California employment case index

A school district analyst who wanted to work entirely from home during and after the pandemic sued under FEHA and the Labor Code when her employer insisted on a phased return to the office. Division One affirmed summary judgment, holding that Government Code section 855.4 immunizes a public entity's discretionary decisions about controlling the spread of disease – including whether to permit remote work, when to require a return, and whether to mandate vaccination. But the court was explicit that it affirmed on immunity because the plaintiff's briefing 'contains no reasoned argument' explaining why her claims fell outside it, and it went on to affirm on three independent grounds: no qualifying disability, no admission of disability from holding interactive meetings, and no adverse employment action where a threatened leave was never imposed and the retirement was voluntary.

Two Nordstrom employees worked stretches of more than six consecutive days, but never seven days inside a single established workweek, and always with at least one short shift. The Ninth Circuit certified three questions, and a unanimous Supreme Court answered all of them on one page: the day-of-rest guarantee runs by the workweek rather than on a rolling seven days, so runs spanning two workweeks are not per se prohibited; the six-hour exemption applies only where the employee never exceeds six hours on any day of that week, because the contrary reading would let a single short shift swallow the rule; and an employer 'causes' a lost day of rest by inducing the employee to forgo it, owing a duty to apprise employees of the right and then maintain absolute neutrality about its exercise.

In Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, a unanimous California Supreme Court resolved three recurring procedural and damages questions: a postjudgment order denying discovery-sanction (cost-of-proof) attorney fees is separately appealable; a personal-injury plaintiff bears the burden of proving which portion of a general award is “damages for personal injury” before claiming Civil Code section 3291 prejudgment interest; and that interest never accrues on punitive damages. The court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded.