(1971) 401 U.S. 424
Supreme Court of the United States · Decided March 8, 1971
01. Facts
Black employees of Duke Power Co. brought a class action alleging the company violated Title VII by requiring a high-school diploma and a passing score on standardized general-intelligence tests as a condition of employment in, or transfer to, its higher-paying departments (401 U.S. at pp. 426–427). Before the Civil Rights Act, Black employees had been confined to the Labor Department, where the highest-paying jobs paid less than the lowest-paying jobs in the other “operating” departments; the diploma and test requirements were not shown to be significantly related to successful job performance (id. at pp. 426–427).
02. Procedural posture
The United States Supreme Court held the requirements unlawful under Title VII, reversing in relevant part (401 U.S. at p. 426).
03. Issue
Whether Title VII prohibits facially neutral employment practices — such as diploma and testing requirements — that disproportionately exclude a protected group and are not shown to be job-related, even absent discriminatory intent.
Holding
Title VII prohibits employment practices that operate to exclude protected groups and are not demonstrably related to job performance, regardless of the employer’s intent (disparate-impact liability). If a neutral practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, the employer must show the practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
05. Reasoning
The Court held that Title VII targets the consequences of employment practices, not just motivation: practices that are “fair in form but discriminatory in operation” are unlawful unless justified by business necessity and job-relatedness. The diploma and test requirements, which neither measured nor predicted job performance and disqualified Black applicants at a far higher rate, could not stand absent such a showing.
Practice Pointer
Griggs created disparate-impact theory — a way to attack facially neutral policies (tests, credentials, physical requirements, scoring cutoffs) by their discriminatory effect, without proving intent. California’s FEHA likewise recognizes disparate-impact claims; plaintiff’s counsel should use statistical evidence to show the disparate effect, then force the employer to prove job-relatedness and business necessity (and address less-discriminatory alternatives).
06. Open questions
Griggs’s impact framework was later modified by statute and case law (including the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codifying burdens), and California disparate-impact claims proceed under the FEHA’s own provisions; counsel should apply the current statutory burden-shifting rather than Griggs’s original formulation alone.
Cite this entry
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U.S. 424.
“[Before the Act, Black employees] were employed only in the Labor Department where the highest paying jobs paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the other … departments.” — 401 U.S. at p. 426
Source: United States Reports / official slip opinion – [insert durable supremecourt.gov link at verification].
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See also: California’s Automated-Decision-Making (AI) Employment Regulations — An Employee’s Rights Guide. · Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services · California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra