California employment case index

Harassment and discrimination are distinct wrongs, but official personnel actions can themselves supply evidence of a hostile message and thus support a harassment claim; the two theories are not hermetically sealed. On punitive damages, the court held that in the circumstances of this case the amount of compensatory…

Affirming a judgment for a disabled grocery checker on her FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court of Appeal held that the duty to engage in the interactive process (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)) and the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation (id., subd. (m)) are separate, independent claims; an employer cannot graft the interactive process onto, and thereby excuse, a later failure to deliver an accommodation it had already granted. The court also held the failure-to-accommodate statute contains no “pattern of failure” requirement, so a single lapse is actionable, with triviality a jury question.

To recover for failure to engage in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that was available at the time the interactive process should have occurred; because Scotch did not identify such an available accommodation, he could not recover on that claim.

The decision clarified the reasonable-accommodation burdens: an employee claiming failure to accommodate by reassignment must show a vacant position existed for which she was qualified, while the allocation of proof tracks who has access to the relevant information; on this record, triable issues precluded summary…

An employee fired under a no-fault attendance policy after a pancreatitis hospitalization sued under FEHA, CFRA, and Tameny. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment on the FEHA disability claims — telling the employer he was “sick” or hospitalized did not give notice of a disability — but reversed on CFRA and the related Tameny claim, holding that while “calling in sick” alone is insufficient CFRA notice, hospital records showing inpatient care can constitute a request for CFRA-qualifying leave, shifting to the employer the burden to inquire and designate, and that causation does not require the decision-maker to know the absences were protected.

Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

The FEHA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s use of medical marijuana. The Compassionate Use Act did not address the rights and duties of employers and employees, and under California law an employer may require pre-employment drug testing and may take illegal drug use into account in employment…

Failure to engage in the interactive process is a separate FEHA violation requiring different proof from failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; the two findings are not inconsistent, so a jury may hold an employer liable for failing to engage in the interactive process even while finding no failure to…

The employee bears the burden of proving he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA — that is, able to perform the essential duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation — just as the federal ADA requires; it is not the employer’s burden to disprove qualification.

The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

Reversing summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that an employee need not mention the CFRA to request protected medical leave — and that an employer that never gave notice of CFRA rights, rejected a chiropractor's certification out of hand, and refused to communicate with the employee's designated representatives could not defeat his interference, retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful termination claims as a matter of law.

Yes. An employer that regards a person as physically disabled must engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodation to that person, even if he or she is not actually disabled; the duty runs to those “regarded as” disabled, not only to the actually disabled (id. at p. 40).

In Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, the Third District reversed summary judgment, holding that an employee may bring a stand-alone FEHA claim for the employer's failure to engage in the timely, good-faith interactive process required by Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n)—while emphasizing that the process demands good-faith participation by both employer and employee.

The FEHA requires only that a physiological disease or condition affecting a body system “limit” — not “substantially limit” — the plaintiff’s ability to participate in a major life activity, a standard broader than the federal ADA; the later Poppink Act merely clarified, and did not change, that existing “limits”…

Reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that an employee stated a cause of action for damages caused by her employer's failure to make reasonable accommodation for her known disability under FEHA. Treating Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m) as a “separate and distinct” unlawful employment practice independent of the disability-discrimination prohibition in subdivision (a), the court rejected the importation of federal ADA limits (the “qualified individual” and adverse-action requirements) and held the FEHA accommodation duty broader than the ADA's, and not barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

The continuing-violation doctrine applies to FEHA claims: an employer’s related unlawful acts are treated as a single continuing violation — and the limitations period does not begin to run — so long as the conduct is sufficiently similar and frequent and has not yet acquired a degree of permanence that should put the…

In Diffey v. Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1031, the Fourth District reversed a verdict for a color-blind deputy applicant and directed judgment for the County, holding that a 'regarded-as' disability claim requires proof that the employer's perception stemmed from a false idea—'myths, fears and stereotypes'—about disability; an employer's accurate assessment of a genuine limitation does not satisfy the perceived-disability prong.

In Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1376, the First District reversed summary judgment on a failure-to-accommodate claim, holding in the published portion that FEHA's reasonable-accommodation duty can require reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position—an obligation the employer escapes only by showing undue hardship or that no suitable vacancy exists.