California employment case index

The Fourth District reversed summary judgment for the County, holding that a deputy district attorney's internal warnings that a murder prosecution lacked probable cause were protected disclosures under Labor Code section 1102.5 — no express citation of law required, job duties notwithstanding — and that months of testing for a suspected neurological disease raised a triable issue of FEHA disability.

A unanimous Court of Appeal affirmed a $723,746 judgment for a probationary community-college employee terminated while on approved industrial-injury leave. Granting the leave was not a reasonable accommodation because it led directly to her termination; FEHA and Education Code section 88013 let the district toll, not forfeit, her probation, and its conduct showed no good-faith interactive process.

A 15-year Berkeley Tennis Club employee fired after a recorder was found at a board meeting sued for FEHA disability discrimination, harassment, and more, alleging her severe obesity is a protected physical disability. The Court of Appeal held the Club, as summary-adjudication movant, never carried its initial burden of showing Cornell could not prove a physiological cause for her obesity, reinstating her discrimination, harassment, and defamation claims while affirming dismissal of accommodation and retaliation.

When an employee resigns and the employer promptly accepts, can she undo it by later revealing she was disabled at the time? In Featherstone, the Court of Appeal said no — refusing to let a former employee rescind a voluntary, accepted resignation is not an adverse employment action under FEHA, and an accommodation duty never arises for a disability the employer did not know about when the resignation was accepted.

Five LAPD recruits were injured during Academy training and parked in the Department’s light-duty “Recycle” program until, mid-recovery, the City imposed a new six-month cutoff and forced them out. Atkins holds that the recruits could not win a FEHA disability-discrimination claim — they could not perform a recruit’s physically demanding essential functions, and FEHA never requires eliminating an essential function — yet could win a failure-to-accommodate claim, because they had actually performed the Recycle duties and the City’s own longstanding practice made continued reassignment reasonable. The court also vacated lifetime-career front-pay damages as speculative.

Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc.A detailed application of the summary-judgment framework to FEHA disability claims: triable issues on the employer’s knowledge of the disability, pretext, and the interactive process defeated summary judgment.Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570Parallel citation: 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 59. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate […]

Wallace v. County of Stanislaus A FEHA disability-discrimination plaintiff need not prove the employer acted out of animosity or ill will; it is enough that the disability was a “substantial motivating reason” for the adverse action — even a well-intentioned but mistaken one. Wallace v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109 Parallel citation: 199 […]

An employee who cannot work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress tied to that supervisor’s ordinary oversight has no disability under FEHA. In Higgins-Williams, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for Sutter on that single ground, which dissolved the plaintiff’s discrimination, accommodation, retaliation, and wrongful-termination claims, while remanding only the cost award under Williams v. Chino Valley.

A disabled Santa Monica refuse worker argued his employer could have kept him on by stripping heavy lifting from the job or holding a position open. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that eliminating a true essential function is not a reasonable accommodation, that reassignment is required only where an actual qualifying vacancy exists, and that a bare request for accommodation is not protected activity for a retaliation claim.

In Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for a school district sued by a breast-cancer-survivor teacher whose contract was not renewed. The court held that FEHA imposes a continuous, good-faith duty to engage in the interactive process under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) — not satisfied by a single gesture — and that reasonable accommodation can require reassignment to a vacant position under subdivision (m), implicating CACI Nos. 2541 and 2546.

In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeal held that an employee disabled by a high-risk pregnancy who was terminated after exhausting the four months of leave guaranteed by the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law may still state a FEHA claim, because the PDLL augments rather than supplants the independent reasonable-accommodation duty of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m). A finite leave exceeding four months can be a reasonable accommodation, and the plaintiff's allegations cleared demurrer.

A correctional lieutenant who lost the use of his left arm could no longer use a baton or subdue inmates. In Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA's reassignment duty, though affirmative, does not require an employer to waive an essential function or create an administrative position that does not exist; medical demotion to a position the employee could perform was proper.

In Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, the First District affirmed a defense judgment, holding that strenuous patrol duties — forcible arrests, pursuing suspects, emergency response — are essential functions of administrative police positions because the Department must be able to deploy every full-duty officer during mass mobilizations, even if those situations are infrequent. A disabled officer who cannot perform those duties is not a qualified individual under FEHA, and the employer need not create a permanent light-duty post.

A disabled LAPD officer placed in a permanent administrative light-duty post under the department's longstanding accommodation policy is a qualified individual under FEHA if he can perform that post's essential functions — not the field duties of a sworn officer generally. Removing him because a workers' compensation administrator rated him 100% disabled violated Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m). The Court of Appeal affirmed a $1,571,500 judgment.

