California employment case index

A school district analyst who wanted to work entirely from home during and after the pandemic sued under FEHA and the Labor Code when her employer insisted on a phased return to the office. Division One affirmed summary judgment, holding that Government Code section 855.4 immunizes a public entity's discretionary decisions about controlling the spread of disease – including whether to permit remote work, when to require a return, and whether to mandate vaccination. But the court was explicit that it affirmed on immunity because the plaintiff's briefing 'contains no reasoned argument' explaining why her claims fell outside it, and it went on to affirm on three independent grounds: no qualifying disability, no admission of disability from holding interactive meetings, and no adverse employment action where a threatened leave was never imposed and the retirement was voluntary.

A district court remanded a California wage-and-hour class action on its own motion because the removing employer had not produced evidence justifying the violation rate behind its $15 million amount-in-controversy figure. The Ninth Circuit vacated: a CAFA defendant may rely on a chain of reasoning built from assumptions tethered to the complaint, and cannot fairly be asked to prove violations it denies ever occurred. Ibarra still bites where the defendant's reading of the pleading is unreasonable – but not merely because a lower rate was equally plausible. The uncomfortable corollary for plaintiffs is that vague frequency language such as at times is now a jurisdictional concession made at the drafting table.

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) makes it unlawful to fail to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process, and an employee may sue on that practice alone. The received wisdom that California courts are split on whether such a plaintiff must also prove an available accommodation has not been accurate since 2009. This analysis traces the rule from Claudio through Wysinger, Nadaf-Rahrov and Scotch to Shirvanyan, isolates the two words that carry the element, and sets out exactly what must be proved, by whom, and as of when.

FEHA defines both mental and physical disability to include being regarded or treated by the employer as having a condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult, and the Legislature enacted those paragraphs by number, expressly notwithstanding Cassista. Gelfo held that the only question under the prong is what the employer believed — no actual disability, no mistake, no myths-or-stereotypes showing — and, breaking with the federal authority then controlling in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, that a perceived-disability plaintiff is owed reasonable accommodation and the interactive process. Wallace removed animosity from the elements and refused to let an honest mistake count as a legitimate reason; Soria extended the prong to conditions that are merely potentially disabling. What the prong does not do is lower the definitional floor, which is where Higgins-Williams sits — and, as this analysis shows, where the real contest now is.

A 305-pound applicant rejected by a Santa Cruz health food collective sued under the FEHA, alleging she was regarded as physically handicapped because of her weight. The California Supreme Court held that weight may qualify as a protected disability only where medical evidence shows it results from a physiological condition affecting a basic bodily system and limits a major life activity, and that this plaintiff – who maintained she was healthy and fit – had proved no such thing. Government Code section 12926.1 now names the case and disclaims several of its interpretations.