction required a new trial.

An employer cannot rebut a discrimination plaintiff’s prima facie case by professing ignorance: stage-two production under McDonnell Douglas demands the actual nondiscriminatory reason for a failure to interview, not a witness’s “I don’t know.”

The California Supreme Court holds that Labor Code §1102.6 — not McDonnell Douglas — governs §1102.5 whistleblower-retaliation claims: the employee need only show protected activity was a contributing factor, shifting to the employer the clear-and-convincing burden of proving it would have acted the same anyway.

In the Sixth District's treatise-level employment-MSJ opinion, a security supervisor laid off days before his expected return from knee surgery revives his disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims — the employer's RIF showing was inadequate under Guz's "roadmap" because it never explained retaining two lower-ranked supervisors, and its failure to accommodate, the timing, and an overpayment vendetta were substantial evidence of animus — while the retaliation claim fails because pre-2016 accommodation requests were not protected activity.

A 60-year-old engineer cut in a 306-person, budget-driven layoff lost on both procedure and merits: his EEOC and post-closure DFEH amendments could not exhaust class and disparate-impact theories, and his pretext case failed for want of combined-position qualifications, controlled statistics, and comparators.

An employer that fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily entails discrimination because of sex, because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being gay or transgender without taking the…

Comparator evidence is admissible in a FEHA case where the plaintiff and the comparator are similarly situated in all relevant respects — similar jobs and similar conduct. Affirming a plaintiff's verdict against San Francisco State University, the First District clarified how Reeves v. MV Transportation governs the admissibility, not merely the weight, of evidence that others outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

An employer's stereotyping of a long-tenured Filipino nurse over her accent and English skills was not a neutral performance concern but evidence of national-origin discrimination. The Third District reversed summary judgment for Dameron Hospital, holding that a jury could find the hospital's stated reasons pretextual and that accent-based bias falls squarely within FEHA's protection of national origin.

The Court of Appeal reinstated Ada Abed’s FEHA pregnancy claim, holding that a job application is not an element of a failure-to-hire claim. An employer who falsely tells a pregnant woman no position is open — and thereby stops her from applying — can be liable for pregnancy discrimination, even though she never applied.

In Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, a celebrated sports columnist won a jury verdict on FEHA age and disability discrimination and constructive discharge, recovering more than $7 million. The trial court let the discrimination liability stand but granted JNOV on the constructive-discharge claim and ordered a new trial limited to damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed all of the orders. Even where age or disability is a substantial motivating reason for a demotion, an employee who resigns in response to standard disciplinary procedures has not suffered a constructive discharge absent “unusually aggravated” conditions or a “continuous pattern of mistreatment.” And because the noneconomic award could not be apportioned between the surviving discrimination theory and the vacated constructive-discharge theory, a new trial limited to damages — not liability — was the proper remedy.

A FEHA disparate-treatment verdict collapsed where the only proof of racial animus was the race of the officers’ shooting victim — not the officers themselves — and the City’s risk-management rationale stood unrebutted. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to enter judgment for the City.

A gay executive's evidence that his sexual orientation was a substantial motivating factor in his termination was enough to revive his FEHA discrimination claim, even though his parallel retaliation theory failed. The Second District applied Harris v. City of Santa Monica's causation and same-decision framework (CACI Nos. 2500, 2505, 2512) to a sexual-orientation disparate-treatment case.

In Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, the Court of Appeal held that the mixed-motive, same-decision framework adopted in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA disparate-treatment claims applies equally to a common law wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim grounded in the policy against age discrimination — even though the plaintiff pleaded no FEHA claim. Because the jury found age was a substantial motivating reason but that Farmers would have fired Davis anyway, the same-decision finding left no damages, no equitable relief, and no fees; the court nonetheless reversed a directed verdict on his wage claim, holding the employer bears the burden of proving paycheck deductions lawful.

A Black firefighter's discrimination verdict collapsed because he could not show the City's reasons were pretextual or marshal the statistical proof a disparate-impact theory requires, and the continuing-violation doctrine could not rescue time-barred claims. The Second District reversed with directions to enter judgment for the City, illustrating the demanding pretext and impact standards behind CACI Nos. 2502, 2505, and 2508.

