California employment case index

A firm filed a wage-and-hour class action duplicating one it had already filed elsewhere, then opposed a stay with a brief — drafted by a contract attorney using generative AI — full of nonexistent citations and at least eight fabricated quotations. The First District affirms $6,000 in section 128.7 sanctions: counsel of record bear ultimate responsibility for what they sign, and the duty to verify authority cannot be delegated to any form of technology.

A PAGA plaintiff proved Labor Code violations but recovered about one percent of the $56 million maximum he calculated, and his attorney fees were cut by a 0.70 negative multiplier. The Fourth District affirms: section 2699(e)(2) mandates no method for reducing penalties — per-employee is fine — and the trial court adequately justified the fee multiplier, leaving the “heightened scrutiny” question for the Supreme Court.

Studebaker made a new employee sign three onboarding arbitration documents; the trial court found their “conflicts” showed no valid agreement and denied arbitration. The Second District reverses and compels arbitration — ambiguities must be reconciled to give effect to the intent to arbitrate, the agreement was not unconscionable, and an inconsistent wholesale PAGA waiver should have been severed.

A terminated COO forwarded her employer’s e-mails — some attorney-client privileged — to her personal account and handed them to her lawyers for her wrongful-termination and harassment cross-claims. The Fourth District holds the State Fund rule on handling privileged materials applies even to such intentional, unauthorized disclosures, and reverses the denial of the employer’s motion to disqualify counsel.

Intuitive Surgical defended a harassment suit by pointing to the adequacy of its attorney-led investigation, then tried to withhold the investigator’s findings as work product. The Sixth District grants the employee a writ: putting the investigation’s adequacy at issue waives privilege and even core work product over the investigator’s factual findings and anything bearing on the investigation’s scope and adequacy.

Two Chico State physics professors sued the CSU Trustees for retaliation, alleging a sham investigation and sabotage of their move to a new university after they reported harassment. The Trustees moved to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute as “based in part” on protected speech. The Third District affirms denial: a movant must analyze each claim element-by-element and identify which acts are protected — “based in part” is not enough.

Cambodian villagers forced to work at Thai seafood factories sued a U.S. marketer under the trafficking civil-remedy statute; their case was dismissed because the statute then reached only those who succeeded in benefiting, not those who attempted to. After Congress amended the law, the en banc Ninth Circuit holds the clarifying amendment retroactive — and that Landgraf governs all such amendments, overruling the “clarifying amendment” exception — reviving the claims.

Marshalls moved to compel arbitration of the individual component of a single-count PAGA action under a 2014 arbitration agreement, relying on Viking River. Division Four affirmed the denial on pure contract grounds: the parties would have had to be clairvoyant to anticipate a distinction the Supreme Court would not draw for another eight years. The court expressly declined to enter the headless-PAGA dispute, and the authoring justice wrote separately at length questioning whether Viking River's federally imposed claim-splitting rule is constitutionally sound.

A resident manager whose apartment came with the job refused to leave after she was terminated. The Appellate Division affirms an unlawful detainer judgment: housing provided as part of employment compensation is not a protected tenancy, the former manager became a tenant at sufferance or licensee outside the Tenant Protection Act, and her retaliatory-eviction defense failed for lack of evidence.

Lauren Brown filed the fifth of five overlapping PAGA actions against the same restaurant operator. While her case sat stayed, the employer settled globally with an earlier plaintiff, and the trial court then granted judgment on the pleadings. Division Eight affirmed. The only contested question it reached was whether the settling plaintiff's failure to wait the full 65 days after her amended agency notice destroyed the settlement's preclusive effect – and the court held it did not, because nothing extends the waiting period to amended notices and the agency itself had accepted the settlement. Brown also lacked standing for violations postdating her 2018 separation.

A fire-department mechanic repeatedly confronted management and then alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The Second District affirms a three-year workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8: the veiled reference was a credible, implied threat outside the First Amendment, and the order’s firearm restriction survives Second Amendment review under Rahimi.

