California employment case index

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 reaches only a “dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after” March 3, 2022 — and in Combs v. Netflix the Ninth Circuit decided, for the first time in the circuit, what each of those words means. A claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action; a dispute arises, in the employment setting, when an employee registers disagreement with the employer — internally, externally or otherwise — and the employer expressly or constructively opposes that position. The panel rejected both extremes: a dispute need not await a formal agency or court filing, but neither does it arise merely because the harassment happened. On Jessica Combs's own allegations — years of internal complaints that Netflix ignored, and a firing in December 2021 — both triggers fell before the cut-off, the EFAA did not apply, and her arbitration agreement was enforced. The decision is the gateway authority for every EFAA fight in the circuit, and it cuts in both directions.

The California Supreme Court granted review on March 25, 2026 in Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center Medical Group to decide whether an arbitration agreement that designates the Federal Arbitration Act thereby imports the FAA's substantive provisions and their preemptive force, even where no interstate commerce is shown. The underlying Court of Appeal opinion is nonpublished, and the Court denied the requests to publish it on granting review. The paired grant-and-hold, Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Administrative Services, is published but itself under review, and answered the question yes. This pending-review analysis sets out the Court's own issue statement, the competing answers below with their correct citability under rule 8.1115(e)(1), and what the answer decides for Armendariz, Labor Code section 432.6, the arbitration-fee statutes and the EFAA.

A former Work Practice Apprentice at the San Francisco Zen Center won a wage award, but the trial court held the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred his claims. The First District reverses, adopting its companion case Lorenzo: the exception bars only claims that require resolving ecclesiastical questions, and the Center showed none. NOTE: the controlling ministerial-exception issue is now before the California Supreme Court in Lorenzo (S294565), so this opinion is citable for persuasive value only.

A work practice apprentice at one of North America’s largest Soto Zen Buddhist temples conceded she was a minister, sued only for the minimum and overtime wages she had already earned, and lost on summary judgment to the First Amendment ministerial exception. Division Five of the First District reversed on two independent grounds. The exception, it held, bars only those employment claims that necessarily require an inquiry into matters of a religious entity’s internal government closely linked to its faith and doctrine — and the Center never explained how a minimum-wage claim required one, conceding in its brief that adjudicating the case raised no ecclesiastical question. Separately, because the Labor Commissioner had found two individuals liable as the employer under Labor Code section 558.1, each of them had to post an undertaking under section 98.2 to perfect a de novo appeal; neither did, so the trial court had no jurisdiction over their appeals. The California Supreme Court granted review on February 11, 2026, limited to the ministerial-exception question, but denied depublication and directed that the opinion may still be cited both for its persuasive value and to establish a conflict in authority. This analysis sets out the Court’s own issue statement, what the Court of Appeal actually held and on what evidence, and exactly how much weight the opinion carries while review is pending.

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) makes it unlawful to fail to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process, and an employee may sue on that practice alone. The received wisdom that California courts are split on whether such a plaintiff must also prove an available accommodation has not been accurate since 2009. This analysis traces the rule from Claudio through Wysinger, Nadaf-Rahrov and Scotch to Shirvanyan, isolates the two words that carry the element, and sets out exactly what must be proved, by whom, and as of when.

FEHA defines both mental and physical disability to include being regarded or treated by the employer as having a condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult, and the Legislature enacted those paragraphs by number, expressly notwithstanding Cassista. Gelfo held that the only question under the prong is what the employer believed — no actual disability, no mistake, no myths-or-stereotypes showing — and, breaking with the federal authority then controlling in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, that a perceived-disability plaintiff is owed reasonable accommodation and the interactive process. Wallace removed animosity from the elements and refused to let an honest mistake count as a legitimate reason; Soria extended the prong to conditions that are merely potentially disabling. What the prong does not do is lower the definitional floor, which is where Higgins-Williams sits — and, as this analysis shows, where the real contest now is.

A 305-pound applicant rejected by a Santa Cruz health food collective sued under the FEHA, alleging she was regarded as physically handicapped because of her weight. The California Supreme Court held that weight may qualify as a protected disability only where medical evidence shows it results from a physiological condition affecting a basic bodily system and limits a major life activity, and that this plaintiff – who maintained she was healthy and fit – had proved no such thing. Government Code section 12926.1 now names the case and disclaims several of its interpretations.