Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center
The First District holds that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception does not categorically bar a minister’s wage-and-hour claims absent evidence that adjudicating them would resolve an ecclesiastical question — reversing summary judgment for a Zen center — while splitting from its companion case on whether individuals “liable as the employer” must post an appeal bond.
Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center (2026) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [No. A171527]
Controlling issue pending before the California Supreme Court. The ministerial-exception question decided here is squarely before the Supreme Court in the companion case Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center (review granted Feb. 11, 2026, S294565), and Ehrenkranz has been reported as a grant-and-hold for Lorenzo. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e), a Court of Appeal opinion in which review has been granted may be cited only for its potential persuasive value, with a notation of the grant of review and any later action. Confirm the current status before relying on this decision.
Wage & Hour
Ministerial exception
First Amendment
Reversed in part
In brief. Michael Ehrenkranz, a former Work Practice Apprentice and staff member at the San Francisco Zen Center, won a Labor Commissioner award for unpaid wages; the Center and two of its leaders appealed, and the trial court granted summary judgment, holding the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred his wage-and-hour claims. The Court of Appeal reversed, adopting the reasoning of its companion case Lorenzo: the ministerial exception bars only employment claims that require inquiry into “strictly ecclesiastical” matters, and the Center presented “no evidence that [Ehrenkranz’s] claims raised an ecclesiastical concern.” But the court parted ways with Lorenzo on a separate point, holding that under Labor Code section 98.2(b) only the employer (the Center) — not the individual leaders held “liable as the employer” under section 558.1 — had to post an appeal undertaking. (Ehrenkranz v. San Francisco Zen Center (2026) No. A171527 (slip opn. at pp. 1–2, 16–17, 35–36).)
By Jonathan J. Delshad
Draft for review · source-verification pending
Facts
The San Francisco Zen Center is a nonprofit religious corporation operating three temples; it generates income by renting rooms to overnight guests and event space to companies including Google and Facebook, and its “primary source of income” for several years came from the summer guest season at its Tassajara location. (slip opn. at pp. 2–3.) Ehrenkranz progressed through the Center’s residential programs — guest student, then a two-year Work Practice Apprentice (WPA), then staff — performing housekeeping, kitchen, garden, childcare, and guest-cook work, for modest monthly stipends ($175 to $245) plus room and board. (slip opn. at pp. 3–5.) He filed a Labor Commissioner claim for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, split-shift premiums, liquidated damages, expenses, and waiting-time penalties; the Commissioner awarded $81,170.23 against the Center and, individually under Labor Code section 558.1, against leaders Galijan and Smith. (slip opn. at pp. 5–6.)
Defendants appealed to the superior court (a de novo “Berman” appeal), posting an undertaking naming only the Center, and moved for summary judgment on the ministerial exception. (slip opn. at pp. 6–7.) Ehrenkranz conceded the Center is a religious organization and that he was a “minister” for purposes of the exception; “[t]he only question” was whether the exception bars his wage claims “despite the lack of any evidence that [they] raise an ecclesiastical concern.” (slip opn. at pp. 12–13.)
Procedural history
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ministerial exception and denied Ehrenkranz’s motion to dismiss the individual leaders’ appeals for failing to post an undertaking. (slip opn. at pp. 7–8.) While the appeal was pending, Division Five decided the “strikingly similar” companion case Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 258 — same defendants, same counsel, “almost identical” briefs — ruling for the employee on both issues, after which the Supreme Court granted review of the ministerial-exception question (S294565). (slip opn. at pp. 1–2, 8.) Reviewing de novo, the Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment but affirmed the undertaking ruling. (slip opn. at pp. 8–9, 36.)
Issue
Does the ministerial exception categorically bar a minister’s wage-and-hour claims against a religious organization, without any inquiry into whether the claims touch on an ecclesiastical concern? And under Labor Code section 98.2(b), must individuals found “liable as the employer” under section 558.1 — not just the employing entity — post an undertaking to appeal a Labor Commissioner award? (slip opn. at pp. 1–2.)
Holding
Reversed in part. (1) Adopting Lorenzo, the court held “the ministerial exception does not bar every employment claim for lost or unpaid wages”; it bars only claims that “necessarily require an inquiry into matters of a religious entity’s ‘internal government’ that are ‘closely linked’ to the entity’s ‘faith and doctrine.’” (slip opn. at pp. 16–17.) Because the Center “presented no evidence that [Ehrenkranz’s] claims raised an ecclesiastical concern” — indeed, it conceded that “‘[a]djudication of this case does not require the Court to resolve any ecclesiastical questions’” — summary judgment was error. (slip opn. at pp. 1–2, 17.) (2) Splitting from Lorenzo, the court held that under the plain language of Labor Code section 98.2(b), only “an employer” must post the appeal undertaking; an individual “liable as the employer” under section 558.1 need not, so the Center’s undertaking sufficed and the individual leaders’ appeals were not subject to dismissal. (slip opn. at pp. 35–36.)
Reasoning
1. The ministerial exception protects ecclesiastical decisions, not all minister claims. Drawing on the only two Supreme Court decisions on the exception, the court explained that Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C. (2012) 565 U.S. 171 and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732 bar only claims that intrude on a church’s “‘authority to select, supervise, and … remove a minister,’” and that Hosanna-Tabor “express[ed] no view” on other suits. (slip opn. at pp. 9–12.) Religious institutions do not enjoy “a general immunity from secular laws.” (slip opn. at p. 12, quoting Our Lady, 591 U.S. at p. 746.)
