Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc.
A detailed application of the summary-judgment framework to FEHA disability claims: triable issues on the employer’s knowledge of the disability, pretext, and the interactive process defeated summary judgment.
Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570
Disability
Employer Knowledge
Pretext
Summary Judgment
Reversed
In brief. Reversing summary judgment, the court held that a FEHA disability plaintiff raised triable issues on each contested element — most importantly, the employer’s knowledge of her disability and whether its stated reason for termination was a pretext. (Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 590–604.) “[K]nowledge will only be imputed to the employer” where “the person who [decided] to discharge her knew of her disability,” and pretext “may be demonstrated” and “inferred from the timing” of the decision and the employee’s prior performance. (Id. at pp. 592, 594–595.)
Facts
Sofia Soria worked as an account executive (advertising sales) for Univision Radio. (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 578–584.) She developed a serious medical condition requiring evaluation and treatment, experienced symptoms at work, and took medical leave. (Ibid.) Univision terminated her, attributing the decision to performance and a restructuring/reduction. (Ibid.) Soria contended the termination was the product of disability discrimination and that Univision failed to accommodate her or engage in the interactive process; Univision asserted it did not know she was disabled and acted for legitimate business reasons. (Id. at pp. 584–590.)
Procedural history
The trial court granted Univision summary judgment on all claims. (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 588–590.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding triable issues precluded summary judgment on the disability-discrimination, failure-to-accommodate, interactive-process, and related claims. (Id. at pp. 590–604.)
Issue
Did the plaintiff raise triable issues of material fact — on whether the employer knew of her disability, whether its stated reason for termination was pretextual, and whether it failed to accommodate or to engage in the interactive process — sufficient to defeat summary judgment on her FEHA disability claims? (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 590–591.)
Holding
Yes. The plaintiff raised triable issues on each contested element, so summary judgment was improper. Employer knowledge of the disability is essential, and “knowledge will only be imputed to the employer” when “the person who [made] the [decision] to discharge her knew of her disability.” (5 Cal.App.5th at p. 592.) On pretext, an employee may rebut the employer’s legitimate-reason showing by evidence “that the . . . reason was actually a pretext,” which “may be inferred from the timing of the company’s termination decision” and “the terminated employee’s job performance before the termination.” (Id. at pp. 594–595.) Reversed and remanded. (Id. at p. 604.)
Reasoning
1. The summary-judgment framework for disability claims. The court applied the familiar burden-shifting structure (adapted from McDonnell Douglas and Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317): the employer moving for summary judgment must show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or negate an element, after which the employee must raise a triable issue of pretext or discriminatory motive. (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 590–595.) The court evaluated whether Soria’s evidence, viewed favorably to her, created such an issue. (Ibid.)
2. Employer knowledge of the disability. Because liability requires that the employer knew (or perceived) the disability, the court focused on the decisionmaker’s knowledge. (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 591–593.) Knowledge is imputed only where the person who decided to terminate knew of the disability; but such knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence — observed symptoms, communications, and the leave itself — creating a triable issue on this record. (Ibid.)
3. Pretext. The court canvassed the ways a plaintiff may show the employer’s stated reason is pretextual: inconsistencies or weaknesses in the proffered reason, the timing of the termination relative to the disability and leave, and strong pre-termination performance that undercuts a performance-based justification. (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594–599.) Soria’s evidence on these points sufficed to reach a jury. (Ibid.)
4. Accommodation and the interactive process. The court also addressed the accommodation and interactive-process claims, reiterating that the interactive process generally requires the employee to initiate by requesting accommodation but imposes good-faith obligations on both sides; triable issues remained on whether Univision met its duties. (5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 599–604.) These claims, too, required trial. (Ibid.)
Significance
Soria is a frequently cited, practical roadmap for litigating FEHA disability claims at summary judgment. It crystallizes the employer-knowledge requirement (focused on the decisionmaker), the circumstantial proof of knowledge, and the multiple routes to showing pretext — especially timing and pre-termination performance. It applies the Guz burden-shifting framework in the disability context and works alongside Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254 (qualified-individual burden), Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952 and Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986 (accommodation and interactive-process burdens), Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 935 (duty to inform of vacancies), and Wallace v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 109 (no animus required). It is a staple for defeating employer summary-judgment motions in disability cases. See the Review’s coverage of the disability line.
Key quotes
“[K]nowledge will only be imputed to the employer” where “the person who [decided] to discharge her knew of her disability.” (Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 592.)
Pretext “may be inferred from the timing of the company’s termination decision . . . and by the terminated employee’s job performance before the termination.” (Id. at pp. 594–595.)
Read the full opinion (California Court of Appeal — full text) →
Practice pointer
Defeat summary judgment with knowledge and timing. Soria shows how to take a FEHA disability case to a jury: prove the decisionmaker’s knowledge of the disability (through symptoms observed, communications, and the leave itself), and build pretext from suspicious timing (termination on the heels of a diagnosis or leave) and strong pre-termination performance that contradicts a performance-based reason. Tie the discrimination, accommodation, and interactive-process theories together. Defendants should establish a clean, well-documented legitimate reason predating any knowledge of the disability and a genuine interactive process. Pair with Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 to keep decisionmaker and coworker remarks in the summary-judgment record.
Open questions
How much circumstantial evidence establishes decisionmaker knowledge of a disability — and how courts weigh timing and performance evidence of pretext at summary judgment — remains fact-intensive. The precise allocation of initiative in the interactive process, and how Soria’s analysis interacts with the accommodation-availability burden of Nadaf-Rahrov and Scotch, continue to be litigated.