The FEHA protects an employee’s disability status, not threatening or violent conduct; an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for making workplace threats even if the threats are caused by a disability, and doing so is not unlawful disability discrimination (195 Cal.App.4th at p. 147).

Harassment and discrimination are distinct wrongs, but official personnel actions can themselves supply evidence of a hostile message and thus support a harassment claim; the two theories are not hermetically sealed. On punitive damages, the court held that in the circumstances of this case the amount of compensatory…

Affirming a judgment for a disabled grocery checker on her FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court of Appeal held that the duty to engage in the interactive process (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)) and the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation (id., subd. (m)) are separate, independent claims; an employer cannot graft the interactive process onto, and thereby excuse, a later failure to deliver an accommodation it had already granted. The court also held the failure-to-accommodate statute contains no “pattern of failure” requirement, so a single lapse is actionable, with triviality a jury question.

To recover for failure to engage in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that was available at the time the interactive process should have occurred; because Scotch did not identify such an available accommodation, he could not recover on that claim.

The decision clarified the reasonable-accommodation burdens: an employee claiming failure to accommodate by reassignment must show a vacant position existed for which she was qualified, while the allocation of proof tracks who has access to the relevant information; on this record, triable issues precluded summary…

An employee fired under a no-fault attendance policy after a pancreatitis hospitalization sued under FEHA, CFRA, and Tameny. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment on the FEHA disability claims — telling the employer he was “sick” or hospitalized did not give notice of a disability — but reversed on CFRA and the related Tameny claim, holding that while “calling in sick” alone is insufficient CFRA notice, hospital records showing inpatient care can constitute a request for CFRA-qualifying leave, shifting to the employer the burden to inquire and designate, and that causation does not require the decision-maker to know the absences were protected.

Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

The FEHA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s use of medical marijuana. The Compassionate Use Act did not address the rights and duties of employers and employees, and under California law an employer may require pre-employment drug testing and may take illegal drug use into account in employment…

Failure to engage in the interactive process is a separate FEHA violation requiring different proof from failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; the two findings are not inconsistent, so a jury may hold an employer liable for failing to engage in the interactive process even while finding no failure to…

The employee bears the burden of proving he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA — that is, able to perform the essential duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation — just as the federal ADA requires; it is not the employer’s burden to disprove qualification.

The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

Reversing summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that an employee need not mention the CFRA to request protected medical leave — and that an employer that never gave notice of CFRA rights, rejected a chiropractor's certification out of hand, and refused to communicate with the employee's designated representatives could not defeat his interference, retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful termination claims as a matter of law.

Yes. An employer that regards a person as physically disabled must engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodation to that person, even if he or she is not actually disabled; the duty runs to those “regarded as” disabled, not only to the actually disabled (id. at p. 40).

In Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, the Third District reversed summary judgment, holding that an employee may bring a stand-alone FEHA claim for the employer's failure to engage in the timely, good-faith interactive process required by Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n)—while emphasizing that the process demands good-faith participation by both employer and employee.

The FEHA requires only that a physiological disease or condition affecting a body system “limit” — not “substantially limit” — the plaintiff’s ability to participate in a major life activity, a standard broader than the federal ADA; the later Poppink Act merely clarified, and did not change, that existing “limits”…

Reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that an employee stated a cause of action for damages caused by her employer's failure to make reasonable accommodation for her known disability under FEHA. Treating Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) as a “separate and distinct” unlawful employment practice independent of the disability-discrimination prohibition in subdivision (a), the court rejected the importation of federal ADA limits (the “qualified individual” and adverse-action requirements) and held the FEHA accommodation duty broader than the ADA's, and not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

The continuing-violation doctrine applies to FEHA claims: an employer’s related unlawful acts are treated as a single continuing violation — and the limitations period does not begin to run — so long as the conduct is sufficiently similar and frequent and has not yet acquired a degree of permanence that should put the…

In Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1031, the Fourth District reversed a verdict for a color-blind deputy applicant and directed judgment for the County, holding that a 'regarded-as' disability claim requires proof that the employer's perception stemmed from a false idea—'myths, fears and stereotypes'—about disability; an employer's accurate assessment of a genuine limitation does not satisfy the perceived-disability prong.

In Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376, the First District reversed summary judgment on a failure-to-accommodate claim, holding in the published portion that FEHA's reasonable-accommodation duty can require reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position—an obligation the employer escapes only by showing undue hardship or that no suitable vacancy exists.