California employment case index

Fired the day she returned from pregnancy-related bed rest, a caregiver defeated summary judgment with declarations from four coworkers describing pregnancy-triggered firings by the same supervisors — evidence the court held admissible as a matter of law to prove motive, not propensity.

A 64-year-old superior-court commissioner, passed over for a full-time post in favor of a 43-year-old after the presiding judge said the court wanted “somebody younger, maybe in their 40's,” sued for age discrimination under the FEHA. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding a superior court has no discretionary-act immunity against FEHA suits and that the presiding judge's remarks were direct evidence whose animus could taint a multilevel hiring decision under the cat's-paw doctrine.

Summary judgment was error. A plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence from which a trier of fact could find the employer’s proffered reasons unworthy of credence, and the record here showed the dismissal decision may in fact have been made by Mamou’s own biased immediate supervisor, raising triable…

Carlos Arteaga, a messenger on Brink’s armored trucks, first told the company about pain and numbness in his arms and fingers — and filed workers’ compensation claims — while Brink’s was investigating a string of cash shortages on his ATM runs; he was terminat

A White news anchor’s claim that his station’s “on-air style” rationale masked race-conscious hiring failed on summary judgment because the record corroborated the employer’s subjective assessment, and his sole contrary showing — that the executive lied about counseling him — could not alone support the inference that race was the real reason.

Affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Court of Appeal held that a correctional officer's FEHA claims for sexual harassment, gender and race discrimination, and retaliation all failed because she could not establish a nexus between the conduct and her protected status — asked whether her coworkers' conduct was prompted by gender or race, she “repeatedly answered, 'No' and 'I don't know'” — and could not show a “substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions” of her employment. Her common-law claims for assault, emotional distress, and negligent supervision were barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.

The Third District affirmed summary judgment for UPS on a 30-year supervisor's disability claims, holding that the employer's honest belief in its integrity-violation charge — not the truth of the accusation — controls, and that accommodation claims require a specific request and concrete medical restrictions.

A fire captain who lost his leg sued for disability discrimination after his department barred him from the firefighting “platoon duty” he loved and kept him in an office-style “special duty” assignment. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the department, holding the reassignment was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA: the special-duty post carried equal pay, equal promotional opportunity, and substantial overtime, so the captain's complaint was a preference, not a material detriment.

A pregnant marketing VP laid off in a reduction in force wins reversal of summary judgment: the Second District holds the moving employer must present evidence permitting a more-likely-than-not finding that its nondiscriminatory reason actually drove the discharge, and that replacement by a consultant, a decisionmaker's lie, and an evaluation e-mailed hours after her internal complaint made falsity and pregnancy animus triable.

Over a Mosk dissent, Division Five holds that a pregnancy-discrimination plaintiff who confided her early pregnancy only to sworn-to-secrecy friends cannot make a prima facie case absent evidence the decisionmaker knew, and that "Not while you are working for me" and post-firing outbursts were not direct evidence bypassing McDonnell Douglas.

The Sixth District affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that a five-year pattern of stripping a female employee's coveted technical duties was "a collection of isolated employment decisions" that had acquired permanence by 1996 under Richards v. CH2M Hill — and that a biased supervisor's sexist remarks could not show pretext where he neither knew of her candidacy nor took part in the challenged hiring.

A 62-year-old Bechtel engineer removed from a Saudi project after the Saudi government client called him too old won a FEHA age-discrimination and contract verdict in San Francisco. The Court of Appeal reversed outright, holding that a principal's discriminatory bias cannot be imputed to an innocent agent who merely carries out a foreign sovereign's removal order, and that, absent substantial evidence of the project director's own animus, the verdict could not stand. The contract award separately failed because West, who refused comparable offers and never looked for work, failed to mitigate as a matter of law.

Affirming a retaliation verdict for a former deputy district attorney, the Court of Appeal held that FEHA retaliation requires a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment — a test satisfied where undeserved accusations of dishonesty and incompetence destroyed the prosecutor's promotability even without a firing, demotion, or lost pay.

“Academic catfighting or anti-Semitism?” — a professor’s proof that her tenure denial rested on a hidden, forbidden “collegiality” criterion defeated her own FEHA claim, because the same evidence showed the real motive was a colleague’s grudge, not her religion.

A world-class AIDS researcher — the only full-time, non-Caucasian faculty member in his department, and the only one without a tenured (FTE) position — was promised a tenure line for over a decade while the university gave the openings to others, then had his

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.A plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false can, without more, sustain a finding of intentional discrimination.Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 530 U.S. 133Parallel citations: 120 S.Ct. 2097; 147 L.Ed.2d 105. Supreme Court of the United States. Argued March 21, […]

A city secretary hired at 62 and let go at 74 during a budget crisis lost her FEHA age-discrimination claim after a bench trial. Affirming, the First District clarified that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is a pretrial screening device; at trial it drops from the case, leaving only the ultimate question whether the employer intentionally discriminated, reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence.

