California employment case index

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 reaches only a “dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after” March 3, 2022 — and in Combs v. Netflix the Ninth Circuit decided, for the first time in the circuit, what each of those words means. A claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action; a dispute arises, in the employment setting, when an employee registers disagreement with the employer — internally, externally or otherwise — and the employer expressly or constructively opposes that position. The panel rejected both extremes: a dispute need not await a formal agency or court filing, but neither does it arise merely because the harassment happened. On Jessica Combs's own allegations — years of internal complaints that Netflix ignored, and a firing in December 2021 — both triggers fell before the cut-off, the EFAA did not apply, and her arbitration agreement was enforced. The decision is the gateway authority for every EFAA fight in the circuit, and it cuts in both directions.

The California Supreme Court granted review on March 25, 2026 in Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center Medical Group to decide whether an arbitration agreement that designates the Federal Arbitration Act thereby imports the FAA's substantive provisions and their preemptive force, even where no interstate commerce is shown. The underlying Court of Appeal opinion is nonpublished, and the Court denied the requests to publish it on granting review. The paired grant-and-hold, Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Administrative Services, is published but itself under review, and answered the question yes. This pending-review analysis sets out the Court's own issue statement, the competing answers below with their correct citability under rule 8.1115(e)(1), and what the answer decides for Armendariz, Labor Code section 432.6, the arbitration-fee statutes and the EFAA.

Ask what California law says about rounding employees' time punches and the honest answer is that nobody knows. One Court of Appeal decision approved the practice in 2012, borrowing its standard from a federal regulation; it has never been overruled and still binds trial courts. But the Supreme Court has twice declined to adopt it, saying in Donohue that it "has never decided the validity of the rounding standard articulated in See's Candy I" — and then deciding that case on an assumption rather than an endorsement. Two Courts of Appeal have since rejected rounding where the employer captured exact minutes and underpaid anyway, and the Supreme Court granted review in both. The result is a genuine vacuum: the binding authority is the weakest, the strongest reasoning cannot bind, and the question sits with the Supreme Court in S277518. This piece sets out precisely what has been decided, what has not, and what to do in the meantime.

The Court of Appeal affirms a statewide preliminary injunction against Uber and Lyft, holding the People likely to prevail under prong B of the ABC test (Lab. Code, § 2775) — rideshare driving is within the usual course of the companies’ business — and rejecting the “technology platform” defense as a false dichotomy. (Predates Proposition 22; see Castellanos.)

There is no California statute or case law authorizing or prohibiting employee time rounding, so Division One borrowed the federal rule: an employer may round punch times to the nearest tenth of an hour if the policy is fair and neutral on its face and, as applied, does not fail over time to compensate employees for the time they actually worked. The posture is narrow – a writ vacating summary adjudication on two of the employer's affirmative defenses, with the court expressly leaving open whether either side will prevail. The plaintiff's expert lost the case by treating the employer's separate grace-period policy as if it were rounding. Whether neutral rounding survives at all is now pending before the California Supreme Court in Camp v. Home Depot, S277518.