California employment case index

A work practice apprentice at one of North America’s largest Soto Zen Buddhist temples conceded she was a minister, sued only for the minimum and overtime wages she had already earned, and lost on summary judgment to the First Amendment ministerial exception. Division Five of the First District reversed on two independent grounds. The exception, it held, bars only those employment claims that necessarily require an inquiry into matters of a religious entity’s internal government closely linked to its faith and doctrine — and the Center never explained how a minimum-wage claim required one, conceding in its brief that adjudicating the case raised no ecclesiastical question. Separately, because the Labor Commissioner had found two individuals liable as the employer under Labor Code section 558.1, each of them had to post an undertaking under section 98.2 to perfect a de novo appeal; neither did, so the trial court had no jurisdiction over their appeals. The California Supreme Court granted review on February 11, 2026, limited to the ministerial-exception question, but denied depublication and directed that the opinion may still be cited both for its persuasive value and to establish a conflict in authority. This analysis sets out the Court’s own issue statement, what the Court of Appeal actually held and on what evidence, and exactly how much weight the opinion carries while review is pending.

A unanimous Supreme Court holds that a signed offer letter stating employment is "at will" and terminable "at any time" is unambiguous — recruitment talk of a "long-term fix" cannot create an implied for-cause contract or support fraud reliance — with Justice Baxter (joined by Corrigan) urging reconsideration of Pacific Gas and Justice Moreno reserving "upon notice" clauses.

Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.The at-will presumption can be overcome by an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause, judged on the totality of the relationship — but the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot impose substantive limits beyond the agreement’s actual terms, and a FEHA discrimination claim must survive the […]

Nine days after Fatmeh Badih told her employer — a physician with fewer than five employees — that she was pregnant, her last day was set; the DFEH would not even accept her complaint because the office was too small for the FEHA. Division One of the First District affirmed her wrongful-discharge verdict anyway, holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, whose fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment binds every employer regardless of size. Jennings v. Marralle was distinguished, not disturbed: age has no constitutional anchor, but sex — and therefore pregnancy — does. Badih remains the pleading answer for pregnancy discharges at California's smallest workplaces.

The Tameny claim failed because Foley’s report about a coworker served the employer’s private interest, not a fundamental public policy. Foley nonetheless adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause — based on longevity of service, promotions, raises, assurances, and the employer’s…

Yes. The longevity of Pugh’s service, together with the employer’s commendations and assurances and its acknowledged practices, supported an implied-in-fact promise that he would not be discharged except for good cause; the nonsuit was therefore error and the judgment was reversed (id. at p. 330).