Billy Ford's 2018 arbitration agreement carved out representative claims under PAGA. After Viking River split PAGA claims into individual and non-individual halves, his employer argued the word representative had become ambiguous and that the FAA should resolve the ambiguity toward arbitration. The Third District affirmed the denial of the motion to compel, holding the clause unambiguous: because the contract was formed when settled California law forbade splitting a PAGA claim at all, the carve-out excludes every PAGA claim. Viking River changed the law of divisibility, not the principle that nobody arbitrates what they never agreed to arbitrate – a clean rule of construction for a very large installed base of legacy agreements.

A district court remanded a California wage-and-hour class action on its own motion because the removing employer had not produced evidence justifying the violation rate behind its $15 million amount-in-controversy figure. The Ninth Circuit vacated: a CAFA defendant may rely on a chain of reasoning built from assumptions tethered to the complaint, and cannot fairly be asked to prove violations it denies ever occurred. Ibarra still bites where the defendant's reading of the pleading is unreasonable – but not merely because a lower rate was equally plausible. The uncomfortable corollary for plaintiffs is that vague frequency language such as at times is now a jurisdictional concession made at the drafting table.

Overlapping PAGA actions against one employer are now routine, and so is the race to settle. Turrieta v. Lyft decided what the losing racer may do about it: nothing. A non-settling plaintiff suing as the state's deputy on identical claims has no authority to intervene in the settling plaintiff's action, to require the court to hear objections, or to move to vacate the judgment — and Moniz v. Adecco (2025) holds that recasting the asserted stake as personal rather than sovereign changes none of it. What survives is not a voice in the first case but a defence in the second. Under Arias a PAGA judgment does bind non-party aggrieved employees; under LaCour v. Marshalls that preclusion must be proved, and a release reaching past the settling plaintiff's own agency authority binds her alone. The practical consequence is that the leverage has moved to the LWDA notice letter, which now measures what a PAGA plaintiff can ever release.

After Turrieta v. Lyft disapproved Moniz II by name, the objector in the long-running Adecco PAGA settlement tried a new key for the same lock: she was asserting her own personal interests — a penalty share, fees, a service award — not the state’s. Division Four dismissed her appeals. Every interest she claimed arises from PAGA itself and is derivative of the state’s; relabeling it personal is a semantic exercise that would leave Turrieta’s holding with no effect. The first published application of Turrieta makes overlapping-settlement fights a before-judgment affair: object in the approving court, police preclusion scope under LaCour — but intervention, vacatur, and appeal are closed.

Does every PAGA action contain an individual claim an employer can compel to arbitration? The split the California Supreme Court will resolve.

Two Highland Hospital workers sued the public hospital authority running Alameda County’s medical facilities for meal-and-rest violations, unpaid wages, and PAGA penalties. A unanimous Supreme Court ended the case at the definitions: Labor Code section 18’s “person” — the term that controls who is an “employer” under the wage order and who can be penalized under PAGA — affirmatively excludes public entities. Absent express words bringing the government in, break rules and PAGA penalties stop at the public-sector line. The court disapproved Sargent’s contrary rule for statutes carrying their own penalties, declined to decide whether Government Code section 818 independently bars such penalties, and reserved the effect of the 2024 PAGA reform.

Three Lyft drivers filed overlapping PAGA actions; when one settled, the other two moved to intervene, objected, and moved to vacate the judgment — invoking their status as deputized proxies of the state. A divided Supreme Court held a PAGA plaintiff’s deputization confers no such rights: the statute delegates the power to commence and prosecute one’s own action, and it entrusts settlement oversight to the LWDA and the approving court. Moniz v. Adecco is disapproved. What remains for rival plaintiffs is coordination, informal input to the approving court, and advocacy to the LWDA — plus the open questions the court expressly reserved, including the state’s own rights and personal-interest intervention.

