California employment case index

Luis Betanco delivered Living Spaces furniture from the retailer's California distribution centers to California customers and never crossed a state line. In a published decision filed June 25, 2026, the First District held he is still a 'transportation worker' exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, because he was actively engaged in the interstate transportation of goods even though he made retail — not wholesale — deliveries. The furniture was inevitably destined from the outset of its interstate journey to his customers, so it never left the interstate stream even though it paused in a California warehouse. Because the FAA does not reach a section 1-exempt worker, Labor Code section 229 kept his statutory wage claims in court, and his representative PAGA claims survived under Adolph v. Uber Technologies. The order was affirmed.

A Tesla yard hostler who moved 53-foot trailers of out-of-state auto parts around the Fremont factory — never crossing a state line — sued for wage-and-hour violations, and Tesla moved to compel individual arbitration. In the published portion of its opinion, the First District holds yard hostlers are FAA section 1 transportation workers exempt from arbitration, and clarifies which wage claims Labor Code section 229 keeps in court.

An employer must prove a reasonable, good-faith attempt to comply before escaping liquidated damages under Labor Code section 1194.2.

A solar-project electrician queued unpaid at a security gate while guards inspected vehicles, drove miles of access road under strict site rules, and ate lunch confined to a designated area under a CBA calling meal periods “unpaid.” Answering the Ninth Circuit, a unanimous Supreme Court held the exit procedure is compensable “hours worked”; the gate-to-lot drive is compensable only as “employer-mandated travel,” and only if the gate is the first location required for a reason beyond site access; and no collective bargaining agreement can waive the minimum wage for a meal period during which the employer’s confinement forecloses otherwise feasible personal activities.

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) makes it unlawful to fail to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process, and an employee may sue on that practice alone. The received wisdom that California courts are split on whether such a plaintiff must also prove an available accommodation has not been accurate since 2009. This analysis traces the rule from Claudio through Wysinger, Nadaf-Rahrov and Scotch to Shirvanyan, isolates the two words that carry the element, and sets out exactly what must be proved, by whom, and as of when.

Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829 holds that California has not adopted the federal de minimis doctrine: an employer that requires small but regularly recurring off-the-clock work — here, several minutes of closing tasks each shift — must pay for that time and cannot invoke de minimis to avoid it.

FEHA defines both mental and physical disability to include being regarded or treated by the employer as having a condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult, and the Legislature enacted those paragraphs by number, expressly notwithstanding Cassista. Gelfo held that the only question under the prong is what the employer believed — no actual disability, no mistake, no myths-or-stereotypes showing — and, breaking with the federal authority then controlling in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, that a perceived-disability plaintiff is owed reasonable accommodation and the interactive process. Wallace removed animosity from the elements and refused to let an honest mistake count as a legitimate reason; Soria extended the prong to conditions that are merely potentially disabling. What the prong does not do is lower the definitional floor, which is where Higgins-Williams sits — and, as this analysis shows, where the real contest now is.

Neither Labor Code section 1194 nor section 218.5 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a party that prevails on a section 226.7 claim; such claims are not actions for the nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime (§1194) and are not the kind of nonpayment-of-wages action that triggers §218.5 fee-shifting, so each…

Three Oracle instructors living in Colorado and Arizona worked a limited number of days in California for their California-headquartered employer. Answering certified questions from the Ninth Circuit, the California Supreme Court held that the Labor Code's overtime provisions apply to work performed in this state regardless of residence, and that those violations support a UCL claim – but that the UCL does not reach FLSA violations occurring in other states on these stipulated facts. The court confined its holding to overtime and to entire days and weeks worked in California.

California does not permit wage averaging: the minimum-wage standard applies to each hour worked, and an employer must pay at least the minimum wage for every compensable hour; it cannot use higher pay for some hours to offset unpaid or sub-minimum hours.

A 305-pound applicant rejected by a Santa Cruz health food collective sued under the FEHA, alleging she was regarded as physically handicapped because of her weight. The California Supreme Court held that weight may qualify as a protected disability only where medical evidence shows it results from a physiological condition affecting a basic bodily system and limits a major life activity, and that this plaintiff – who maintained she was healthy and fit – had proved no such thing. Government Code section 12926.1 now names the case and disclaims several of its interpretations.