California employment case index

Two Chico State physics professors sued the CSU Trustees for retaliation, alleging a sham investigation and sabotage of their move to a new university after they reported harassment. The Trustees moved to strike the claims under the anti-SLAPP statute as “based in part” on protected speech. The Third District affirms denial: a movant must analyze each claim element-by-element and identify which acts are protected — “based in part” is not enough.

Inglewood’s elected city treasurer accused the mayor of misappropriating public funds, then saw her monthly salary cut from $8,000 to $1,404 and her duties stripped away. Her whistleblower retaliation suit under Labor Code section 1102.5 failed at the threshold: a unanimous Supreme Court held that elected officials are not “employees” within section 1106’s definition. Finding the statutory text inconclusive, the court rested on legislative history and context — section 1106 protects rank-and-file public workers, not officials who answer to the electorate — while noting that other remedies, including the First Amendment, may remain available.

Reversing summary judgment for United Airlines, the Court of Appeal held that whether three male employees with comparable social-media accounts were "similarly situated" comparators was a question for the jury, applied the continuing violation doctrine and section 12923's low bar to the harassment claim, and found a two-week complaint-to-termination gap sufficient for retaliation causation.

The Fourth District reversed summary judgment for the County, holding that a deputy district attorney's internal warnings that a murder prosecution lacked probable cause were protected disclosures under Labor Code section 1102.5 — no express citation of law required, job duties notwithstanding — and that months of testing for a suspected neurological disease raised a triable issue of FEHA disability.

A tenured professor sued CSU for retaliation and defamation after the university launched investigations and made statements about him. CSU moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal held the retaliation claim did not “arise from” protected speech merely because protected activity sat in the background, and applied Baral v. Schnitt to parse the pleading into its component claims — striking only the discrete defamation allegations that were themselves based on protected statements.

In Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 352, a county social worker was placed on administrative leave days after telling the juvenile court that her superiors had directed her to submit misleading evidence; the County’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike her whistleblower suit was denied. Affirming, the Court of Appeal held the leave — unrequested, investigative, paired with a decision to terminate her, and removing her from her assigned case — was an adverse employment action under Yanowitz’s contextual materiality standard, so the claim was not a meritless SLAPP.

An employee’s refusal to participate in conduct she reasonably believes is unlawful under the FEHA — including refusing to go along with retaliation against a coworker — can constitute protected activity, and threats or intimidation may qualify as a materially adverse employment action supporting a retaliation claim;…

When a recreation-program manager was laid off after publicly opposing the City's cuts to disabled-community services, he sued for FEHA retaliation. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that generalized advocacy for the disabled public is not “protected activity” under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h): the opposition clause reaches only opposition to conduct an employee reasonably believes is unlawful employment discrimination against an employee or applicant, not opposition to policy choices affecting the public at large.

A truck driver fired for refusing a shift that would have stopped him from administering his disabled son’s dialysis raised triable issues of associational disability discrimination and retaliation under FEHA — because association with a disabled person is itself a protected disability.

A long-serving employee laid off after her supervisor allegedly called her a “liability to the department” in light of her heart condition sued for perceived-disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, CFRA violations, and FEHA retaliation. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment on the disability-related claims — the supervisor's remark plus the employer's departure from its own seniority and recall policies raised triable issues of pretext — but affirmed on retaliation, holding that a pre-2016 accommodation request was not, by itself, “protected activity.”

In Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 635, the Second District held that FEHA forbids firing a nondisabled employee because of his association with a disabled relative, sustaining an expense-theory associational claim where the employer allegedly fired the plaintiff to avoid paying for organ-donation leave for his disabled sister. The court affirmed dismissal of the retaliation, Labor Code, PAGA, and direct-disability counts while reinstating the associational, failure-to-prevent, and public-policy claims.

Applying Harris v. City of Santa Monica to a pregnancy-leave retaliation verdict, the Court of Appeal held the old “a motivating reason” instructions were prejudicial error — and that an employer who never pleads the same-decision defense forfeits it. The judgment and fee award were reversed.

After a vessel-planner trainee complained, a confidential settlement was leaked and coworker hostility followed; the jury found retaliation, but the trial court entered JNOV. The Court of Appeal reversed the JNOV, holding that actions for retaliation are “inherently fact-driven” and that the jury, not the court, decides whether the conduct materially altered the plaintiff's employment — while affirming the alternative new-trial order on grounds of attorney misconduct, surprise, and excessive damages.

A manager fired after an internal investigation into a subordinate's harassment complaint sued for discrimination and retaliation. Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h) does not shield an employee from termination or discipline for lying or withholding information during the employer's internal investigation — such dishonesty and non-cooperation are unprotected and supply a legitimate, nondiscriminatory ground to terminate an at-will employee.

A physician-partner alleged she was stripped of her regional directorship after reporting that CEP officers had sexually harassed the partnership's employees. The trial court dismissed her claim because, as a partner, she was not an “employee.” The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that FEHA's retaliation provision protects “any person” who opposes forbidden practices — so a partner who opposes her partnership-employer's harassment of its employees is protected from retaliation, notwithstanding Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines.

