California employment case index

A sheriff’s deputy proved every element of his whistleblower retaliation claim — and still left the courthouse owing costs. The jury found his protected disclosures were a factor in the County’s actions against him, but also that the County would have made the same decisions anyway. Division Four held that a plaintiff defeated by the section 1102.6 same-decision defense who obtains no relief has not brought a “successful action” under section 1102.5(j): no attorney’s fees, and the employer is the prevailing party for costs. The panel declined to extend Harris v. City of Santa Monica’s FEHA rule, agreed the contrary result would be “a rational policy choice,” and pointedly left the fix to the Legislature.

The First District held that an employer's same-decision showing under Labor Code § 1102.6 is a complete defense to a § 1102.5 whistleblower claim — barring declaratory relief and attorney's fees along with damages — expressly declining to import Harris v. City of Santa Monica's FEHA partial-defense rule.

An environmental consultant told his supervisor that the client's instruction to omit a decade of prior helicopter operations from a NEPA assessment was illegal, and was fired days later. The district court held the disclosure unprotected because the supervisor had no power to correct the client's noncompliance. Applying California's last-antecedent rule, the Ninth Circuit held that the 'authority to investigate, discover, or correct' clause in Labor Code section 1102.5(b) modifies only 'another employee,' so a report to one's own supervisor is protected standing alone. The panel also treated a disclosure to the client agency's project leader as a disclosure to a government agency, rejected the job-duties and wrongdoer defenses, and held that section 1102.5(b) reaches anticipated whistleblowing – while affirming judgment on the refusal-to-participate claim.

Months after Lawson, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for the County of Sacramento under Labor Code § 1102.6 — undisputed evidence of insubordination, disrespect, and dishonesty proved clearly and convincingly that the county would have released the probationary employee anyway — while leaving open whether § 1102.5 requires an actual belief that the law was violated.

Reversing summary judgment for the UC Regents, the Second District mapped the post-Lawson landscape — Labor Code § 1102.6 governs § 1102.5 claims, Government Code § 8547.10(e) supplies the same framework for University of California whistleblowers, and McDonnell Douglas still governs Health and Safety Code § 1278.5 claims, under which Scheer's clause-by-clause dismantling of his termination letter raised a triable issue of pretext.

The California Supreme Court holds that Labor Code §1102.6 — not McDonnell Douglas — governs §1102.5 whistleblower-retaliation claims: the employee need only show protected activity was a contributing factor, shifting to the employer the clear-and-convincing burden of proving it would have acted the same anyway.

A class of 1,500 customer service managers was denied certification because the trial court believed Labor Code section 2802 liability turned on each employee's own cell phone plan and on who actually paid the bill. Division Two reversed and stated the rule in its opening sentence: when employees must use personal cell phones for work-related calls, the employer must reimburse them a reasonable percentage of the bill, whether the plan is limited or unlimited. Whether a third party paid, and whether the employee changed plans, are irrelevant – plan details go to damages, not liability. The disposition is a reversal of a certification denial, not a merits judgment.

Harte-Hanks paid outside sales representatives higher salaries and commission rates than inside representatives and treated the difference as reimbursement for their automobile expenses. The California Supreme Court held the practice permissible in principle, but only where the employer establishes a means to identify which portion of overall compensation is intended as reimbursement and that portion fully covers expenses actually and necessarily incurred. Section 2804 bars any agreement that waives full reimbursement – a holding that unravelled the trial court's denial of class certification.

The employee bears the burden of proving he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA — that is, able to perform the essential duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation — just as the federal ADA requires; it is not the employer’s burden to disprove qualification.

The FEHA requires only that a physiological disease or condition affecting a body system “limit” — not “substantially limit” — the plaintiff’s ability to participate in a major life activity, a standard broader than the federal ADA; the later Poppink Act merely clarified, and did not change, that existing “limits”…