Government Code section 12965(b) governs both fee and cost awards in FEHA actions and makes them discretionary under the asymmetric Christiansburg standard: a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily recovers fees and costs, but a prevailing defendant may recover them only if the action was objectively frivolous, unreasonable,…

UPS accommodated drivers hurt on the job, drivers with ADA disabilities, and drivers who lost their DOT certifications — but told pregnant driver Peggy Young she could not work under a 20-pound lifting restriction. The Supreme Court vacated summary judgment and built the governing framework for PDA accommodation claims: show the employer accommodated others similar in ability to work, and a jury may infer discrimination if the policies significantly burden pregnant workers and the employer’s reasons are not strong enough to justify it. In California, where the PDLL and FEHA impose affirmative accommodation duties, Young is the federal floor — essential in pure Title VII postures, rarely the lead theory at home.

In Cheal v. El Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the hospital in a FEHA age-discrimination suit, holding triable issues existed on whether the 61-year-old dietary technician performed satisfactorily and on discriminatory animus. Although “satisfactory performance” is ordinarily within the employer’s sole discretion, an employer cannot conclusively establish the governing standard merely by asserting the plaintiff fell short; the hospital’s own written policies anticipated and tolerated the errors charged, and the supervisor’s recorded admission that she favored younger workers was admissible against interest.

Reversing a $113,830 pregnancy-discrimination verdict against Lucasfilm, the First District held that a FEHA defendant is entitled, on request, to a “business judgment” jury instruction — the rule that an employer may act on a wrong, unwise, or mistaken but nondiscriminatory reason — and that an abstractly correct “no fetal-hazard defense” instruction untethered to any defense actually in the case was misleading error. The cumulative instructional errors required a retrial.

Nielsen fired Christine Earl, 59, for recording the wrong house address on a recruitment form, citing her history of policy violations. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on her FEHA age discrimination and wrongful termination claims: recruiters aged

The Supreme Court’s foundational “cat’s paw” decision: an employer is liable when a biased supervisor performs an act intended to cause an adverse employment action that is a proximate cause of the ultimate decision — even if the formal decisionmaker had no discriminatory animus. A decisionmaker’s “independent investigation” does not automatically break the causal chain, especially when it credits the biased actor’s report without independently confirming the action was justified.

The Third District affirmed summary adjudication against a pregnant executive assistant whose two-month tenure ended in resignation after a pointed email exchange about her maternity-leave dates, holding the conduct neither severe nor pervasive enough to be FEHA harassment and not an adverse employment action under Yanowitz. In a holding of lasting evidentiary importance, the court also held that emails Holmes sent her attorney on the company computer — after being warned it was monitored and not private — were not confidential under Evidence Code section 952 and so were not privileged.

A salesman who suffered a stroke and was fired raised triable issues of age and disability discrimination, even though the same people who hired him made the decision. The Fourth District reversed summary judgment, holding that cane use met the disability threshold, that unexplained employer actions can supply the prima facie inference, and that a strong same-actor inference is still only an inference for the jury (CACI Nos. 2500, 2540, 2570).

Evidentiary objections made in writing before the summary-judgment hearing are preserved for appeal even if the trial court does not expressly rule on them. And California does not adopt a rigid stray-remarks doctrine: discriminatory remarks are not categorically irrelevant but must be considered, with all the…

A plaintiff who relies on his superior qualifications to prove discrimination must show a substantial disparity — a juror who finds the comparison merely 'close' will not ordinarily infer bias. Affirming summary judgment, the First District surveyed the federal relative-qualifications cases and held that the gap between the rejected applicant and the person hired was not wide enough to raise a triable issue.

Fired the day she returned from pregnancy-related bed rest, a caregiver defeated summary judgment with declarations from four coworkers describing pregnancy-triggered firings by the same supervisors — evidence the court held admissible as a matter of law to prove motive, not propensity.

A 64-year-old superior-court commissioner, passed over for a full-time post in favor of a 43-year-old after the presiding judge said the court wanted “somebody younger, maybe in their 40's,” sued for age discrimination under the FEHA. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding a superior court has no discretionary-act immunity against FEHA suits and that the presiding judge's remarks were direct evidence whose animus could taint a multilevel hiring decision under the cat's-paw doctrine.