In one of California's early decisions defining the scope of an “adverse employment action,” the Court of Appeal borrowed the prevailing federal standard and held the action must be both detrimental and substantial — a material change in the terms of employment. A corrections officer's pleaded grievances (a delayed paycheck, an early job change, one missed overtime payment, interference with an outside credit-union post) failed that test on demurrer. The opinion was certified for partial publication; the citable holdings live in published parts 6 and 7.

Affirming summary judgment on a 59-year-old communications manager's age claim, the First District adopted Hersant's substantial-evidence pretext standard, gave the same-actor inference "strong" force across a five-year span, and discounted a non-decisionmaker's isolated remark — making Horn the case every California employment plaintiff must be ready to distinguish.

Reversing summary judgment in a FEHA failure-to-promote case, the Ninth Circuit reconciled its competing pretext lines — direct evidence of bias needs only "very little" weight to reach a jury, while circumstantial evidence must be "specific" and "substantial" — a formulation later questioned after Desert Palace but still central to MSJ briefing on both sides.

The FEHA allows employees to sue and hold liable their employers, but not individual supervisors, for discrimination; the same rule applies to common-law claims for wrongful discharge (id. at p. 643).

In Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for an employer in a FEHA age-discrimination case, adopting the rule that once an employer offers a legitimate, non-age-based reason for an adverse action, the employee must offer substantial evidence that the reason is untrue or pretextual, or evidence of discriminatory animus, or a combination, and not merely triable issues about whether the decision was sound.

Age discrimination in violation of the FEHA supports a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. When a plaintiff relies on a statutory prohibition to support such a claim, the common-law claim is subject to the statute’s substantive limits (the nature and scope of the prohibition) but not…

Reversing summary judgment for the hospital, Division One held that a registry nurse's point-by-point factual dispute, the employer's conclusory comparative-qualifications showing, and the decisionmaker's anti-Mexican remarks created triable issues of discrimination and retaliation — and that the FEHA's antiretaliation provision protects job applicants, including one whose injury was the loss of temporary contract work.

A conservative Jewish airline employee fired for refusing to work the first day of Passover sued under FEHA for religious discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment, holding the claims were not RLA-preempted 'minor' disputes and that a collective bargaining agreement does not, in the abstract, discharge an employer's duty to accommodate where the employer did nothing to explore alternatives. Any reasonable accommodation suffices, but the employer must actually offer one.

Individual supervisors are not personally liable under the FEHA for discrimination, which arises out of the necessary personnel-management functions of the employer; by contrast, harassment — conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance and presumably engaged in for personal gratification or bias — can give…

A school administrator lost his FEHA age- and race-discrimination claims at trial, then won a new trial when the judge decided he had mis-instructed the jury on the McDonnell Douglas prima facie burden. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the prima facie and rebuttal stages are questions of law for the court, not the jury: once the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden-shifting construct drops from the case and only the ultimate question of discriminatory intent reaches the jury.

Nine days after Fatmeh Badih told her employer — a physician with fewer than five employees — that she was pregnant, her last day was set; the DFEH would not even accept her complaint because the office was too small for the FEHA. Division One of the First District affirmed her wrongful-discharge verdict anyway, holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, whose fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment binds every employer regardless of size. Jennings v. Marralle was distinguished, not disturbed: age has no constitutional anchor, but sex — and therefore pregnancy — does. Badih remains the pleading answer for pregnancy discharges at California's smallest workplaces.

The Sixth District's 1994 decision translated McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting into Code of Civil Procedure section 437c practice — affirming summary judgment for Lockheed where a laid-off 65-year-old answered a documented reduction in force with speculation rather than "substantial responsive evidence," and holding that EEOC-only filings did not exhaust DFEH remedies.

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks Disproving the employer’s stated reason permits — but does not compel — a finding of intentional discrimination; the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502 Parallel citations: 113 […]

A Black assistant professor denied tenure won a jury verdict for race discrimination under FEHA, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in the published portion of its opinion. The court held the verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that a tenure plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of a multilevel review: discrimination at one level can infect the ultimate decision. On causation, racial animus need not be the sole motivation, only a but-for cause of the adverse decision.

In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, the Supreme Court held that an employer's fetal-protection policy excluding all fertile women from lead-exposed jobs is facial sex discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — not a neutral practice to be tested for business necessity. The narrow bona fide occupational qualification defense reaches only qualifications affecting an employee's ability to do the job, and cannot be grounded in feared harm to a future fetus or in cost and tort-liability concerns.

The FEHA does not displace other state-law remedies, including common-law claims, for employment discrimination; an employee need not exhaust FEHA’s administrative process before pursuing nonstatutory causes of action; and sex discrimination in employment may support a tort claim for wrongful discharge in…

In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 517, the Court of Appeal struck down a fetal-protection policy barring fertile women from lead-exposed battery jobs as overt sex discrimination under FEHA. The court articulated California's two-part bona fide occupational qualification test — the sex-based qualification must be reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business, and the employer must show that all or substantially all of the excluded class cannot safely and efficiently perform the job — and held the employer failed both prongs.