An LAPD officer who was disciplined after the Department concluded he had fabricated a sexual-harassment complaint won a jury verdict for retaliation. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an employer does not retaliate under FEHA when it disciplines an employee based on a genuine, good-faith determination that the harassment complaint was false — and that an independent, de novo adjudication of the charges insulates the resulting discipline from claims that animus tainted the underlying investigation.

An ironworker apprentice subjected to graphic same-sex verbal abuse complained, then faced a campaign of coworker hostility and lost work opportunities. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment on the sexual-harassment claim (the conduct was not shown to be “because of sex”) but revived the retaliation claim, holding that an employer may be liable under FEHA when it knows or should know that coworkers are punishing an employee for protected complaints and fails to take reasonable steps to stop them.

A state administrative law judge prevailed on a FEHA retaliation claim after she was suspended following gender-bias complaints. Affirming her judgment, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a retaliation plaintiff need prove only that retaliatory animus was “at least a substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse action — not its sole or but-for cause — and that a civil-service board's finding that some discipline was warranted does not, by itself, defeat the claim.

Summary judgment was error. A plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence from which a trier of fact could find the employer’s proffered reasons unworthy of credence, and the record here showed the dismissal decision may in fact have been made by Mamou’s own biased immediate supervisor, raising triable…

In Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, the Third District affirmed a judgment and fee award for an employee, holding that FEHA's anti-retaliation provision reaches preemptive retaliation—adverse action taken against an employee the employer believes will become a complainant or witness in a discrimination proceeding—even before the employee has formally opposed any practice or filed any charge.

The same rule that governs discrimination governs retaliation: the employer, but not nonemployer individuals, may be held liable for retaliation under the FEHA (id. at p. 1160).

The Fourth District affirmed a whistleblower-retaliation verdict for an Office on Aging director fired after warning that a County reorganization was unlawful — holding the County waived its exhaustion defense by first raising it after trial — while reversing her sexual-harassment claim under the pre-§ 12923 "severe or pervasive" standard and affirming a remittitur-backed new trial order on damages.

The Fourth District held that while the timing of an adverse action can carry a FEHA retaliation plaintiff past the prima facie stage — even on an uncorroborated declaration — temporal proximity does not, standing alone, create a triable issue of pretext once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate reason, and it expressly rejected Gemini Aluminum's suggestion that employers must also prove their termination procedures were objectively fair.

Reversing summary judgment, the Court of Appeal held that an employee need not mention the CFRA to request protected medical leave — and that an employer that never gave notice of CFRA rights, rejected a chiropractor's certification out of hand, and refused to communicate with the employee's designated representatives could not defeat his interference, retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful termination claims as a matter of law.

In Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, the Second District reversed a dismissal on demurrer, holding that retaliation is a form of discrimination so that the employer's duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k), extends to retaliation—and that a supervisor may be held personally liable for retaliation under subdivision (h).

On retransfer from the Supreme Court in light of Yanowitz, the First District reversed a $75,000 retaliation verdict, holding that file memoranda, a letter of instruction, an investigation, an unimplemented 30-day suspension, and a lateral transfer to a comparable position did not — separately or collectively — materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and that the surgeon's beliefs about her employer's motives were not substantial evidence of pretext.

An employee engages in protected activity by opposing conduct she reasonably and in good faith believes is unlawful under the FEHA, even without using magic words or filing a formal complaint. For the adverse-action element, the FEHA reaches employer actions that materially and adversely affect the terms, conditions,…

California's leading “cat's paw” decision. A 29-year Safeway food clerk who complained that his female coworkers were being sexually harassed was fired after a trivial bathroom-door confrontation was escalated into “workplace violence” by a resentful store manager and a one-sided security investigation, then rubber-stamped by a district manager who had never heard of his complaints. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding that a biased supervisor's animus is a but-for cause that imputes to the employer through the “cat's paw” it uses to carry out the firing.

An alleged harasser’s vow to “get revenge” on those who cooperated against her, plus suspiciously timed scrutiny of a star performer’s paperwork, was enough direct and circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive to defeat summary judgment on a wrongful-termination claim.

Affirming a retaliation verdict for a former deputy district attorney, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA retaliation requires a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment — a test satisfied where undeserved accusations of dishonesty and incompetence destroyed the prosecutor's promotability even without a firing, demotion, or lost pay.

A steelworker fired months after testifying in a coworker’s asbestos case revived his public-policy and FEHA disability claims: they required no CBA interpretation, his union could not waive his judicial forum, and coworker evidence that the termination-night incident was staged made pretext a jury question.

Affirming a remitted $500,000 FEHA retaliation judgment for a Nigerian-American harbor-department engineer, the Second District held that pretext may be shown by direct evidence of decisionmakers' retaliatory remarks and by comparative evidence of disparate treatment — not only by a head-on attack on the employer's stated performance reasons — and that lay testimony alone can support a substantial emotional-distress award.

In a foundational FEHA retaliation opinion, the Court of Appeal held that a supervisor who confronts a fellow manager over sexual harassment of a subordinate engages in protected activity based on a reasonable, good-faith belief — whether or not harassment is ultimately proved — and reversed summary adjudication where the confronted harasser himself made the termination decision four months later.