California employment case index

In Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, the Third District reversed summary judgment for a hospital, holding a jury could find a national-origin and age hostile work environment where a supervisor repeatedly mocked older Filipino nurses’ accents, transferred the plaintiff to a unit she was untrained for, and falsely accused her of sleeping on the job. The supervisor’s animus was attributable to the employer under Government Code section 12926, subdivision (d).

In Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, a correctional officer who stutters proved that a supervisor mocked his speech impediment in front of others at least a dozen times over roughly two years, and a jury awarded $500,000 for FEHA disability harassment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the liability finding, reaffirming that harassment need only be severe OR pervasive — not both — and that because the conduct occurred on “more than one isolated occasion,” the plaintiff was not required to prove a physical assault or threat. On the employer's cross-appeal, the court reversed the trial court's order granting a new trial on damages, because the court failed to file the statement of reasons within the ten days Code of Civil Procedure section 657 requires, rendering the order a nullity.

In Meeks v. AutoZone, the Fourth District reversed defense verdicts in a FEHA sexual harassment case, holding that a cluster of evidentiary rulings cumulatively skewed a credibility contest against the plaintiff. The court drew a usable line under Evidence Code section 1106: a plaintiff’s sexually charged banter directed at the harasser is admissible under subdivision (b), but a privately posted photograph of her tattoo — never shared “with” the harasser — remains barred by subdivision (a). It also confirmed that a harasser puts his intent in issue, and opens the door to me-too evidence, simply by claiming he treated everyone the same.

Reversing a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that a hotel housekeeper stated viable FEHA claims for sexual harassment by a nonemployee (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1)) and for failure to prevent harassment (id., subd. (k)) where she alleged she was assaulted on the employer's premises by a drunk trespasser the employer knew or should have known was wandering the property and aggressively propositioning other housekeepers. Whether the employer's response was adequate is a question of fact unsuitable for resolution on demurrer.

A massage therapist won a FEHA verdict against her spa employer for failing to prevent customer sexual harassment and sex discrimination — even though the same jury found the harassing conduct was not severe or pervasive and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) is wholly derivative: it cannot stand without an underlying, actionable FEHA violation. Sharpening Trujillo, the court held it is the absence of actionable harassment — not the lack of any harassing conduct — that defeats the prevention claim, and directed entry of judgment for the employer.

A franchisor is not ordinarily the employer of its franchisee’s employees and is not vicariously liable for a franchisee-supervisor’s harassment unless the franchisor has retained or assumed general control over the relevant day-to-day aspects of the franchisee’s employment practices; a comprehensive operating system…

In Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the University and reaffirmed the FEHA line between discrimination and harassment: a supervisor’s personnel-management decisions — who attends an employee’s meetings, how they are run, and accusations of dishonesty or poor performance — are not harassment under Reno v. Baird and Janken, even if discriminatory; the few stray remarks the plaintiff cited were neither offensive nor pervasive. The court also held after-acquired expert evidence of no adverse consequences did not raise a triable issue on pretext.

In Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 886, the Court of Appeal affirmed a defense verdict in an age-discrimination suit and held that an employer may put before the jury, on mitigation of damages, the employee’s failure to invoke the employer’s internal grievance procedure — extending the FEHA avoidable-consequences doctrine of State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court beyond the hostile-environment harassment context in which it arose.

A heterosexual male volunteer at a city water plant sued under FEHA for same-sex harassment by two supervisors. The First District reversed summary judgment for one supervisor — gifts, lunches, suggestive remarks, and pornographic images supported an inference of genuine sexual interest and pervasiveness — while affirming for the other. Finding sexual interest on the record, the court expressly declined to decide the effect of the new statute providing that harassing conduct “need not be motivated by sexual desire.”

A male oil-rig floorhand was relentlessly gay-baited, urinated on, and propositioned by his supervisors. The Court of Appeal held these sex-based attacks on his heterosexual identity were harassment because of sex under the FEHA — no proof of the harassers' sexual desire required — endorsing Singleton, rejecting Kelley, and holding that a special verdict rendered defective by a drafting typo is subject to harmless-error review.