Summary judgment was error. A plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence from which a trier of fact could find the employer’s proffered reasons unworthy of credence, and the record here showed the dismissal decision may in fact have been made by Mamou’s own biased immediate supervisor, raising triable…

Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

A White news anchor’s claim that his station’s “on-air style” rationale masked race-conscious hiring failed on summary judgment because the record corroborated the employer’s subjective assessment, and his sole contrary showing — that the executive lied about counseling him — could not alone support the inference that race was the real reason.

Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that a correctional officer's FEHA claims for sexual harassment, gender and race discrimination, and retaliation all failed because she could not establish a nexus between the conduct and her protected status — asked whether her coworkers' conduct was prompted by gender or race, she “repeatedly answered, 'No' and 'I don't know'” — and could not show a “substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions” of her employment. Her common-law claims for assault, emotional distress, and negligent supervision were barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

A fire captain who lost his leg sued for disability discrimination after his department barred him from the firefighting “platoon duty” he loved and kept him in an office-style “special duty” assignment. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the department, holding the reassignment was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA: the special-duty post carried equal pay, equal promotional opportunity, and substantial overtime, so the captain's complaint was a preference, not a material detriment.

A pregnant marketing VP laid off in a reduction in force wins reversal of summary judgment: the Second District holds the moving employer must present evidence permitting a more-likely-than-not finding that its nondiscriminatory reason actually drove the discharge, and that replacement by a consultant, a decisionmaker's lie, and an evaluation e-mailed hours after her internal complaint made falsity and pregnancy animus triable.

Over a Mosk dissent, Division Five holds that a pregnancy-discrimination plaintiff who confided her early pregnancy only to sworn-to-secrecy friends cannot make a prima facie case absent evidence the decisionmaker knew, and that "Not while you are working for me" and post-firing outbursts were not direct evidence bypassing McDonnell Douglas.

The Sixth District affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that a five-year pattern of stripping a female employee's coveted technical duties was "a collection of isolated employment decisions" that had acquired permanence by 1996 under Richards v. CH2M Hill — and that a biased supervisor's sexist remarks could not show pretext where he neither knew of her candidacy nor took part in the challenged hiring.

A 62-year-old Bechtel engineer removed from a Saudi project after the Saudi government client called him too old won a FEHA age-discrimination and contract verdict in San Francisco. The Court of Appeal reversed outright, holding that a principal's discriminatory bias cannot be imputed to an innocent agent who merely carries out a foreign sovereign's removal order, and that, absent substantial evidence of the project director's own animus, the verdict could not stand. The contract award separately failed because West, who refused comparable offers and never looked for work, failed to mitigate as a matter of law.

Affirming a retaliation verdict for a former deputy district attorney, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA retaliation requires a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment — a test satisfied where undeserved accusations of dishonesty and incompetence destroyed the prosecutor's promotability even without a firing, demotion, or lost pay.

“Academic catfighting or anti-Semitism?” — a professor’s proof that her tenure denial rested on a hidden, forbidden “collegiality” criterion defeated her own FEHA claim, because the same evidence showed the real motive was a colleague’s grudge, not her religion.

A world-class AIDS researcher — the only full-time, non-Caucasian faculty member in his department, and the only one without a tenured (FTE) position — was promised a tenure line for over a decade while the university gave the openings to others, then had his

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. A plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false can, without more, sustain a finding of intentional discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133 Parallel citations: 120 S.Ct. 2097; 147 L.Ed.2d 105. Supreme Court of the United States. […]

A city secretary hired at 62 and let go at 74 during a budget crisis lost her FEHA age-discrimination claim after a bench trial. Affirming, the First District clarified that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is a pretrial screening device; at trial it drops from the case, leaving only the ultimate question whether the employer intentionally discriminated, reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence.

In one of California's early decisions defining the scope of an “adverse employment action,” the Court of Appeal borrowed the prevailing federal standard and held the action must be both detrimental and substantial — a material change in the terms of employment. A corrections officer's pleaded grievances (a delayed paycheck, an early job change, one missed overtime payment, interference with an outside credit-union post) failed that test on demurrer. The opinion was certified for partial publication; the citable holdings live in published parts 6 and 7.

Affirming summary judgment on a 59-year-old communications manager's age claim, the First District adopted Hersant's substantial-evidence pretext standard, gave the same-actor inference "strong" force across a five-year span, and discounted a non-decisionmaker's isolated remark — making Horn the case every California employment plaintiff must be ready to distinguish.

