California employment case index

The Fourth District reversed summary judgment for the County, holding that a deputy district attorney's internal warnings that a murder prosecution lacked probable cause were protected disclosures under Labor Code section 1102.5 — no express citation of law required, job duties notwithstanding — and that months of testing for a suspected neurological disease raised a triable issue of FEHA disability.

In Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, the Third District reversed summary judgment for a hospital, holding a jury could find a national-origin and age hostile work environment where a supervisor repeatedly mocked older Filipino nurses’ accents, transferred the plaintiff to a unit she was untrained for, and falsely accused her of sleeping on the job. The supervisor’s animus was attributable to the employer under Government Code section 12926, subdivision (d).

In Caldera v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, a correctional officer who stutters proved that a supervisor mocked his speech impediment in front of others at least a dozen times over roughly two years, and a jury awarded $500,000 for FEHA disability harassment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the liability finding, reaffirming that harassment need only be severe OR pervasive — not both — and that because the conduct occurred on “more than one isolated occasion,” the plaintiff was not required to prove a physical assault or threat. On the employer's cross-appeal, the court reversed the trial court's order granting a new trial on damages, because the court failed to file the statement of reasons within the ten days Code of Civil Procedure section 657 requires, rendering the order a nullity.

In Meeks v. AutoZone, the Fourth District reversed defense verdicts in a FEHA sexual harassment case, holding that a cluster of evidentiary rulings cumulatively skewed a credibility contest against the plaintiff. The court drew a usable line under Evidence Code section 1106: a plaintiff’s sexually charged banter directed at the harasser is admissible under subdivision (b), but a privately posted photograph of her tattoo — never shared “with” the harasser — remains barred by subdivision (a). It also confirmed that a harasser puts his intent in issue, and opens the door to me-too evidence, simply by claiming he treated everyone the same.

A unanimous Court of Appeal affirmed a $723,746 judgment for a probationary community-college employee terminated while on approved industrial-injury leave. Granting the leave was not a reasonable accommodation because it led directly to her termination; FEHA and Education Code section 88013 let the district toll, not forfeit, her probation, and its conduct showed no good-faith interactive process.

A 15-year Berkeley Tennis Club employee fired after a recorder was found at a board meeting sued for FEHA disability discrimination, harassment, and more, alleging her severe obesity is a protected physical disability. The Court of Appeal held the Club, as summary-adjudication movant, never carried its initial burden of showing Cornell could not prove a physiological cause for her obesity, reinstating her discrimination, harassment, and defamation claims while affirming dismissal of accommodation and retaliation.

Reversing a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, the Court of Appeal held that a hotel housekeeper stated viable FEHA claims for sexual harassment by a nonemployee (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1)) and for failure to prevent harassment (id., subd. (k)) where she alleged she was assaulted on the employer's premises by a drunk trespasser the employer knew or should have known was wandering the property and aggressively propositioning other housekeepers. Whether the employer's response was adequate is a question of fact unsuitable for resolution on demurrer.

When an employee resigns and the employer promptly accepts, can she undo it by later revealing she was disabled at the time? In Featherstone, the Court of Appeal said no — refusing to let a former employee rescind a voluntary, accepted resignation is not an adverse employment action under FEHA, and an accommodation duty never arises for a disability the employer did not know about when the resignation was accepted.

Five LAPD recruits were injured during Academy training and parked in the Department’s light-duty “Recycle” program until, mid-recovery, the City imposed a new six-month cutoff and forced them out. Atkins holds that the recruits could not win a FEHA disability-discrimination claim — they could not perform a recruit’s physically demanding essential functions, and FEHA never requires eliminating an essential function — yet could win a failure-to-accommodate claim, because they had actually performed the Recycle duties and the City’s own longstanding practice made continued reassignment reasonable. The court also vacated lifetime-career front-pay damages as speculative.

Wallace v. County of StanislausA FEHA disability-discrimination plaintiff need not prove the employer acted out of animosity or ill will; it is enough that the disability was a “substantial motivating reason” for the adverse action — even a well-intentioned but mistaken one.Wallace v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109Parallel citation: 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 462. Court […]

Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. A detailed application of the summary-judgment framework to FEHA disability claims: triable issues on the employer’s knowledge of the disability, pretext, and the interactive process defeated summary judgment. Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570 Parallel citation: 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 59. Court of Appeal of […]

An employee who cannot work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress tied to that supervisor’s ordinary oversight has no disability under FEHA. In Higgins-Williams, the Third District affirmed summary judgment for Sutter on that single ground, which dissolved the plaintiff’s discrimination, accommodation, retaliation, and wrongful-termination claims, while remanding only the cost award under Williams v. Chino Valley.

A massage therapist won a FEHA verdict against her spa employer for failing to prevent customer sexual harassment and sex discrimination — even though the same jury found the harassing conduct was not severe or pervasive and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) is wholly derivative: it cannot stand without an underlying, actionable FEHA violation. Sharpening Trujillo, the court held it is the absence of actionable harassment — not the lack of any harassing conduct — that defeats the prevention claim, and directed entry of judgment for the employer.

