California employment case index

Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 created California’s public-policy wrongful-discharge tort: an employee fired for refusing to commit an illegal act may sue in tort, recovering tort and punitive damages, not just contract remedies.

A trucking-job applicant brought an FCRA class action over confusing, noncompliant background-check disclosure forms; after Limon v. Circle K required concrete injury, the trial court decertified the class. The First District reverses and declines to follow Limon: California courts are not bound by Article III, and a willful FCRA violation supports statutory damages of $100–$1,000 and standing without proof of harm.

Wal-Mart ran a background check on a job applicant but allegedly botched the ICRAA disclosure form, then won summary judgment because she showed no real-world harm. The Fourth District reverses: California standing requires only an invasion of a legally protected interest, and ICRAA’s “$10,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater” remedy is independent of actual damages — so a bare disclosure violation confers standing.

A partially published Court of Appeal decision on defamation and compelled self-publication in the termination context — an issue now pending before the California Supreme Court.

The employee-non-solicitation provision was void under section 16600 because it restrained the individual defendants — recruiters whose profession is recruiting and placing nurses — from engaging in their chosen profession; applying Edwards, the court declined to use the older “reasonableness” analysis and held such…

A maintenance technician paid $10 an hour and never reimbursed for the heavy work mileage he was ordered to drive in his own truck could state a claim for constructive discharge in violation of public policy, where the unreimbursed expense pushed his effective pay below the minimum wage; whether conditions were intolerable was normally a jury question, so the demurrer should not have been sustained. The IIED count, however, was barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

Section 16600 voids contracts that restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business; Edwards’s noncompetition agreement was therefore invalid. California does not recognize the federal courts’ “narrow-restraint” exception — even a limited or partial restraint on practicing one’s profession is…

Miklosy v. Regents of University of CaliforniaThe Whistleblower Protection Act bars a damages action against the University once it timely decides an internal retaliation complaint; a Tameny tort does not lie against a public entity or against a supervisor; and workers’ compensation exclusivity bars the related emotional-distress claim.Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) […]

A unanimous Supreme Court holds that a signed offer letter stating employment is "at will" and terminable "at any time" is unambiguous — recruitment talk of a "long-term fix" cannot create an implied for-cause contract or support fraud reliance — with Justice Baxter (joined by Corrigan) urging reconsideration of Pacific Gas and Justice Moreno reserving "upon notice" clauses.

To recover for intentional interference with an at-will employment relationship, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act — conduct unlawful by some measure beyond the interference itself — that induced the employees to leave or otherwise disrupted the relationship; here, the…

A steelworker fired months after testifying in a coworker’s asbestos case revived his public-policy and FEHA disability claims: they required no CBA interpretation, his union could not waive his judicial forum, and coworker evidence that the termination-night incident was staged made pretext a jury question.

Good cause to terminate under an implied “good cause” contract means a reasoned, good-faith conclusion that the misconduct occurred, supported by substantial evidence gathered through an adequate investigation that gave the employee notice and a chance to respond — not the jury’s after-the-fact determination of…

Age discrimination in violation of the FEHA supports a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. When a plaintiff relies on a statutory prohibition to support such a claim, the common-law claim is subject to the statute’s substantive limits (the nature and scope of the prohibition) but not…

In Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 731, a long-tenured manager who resigned after a demotion and a steady erosion of his responsibilities sued for constructive discharge in contract; the trial court and Court of Appeal held his claims time-barred, running the limitations period from the date he learned of the adverse changes. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Extending its reasoning in Romano v. Rockwell, the court held that the limitations period for a contract action based on constructive discharge runs from the date of actual termination of employment — the resignation — not from the onset of, or the employee's knowledge of, the intolerable conditions. Because the breach alleged is termination without good cause, and an employee who continues to perform retains an election of remedies, the cause of action accrues only upon resignation. The court disapproved Regents of University of California v. Superior Court to the extent inconsistent.

A public employer may require suspicionless drug testing of job applicants as part of a lawful pre-employment medical examination, because applicants’ privacy expectations are lower and such testing is a reasonable hiring practice; but it may not impose the same blanket, suspicionless testing on current employees…

Nine days after Fatmeh Badih told her employer — a physician with fewer than five employees — that she was pregnant, her last day was set; the DFEH would not even accept her complaint because the office was too small for the FEHA. Division One of the First District affirmed her wrongful-discharge verdict anyway, holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, whose fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment binds every employer regardless of size. Jennings v. Marralle was distinguished, not disturbed: age has no constitutional anchor, but sex — and therefore pregnancy — does. Badih remains the pleading answer for pregnancy discharges at California's smallest workplaces.

To establish a constructive discharge, an employee must prove that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions so intolerable or aggravated that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have had no reasonable alternative but to resign; ordinary job dissatisfaction or…

General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court In-house counsel may sue for wrongful termination — both on an implied-in-fact contract theory and, within limits, a Tameny public-policy theory — even though a client may generally discharge its lawyer at will. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 Parallel citations: 876 P.2d 487; 32 […]

A plaintiff asserting a state constitutional privacy claim must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (3) conduct constituting a serious invasion of privacy; the defendant may then prevail by showing legitimate, countervailing…

The discharge stated an actionable Tameny claim and was not preempted by the workers’-compensation law (id. at p. 1085). More durably, the court held that the public policy underpinning a Tameny claim must be “tethered to” specific constitutional or statutory provisions, not merely the court’s own notions of sound…

The FEHA does not displace other state-law remedies, including common-law claims, for employment discrimination; an employee need not exhaust FEHA’s administrative process before pursuing nonstatutory causes of action; and sex discrimination in employment may support a tort claim for wrongful discharge in…

The Tameny claim failed because Foley’s report about a coworker served the employer’s private interest, not a fundamental public policy. Foley nonetheless adequately pleaded an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause — based on longevity of service, promotions, raises, assurances, and the employer’s…

Yes. The longevity of Pugh’s service, together with the employer’s commendations and assurances and its acknowledged practices, supported an implied-in-fact promise that he would not be discharged except for good cause; the nonsuit was therefore error and the judgment was reversed (id. at p. 330).