The Supreme Court held 5-4 that an employee is a “supervisor” for Title VII vicarious-liability purposes only if empowered to take tangible employment actions — hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline. An employee who merely directs daily work is a co-worker, so the employer is liable only for negligence. The decision does not govern California’s FEHA, which defines “supervisor” more broadly and imposes strict liability for supervisor harassment.

A Muslim engineer born in Pakistan raised triable claims that his employer was liable for a hostile work environment created by Indian coworkers. Because the harassers were nonsupervisory, liability turned on negligence — whether the employer knew or should have known and failed to take corrective action. The Court of Appeal granted a writ reversing summary adjudication of the national-origin and religion harassment claims.

After a Kern County jury returned a defense verdict, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “me-too” evidence of harassment of other women — even outside the plaintiff’s presence — is admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove discriminatory intent and motive, and that harassment “because of sex” requires bias against the plaintiff’s gender, not sexual desire.

Harassment and discrimination are distinct wrongs, but official personnel actions can themselves supply evidence of a hostile message and thus support a harassment claim; the two theories are not hermetically sealed. On punitive damages, the court held that in the circumstances of this case the amount of compensatory…

Summary judgment was improperly granted on the harassment and retaliation claims because triable issues of fact existed; the decision is notable for its strong criticism of the overuse and abuse of summary judgment in employment cases, for its treatment of the parties’ voluminous (and often meritless) evidentiary…

The Fourth District affirmed a whistleblower-retaliation verdict for an Office on Aging director fired after warning that a County reorganization was unlawful — holding the County waived its exhaustion defense by first raising it after trial — while reversing her sexual-harassment claim under the pre-§ 12923 "severe or pervasive" standard and affirming a remittitur-backed new trial order on damages.

In Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1403, the Third District reversed summary adjudication for the employer, reaffirming that under FEHA an employer is strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate unless the harassment 'result[ed] from a completely private relationship unconnected with the employment'—a narrow exception the court declined to apply where the supervisor exploited his workplace authority.

In Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547, the Second District reversed summary judgment for the employer, holding that same-sex sexual harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire to be actionable: it is enough that sex was 'used as a weapon to create a hostile work environment,' and the court found triable issues on both the harassment and the employer's knowledge.

The sexually coarse and vulgar language used in the Friends writers’ room was not actionable sexual harassment on this record, because it was generally part of the creative process of writing adult comedic material rather than conduct directed at the plaintiff or at women because of their sex; harassment must be…

Although an isolated workplace romance does not by itself constitute sexual harassment, widespread sexual favoritism that is severe or pervasive may create an actionable hostile work environment — one that conveys the demeaning message that women are sexual playthings and that managers view sexual favors as the way to…

Whether a harasser is personally liable under the FEHA — and his employer strictly liable — often turns on one threshold fact: was he the plaintiff's “supervisor”? In Chapman v. Enos, the Court of Appeal reversed a defense verdict because the trial court told the jury a supervisor must be “fully accountable and responsible” for a subordinate's work product, an extra-statutory requirement that wrongly narrowed the FEHA's class of supervisors. Full accountability is an indicium of supervisory power, the court held, not an element; the statute requires only the responsibility to direct an employee's work using independent judgment.

An employer is strictly liable under the FEHA for a supervisor’s hostile-environment sexual harassment. But the avoidable-consequences doctrine applies: the employer may avoid liability for those damages the employee could have avoided with reasonable effort — for example, by timely using the employer’s complaint…

A workers' compensation judge awarded an inspector benefits for a psychiatric injury, finding the employer's investigation into a coworker's accusation that he had racially discriminated against a trainee was not a good faith personnel action under Labor Code section 3208.3, subdivision (h). The Court of Appeal reversed: because FEHA imposes an affirmative, mandatory duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent and investigate workplace discrimination, a legally compelled investigation conducted without arbitrary motive or intent to deceive is a good faith personnel action exempting the employer from compensation liability — and an unsubstantiated outcome does not retroactively brand the inquiry bad faith.