The Review · Case Index

California employment case index

Search every indexed California wrongful-termination and employment decision, or browse by subject area, statute, and decade — each summary source-verified against the published reporter.

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Statute

9 cases

After-Acquired Evidence and Unclean Hands in California Employment Cases

June 26, 2014
The after-acquired-evidence defence is raised in a large share of wrongful-termination cases and its effect is routinely mis-stated. It does not defeat liability. Under McKennon it limits the remedy — no reinstatement and no front pay as a general rule, with backpay running from the unlawful discharge to the date the employer actually discovered the wrongdoing — and under Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. the same is true in California of both after-acquired evidence and unclean hands, neither of which is a complete defence to a FEHA claim. This analysis fixes the cut-off date, sets out what the employer must prove to earn it, keeps Salas's immigration-status holding in its proper place as a separate federal overlay, and explains why Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro — the one California decision to produce a complete bar — now sits uneasily with Salas.

Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP

March 6, 2013
Piece-rate employees are entitled to separate hourly compensation for time spent waiting for repair work or performing other nonrepair tasks directed by the employer during their work shifts; piece-rate earnings cannot be averaged across that nonproductive time to satisfy the minimum-wage obligation (215 Cal.App.4th…

Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A.

November 18, 2010
Section 203(b) contains a single, three-year limitations period governing all actions for section 203 penalties, regardless of whether the penalty claim is accompanied by a claim for unpaid final wages; and the penalties may be recovered even though the underlying wages were eventually paid.

Schachter v. Citigroup: Forfeiture of Unvested Incentive Comp

November 2, 2009
Citigroup let employees take part of their annual compensation as discounted restricted stock vesting only after two years; an employee who resigned early forfeited both the shares and the pay used to buy them. The California Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the company, holding that no earned wages remained unpaid on resignation. The decision agrees that restricted stock is a wage – so it turns on when incentive compensation is earned, not on characterization – and expressly refuses to extend Suastez's pro rata vacation-vesting rule to voluntary incentive programs.

Smith v. Superior Court (L’Oreal)

July 10, 2006
“Discharge” under sections 201 and 203 includes not only firing but also releasing an employee upon completion of the particular job assignment or time duration for which he or she was hired; final wages are then immediately due, and a willful failure to pay triggers waiting-time penalties.

Armenta v. Osmose, Inc.

December 29, 2005
California does not permit wage averaging: the minimum-wage standard applies to each hour worked, and an employer must pay at least the minimum wage for every compensable hour; it cannot use higher pay for some hours to offset unpaid or sub-minimum hours.

Leave as Reasonable Accommodation Under FEHA

December 5, 2000
FEHA never names leave as a reasonable accommodation, yet leave is the most common accommodation dispute in practice. Two published decisions supply both halves of the rule: Hanson v. Lucky Stores holds that a finite leave can be a reasonable accommodation where the employee is likely to be able to work at the end of it, and that an employer need not wait indefinitely; Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank fixes what an employer must establish to end such a case on summary judgment. This analysis states the rule, the proviso, the indefiniteness limit and the duty to reassign, and corrects the subdivision lettering that briefs still get wrong.

California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra: Pregnancy-Leave Statute Upheld — the “Floor, Not a Ceiling”

January 13, 1987
When Lillian Garland returned from pregnancy disability leave to find her receptionist job filled, California’s guarantee of leave and reinstatement collided with her employer’s theory that Title VII forbade treating pregnancy “better” than other disabilities. The Supreme Court sided with California: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is a floor beneath which pregnancy benefits may not drop, not a ceiling above which states may not rise — and employers can always comply with both laws by leveling benefits up. Guerra remains the constitutional foundation of the PDLL and of every California pregnancy protection built since.