Reversing summary judgment in a FEHA failure-to-promote case, the Ninth Circuit reconciled its competing pretext lines — direct evidence of bias needs only "very little" weight to reach a jury, while circumstantial evidence must be "specific" and "substantial" — a formulation later questioned after Desert Palace but still central to MSJ briefing on both sides.

The FEHA allows employees to sue and hold liable their employers, but not individual supervisors, for discrimination; the same rule applies to common-law claims for wrongful discharge (id. at p. 643).

In Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for an employer in a FEHA age-discrimination case, adopting the rule that once an employer offers a legitimate, non-age-based reason for an adverse action, the employee must offer substantial evidence that the reason is untrue or pretextual, or evidence of discriminatory animus, or a combination, and not merely triable issues about whether the decision was sound.

Age discrimination in violation of the FEHA supports a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. When a plaintiff relies on a statutory prohibition to support such a claim, the common-law claim is subject to the statute’s substantive limits (the nature and scope of the prohibition) but not…

Reversing summary judgment for the hospital, Division One held that a registry nurse's point-by-point factual dispute, the employer's conclusory comparative-qualifications showing, and the decisionmaker's anti-Mexican remarks created triable issues of discrimination and retaliation — and that the FEHA's antiretaliation provision protects job applicants, including one whose injury was the loss of temporary contract work.

A conservative Jewish airline employee fired for refusing to work the first day of Passover sued under FEHA for religious discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding the claims were not RLA-preempted 'minor' disputes and that a collective bargaining agreement does not, in the abstract, discharge an employer's duty to accommodate where the employer did nothing to explore alternatives. Any reasonable accommodation suffices, but the employer must actually offer one.

Individual supervisors are not personally liable under the FEHA for discrimination, which arises out of the necessary personnel-management functions of the employer; by contrast, harassment — conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance and presumably engaged in for personal gratification or bias — can give…

A school administrator lost his FEHA age- and race-discrimination claims at trial, then won a new trial when the judge decided he had mis-instructed the jury on the McDonnell Douglas prima facie burden. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the prima facie and rebuttal stages are questions of law for the court, not the jury: once the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden-shifting construct drops from the case and only the ultimate question of discriminatory intent reaches the jury.

Nine days after Fatmeh Badih told her employer — a physician with fewer than five employees — that she was pregnant, her last day was set; the DFEH would not even accept her complaint because the office was too small for the FEHA. Division One of the First District affirmed her wrongful-discharge verdict anyway, holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, whose fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment binds every employer regardless of size. Jennings v. Marralle was distinguished, not disturbed: age has no constitutional anchor, but sex — and therefore pregnancy — does. Badih remains the pleading answer for pregnancy discharges at California's smallest workplaces.

The Sixth District's 1994 decision translated McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting into Code of Civil Procedure section 437c practice — affirming summary judgment for Lockheed where a laid-off 65-year-old answered a documented reduction in force with speculation rather than "substantial responsive evidence," and holding that EEOC-only filings did not exhaust DFEH remedies.

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks Disproving the employer’s stated reason permits — but does not compel — a finding of intentional discrimination; the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502 Parallel citations: 113 […]

A Black assistant professor denied tenure won a jury verdict for race discrimination under FEHA, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in the published portion of its opinion. The court held the verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that a tenure plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of a multilevel review: discrimination at one level can infect the ultimate decision. On causation, racial animus need not be the sole motivation, only a but-for cause of the adverse decision.

In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, the Supreme Court held that an employer's fetal-protection policy excluding all fertile women from lead-exposed jobs is facial sex discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — not a neutral practice to be tested for business necessity. The narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense reaches only qualifications affecting an employee's ability to do the job, and cannot be grounded in feared harm to a future fetus or in cost and tort-liability concerns.

The FEHA does not displace other state-law remedies, including common-law claims, for employment discrimination; an employee need not exhaust FEHA’s administrative process before pursuing nonstatutory causes of action; and sex discrimination in employment may support a tort claim for wrongful discharge in…

In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 517, the Court of Appeal struck down a fetal-protection policy barring fertile women from lead-exposed battery jobs as overt sex discrimination under FEHA. The court articulated California's two-part bona fide occupational qualification test — the sex-based qualification must be reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business, and the employer must show that all or substantially all of the excluded class cannot safely and efficiently perform the job — and held the employer failed both prongs.