A disabled Santa Monica refuse worker argued his employer could have kept him on by stripping heavy lifting from the job or holding a position open. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that eliminating a true essential function is not a reasonable accommodation, that reassignment is required only where an actual qualifying vacancy exists, and that a bare request for accommodation is not protected activity for a retaliation claim.

In Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for a school district sued by a breast-cancer-survivor teacher whose contract was not renewed. The court held that FEHA imposes a continuous, good-faith duty to engage in the interactive process under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) — not satisfied by a single gesture — and that reasonable accommodation can require reassignment to a vacant position under subdivision (m), implicating CACI Nos. 2541 and 2546.

A franchisor is not ordinarily the employer of its franchisee’s employees and is not vicariously liable for a franchisee-supervisor’s harassment unless the franchisor has retained or assumed general control over the relevant day-to-day aspects of the franchisee’s employment practices; a comprehensive operating system…

In Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the University and reaffirmed the FEHA line between discrimination and harassment: a supervisor’s personnel-management decisions — who attends an employee’s meetings, how they are run, and accusations of dishonesty or poor performance — are not harassment under Reno v. Baird and Janken, even if discriminatory; the few stray remarks the plaintiff cited were neither offensive nor pervasive. The court also held after-acquired expert evidence of no adverse consequences did not raise a triable issue on pretext.

In Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 886, the Court of Appeal affirmed a defense verdict in an age-discrimination suit and held that an employer may put before the jury, on mitigation of damages, the employee’s failure to invoke the employer’s internal grievance procedure — extending the FEHA avoidable-consequences doctrine of State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court beyond the hostile-environment harassment context in which it arose.

A heterosexual male volunteer at a city water plant sued under FEHA for same-sex harassment by two supervisors. The First District reversed summary judgment for one supervisor — gifts, lunches, suggestive remarks, and pornographic images supported an inference of genuine sexual interest and pervasiveness — while affirming for the other. Finding sexual interest on the record, the court expressly declined to decide the effect of the new statute providing that harassing conduct “need not be motivated by sexual desire.”

A male oil-rig floorhand was relentlessly gay-baited, urinated on, and propositioned by his supervisors. The Court of Appeal held these sex-based attacks on his heterosexual identity were harassment because of sex under the FEHA — no proof of the harassers' sexual desire required — endorsing Singleton, rejecting Kelley, and holding that a special verdict rendered defective by a drafting typo is subject to harmless-error review.

The Supreme Court held 5-4 that an employee is a “supervisor” for Title VII vicarious-liability purposes only if empowered to take tangible employment actions — hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline. An employee who merely directs daily work is a co-worker, so the employer is liable only for negligence. The decision does not govern California’s FEHA, which defines “supervisor” more broadly and imposes strict liability for supervisor harassment.

In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeal held that an employee disabled by a high-risk pregnancy who was terminated after exhausting the four months of leave guaranteed by the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law may still state a FEHA claim, because the PDLL augments rather than supplants the independent reasonable-accommodation duty of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m). A finite leave exceeding four months can be a reasonable accommodation, and the plaintiff's allegations cleared demurrer.

A correctional lieutenant who lost the use of his left arm could no longer use a baton or subdue inmates. In Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA's reassignment duty, though affirmative, does not require an employer to waive an essential function or create an administrative position that does not exist; medical demotion to a position the employee could perform was proper.

In Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, the First District affirmed a defense judgment, holding that strenuous patrol duties — forcible arrests, pursuing suspects, emergency response — are essential functions of administrative police positions because the Department must be able to deploy every full-duty officer during mass mobilizations, even if those situations are infrequent. A disabled officer who cannot perform those duties is not a qualified individual under FEHA, and the employer need not create a permanent light-duty post.

A Muslim engineer born in Pakistan raised triable claims that his employer was liable for a hostile work environment created by Indian coworkers. Because the harassers were nonsupervisory, liability turned on negligence — whether the employer knew or should have known and failed to take corrective action. The Court of Appeal granted a writ reversing summary adjudication of the national-origin and religion harassment claims.

After a Kern County jury returned a defense verdict, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “me-too” evidence of harassment of other women — even outside the plaintiff’s presence — is admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove discriminatory intent and motive, and that harassment “because of sex” requires bias against the plaintiff’s gender, not sexual desire.

A disabled LAPD officer placed in a permanent administrative light-duty post under the department's longstanding accommodation policy is a qualified individual under FEHA if he can perform that post's essential functions — not the field duties of a sworn officer generally. Removing him because a workers' compensation administrator rated him 100% disabled violated Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m). The Court of Appeal affirmed a $1,571,500 judgment.

The FEHA protects an employee’s disability status, not threatening or violent conduct; an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for making workplace threats even if the threats are caused by a disability, and doing so is not unlawful disability discrimination (195 Cal.App.4th at p. 147).