2. Alamo and the commercial-activity point. The court emphasized Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor (1985) 471 U.S. 290, which held that applying minimum-wage laws to a religious entity’s commercial activities causes no “excessive government entanglement.” (slip opn. at pp. 14–15.) Like the Alamo plaintiffs, Ehrenkranz “only challenge[d] the Center’s failure to pay … minimum wage and overtime wages for work … already performed as part of the Center’s commercial activities,” not any decision to select, retain, or remove a minister. (slip opn. at pp. 15–17.) As Justice Edmon explained in Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1175, the exception does not bar a claim “‘simply because the person … is a minister,’” and “‘not every aspect of a minister’s compensation’” is an ecclesiastical decision. (slip opn. at pp. 15–16.)
3. Declining the broad Ninth Circuit rule. The court declined to follow Markel v. Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (9th Cir. 2024) 124 F.4th 796, 803, which held the exception “encompasses all adverse personnel or tangible employment actions” and bars suits “based on lost or reduced pay,” explaining that Markel (and the Alcazar/Elvig/McClure line on which it relied) “provided little or no analysis,” rested on discrimination and wrongful-termination cases, and is “of course, not binding.” (slip opn. at pp. 17–20, citing People v. Mackey (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 87.) The court was careful to note its ruling “does not foreclose the Center from presenting evidence at trial that applying wage-and-hour laws to ministers … raises an ecclesiastical concern.” (slip opn. at p. 20.)
4. The undertaking: only “an employer” must post it. On the second issue, the court parted from Lorenzo. Section 98.2(b) requires “an employer” — not “each employer” — to post an undertaking, and nothing in section 98.2 references section 558.1 or extends the requirement to an “other person acting on behalf of an employer.” (slip opn. at pp. 25–28.) Tellingly, the Legislature amended neighboring section 98 to expressly reference section 558.1 while “leaving section 98.2 silent,” which “strongly suggests” it did not intend to require individuals to post the bond. (slip opn. at pp. 27–29.) The court declined to apply the “identical words” canon Lorenzo used, because section 558.1 distinguishes “employer” from a person merely “liable as the employer.” (slip opn. at pp. 28–29.) Adopting the wage-order definition of “employer,” and because Ehrenkranz conceded the individuals were not his employer, only the Center had to post the undertaking — which it did. (slip opn. at pp. 29–36.)
Significance
Subject to the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Lorenzo, Ehrenkranz stakes out the California position that the ministerial exception does not give religious employers blanket immunity from wage-and-hour law: a minister’s claim for unpaid minimum and overtime wages for ordinary, commercial work is litigable unless the employer shows the claim would require resolving a genuinely ecclesiastical question. That reading rejects the broader Ninth Circuit approach in Markel and aligns with Alamo and Justice Edmon’s Su concurrence. Because the Supreme Court has granted review in the companion case on precisely this question, the rule is not yet settled — which is why this decision is flagged above as citable for persuasive value only. The opinion’s second holding is independently useful and unaffected by the pending review: under Labor Code section 98.2(b), an individual found “liable as the employer” under section 558.1 need not post a separate appeal undertaking, a point on which the Courts of Appeal are now split (Ehrenkranz versus Lorenzo).
Key quotes
“[T]he ministerial exception does not bar every employment claim for lost or unpaid wages. Instead, it only bars those claims that necessarily require an inquiry into matters of a religious entity’s ‘internal government’ that are ‘closely linked’ to the entity’s ‘faith and doctrine.’” (Ehrenkranz, supra, No. A171527 (slip opn. at pp. 16–17), quoting Lorenzo.)
“Section 98.2(b) does not state that ‘each employer’ shall post the undertaking; it only states that ‘an employer’ shall post the undertaking.” (Ehrenkranz, supra, No. A171527 (slip opn. at p. 26).)
Practice pointer
Watch Lorenzo (S294565): the Supreme Court will decide whether the ministerial exception categorically bars a minister’s wage-and-hour claims, and that ruling will control. In the meantime, when a religious employer asserts the exception against unpaid-wage claims, press the point Ehrenkranz and Lorenzo make — the employer must show the claim would require resolving an ecclesiastical question; a bare “the plaintiff is a minister” does not suffice, particularly for wages earned in the entity’s commercial operations. Because the issue is under review, cite these opinions only for persuasive value, with the required notation, and rely primarily on the Supreme Court authority (Hosanna-Tabor, Our Lady, Alamo). Independently, note the live Ehrenkranz/Lorenzo split on the section 98.2(b) undertaking: under Ehrenkranz, individuals liable under section 558.1 need not post a separate bond — a point that can determine whether an individual defendant’s appeal survives. (slip opn. at pp. 9–36.)
Open questions
The central question — whether the ministerial exception categorically precludes a minister’s wage-and-hour claims — is pending before the Supreme Court in Lorenzo and will likely be resolved there; Ehrenkranz’s holding may be superseded. (slip opn. at pp. 1–2.) Even under Ehrenkranz, the court left open whether the Center can show at trial that applying wage-and-hour law to its apprentices would raise an ecclesiastical concern, and did not reach Ehrenkranz’s separate church-autonomy/ecclesiastical-abstention argument. (slip opn. at pp. 20 & fn. 6.) Finally, the section 98.2(b) undertaking split between Ehrenkranz and Lorenzo — whether individuals “liable as the employer” must post a bond — itself awaits resolution, potentially by the Supreme Court. (slip opn. at pp. 25–36.)
See also: McMahon v. World Vision Inc.