Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc.
On-call hours that security guards were required to spend at their worksites were compensable “hours worked,” and California’s Wage Order 4 — unlike federal law — does not permit excluding sleep time from compensable hours on a 24-hour shift.
Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833
Wage & Hour
Hours Worked
On-Call Time
Control Test
Reversed in part
Published
In brief. Security guards were required to spend their on-call hours at the construction sites they guarded, living in employer-provided trailers and ready to respond. The Court held two things. First, that on-call time constituted compensable “hours worked” under the control clause, because the guards were subject to the employer’s control during those hours. Second, that California’s Wage Order 4 does not permit an employer to exclude sleep time from compensable hours on a 24-hour shift — declining to import the contrary federal rule and rejecting the appellate authority on which the employer relied. (Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 833, 838–839, 843–845.)
Facts
CPS Security Solutions supplied guards to protect construction sites and equipment, principally at night and on weekends. (60 Cal.4th at pp. 837–839.) The guards were required to remain at their assigned sites during on-call hours, residing in trailers CPS provided and equipped. (Ibid.) On weekdays, guards were on patrol for part of the day and then on call; on weekends, they worked 24-hour shifts that combined active patrol with on-call periods. (Id. at p. 838.) During on-call time a guard could engage in some personal activities within the trailer, but had to remain at the site, respond to disturbances or alarms, and could leave only after notifying a dispatcher, waiting for and being relieved by a reliever, and could be recalled on short notice. (Id. at pp. 838–839.) CPS’s on-call agreements compensated guards only when they were actually called to respond, and excluded designated sleep time — up to eight hours — from the 24-hour weekend shifts. (Ibid.)
Procedural history
The plaintiffs challenged both practices. The trial court concluded the on-call hours were compensable, and the Court of Appeal agreed as to on-call time but held that CPS could exclude sleep time from the 24-hour shifts, relying on appellate decisions including Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Service, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 16 and Seymore v. Metson Marine, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 361. (60 Cal.4th at pp. 838–839.) The Supreme Court granted review, affirmed the on-call ruling, and reversed the sleep-time ruling. (Id. at pp. 838–839, 850.)
Issue
(1) Did the guards’ on-call time, spent at the worksite subject to CPS’s requirements, constitute compensable “hours worked” under Wage Order 4’s control clause; and (2) may an employer exclude sleep time from compensable hours on a 24-hour on-call shift under California law? (60 Cal.4th at pp. 838–839.)
Holding
On-call time is compensable “hours worked” because the guards were subject to the employer’s control. And Wage Order 4 does not permit the exclusion of sleep time from compensable hours worked on a covered 24-hour shift; the federal sleep-time exclusion is not part of California law, and the parties may not agree to exclude sleep time the wage order treats as compensable. (60 Cal.4th at pp. 838–839, 843–845.)
Reasoning
1. On-call time and the control clause. Applying Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, the Court reiterated that an employee “subject to an employer’s control does not have to be working … to be compensated,” and that “[t]he level of an employer’s control over its employees … is determinative” of whether on-call time is hours worked. (60 Cal.4th at pp. 840–841.)
2. The on-call factors. Courts assess control during on-call time using a set of factors drawn from Owens v. Local No. 169 and Gomez v. Lincare, Inc.: (1) whether there is an on-premises living requirement; (2) the extent of geographic restrictions on movement; (3) whether the frequency of calls is unduly restrictive; (4) whether a fixed response-time limit is unduly restrictive; (5) the ability to trade on-call duty; (6) whether a pager could ease restrictions; and (7) whether the employee actually engaged in personal activities during call-in time — together with whether the time is “spent primarily for the benefit of the employer.” (60 Cal.4th at pp. 841–842.)
3. Application: the guards were controlled. The guards’ on-call hours satisfied that test decisively. They were required to live on site in CPS trailers, were geographically confined to the worksite, could leave only with permission and after securing a reliever, and had to respond to disturbances on short notice. Those restrictions existed to serve CPS’s interest in maintaining a guard presence — i.e., the time was spent primarily for the employer’s benefit — so the on-call hours were hours worked. (60 Cal.4th at pp. 842–843.) That the guards could read, watch television, or sleep in the trailers did not negate control, just as limited personal activity did not in Morillion. (Ibid.)
4. Sleep time and the rejection of the federal rule. The remaining question was whether CPS could exclude up to eight hours of sleep time from the 24-hour shifts, as the FLSA permits by agreement for certain long shifts. The Court held it could not. Wage Order 4 contains no comparable sleep-time exclusion, and “[c]ourts should not incorporate a federal standard” into California wage law where the state and federal schemes “substantially differ.” (60 Cal.4th at pp. 843–845.) Because the wage order did not authorize excluding sleep time from compensable hours on these shifts, the parties could not contract around it — the wage order’s protections are not waivable by private agreement. (Id. at pp. 844–845.) In so holding, the Court rejected the contrary approach of the appellate decisions on which the Court of Appeal had relied, including Seymore. (Id. at pp. 838–839, 845.)
Significance
Mendiola is the leading California authority on the compensability of on-call and standby time, supplying the multi-factor control analysis (the Owens/Gomez factors) that courts apply to residential, on-premises, and rapid-response duty. It is equally important for what it says about California’s independence from federal wage law: just as the Court would later refuse the federal de minimis rule in Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829 and the federal screening rule in Frlekin v. Apple, Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, Mendiola refused the federal sleep-time exclusion where California’s wage orders are more protective — and confirmed those protections cannot be waived by agreement. With Morillion and Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 257, it forms the core of California’s compensable-time doctrine. See the Review’s practice guide on off-the-clock work and compensable “hours worked.”
Key quotes
“The level of an employer’s control over its employees … is determinative” of whether on-call time constitutes hours worked. (Mendiola, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 840.)
“Courts should not incorporate a federal standard” for excluding sleep time where the state and federal labor laws “substantially differ.” (Id. at pp. 843–845.)
Practice pointer
Analyze on-call and standby claims through the Owens/Gomez factors, emphasizing on-premises or geographic confinement, short mandatory response times, restrictions on trading duty, and whether the arrangement primarily serves the employer — the more constrained the worker, the more likely the time is compensable. Do not let an employer carve out sleep time on 24-hour shifts: after Mendiola, California’s wage orders do not permit it, and any FLSA-style agreement to exclude sleep is unenforceable in the covered context because wage-order protections cannot be waived. Pair the on-call theory with minimum-wage and overtime claims and the derivative penalties, and be ready to rebut any reliance on pre-Mendiola sleep-exclusion authority.
Open questions
Mendiola applied the on-call factors to a residential, on-premises arrangement and did not fix a bright line for less restrictive on-call regimes — for example, pager- or phone-based on-call where the employee may remain at home and enjoys substantial freedom. How the factors weigh in those settings, the point at which on-call restrictions ripen into “control,” and how the rule applies across different wage orders and 24-hour-care industries (which have their own sleep-time provisions) continue to be litigated.
See also: Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors · Camp v. Home Depot · Ward v. Tilly’s