California employment case index

A fire-department mechanic repeatedly confronted management and then alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The Second District affirms a three-year workplace violence restraining order under section 527.8: the veiled reference was a credible, implied threat outside the First Amendment, and the order’s firearm restriction survives Second Amendment review under Rahimi.

The Department of Consumer Affairs refused to discuss settlement, refused to stipulate to an amendment, demurred, moved for summary adjudication, rejected a $600,000 section 998 offer and lost a six-week trial – and then appealed the $4,889,786.03 fee award that followed. Division Eight affirmed all of it: top-of-market Los Angeles rates supported by the trial judge's own observation of counsel, a 1.75 multiplier through verdict and 1.25 on the fee litigation, and two holdings with reach – that a fee payable from public funds does not bar an enhancement, and that Ketchum's rule does not apply to FEHA fees, which section 12965 makes discretionary and therefore contingent until the final fee order.

California's fee-default statutes have become the most-used route out of employer-drafted arbitration, and in August 2025 the Supreme Court rewrote how they work. Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97 and 1281.98 still declare that a drafting party who pays the arbitrator more than 30 days late is in material breach, in default, and has waived its right to compel arbitration. But in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court the court held, 5-2, that this scheme survives FAA preemption only on a construction that leaves intact the background relief-from-forfeiture provisions — Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) and Civil Code sections 3275 and 1511 — so that the loss of the arbitral forum follows only from nonpayment that was willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent. Mandatory monetary sanctions under section 1281.99, subdivision (a) still follow automatically. This synthesis sets out the operative statutory text and credit lines, traces the eleven Court of Appeal decisions the Supreme Court disapproved, states the post-Hohenshelt rule as a four-step sequence, shows how the first published application (Wilson v. Tap Worldwide) deployed it as an as-applied preemption argument, and identifies what remains open — including whether the same construction governs section 1281.97.

A jury found that the Department of State Hospitals discriminated against Ashley Howell because of a mental disability, and awarded her lost earnings, lost health insurance, and nothing for pain and suffering. By the end of the appeal the insurance award was gone, the zero pain-and-suffering verdict stood, and a $1.75 million attorney fee request had been reduced to $135,102. The insurance award fell because Howell proved an obligation rather than a loss: she introduced a premium invoice she never paid, and she bought no replacement coverage, so there was nothing to compensate. The fee award survived because the trial court could not audit block-billed hours and because the request had grown more than tenfold from counsel's own pretrial estimate. Howell's only appellate win was a remand to rule on the prejudgment interest nobody had opposed. This is an adverse decision, and its value to the plaintiff's bar is as a checklist of what the damages and fee record has to contain.

Government Code section 12965(b) governs both fee and cost awards in FEHA actions and makes them discretionary under the asymmetric Christiansburg standard: a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily recovers fees and costs, but a prevailing defendant may recover them only if the action was objectively frivolous, unreasonable,…

Attorney fees awarded under section 12965 belong to the attorneys whose services earned them, except to the extent the attorneys and client have entered an enforceable agreement providing otherwise; the portion of a statutory fee award exceeding fees the client already paid does not belong to the client by default.