Between Viking River in June 2022 and Adolph in July 2023, federal courts across California dismissed the non-individual half of PAGA cases for want of standing, on the United States Supreme Court's reading of California law. In Johnson the Ninth Circuit says what to do about those dismissals while the case is still on appeal: affirm the order compelling arbitration of the individual PAGA claim, vacate the dismissal of the non-individual claims – not because the district court erred, but because the California Supreme Court has since corrected the state-law premise – and remand so the district court can apply Adolph. The panel also rejected the argument that Adolph cannot be reconciled with Viking River. Judge Lee concurred to flag what he called a lurking tension between Adolph's bifurcation procedure and the Federal Arbitration Act: if an arbitrator's findings in a low-stakes individual arbitration can bind in a high-stakes representative action, the economics of arbitration change. He saw no irreconcilable conflict on these facts, and explained why – which is also a map of how the argument will be made next time.

For three years the first move in every large PAGA defence was a motion to strike the claim as unmanageable. Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills ended that unanimously, and ended it structurally: the Supreme Court did not weigh the policy and come out against, it found that no California court had ever possessed such a power and declined to create one. The question since is what remains, and the answer is more than defendants expected and less than they wanted. Evidence limits, scope limits, witness control, consolidation and ordinary merits rulings all survive untouched, and in 2024 the Legislature put the first two into Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (p) in almost the court's own words — while pointedly leaving out the dismissal power. The word manageability appears nowhere in the statute. What is left open is narrow: a due-process authority of last resort that Estrada reserved and no published decision has yet defined.

Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582 holds that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim as unmanageable, even if it is complex or time-intensive. Manageability is a class-action requirement that does not apply to PAGA; complexity must be handled through ordinary case-management tools, not dismissal.

Marshalls bought a sweeping PAGA release in a federal settlement whose plaintiff had noticed only one theory to the LWDA — off-the-clock time in end-of-shift bag checks. When Robert LaCour later sued over expense reimbursement and other never-noticed violations, the trial court struck his claims as precluded. Division Four reversed: a PAGA judgment’s preclusive reach is measured by the claims the settling plaintiff pleaded or was authorized by her LWDA notice to plead, not by the words of her release, and an unauthorized proxy is in privity with no one. The court also upheld pandemic Emergency Rule 9, and it reserved issue preclusion while barring any double recovery.

Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 holds that a PAGA plaintiff whose individual claims are compelled to arbitration retains standing as an “aggrieved employee” to litigate the non-individual representative claims in court — California’s answer to the standing question left open by Viking River.

The FAA preempts Iskanian to the extent it bars division of a PAGA action and prevents arbitration of an employee’s individual PAGA claim; an employer may compel the individual PAGA claim to arbitration. (The Supreme Court further opined that, under its reading of California law, the plaintiff would then lack standing…

Settling and dismissing individual Labor Code claims does not strip an employee of standing to pursue a PAGA claim. PAGA standing depends on being an “aggrieved employee” — someone employed by the alleged violator against whom one or more Labor Code violations were committed — not on maintaining an unredressed…

The unpaid-wages component of section 558 is not a civil penalty recoverable through PAGA; only the fixed civil penalties ($50/$100 per employee per pay period) are PAGA penalties. Because the unpaid wages are not part of the PAGA claim, the trial court could not compel that portion to arbitration as if it were.

In Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment against a dismissed community-college librarian, holding her FEHA discrimination and harassment claims time-barred. Applying the three-part continuing-violation test from Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the doctrine could not save the claims because the pre- and post-limitations acts were “not at all similar” and the employer’s conduct “acquired a degree of permanence” when her employment was terminated — and post-dismissal acts of a neutral administrative law judge could not be imputed to the employer.

A PAGA plaintiff is presumptively entitled to discover the identities and contact information of other aggrieved employees statewide, subject to the employees’ privacy interests (which may be protected through a Belaire-West opt-out notice) rather than to a heightened threshold showing of merit before discovery.

Iskanian v. CLS Transportation (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 holds that class-action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are enforceable after Concepcion (abrogating Gentry), but a predispute waiver of a representative PAGA action is contrary to public policy and not preempted by the FAA, because a PAGA claim belongs to the state.

