California employment case index

To state a hostile-environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must allege conduct that was unwelcome, based on sex, and sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; an employee may be “subjected to” a hostile environment by harassment she…

In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989) 490 U.S. 642, the Supreme Court held that a disparate-impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment practice causing a statistical disparity and bears the burden of persuasion on business justification, with the employer carrying only a burden of production and the challenged practice needing only to serve legitimate goals — not to be “essential.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991 later superseded the burden-of-persuasion holding, restoring Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

When Lillian Garland returned from pregnancy disability leave to find her receptionist job filled, California’s guarantee of leave and reinstatement collided with her employer’s theory that Title VII forbade treating pregnancy “better” than other disabilities. The Supreme Court sided with California: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is a floor beneath which pregnancy benefits may not drop, not a ceiling above which states may not rise — and employers can always comply with both laws by leveling benefits up. Guerra remains the constitutional foundation of the PDLL and of every California pregnancy protection built since.

A claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII; the harassment need not cause economic or tangible loss, but must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and must be unwelcome.

The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a racially balanced “bottom-line” workforce to defend a discriminatory pass/fail barrier that excludes individual employees. Title VII protects the person, not just the group.

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. BurdineAt step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employer bears only a burden of production — to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248Parallel citations: 101 S.Ct. 1089; […]

Larry Hardison was fired when his Saturday Sabbath collided with a low-seniority shift at TWA's around-the-clock maintenance base. Reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer to override a bona fide seniority system to accommodate an employee's religion, and that requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost is an undue hardship. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. The de minimis standard was later clarified and raised by Groff v. DeJoy (2023).

In Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324, the Supreme Court drew the foundational line between disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination, explained the Government's pattern-or-practice burden to prove that discrimination was a company's “standard operating procedure,” shielded bona fide seniority systems under section 703(h), and recognized the “futile gesture” doctrine excusing non-applicants deterred from applying by a known discriminatory policy.

In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976) 427 U.S. 273, two white employees were discharged for participating in the theft of antifreeze from a shipment in their employer's care, while a Black employee charged with the same misconduct was retained. The Supreme Court held — unanimously as to Title VII, and seven-to-two as to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 — that both statutes protect against racial discrimination directed at any race, including white persons. An employer “may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races.” The judgment dismissing the complaint was reversed and the case remanded.

The Supreme Court held that back pay should normally be awarded to make Title VII victims whole — an employer’s good faith is no defense — and that job-validation studies must meet professional standards before discriminatory employment tests can stand.

Title VII disparate-treatment claims proceed under a three-step framework: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and (3) the plaintiff must then have the…

Title VII prohibits employment practices that operate to exclude protected groups and are not demonstrably related to job performance, regardless of the employer’s intent (disparate-impact liability). If a neutral practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, the employer must show the practice is job-related…