In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

A FEHA complainant need not prove that discriminatory animus was the sole motivation for an adverse action — but must still prove it was a determining factor. Affirming the Commission's finding that a Black employee was discharged for commute-cost reasons rather than race, the Sixth District clarified the causation standard that underlies CACI Nos. 2500 and 2507, even as it upheld the employer's legitimate-reason defense on the facts.

A disparate-impact plaintiff is relieved of proving discriminatory intent, but is not relieved of proving the discriminatory impact. Affirming summary judgment for the University, the First District held that the plaintiff offered no statistical or other evidence that a facially neutral practice fell more harshly on a protected group — the indispensable element of a disparate-impact theory (CACI No. 2502).

A facially neutral firefighter promotional exam that screened out Black candidates at well below four-fifths of the White rate, and that failed to test the job’s primary supervisory function, violated FEHA — though parallel federal litigation displaced the Commission’s remedy.

An exclusive all-male club is a covered FEHA employer, and its members’ preference for male staff is no bona fide occupational qualification. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the BFOQ defense is an extremely narrow exception that customer preference can never satisfy.

In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell (1985) 472 U.S. 400, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part age-BFOQ test for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: the age limit must be reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business, and the employer must show either reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all older workers cannot perform the job safely or that it is impossible or highly impractical to assess older employees individually. The Court rejected a deferential “rational basis” standard.

Punitive damages are recoverable under the FEHA in a court action for intentional employment discrimination; the statute’s remedial scheme does not limit a plaintiff to the relief the administrative agency could award, so the full range of tort-type remedies, including punitive damages, is available.

The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a racially balanced “bottom-line” workforce to defend a discriminatory pass/fail barrier that excludes individual employees. Title VII protects the person, not just the group.

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine At step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 Parallel citations: […]

Larry Hardison was fired when his Saturday Sabbath collided with a low-seniority shift at TWA's around-the-clock maintenance base. Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer to override a bona fide seniority system to accommodate an employee's religion, and that requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost is an undue hardship. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. The de minimis standard was later clarified and raised by Groff v. DeJoy (2023).

In Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324, the Supreme Court drew the foundational line between disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination, explained the Government's pattern-or-practice burden to prove that discrimination was a company's “standard operating procedure,” shielded bona fide seniority systems under section 703(h), and recognized the “futile gesture” doctrine excusing non-applicants deterred from applying by a known discriminatory policy.

In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976) 427 U.S. 273, two white employees were discharged for participating in the theft of antifreeze from a shipment in their employer's care, while a Black employee charged with the same misconduct was retained. The Supreme Court held — unanimously as to Title VII, and seven-to-two as to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 — that both statutes protect against racial discrimination directed at any race, including white persons. An employer “may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.” The judgment dismissing the complaint was reversed and the case remanded.

The Supreme Court held that back pay should normally be awarded to make Title VII victims whole — an employer’s good faith is no defense — and that job-validation studies must meet professional standards before discriminatory employment tests can stand.

Four women who paid into California’s employee-funded disability insurance program were denied benefits because their disabilities arose from pregnancy. Six Justices upheld the exclusion: the program’s risk selection was rational social-welfare line-drawing, and — in footnote 20, the most consequential footnote in pregnancy-discrimination law — the classification was not sex-based at all, because it divided “pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.” Congress answered with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; California answered with the FEHA’s definition of sex, the PDLL, and Badih v. Myers; even the SDI statute now expressly covers pregnancy. Yet the constitutional holding stands, reaffirmed in Dobbs — a live obstacle for equal-protection claims, and a museum piece everywhere else.

Title VII disparate-treatment claims proceed under a three-step framework: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and (3) the plaintiff must then have the…

Title VII prohibits employment practices that operate to exclude protected groups and are not demonstrably related to job performance, regardless of the employer’s intent (disparate-impact liability). If a neutral practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, the employer must show the practice is job-related…

In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (5th Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 228, the Fifth Circuit announced the foundational Title VII sex-BFOQ standard: an employer invoking sex as a bona fide occupational qualification must prove a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job. The court rejected stereotype-based “romantic paternalism” and a state weight-lifting limit as justifications and placed the burden on the employer.