In Kim v. Konad USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, the Court of Appeal affirmed a $60,000 bench-trial judgment for a sexually harassed employee, holding that FEHA’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is “jurisdictional” only in the loose, prudential sense and does not affect the trial court’s fundamental subject matter jurisdiction. Because the defendants waited until after the case was submitted to assert non-exhaustion, they forfeited the defense; and because exhaustion is not truly jurisdictional, the court could consider post-trial materials confirming the plaintiff had in fact exhausted. The court also held a harassment claim lies against an employer of any size.

In Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402, reviewing a sustained demurrer, the Court of Appeal held the plaintiff’s FEHA disability- and race-discrimination claims time-barred but reversed on her retaliation and wrongful-termination claims, holding that the section 12960 clock for a discharge runs from the actual termination — not from when the retaliatory motive arose — and that the employer, which controlled the termination date, controlled the accrual trigger. On the accommodation claims, continuing-violation tolling ended once the employer’s refusal reached a degree of permanence.

Summary judgment was improperly granted on the harassment and retaliation claims because triable issues of fact existed; the decision is notable for its strong criticism of the overuse and abuse of summary judgment in employment cases, for its treatment of the parties’ voluminous (and often meritless) evidentiary…

Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969 holds that a representative PAGA action for civil penalties need not satisfy class-action requirements, while a representative UCL claim for the same Labor Code violations must — and that a non-class PAGA action does not violate the employer’s due-process rights.

Two unions took assignments from more than 150 transportation workers and sued their employers under the UCL and PAGA for meal- and rest-break violations. The Supreme Court unanimously shut the door: after Proposition 64, an assignment cannot confer UCL standing on an uninjured assignee, and a PAGA claim cannot be assigned at all — the act creates no property right, so the aggrieved employee, suing as the state’s proxy, ‘does not own an assignable interest.’ Associational standing does not fill the gap, and representative UCL claims must proceed as class actions per the same-day companion, Arias. The state-proxy architecture announced here is the foundation Iskanian, Kim v. Reins, Adolph, and Turrieta all build on — and the 2024 reform kept its line intact.

Reversing summary judgment, the Second District held that a lesbian mail-services employee raised triable issues on whether her FEHA administrative complaint was timely under the continuing-violation doctrine, even though her harasser stopped his explicit sexual-orientation slurs over a year before she filed. Applying Richards v. CH2M Hill, the court held the harasser's later, facially neutral work-sabotage campaign could be “similar in kind” to the slurs and that “permanence” turns on when the harassment stops, the employee resigns, or protest becomes futile — not on when the offensive words cease.

Three different doctrines collide in public-sector termination cases, and collapsing them is the most expensive mistake in this corner of California employment law. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to suing at all. Exhaustion of judicial remedies is the separate Westlake requirement that an employee who has already lost before a personnel board overturn that decision by administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 before suing on the same facts. And collateral estoppel is what happens if the employee does not: the agency's findings become final and bind. Johnson v. City of Loma Linda extended the rule to FEHA while holding it inapplicable to Title VII, Page applied it on demurrer, and Skelly supplies the due-process floor the agency hearing must meet. This analysis keeps the three apart, states what each anchor actually held and how it was disposed of, and sets out the sequencing obligation a practitioner owes a public-employee client at intake.

The continuing-violation doctrine applies to FEHA claims: an employer’s related unlawful acts are treated as a single continuing violation — and the limitations period does not begin to run — so long as the conduct is sufficiently similar and frequent and has not yet acquired a degree of permanence that should put the…

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit — that one or more elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense — by either conclusively negating an element or showing the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to…

An African-American electronic technician laid off in a budget cut applied for dozens of university jobs, was hired for none, and sued under the FEHA for retaliation. Affirming summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that a string of rejections by different managers in unrelated departments is a series of isolated decisions, not a “continuing violation” — and that retaliatory remarks by HR staff who took no part in the hiring cannot establish causation, because every actual decisionmaker disclaimed knowledge of the protected grievance.