California employment case index

Taking the walls off harassment law raises a harder question than the one it answers: if the conduct need not happen at work, what still has to connect it to this plaintiff? California answers with a nexus requirement, and the authorities disagree less than practitioners think. Fisher spoke of presence; Beyda read Fisher as requiring a nexus and held that awareness suffices; Carranza let a $4 million verdict stand on a photograph the plaintiff never saw circulate; and Kruitbosch held that where the harasser’s conduct is not work related, the employer’s response to the complaint can create a hostile environment all by itself. This is the companion to our analysis of the Okonowsky locus rule.

An LAPD captain never witnessed officers passing around a fake nude photo of her and was never confronted to her face — yet the Second District affirmed a $4 million FEHA verdict, holding that her secondhand knowledge of the department-wide circulation, and the LAPD’s refusal to stop it, supplied substantial evidence of a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. A leading application of Government Code section 12923.

A divided First District panel threw out a $2.16 million defamation verdict, holding that a fired PG&E lineman's defamation claim was wrongful termination by another name: the statements came from the same conduct that caused the discharge, and the damages flowed from the job loss alone. Presiding Justice Tucher dissented in part, arguing the majority had invented an employer immunity the Supreme Court has already disclaimed. The California Supreme Court granted review, limited to whether a terminated employee may bring a defamation claim when the defamation contributed to the reasons for the termination, or must instead plead wrongful discharge. The opinion remains published and citable for persuasive value with the required review-granted notation; part II is unpublished. Analysis of a pending matter — confirm the status of S289581 before relying on anything here.

Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.

Harassment no longer happens in a place. A private Instagram account about a specific prison, a group chat, a warehouse saturated with misogynistic music — the dominant fact pattern in harassment intake now begins outside the premises. Okonowsky v. Garland rejects the notion that only conduct inside the physical workplace can be actionable and substitutes a test of effect plus employer response; Sharp v. S&S Activewear disposes of the targeting and equal-opportunity-harasser objections. This analysis sets out what the Ninth Circuit actually held, what it conspicuously did not, and why FEHA reaches the same question through a different instrument.

In Naranjo II (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, the California Supreme Court holds that an employer’s objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that its wage statements complied with the law defeats both Labor Code § 226 penalties (no “knowing and intentional” violation) and § 203 waiting-time penalties (no “willful” failure) — harmonizing the two penalty statutes around a common good-faith defense.

Almost every California wage case carries two penalty claims that do not depend on their own facts: waiting-time penalties under Labor Code section 203 for failing to pay a wage, and wage-statement penalties under section 226, subdivision (e)(1) for failing to report it. A good-faith dispute had long defeated the first. Whether it also defeated the second had split the Court of Appeal, with Kao, Furry and Gola holding that an employer aware of the underlying facts violated section 226 knowingly and intentionally whatever it believed about the law. In May 2024 the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., holding that an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief in compliance precludes section 226 penalties. This article sets out the holding, explains why Naranjo did not create the section 203 rule it applied, identifies precisely what the decision disapproved in Gola and Furry and how much of both survives, and marks the remedy that a good-faith finding leaves untouched.

Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (Naranjo I)Premium pay owed for missed meal and rest breaks under Labor Code section 226.7 constitutes “wages,” so it must be reported on wage statements under section 226 and is subject to waiting-time penalties under section 203 when not timely paid at separation.Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2022) […]

Government Code section 12923 is the most consequential development in California harassment law in twenty years, and it is routinely read for more than it says. It declares that a single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue, that harassment cases are rarely appropriate for summary judgment, and that one Ninth Circuit decision may not be used as a severity yardstick. What it does not do is repeal the severe-or-pervasive element or amend the operative prohibition. This analysis reads the section subdivision by subdivision against the federal case law it addresses, and sets out precisely what survives.

The Fourth District affirmed a whistleblower-retaliation verdict for an Office on Aging director fired after warning that a County reorganization was unlawful — holding the County waived its exhaustion defense by first raising it after trial — while reversing her sexual-harassment claim under the pre-§ 12923 "severe or pervasive" standard and affirming a remittitur-backed new trial order on damages.

Harte-Hanks paid outside sales representatives higher salaries and commission rates than inside representatives and treated the difference as reimbursement for their automobile expenses. The California Supreme Court held the practice permissible in principle, but only where the employer establishes a means to identify which portion of overall compensation is intended as reimbursement and that portion fully covers expenses actually and necessarily incurred. Section 2804 bars any agreement that waives full reimbursement – a holding that unravelled the trial court's denial of class certification.

The failure-to-prevent claim is pleaded in nearly every FEHA complaint and is the one FEHA claim that cannot stand alone. Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) states the employer's preventive duty without any predicate condition, yet since Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. the private claim has been derivative: a jury that finds no actionable discrimination, harassment or retaliation leaves nothing for the claim to rest on, and after Dickson v. Burke Williams harassing conduct that is not severe or pervasive will not serve. This analysis traces how the predicate rule was built, marks where it stops — it limits the private right of action rather than agency enforcement, it leaves the individual-defendant question open, and it survives section 12923 untouched — and sets out the symmetry practitioners miss most often: the same statutory duty whose breach grounds the plaintiff's claim supplies the first element of the employer's avoidable-consequences defence.