Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, California Supreme Court — case card: FEHA requires discrimination to be a substantial motivating factor, and an employer’s same-decision showing limits remedies without being a complete defense. California Wrongful Termination Law Review.

Harris v. City of Santa Monica

“Substantial Motivating Factor” and the Same-Decision Defense Under FEHA

Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203

Parallel citations: 294 P.3d 49; 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392. Supreme Court of California. Filed February 7, 2013. Docket No. S181004. On review from the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight (No. B199571); Los Angeles County Superior Court (No. BC341569). Opinion by Liu, J., for a unanimous Court (Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, and Corrigan, JJ., concurring; Baxter, J., recused).

PUBLISHED.

Discrimination
FEHA
Mixed motive
Substantial motivating factor
Same-decision defense

In brief. Harris sets the causation standard and the mixed-motive rule for FEHA discrimination claims. A plaintiff must prove that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse action — more than merely “a” motivating factor. If the employer then proves it would have made the same decision for lawful reasons alone (a “same-decision” showing), that is not a complete defense to liability: the plaintiff cannot recover damages, backpay, or reinstatement, but may still obtain declaratory or injunctive relief and may be eligible for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Facts

Santa Monica’s city-owned bus service, Big Blue Bus, hired Wynona Harris as a bus-driver trainee in October 2004. During her training period she had an accident the City deemed “preventable” — no one was injured, but the bus’s rear-door glass cracked. After completing training she became a probationary, at-will part-time driver and had a second preventable accident, sideswiping a parked car. Harris informed her supervisor that she was pregnant, and the City soon terminated her, citing her preventable accidents and job performance. Harris sued for pregnancy-based sex discrimination in violation of the FEHA.

Procedural history

At trial, the City asked the court to instruct the jury that, if it found a mix of discriminatory and legitimate motives, the City could avoid liability by proving a legitimate motive alone would have led it to make the same decision. The trial court refused the instruction, and the jury returned a substantial verdict for Harris. The Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight) reversed, holding the requested instruction was legally correct and that refusing it was prejudicial error. The Supreme Court granted review.

Issue

(1) What causation standard governs a FEHA discrimination claim — must discrimination be merely “a motivating factor,” or a “substantial motivating factor”? (2) When the employer makes a “same-decision” showing in a mixed-motive case, does it escape liability entirely, and what remedies remain available to the plaintiff?

Holding

The plaintiff must show that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse action, not merely a motivating factor. A same-decision showing is not a complete defense: when the employer proves it would have made the same decision absent discrimination, the plaintiff may not be awarded damages, backpay, or reinstatement — but the employer does not escape liability. The plaintiff may still be awarded declaratory or injunctive relief where appropriate, and may be eligible for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment overturning the damages verdict and remanded for further proceedings. (56 Cal.4th at pp. 211, 232.)

Reasoning

Reading FEHA’s “because of” causation language together with the statute’s remedial and deterrent purposes, the Court required that discrimination be a substantial motivating factor — enough to ensure liability attaches to discrimination that actually influenced the decision, while not letting employers escape accountability for genuine discrimination by pointing to coexisting lawful reasons. (56 Cal.4th at pp. 215, 232.)

On remedies, the Court reasoned that allowing a same-decision showing to extinguish liability altogether would disserve FEHA’s goal of preventing and deterring workplace discrimination. The showing therefore limits monetary and reinstatement relief but preserves declaratory and injunctive relief and the availability of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, which vindicate the statute’s deterrent purpose even where a damages award is unavailable. (56 Cal.4th at pp. 234–241.)

Key quote

Even where the employer makes a same-decision showing, the Court held, “the employer does not escape liability.” (56 Cal.4th at p. 211.)

Read the full opinion (free full text — Stanford California Supreme Court archive).

Practice pointer

For plaintiff-side counsel, Harris is double-edged and must be handled deliberately. The causation bar is “substantial motivating factor,” so develop evidence that discrimination actually drove the decision, not that bias merely lingered in the background. Anticipate the employer’s same-decision defense: it no longer defeats the case, but it caps recovery — so a FEHA plaintiff who proves discrimination was a substantial motivating factor can still secure declaratory or injunctive relief and, critically, attorney’s fees, preserving fee-shifting leverage and the deterrent value of the claim even where damages are at risk. Frame the case to keep non-damages relief and fees in play, and test the rigor of the defendant’s same-decision proof, which is the employer’s burden by a preponderance.

Open questions

The decision arose from a termination; later authority has worked out how the substantial-motivating-factor standard and the same-decision remedy framework apply to other adverse actions and to retaliation claims, as well as the precise contours of fee recovery following a same-decision finding. Those developments should be researched and independently verified before relying on them.