California employment case index

Reversing summary judgment in a FEHA failure-to-promote case, the Ninth Circuit reconciled its competing pretext lines — direct evidence of bias needs only "very little" weight to reach a jury, while circumstantial evidence must be "specific" and "substantial" — a formulation later questioned after Desert Palace but still central to MSJ briefing on both sides.

An employer is vicariously liable for actionable hostile-environment harassment by a supervisor with authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action was taken, the employer may raise an affirmative defense (the Faragher/Ellerth defense): that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct…

In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 742, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII for a supervisor’s hostile-environment harassment of a subordinate, but where the harassment yields no tangible employment action the employer may raise the two-element Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. The Court demoted the “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” labels from liability tests to threshold proof categories and grounded employer liability in general agency principles.

Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” protects against same-sex sexual harassment; nothing in the statute bars a claim merely because the plaintiff and the harassers are of the same sex, so long as the conduct constitutes discrimination because of sex and meets Title VII’s other requirements.

A unanimous Supreme Court held that Title VII hostile-environment harassment need not “seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being” or cause tangible injury. Reaffirming Meritor, the Court adopted a “middle path” requiring conduct severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that both a reasonable person and the victim find abusive, judged on the totality of the circumstances.

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. HicksDisproving the employer’s stated reason permits — but does not compel — a finding of intentional discrimination; the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason.St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502Parallel citations: 113 S.Ct. 2742; 125 […]

In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, the Supreme Court held that an employer's fetal-protection policy excluding all fertile women from lead-exposed jobs is facial sex discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — not a neutral practice to be tested for business necessity. The narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense reaches only qualifications affecting an employee's ability to do the job, and cannot be grounded in feared harm to a future fetus or in cost and tort-liability concerns.

To state a hostile-environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that was unwelcome, based on sex, and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; an employee may be “subjected to” a hostile environment by harassment she…

In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

When Lillian Garland returned from pregnancy disability leave to find her receptionist job filled, California’s guarantee of leave and reinstatement collided with her employer’s theory that Title VII forbade treating pregnancy “better” than other disabilities. The Supreme Court sided with California: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is a floor beneath which pregnancy benefits may not drop, not a ceiling above which states may not rise — and employers can always comply with both laws by leveling benefits up. Guerra remains the constitutional foundation of the PDLL and of every California pregnancy protection built since.

A claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII; the harassment need not cause economic or tangible loss, but must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and must be unwelcome.

The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a racially balanced “bottom-line” workforce to defend a discriminatory pass/fail barrier that excludes individual employees. Title VII protects the person, not just the group.

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine At step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248 Parallel citations: […]