California employment case index

Tilly’s required retail workers to phone the store exactly two hours before every on-call shift — under threat of written discipline — and paid nothing if the answer was ‘don’t come in.’ Division Three held, 2–1, that this triggers Wage Order 7 reporting-time pay: ‘reporting for work’ means presenting oneself as ordered, and the employer’s own directions define the manner, whether that is walking through the door, logging on remotely, or making a mandatory call. The holding is deliberately tied to the two-hour call-in regime, the retroactivity question was expressly left open, and Justice Egerton’s partial dissent — built on 18,000 pages of IWC history — supplies the employer playbook. Review was denied; Ward remains the leading California authority on call-in scheduling.

The employee-non-solicitation provision was void under section 16600 because it restrained the individual defendants — recruiters whose profession is recruiting and placing nurses — from engaging in their chosen profession; applying Edwards, the court declined to use the older “reasonableness” analysis and held such…

Section 16600 voids contracts that restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business; Edwards’s noncompetition agreement was therefore invalid. California does not recognize the federal courts’ “narrow-restraint” exception — even a limited or partial restraint on practicing one’s profession is…

A unanimous Supreme Court holds that a signed offer letter stating employment is "at will" and terminable "at any time" is unambiguous — recruitment talk of a "long-term fix" cannot create an implied for-cause contract or support fraud reliance — with Justice Baxter (joined by Corrigan) urging reconsideration of Pacific Gas and Justice Moreno reserving "upon notice" clauses.

Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.The at-will presumption can be overcome by an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause, judged on the totality of the relationship — but the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot impose substantive limits beyond the agreement’s actual terms, and a FEHA discrimination claim must survive the […]

The Tameny claim failed because Foley’s report about a coworker served the employer’s private interest, not a fundamental public policy. Foley nonetheless adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause — based on longevity of service, promotions, raises, assurances, and the employer’s…

Yes. The longevity of Pugh’s service, together with the employer’s commendations and assurances and its acknowledged practices, supported an implied-in-fact promise that he would not be discharged except for good cause; the nonsuit was therefore error and the judgment was reversed (id. at p. 330).